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ABSTRACT 
The operational history of Britain's airborne forces during the Second World War 
ranges from small-scale raids in 1941 through to full divisional deployments in 1944 
and 1945. British airborne warfare during the war appears to be characterised by a lack 
of consistency or apparently observable trends in the military effectiveness. The 
execution and results of most British airborne operations are extensively recorded 
within the extant historiography. However, there has been no attempt to examine the 
process of airborne capability development as a method of identifying the relevant 
factors that influenced military effectiveness. 
The inception and growth of any new military capability requires progress and 
coordination across a number of parallel and inter-linked 'lines of development'. Each 
line has the potential to create factors that impinge on the progress of other areas of 
development and ultimately can have effect on the size, shape, and function of the 
overall capability. Some lines of development have a purely physical effect on the 
process such as the procurement and supply of equipment and the recruitment and 
training of manpower. The effect of others is less tangible such as the influence 
exercised by an individual commander and the control exerted by his staff. While not 
strictly a line of development the entire process of bringing military capability into 
service is, at least in part., a function of government policy and therefore the political 
environment is a significant developmental factor. The process of development is 
translated into observable military effectiveness by the concepts and doctrine that 
govern and guide the capability during operations, which is the final line of 
development examined. 
This approach to research, using sources previously unexamined in this context, has 
resulted in the exposure of primary and secondary factors that had either direct or 
indirect influence on the manner in which Britain's airborne forces fought and the 
resultant military effect of their employment during the Second World War. New 
historical insights into the performance of British airborne forces have arisen through 
this approach to study including the conceptual progression from small-scale raids to 
divisional operations and the development of tactical doctfine from the Mediterranean 
in 1943 through northwest Europe in 1944 and 1945. 
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Military Operations 
AVALANCHE - The amphibious landings and associated operations 
by 
United States Fifth Army at Salerno -9 September 1943. 
21 AXEHEAD - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to assist 
Army Group to bridge the Seine - August 1944. 
BEGGAR - Operation to ferry gliders from England to Morocco -3 
June to 7 July 1943. 
BENEFICIARY - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture St 
Malo - 22 June to 3 July 1944. 
BITING - Raid by a company of 2 Parachute Battalion to recover 
components of a German radar at Bruneval, France - 27 
to 28 February 1942. 
BLAZING - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture 
A Iderney - May 1942. 
BOXER - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture 
Boulogne and destroy VI launch sites - August 1944. 
COLOSSUS - Parachute raid by No. 2 Commando to destroy the 
Tregino aqueduct, Italy - 10 February 194 1. 
COMET - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture 
bridges over the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel - 
September 1944. 
CORKSCREW - Operation to capture the island of Pantellaria in the 
Mediterranean - October 1942 to June 1943. 
DEADSTICK - Coup de Main air-landing operation to seize bridges 
over the River Ome and Caen Canal on D Day -6 June 
1944. 
DRACULA - The British and Indian attack on Rangoon -I May 
1945. 
DRAGOON - (Originally Operation Anvil). Allied operation to invade 
southern France - 15 August 1944. 
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FRESHMAN - Glider raid to destroy the Norsk Hydro, plant 
in 
Vermork, Norway - 19 November 1942. 
HANDSUP - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture 
the 
area of Quiberon Bay in Brittany -15 July to 15 August 
1944. 
I TASTY -A company airborne operation by 6 Parachute Battalion 
to harass German withdrawal east of Rome -I to 7 June 
1944. 
HUSKY - The Allied invasion of Sicily -9 July to 17 August 
1943. 
INFATUATE - Operation to capture the Walcheren Islands - September 
1944. 
JUBILEE - Allied raid on Dieppe - 19 August 1942. 
LANCING - Planned and cancelled airborne raids on Boulogne and 
Le Touquet - 23 to 25 May 1942. 
LINNET - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to seize a firm 
base area near Toumai - September 1944. 
MALLARD - Air-landing operation to deploy 6 Air-Landing Brigade 
on the evening of D Day -6 June 1944. 
MARKET GARDEN - Allied operation to drop two United States and one 
British Airborne division in Holland and to link up using 
ground forces - 17-26 September 1944. 
NEPTUNE - The Allied assault and amphibious operations as part of 
Operation OVERLORD on D Day -6 June 1944. 
OVERLORD - Allied operations in France from D Day -6 June 1944 to 
the liberation of Paris - 25 August 1944. 
PLUNDER - Deliberate Allied Rhine crossing operations - 23 to 24 
March 1945. 
ROUNDUP -A 1942 plan for the Allied invasion of northern France 
in the spring of 1943. 
RUTTER - Original name used during planning for the Dieppe 
Raid, subsequently changed to JUBILEE. 
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SLAPSTICK - Landing by sea of British I Airborne Division at 
Taranto, Italy -9 September 1943. 
SLEDGEHAMMER - Allied contingency plan for a limited cross 
Channel 
invasion in response to a German or Soviet collapse in 
1942. 
SWORDHILT - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture the 
Morlaix Viaduct - 20 July to 4 August 1944. 
SYMBOL - Allied conference held in Casablanca - 14 to 24 January 
1943. 
THURSDAY - Allied 'Chindit' operation in Burma, March 1944. 
TONGA - Operations by 3 Parachute Brigade and 5 ParachUtC 
Brigade on D Day -6 June 1944. 
TORCH - (Originally Operation GYMNAST). The allied invasion 
of French North Africa -8 to 10 November 1942 
TRANSFIGURF - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to secure the 
Paris - Orleans gap to cut off the enemy's retreat -7 to 17 
August 1944. 
VARSITY - British and United States airborne element of Operation 
PLUNDER, the deliberate Allied Rhine crossing - 24 
March 1945. 
VERITABLE - 21 s' Army Group operations to clear the land between 
the rivers Roer and Rhine -8 February to II March 1945. 
WILD OATS - Planned and cancelled airborne operation to capture 
Carpiquet airfield and Evrecy to encircle Caen - June 
1944. 
CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose 
British airborne warfare reached its zenith on 24 March 1945. Operation VARSITY 
dropped 6 British Airborne Division alongside 17 US Airborne Division as an integral 
part of Second British Army's wider Rhine crossing, Operation PLUNDER. The 
British airborne division, nearly 12,000 men with their weapons, jeeps, artillery. anti- 
tank guns and even tanks were carried in a single lift in 683 aircraft and 444 gliders. 
The men and equipment were carried over the heads of the assault troops crossing the 
river and were put down on their drop zones (DZ) and landing zones (LZ) east of the 
Rhine around the Diersfordt forest and the village of Hamminkeln. Despite intense 
anti-aircraft fire the entire Division was on the ground within one hour of the first 
paratrooper exiting his aircraft. Four hours later all the Division's objectives were 
secure and the link up with the lead elements of Second British Army had been 
achieved. ' For less than 300 men killed 6 Airborne Division had neutral ised a portion 
of the German indirect fire threat to the troops exposed in their assault boats and on the 
banks of the Rhine. It had also prevented enemy reserves from being brought up to 
interfere with the crossing and by securing bridges over the River Issel a bridgehead 
was available within which General Sir Miles Dempsey's men could establish 
themselves and then push further west. 
This level of military effectiveness is all the more remarkable when it is considered 
that the British military establishment had no concept of airborne warfare just a decade 
before. In 1935 the potential of the airborne assault was graphically demonstrated 
during Soviet Army manoeuvres outside Kiev. European ambassadors and military 
representatives including Major General Archibald Wavell witnessed the simultaneous 
drop of fifteen hundred armed paratroops. The airborne force captured bridges of the 
Dneper, forty kilometres beyond the simulated front line, in order to prevent an 
imaginary enemy from reinforcing his forward echelon. It was an imposing illustration 
of the dawn of a new age of warfare. Ma or General Sir Hastings Ismay, responsible i 
' T. B. 11. Otway, The Second World K'ar 1939-1945, Army: Airborne Forces (London: Imperial War 
Museum, 1990). pp. 304-306. 
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within the War Office for military intelligence relating to Russia at the time. NNas under 
no illusions that this was not a publicity stunt and that 'the Soviet Forces were making 
great strides in equipment and training and that ... parachute units were receiving special 
attention. 2 Wavell was not as impressed nor was he particularly enthusiastic about the 
opportunities that the Kiev exercise had demonstrated. 'This parachute descent, though 
its tactical value may be doubtful, was a most spectacular performance, 0 he recorded at 
the time. On his return to England Wavell was appointed General Officer Commanding 
(GOC) 2 Division in Aldershot. He gave a lecture to the officers under his command 
concerning the airborne exercise he had witnessed closing with the words, 'I advisc you 
when you go home to forget all about it., 4 
A month after the exercise, on the 26 th of October 1935, a captioned photograph of the 
Soviet parachute drop appeared in the Daily Telegraph. 5 On the same day Major 
General John Dill, as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) 
opened the War Office's official interest in airborne forces. On being shown the 
photograph, in a hand written note to the Director of Military Training (DMT) he 
observed, 'This is not the first we have heard of it and I feel that the time has come 
when we should do some experimental training on these lines. 6 The Director of Staff 
Duties (DSD) agreed that the concept warranted scrutiny and so all three directorates of 
the War Office were united on the subject. Unanimity did not however lead to the 
project being vigorously pursued. Information was gathered concerning the state of 
airborne forces in France and Germany as well as the Soviet Union. Dill discussed the 
theory of airborne warfare with Soviet General Tulchachevskiy during the latter's visit 
to London in 1936. All that the enquiries revealed was that Britain was woefully behind 
7 
the other major European powers both in conceptual and physical term S. There was 
early recognition within the War Office that the Air Ministry must be part of the 
dialogue if the policy was to be moved forward and yet it took the Air Ministry nearly a 
2 11. L. I smay, The Memoirs Of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 224. 
3 D. M. Glantz, A History of Soviev. I irborne Forces, (London: Frank Cass, 1994). p. 86. 
4 J. Frost, Near4v There: The Ifernoirs of John Frost of. -Irnhem Bridge. (London: Leo Cooper. 1991). 
p. 70. 
5 NA. WO 32/437 1. DailyTelegraph, 26 October 1935. 
6 NA, WO 32/4371, Minute DMO&I to DMT, 26 October 1935. 
7 For a full examination of the progress in airborne development made b-, other nations prior to the 
Second World War see Otway. Airborne Forces, pp. 6-20 and W. F. Buckingham The Establishment And 
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year to respond to the War Office's request for the department's vieýN s on the subject. 
. progression 
of concept Once the Air Ministry joined the debate it became clear that anY 
and policy within the War Office would quickly be tempered, stopped or even reversed 
by the practical considerations of the limited capabilities of the Royal Air Force in 
terms of lift capacity. 8 
It has been suggested that Dill was prominent in influencing the formation of both 
British and American airborne forces. 9 If this was the case then he certainly did not 
manage to convince his superiors of the worthiness of the concept during these pre-war 
years. Successive Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) (Montgomery- 
Massingberd, Deverell and Gort) doubted the value of pursuing the project and so by 
mid-] 938 airborne forces within the British military establishment had been reduced to 
a purely theoretical group of units, with notional doctrine and tactics, to be used during 
tactical exercises without troops (TEWT) as a basis for further study. Any practical 
realisation was to be limited to experimentation only and even the benefit of this narrow 
pursuit was questioned. 10 With diplomatic and fiscal pressure being applied to the 
British armed forces during the 1930s and with no imperative function for such a 
capability it is unsurprising that airborne forces had been afforded such a low priority. 
Any idea of pursuing airborne development essentially ended in early 1938 with no 
tangible progress having been made during the previous three years. The project 
remained dormant until Germany used its airborne forces to such clear effect in 
Norway, Belgium and The Netherlands in April and May 1940. 
So the British military establishment found itself at a standing start when it was 
ordered to begin airborne development in June 1940. It is therefore perhaps remarkable 
that the effect achieved during Operation VARSITY was at all possible less than five 
years later. Notwithstanding this accomplishment historians in the intervening years 
have doubted the military effectiveness of Britain's airborne forces throughout the 
Second World War. This criticism has been centred on the premise that overall British 
airborne performance and achievements did not justify the investment of resources 
Inifial Development Of British. -firborne Forces June 1940 - January 1942 (Ph. D. Thesis, Universio, of 
Glasgow. 200 1). pp. 19-30. 
8 NA, WO 324371. Air Ministry to War Office, 25 November 1936. 
' C. Bellamy. The Evolution of Xfodern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1990), 
11'. 89. 
10 NA. WO 32/437 1. Deput\ CIGS to DMO&I. DM'Fand DSD. 28 Fcbruary 1938. 
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required to develop the airborne force. J. Peaty has argued that the airborne arm drained 
valuable manpower away from the hard-pressed infantry for no commensurate effect. 
" 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor suggested that the cost in terms of 
multi-engined aircraft, crews and RAF ground personnel committed to airborne warfare 
was not justified by results and that greater dividends might have been produced by 
similar investment in other forms of warfare. 12 Field Marshal Lord Carver believed that 
the effect of an airborne force on the conduct of operations was rarely as decisive as 
hoped. 13 These comments have been provoked, not by an examination of the effect 
achieved during Operation VARSITY alone but by a wider survey of the development 
and military effectiveness of British airborne forces during the Second World War. For 
every success, such as the spectacular operation to seize the crossings over the River 
Orne and Caen Canal in Normandy on D Day, there were prominent failures and 
excessively costly enterprises. 
The most obvious example of poor military effectiveness was witnessed during 
Operation MARKET GARDEN in The Netherlands in September 1944.1 British 
Airborne Division was dropped near the town of Arnhem in order to seize and hold a 
bridge over the River Neder Rijn that would allow the rapid advance of Dempsey's 
Second British Army north to the Zuider See. Only a fraction of the fighting power of 
the Division ever reached the vital bridge and the airborne troops were forced to 
relinquish it before the ground force could arrive. The Division clung grimly to its 
bridgehead on the north bank of the river until it was forced to withdraw eight days after 
its initial deployment. When the Division managed to regroup only approximately 
2,100 men and practically no equipment remained. Over 7,000 men were lost during 
the abortive operation. Fourteen months earlier the same Division had been part of the 
invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY. Although the airborne formation did manage to 
secure its objectives the accuracy of the glider landings in particular was woeful and 
hence casualties in certain areas were excessively high. In some cases as few as thirty- 
four percent of the gliders employed landed on their designated LZs with over fifty 
11 J. R. PeaV.. BrilishArm-v Aldnpower Crisis 1944 (Ph. D. Thesis, King's College. Universiq- of London, 
2 000), pp. 104-112. 
" 
. 1. 
Slessor. The Central Blue (London: Cassell. 1956). p-665. 
13 N1. Car-x er. TheSýven Ages of the British ArmY (London: Wiedenfield & Nicolson, 1984), p. 287. 
15 
percent ditching into the Mediterranean. 14 This in turn led to the high casualtN rate in 
the air-landing brigade of nearly 500 men killed, dro,, Nned, wounded or missing. Intotal 
the Division suffered over 700 casualties during the operation. 15 
The high casualties and relatively poor performance of these two operations can be 
justified by their influence on the wider operations of which they Nýere part. In Sicily 
General Bernard Montgomery, the commander of Eighth Army during HUSKY. 
considered that the operations executed by I Airborne Division had accelerated his 
advance by seven days. 16 Post MARKET GARDEN Montgomery again pronounced 
the operation ninety percent successful. Certainly I Airborne Division's dogged battle 
at Arnhem prevented the Germans from bringing reserves to bear against 82 US 
Airborne Division that was fighting to seize and hold the massive bridge over the River 
Waal at Nijmegen. 17 This bridge was secured and subsequently held by the allies 
providing an important salient into the German-held Netherlands. This salient later 
became the start point for the first of those operations that cleared the west bank of the 
Rhine, Operation VERITABLE. So it would appear that from early 1943 until Mar 
1945 the investment in development of Britain's airborne forces, despite fluctuations in 
military effectiveness, was worthwhile. 
What is perhaps more difficult to justify is the return on the investment in airborne 
forces during the first half of the war. Britain's airborne forces were conceived by 
Prime Ministerial edict on 20 June 1940. From that moment until the beginning of 
November 1942 only two small-scale parachute raids were mounted, at Tragino in Italy, 
Operation COLOSSUS and in Bruneval in France, Operation BITING. COLOSSUS 
was a partial success in that although the objective was achieved the entire party of 
paratroopers was captured. BITING was highly successful in seizing components of a 
German radar and bringing them back to Britain. Even so, these two operations, despite 
considerable investment in terms of manpower, equipment, infrastructure and staff 
effort represented a total return of just over 150 men committed to operations over a 
period of 29 months. Far from deriving maximum combat power from its available 
14 Figures cxti-ýictcd from D. 1 1. Wood- I Noble Pair of Brothers ( _: _ . 
1996). p. 43 and C. Smith. 
The ffistoýl, Of The Glider Pilot Regiment (London: Leo Cooper. 1992), pp. 55-66. 
OtNýaN. Airborne Forces. pp. 123 & 130. 
NA, WO 204/1818. Report on Airborne Operations - "HUSKY". 24 Jul. 1943. 
17 OtwaN- firborne Forces. p. 287. 
16 
resources, Britain's airborne forces were plainly not a militarily effective capabil, tN 
during this period. 18 
What is clear therefore is that the progress of Bfitish airborne warfare from the 
inception to the apogee was not linear. Development proceeded at different rates during 
different phases of the process. Also, although the military effectiveness of Britain's 
airborne forces was undoubtedly high during VARSITY it fluctuated widely along the 
path to that point. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the historical process of 
airborne development, to determine why developmental progress was not consistent and 
explain the wide variance in military effectiveness across the wartime period. 
1.2 Historiography 
In 1948 Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor believed that 'the airborne 
forces of the Army won wide and well-earned fame in the late war. But I am not sure 
they have yet been the subject of all the clear and unemotional thinking they deserve. ' 19 
While no longer wholly true sixty years later this statement still largely applies. There 
is an extensive historiography linked to British airborne forces during the Second World 
War but it is seldom unemotional and the bulk of the material suffers from one or more 
fundamental faults. 
Much of the literature is episodic and concentrates on the performance and experience 
of units, formations and individuals only during airborne operations. The manner in 
which the airborne capability was iteratively committed to operations has produced onl-v 
a fragmentary picture. There were extended periods of time when no British airborne 
units were committed to operations during the Second World War, for example the 
eleven months between HUSKY and OVERLORD. The further back during the war 
the historiography extends the more fragmentary it becomes. Prior to November 1942 
Britain's airborne capability was committed to just two operations totalling four days 
and involving only approximately 150 men. The periods between operations have 
received much less attention. This has led to the situation where the demonstrable 
military effectiveness of Britain's airborne forces is relatively well documented but the 
18 
., \. R. 
Millet, W. Murray and K. H. Watman, 'The Effectlwncss of Militar-, Organi/, ations. ' 
Iniernational, Security. Summer 1986. pp. 37-71. 
19 J. Slessor. 'Some Reflections on Airborne Forces'. Army Quarterly. Vol. LVI. No. 2 July 1948, p. 161. 
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immediate factors and underlying trends in development that influenced performance on 
any given operation have seldom been fully described or examined. As an example. 6 
Airborne Division's highly successful operations on D Day have been extensively 
written about in both primary and secondary sourceS. 20 Likewise I Airborne Division's 
failure to achieve its objectives at Arnhem during MARKET GARDEN has an 
extensive historiography of 'its own. 21 What is not so readily apparent is any literature 
that attempts to draw a link between the two events. What could account for the 
disparity in military effectiveness between D Day and MARKET GARDEN only three 
months later? Perhaps it can be attributed to differences in training methods adopted h. v 
the two formations or due to a change in tactical doctrine between the two operations. 
Alternatively differences in the manner in which the two divisions were equipped could 
have had an effect or individuals' command and control style might have been a factor. 
The second widespread feature with the historiography is its tendency to be 
hagiographic. This often results in a lack of critical analysis in both published primary 
and secondary sources. The low points in British airborne performance have been 
understated while the heroic aspects are emphasised. Hence I Airborne Division's 
battle at Arnhem is more often portrayed as a gallant defence against the odds rather 
than a costly tactical defeat. This is understandable, particularly in primary published 
sources where any overt criticism could be considered to imply a slur against the 
reputation of gallant comrades both dead and alive. However, this approach has 
increased the difficulty in gaining a critical understanding of the underlying factors that 
influenced military effectiveness. Some authors and historians have made attempts to 
analyse the reasons for success or failure, more commonly the latter. For example 
20 See for example of primary literature D. Anderson, Three Cheers For TheA"ext Alan To Die (London: 
Ha1c, 1983), D. Edwards, The Devil's Own Luck (London: Leo Cooper, 1999), R. Gale, With the 677' 
lirborne Division In Normanaý (London: Samson Low, 1948) and R. G. Pine-Coff n, T Taleof 0 i he Tw 
Bridges (Petworth: Pine-Coffin. 2003) and for examples of secondary sources S. E. Ambrose, Pegasus 
Bridge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984). G. Bernage, RedDevils In Normandy (Bayeux: fleimdal, 2002), 
N. Crookenden, Dropzone Normandy (London: Ian Allen, 1976). J. Golley. The Big Drop (London: Janes, 
1982) and K. Shannon and S. Wright, One Night In June (Shrex% sbury: A irlife, 1994). 
21 Scc for examples of primary literature J. FrostA Drop Too Alany (London: Leo Cooper, 1980). L. 
Golden, 1ý. choes FromArnhem (London: Kimber. 1984) L. I lagen, Arnhem Lift (London: Leo Cooper, 
1993). V. Miller, Nothing Is Impossible (Kent: Spellmount. 1994)and R. E. Urquhart, Arnhem (London: 
Cassell. 1958). For examples of secondary sources see J. Baynes, Urquhart ofArnhem. (London: 
llrasscý's. 1993). 1). Harclercde, Arnhem: A Tragedý Of Errors (London: Cassell, 1994) C. Ilibbert. 
Arnhem (GloLiccstershirc: Fhe Windrush 11'rcss. 1998), R. Kershax%. It Vever Snows InSeplember 
(London: Ian Allen. 1990), M. Middlebrook.. Irnhem 1944: The. -lirborne Battle 17-26Seplember 
(London: Penguin, 1995) and F. Steer, Arnhem: The Fight To Sustain (London: Leo Cooper, 2000). 
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Martin Middlebrook has successfully attempted to list the factors for I Airborne 
Division's tactical failure during MARKET GARDEN. However, his analN sis onlý 
examines the immediate contributory causes. He cites manly factors including 
Lieutenant General Frederick Browning's decision to expend valuable aircraft in flying 
forward his own corps headquarters for no useful contribution in return. He does not, 
though, critically analyse the reasons why Browning made this decision. Likewise 
Middlebrook quotes the failure by the divisional commander to impress the absolute 
necessity for speed and momentum during the early part of the operation as a factor but 
does not explain the possible reasons for that failure or why it was so crucial to generate 
that momentum in the first place. 22 
A contributing factor to the lack of critical analysis is the reliance of authors and 
historians on standard unpublished primary sources such as war diaries and regimental 
histories. This leads to accounts that are superbly detailed but adhere only to the bare 
facts of an event or operation. The prime example of this approach is the official 
history of British airborne forces during the Second World War written by Terence 
Otway in 1951 and reprinted by the Imperial War Museum in 1990. In common with 
all the British official histories of the Second World War, Otway's publication provides 
an authoritative source of reference. It contains thorough detail, such as numbers of 
airborne troops deployed, the progress of battles and casualty lists which enables a 
picture of military effectiveness to be constructed. It also includes a great deal of 
information on British airborne developmental progress between and during the 
sporadic operational phases. However, Otway presents only factual detail and the 
official history is devoid of any critical analysis. This is unsurprising considering 
Otway himself was an airborne officer during the war and the fact that the official 
histories were compiled under the auspices of the Cabinet Office Historical Section. 
The lack of criticism was therefore to some extent institutionally ingrained. 
A more recent contribution to the historiography has been the thesis and subsequent 
23 
book by William Buckingham . Buckingham's analysis 
is presented chronologically 
and provides a detailed commentary of the early development of British airborne forces 
22 Middlebrwk, Arnhem 1944, p. 443. 
13 W. I-'. Buckingham, The Establishment AndInitial Development Of British Airborne Forces June 1940 
Januan, 1942 (Ph. D. Thesis. [Jni\ crsitý ol'Glasgow. 200 1) and W. F. Buckingham, Parav (Shroud: 
Tcmpus. 2005). 
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and the progress that had been made by other nations prior to the war. The conclusions 
of the thesis are valuable but limited by the narrow range of unpublished priman, 
sources that has been examined. More significantly Buckingham's work is constrained 
by the time span that he has chosen. He does not analyse the developmental process 
after early 1942 and therefore provides no explanation for military effectiveness during 
the period where Britain's airborne forces were committed to formation level 
operations. He does stray into the latter pefiod in the conclusion to his thesis to make 
some broad assertions on military effectiveness. However, because he does not 
examine development during that period he, like Middlebrook, has to concede that he 
can provide no explanation for Browning's decision or I Airborne Division's lack of 
24 drive during Operation MARKET GARDEN 
. 
Those critical comments quoted above made by Peaty and Carver referring to British 
airborne effectiveness are typical of a wider orthodox historiography. that has portrayed 
the performance of the British army during the Second World War as basically poor. 
This view, shared by others writing in the second half of the twentieth century such as 
Max Hastings, is typified by the assertion that the British army, often bedevilled by 
poor leadership, equipment and morale was operationally and certainly tactically 
inferior to the German army and only achieved victory in the west thanks to the weight 
of American military resources and strategic errors committed by the German high 
command. However during this decade a revisionist historiography has emerged that 
has challenged these established views. This revisionist school of thought is 
represented by the proposition that the British army's journey from defeat in France in 
the summer of 1940, across North Africa and the Mediterranean and then over the 
Channel and through northwest Europe to the Baltic five years later was essentially one 
long learning process. That process was often constrained by resources limited in both 
quantity and quality. The commanders who also the subjects of this learning process 
naturally made mistakes along the way and their subsequent analysis of those mistakes 
steadily informed doctrinal development. The result of this extended process was that 
by the end of 1944 and into 1945 the British army was experienced and equipped, 
trained and led to a degree that made it markedly superior to its German counterpart. 
24 Buckingham The Establishment And lnitial Development Of British Airborne Forces, pp. 270-290. 
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This school of thought is represented by Russell Hart who concluded that the British 
Army slowly adapted throughout the war through combat exposure and costl" trial and 
error to the point where it settled on a doctrine and method of operating with NN hich it 
could effectively counter the German Heer whilst conserving scarce resources and 
morale. This doctrine, described by Hart as Montgomery's Materia1schlacht, NN as N cr. \ 
different to that adopted by the Americans because it was as much a result of the socio- 
economic state of Great Britain and the Empire as it was a template to defeat the Heer 
25 in the field . As David French has explained the pursuit of Materia1schlachl relies on 
the possession of adequate quantities of high-quality equipment. However, thanks to its 
historical commitment to colonial warfare much of the British Army's equipment had 
sacrificed firepower for mobility. Such a transformation in military capability takes 
time. ) 
hence it was late 1942 before the resources were available which allowed British 
commanders to maximise the use of machinery and minimise the possibility of hcavy 
casualties. 26 This thesis is part of the revisionist historiography in that it describes the 
process of development of British airborne warfare during the Second World War. It 
examines the limitations on progress imposed by resources, the learning process from 
the Mediterranean to Northwest Europe and airborne employment within a wider British 
material-based doctrine such as Montgomery's 'Colossal Cracks' as described by 
27 Stephen Hart . 
1.3 Methodology 
It would be possible to conduct analysis and draw conclusions on British airborne 
forces' military effectiveness and the factors directly influencing it from an examination 
of the extant historiography plus the traditional unpublished primary sources such as 
war diaries and regimental histories. The same is not true of the development process. 
There has been no complete critical analysis of British airborne development during the 
Second World War. Without this it is not possible to determine the deeper influences 
behind the immediate factors that assisted and impinged on military effectiveness. This 
25 R. A. I-lart, Clash of Arms, How the Allies Won in Normandy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
200 1), pp. 409-419. 
2" D. French. Raising Churchill's Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 274-285. 
2-' S. A. Hart, Colossal Cracks, Honigomery's 21' Army Group in A'Orlins-est Europe, 1944-4J 
(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2007). 
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thesis will therefore concentrate on the development process and then link it to milital-N 
effectiveness in drawing final conclusions. In order to achieve this anal\sis ýNill be 
extended beyond traditional sources in order to produce a thesis that accords with the 
methodologies of the revisionist historiography. 
Military innovation and the development of military capability do not gcnerallý 
progress smoothly along a defined chronological path. Therefore there is little \ alue in 
attempting to examine the subject purely chronologically. Military capability is 
developed simultaneously across a number of distinct and separate lines, each of "\! hich 
may progress at a different rate to the others. This thesis will therefore examine 
airborne development along a number of separate lines of development. This is not a 
new approach to historical analysis. French used a similar method when examining the 
development of the British Army during the inter-war period and throughout the Second 
28 World War. He chose discrete areas of study such as doctrine and Organisation, 
weapons and equipment and personnel to frame his analysis. More recently Philip 
Judkin applied the current Ministry of Defence (MOD) lines of development for 
acquisition to his thesis examining the development of British radar before and during 
the war. 29 
This thesis will take a comparable approach but follow tailored lines of development. 
Britain's airborne forces were conceived by political diktat as opposed to any clearly 
expressed military requirement. Therefore an important factor to be examined in this 
case is the political influence on the generation of military capability during the Second 
World War, including inter-ministerial relationships and the influence of individuals in 
political power. The most obvious influence on military effectiveness comes from the 
potential and limitations of the capability itself, i. e. its constituent manpower and 
equipment. That influence is Often expressed simply in terms of the raw figures, that is 
the number of men, guns or aircraft committed to a given operation. However, soldiers 
require training and the rate and quality of that training is critical as is the initial 
selection process in the case of specialist troops such as paratroopers and glider pilots. 
28 French. Raising Churchill'sArm 
, v. 2L) P. F. Judkins, Alaking Vision Into Power (Ph. D. Thesis. Cranfield Unk crsitý. 2007). 
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Equipment only reaches the battlefield after a lengthy acquisition and procurement 
process, which in turn is inextricably linked to the political environment. 
This physical component gives a military capability the means to fight. However the 
manner in which it fights is governed by moral and conceptual factors. Command and 
leadership is the point at which an individual has the most potential to influence the 
military effectiveness of an entire formation or establishment. The selection of 
commanders is paramount in a small, specialist organisation such as Britain*s airborne 
forces. At the higher level airborne formations were directed and employed by corps 
and army commanders whose experience of airborne warfare, until the latter stages of 
the Second World War, was extremely limited if not nonexistent. Combat officers of all 
ranks are, in theory, influenced in the decisions they make by the doctrine that has been 
imparted to them. While the development of tactical doctrine is often an iterative 
process fed by the lessons acquired during operations and training, a concept of the 
purpose and function of a military capability should be a more enduring statement, 
designed to guide development as well conduct during operations. Such a concept 
broadly existed prior to D Day, appears to have been lost or ignored during MARKET 
GARDEN and then was reasserted for VARSITY. 
Each of these lines of development - politics and policy, equipment and technology, 
personnel and training, command and control and concepts and doctrine - has an 
influence on all the others. They will have therefore to be considered together as well 
as individually in order to gain a more complete view of the process of airborne 
development. Once that is achieved the developmental path can be mapped onto a 
timeline of British airborne operational experience . 
30 By combining an analysis of the 
developmental path with a timeline of British airborne experience it is then possible to 
identify the link between the process of development and the military effectiveness of 
30 For the purposes of this thesis that experience will be limited to those operations that took place 
between 20 June 1940 and 25 March 1945 in north west Europe and around the Mediterranean. Although 
there were considerable British and Empire airborne forces established in India and the Far East during 
the war their contribution to operations was so limited as to make any informed judgement on their 
military effectiveness very difficult. This thesis also does not examine the experience of Major (icneral 
Orde Wingate's long range penetration groups (the Chindits) in Burma in 1944. Despite the extensive use 
of gliders during Operation THURSDAY Wingate's formation was not an airborne force in that the men 
were not specifically trained, equipped or led for airborne warfare. Additionall-, the development of the 
Special Air Service (SAS) which frequently used parachute and glider for the insertion of men and 
equipment is also outside the remit of this thesis. The SAS, despite being administrativel) grouped with 
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Britain's airborne forces during the Second World War. It will be possible to 
demonstrate how, despite resource constraints and limited experience, British airborne 
warfare developed over a period of less than five years to the point where it could 
ultimately achieve the undeniable apogee of military effectiveness on the banks of the 
Rhine in March 1945. 
the Parachute Regiment and the Glider Pilot Regiment, was not conceptually part of Britain's airborne 
establishment contributing as it did almost exclusively to the special forces effort. 
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CHAPTER 2- POLITICS AND POLICY 
2.1 Churchill and His Requirement 
Churchil I's arrival as Prime Minister must have been a shock to the system for man). of 
those comfortably ensconced in Whitehall and its environs. As Isma\ commented: 
The change in leadership may have given rise to a few misgivings in 
Whitehall. There is a type of senior official, both civil and military, 
who get more and more set in their ways as they ascend the ladder of 
promotion. These able, upfight, worthy men do not like the even tenor 
of their lives disturbed, and resent dynamic ministerial control. This is 
precisely what they were likely to suffer at Churchill's hands. ' 
Even the most capable, willing and flexible officers and civil servants began to feel the 
strain soon after the change of Administration. The Prime Minister's working hours 
were unconventional, his output was prodigious in both quantity and scope. He v-as 
interested in the most minute details of everything the Staff did and he poured out 
2 floods of memoranda upon a plethora of problem S. To cope with the sheer volume, the 
validity of Churchill's queries and directions had to be interrogated in order that some 
priority could be brought to the work required. This is perfectly normal practice in any 
organisation where staff are under to pressure to deliver results within the constraints of 
available time. It is particularly apparent when the head of that organisation has a 
reputation for burdening his workforce with tasks that are unachievable, outlandish or 
irrelevant intermingled with that which is vital. Slessor, on the Air Staff for much of 
the War as Director of Plans, wrote of the Prime Minister's hand in the inception of 
British airborne forces that although Churchill's indomitable offensive spirit was a tonic 
to those surrounding him it was liable to manifest itself 'often quite regardless of 
practical realities. ' 3 Dill concurred following his appointment as CIGS in April 1940, 
'He [Churchill] is full of ideas, many brilliant, but most of them impracticable. " 
Consequently those who were the immediate recipients of the Prime Minister's 
directives might be forgiven if, from time to time, some of those that appeared less 
III. L. Ismay, The Memoirs Of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann. 1960), p. 116 
2 J. Kennedy. The Business Of War (London: Hutchinson, 1957), p. 61 
3j. Slessor, 'Some Reflections on Airborne Forces', Army QWarlerly. Vol. LVI. No. 2. Jul-v 1948, p. 162 
4 A. I)anchc\, 'Dill', in J. Keegan (ed), Churchill's Generals (London: Cassell, 2005), p. 55. 
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relevant or only remotely obtainable were sifted, either consciousk or unconsciousk. 
into the category of work that might safely be left until tomorroýý. 
The new Prime Minister, along with most of the high command at the time. had been 
deeply impressed by Germany's airborne campaign in Norway, the parachute assault on 
The Hague and the glider enabled capture of Eben Emael during 1940. On 22 June 
Churchill ordered that Britain should begin the development of its own airborne 
capability. 
We ought to have a corps of at least 5,000 parachute troops, including 
a proportion of Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians, together 
with some trustworthy people from Norway and France. I see more 
difficulty in selecting and employing Danes, Dutch and Belgians. I 
hear something is being done already to form such a corps, but only I 
believe on a very small scale. Advantage must be taken of the 
summer to train these forces. ) who can, none the less, play their part 
meanwhile as shock troops in home defences. Pray let me have a note 5 from the War Office on the subject . 
It was not difficult for anyone to assess the offensive potential of an airborne arm; it 
was, however, difficult in June 1940 to foresee a time when Britain might be in a 
position to employ it. Whilst Churchill might have had the vision to anticipate fighting 
his way back into continental Europe, he did not assist those around him by precisely 
articulating his appreciation. His minute of 22 June 1940 lacked, in several areas, the 
definition required to enable his intentions to be converted into reality. Those few lines 
sacrificed clarity for succinctness. The vagueness of his request no doubt decreased the 
probability of any constructive reaction. The Air Ministry summed up the situation; 
'This requirement in itself is insufficient to enable all concerned to go ahead 
satisfactorily with the production of such a [airborne] force. ' 6 
The Prime Minister's statement gave no indication of how 5,000 parachutists might be 
incorporated within a formation or what the ultimate purpose of that formation might 
be. Even the figure itself is confusing; 5,000 does not equate to any contemporary 
NA. CAB 120/262, Churchill to War Office, 22 June 1940. Buckingham is correct in identi [ý ing stall' 
activity linked with the possible formation of a parachute force between Churchill the ýk ar 11' an th 0 ice de 
Air Ministry earlier in June 1940.1 loývever the executi\ e order that initiated development remains the 
minute of 22 June 1940. Buckingham, The EstablishmenlAnd Inilial Development Of British Airborne 
Forces. pp. 88-95. 
" NA, AIR 32/2. The Provision ofan Airborne lorce. 25 June 1940. 
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fighting unit and falls between the fighting establishment of a coný cntional brigade and 
a division. There is no mention of gliders, despite Germany's success emplo. N in-L, this 
capability, an omission that was to have enduring consequences as the airborne concept 
was devised and amended. The explicit inclusion of foreign nationals in the minute also 
had the possible effect of introducing confusion. Why would the Prime Minister be so 
specific about training these soldiers, particularly those from occupied Europe, unless 
he had a distinct task in mind for them? Only a month before, on 19 May 1940 the 
Chiefs Of Staff (COS) Committee had considered a report entitled 'British Strategy in a 
Certain Eventuality'. The eventuality being the fall of France and the strategy one 
advocating economic warfare and a bombing offensive together with the use of 
resistance movements to ignite widespread insurrection throughout occupied Europe. In 
1940-41 the 'detonator concept' was part of Britain's long-term strategic hopes for 
independent victory over Germany. 7 There was a school of thought in 1940 that this 
type of warfare was ungentlemanly and therefore not suitable for regular British soldiers 
to be involved in. Clement Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal recommended that it was the 
nationals of the oppressed countries who should be the direct participants in any form of 
insurrection. 8 It is probable that Churchill's minute of 22 June became linked with the 
strategic paper of 19 May in some quarters; after all what better way of returning trained 
guerrillas to their home land than by parachute. There is evidence for this as on 4 
September 1940 the Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) suggested that, the 
facilities at Ringway (the establishment responsible for parachute training) would best 
be employed in training Poles, Czechs and other selected foreigners who could lead and 
foster rebellions in their own countries. It was believed that this would follow the 
example set by Russia by concentrating on the parachute training of specialist 
individuals rather than formed military units. 9 Ringway, the Central Landing School 
(CLS) was the only establishment formally training parachutists in Britain in June 1940 
but, as alluded to in Churchill's minute, their throughput was only on a 'very small 
scale'. If the meaning of the minute was interpreted so as to assume that the insertion of 
insurrectionists was the Prime Minister's aim then this could be met by simplý 
7 1). Stafford, 'The Detonator Concept: British Strategy. SOE and l. uropean Resistance af1cr the Fall of' 
France'. Journal (? f Contemporary History, Vol - 10, No. 
2. A pri 1 1975. p. 192. 
ibid.. p. 198. 
9 NA, DEFE 2/791. Me Employment of Airborne Troops. 4 September 1940. 
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increasing the training rate at the CLS. with very little effort or original thought being 
required. There is little evidence outside of the DMO note that this train of thought 
existed but it can be understood how it might be taken as an excuse for inaction. 
Had Churchill closely monitored his instructions during their implementation then any 
confusion might have been easily rectified with a few words of clarification direct from 
the author. Instead the history of the Prime Minister's attitude and focus toNýards this 
project, that some considered was very largely his own personal 'bee, is erratic and 
inconsistent. 'o The first member of the Staff to engage directly in response to the initial 
minute was the Director of Combined Operations (DCO), Admiral Sir Roger Kc\ cs. He 
had quickly grasped that the provision of suitable aircraft in sufficient numbers would 
be a crucial factor and on 27 July 1940 he urged Churchill to use his influence to secure 
the use of Douglas transport aircraft from both the American and Dutch Governments 
The go ahead was given to Ismay to staff the matter. Within the same letter Kcycs 
mentioned that of 3,500 volunteers for parachuting 500 had been selected for training. 
Churchill ringed the latter figure and noted in the margin, 'I said 5,000'. This fact was 
reiterated at the 25 oth meeting of the COS Committee on 6 August, at which Keyes was 
present, and Churchill repeated the same comment in the margin of the minutes, this 
time underlining it. 12 Ismay pointed out that while 5,000 was still the ultimate target, 
500 represented an intermediate aim and was more realistic in the short term. ' 3 Later 
the same month the Air Staff submitted a report dismissing the potential of paratroops 
in favour of pressing ahead with glider development. On I September the Prime 
Minister responded to the Air Ministry supposition by stating that obviously glider 
development should be pursued if it represented a better capability than parachutists. 
However he did question whether it was being taken up seriously, 'Are we not in danger 
of being fobbed off with one doubtful and experimental policy and losing the other 
which has already been proved? ' 14 He requested a full report in typical fashion. 
This he received from the Air Staff., via Ismay, a few days later. Ismay now decided 
to submit a minute bringing together those decisions already made concerning the 
10 NA, AIR 75/45, Air Ministrý to CLE. 12 August 1940. 
'' NA. CAB 120/262, DCO to Prime Minister. 27 Jul) 1940. 
12 NA. CAB 120/262,250th Meeting of the COS Committee. 6 August 1940. 
1-1 NA, AIR 2/7470, Summary of Decisions Concerning Airborne Forces. 28 th April 1941. 
14 NA. CAB 120/262. Prime Minister to Ismay. I September 1940. 
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training of paratroops and the Air Ministry*s recent thoughts on glider development., 
A set of figures was lucidly presented stating that any operation ýýould require an 
airborne force of not more than 1,000 men of which only 100 would need to be 
parachutists, the rest being glider borne. Taking into account multiple operations and 
the need for a reserve the total airborne requirement was stated as 3,200 men of whom 
500 needed to be parachutists. 'Press on', Churchi II ýý rote at the end of the note. \Vith 
this comment he tacitly, and probably unintentionally, reduced his original target for an 
airborne force, reduced the training requirement for parachutists to only five hundred 
and put air-landing troops ahead of paratroops in terms of priority in spite of the fact 
that the gliders needed to deliver them were still largely confined to the drawing board. 
The Prime Minister's enthusiasm and involvement now lapsed until the following 
spring. Having done little to supervise or even monitor the progress of development 
during the intervening months, Churchill visited the CLS (by now renamed the Central 
Landing Establishment (CLE)) at Ringway on 26 April 1941 in order to watch an 
airborne demonstration. What he witnessed was a graphic display of the lack of 
progress that had been made over the past ten months. A formation parachute drop by 
six Whitleys (therefore a maximum of sixty men) was complemented by a formation 
landing by just five civilian, single-seat 'sailplane' gliders. A fly past by a single 
Hotspur was the only demonstration of military gliders that could be mustered. 16 It was 
a sorry effort due in large part to the lack of aircraft being made available to the CLE at 
the time. Despite the poor show Churchill was not unimpressed by what he had been 
shown but was depressed by the paucity of paratroopers and the sluggish pace of glider 
development. He left Ringway with the impression, given to him by the CLE staff, that 
the Air Ministry's apathy was to blame and, in the view of others, he began to believe 
that the Air Staff were deliberately thwarting his airborne project. 17 This belief was not 
without justification as will be demonstrated later. On return to London Churchill 
reviewed the programme and on 27 May 1941 he sent a personal minute to the COS 
Committee via Ismay. 18 In it he blamed himself and the Air Ministry equally for the 
situation. the Air Ministry for offering wrongly based resistance to his initial 
Is NA. CAB 120/262. Ismay to Prime Minister, 9 September 1940. 
16 otN%ay,., 1irborne h'orces, P. 30. 
17 NA. AIR 2/7470. Director Military Cooperation (DMC). 2 May 1941. 
18 NA. CAB 120/262. Prime Minister's Personal Minute. 27 Ma) 194 1. 
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requirement and himself for becoming overborne by that resistance. He referred back to 
his minute of I September the previous year and that his fears had been real ised Ný Ith 
neither a credible parachute training or glider development programme now in place. 
He impressed upon the COS Committee that the airborne capability was not, in his 
opinion, an expensive luxury and that it would be necessary for offensiý e operations in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East in 1942. He placed the problem squarelý in their 
laps, 'A whole year has been lost, and I now invite the Chiefs Of Staff to make 
proposals for trying, so far as is possible, to repair this misfortune. The whole file is to 
be brought before the Chiefs Of Staff this evening. ' 
As might be expected, a flurry of activity followed. The COS Committee issued a 
Joint Memorandum to the Prime Minister on 31 May 1941. In it the War Office set 
their requirement at two brigades of parachutists, one to be based at Home and one in 
the Middle East and a glider organisation capable of carrying a brigade group, again, to 
be duplicated in the Middle East. The Air Staff recognised that the provision of aircraft 
and gliders would require considerable effort in order to keep pace with the army's 
aspirations. Nevertheless, a couple of months later, they were confident of being able to 
provide up to ten heavy and medium transport squadrons and modified bombers capable 
of lifting 2,500 parachutists in line with the War Office's development plan. 19 The 
ability to suddenly promise this support might suggest that Churchill's suspicion of 
deliberate hindrance from the Air Ministry had been justified. However, despite his 
minute earlier in the month the programme put forward by the COS Committee was not 
designed to produce the promised results until the summer of 1943 when, in their 
opinion, the strategic situation would be more conducive to the employment of an 
airborne force. 20 In spite of this the Prime Minister, as Minister of Defence, must have 
felt confident that the COS Committee was as good as its word and that the airborne 
21 
programme was being developed as fast as possible . Once again 
he loosened the reins 
and, aside from occasional correspondence with the India Office on the subject (which 
will be covered later in this chapter), he did little to monitor progress. 
The War Office did now begin to make significant progress. The embryonic II 
19 NA. AIR 2/7470, CAS. Army Air Requirements, Julý 1941. 
20 NA, AIR 2/7470, COS Committcc Joint MemorandL Airborne Forces. 29 %laN 194 1. 
21 NA. AIR 2,, '7470. ibid. 
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Special Air Service (SAS) Battalion became I Parachute Battalion and was then 
expanded to form I Parachute Brigade. An independent infantry brigade %N as converted 
to the air-landing role and an airborne divisional headquarters was approved and 
formed, all within six months. In September 1941 the Air Ministry renamed the CLE 
the Airborne Forces Establishment (AFE), increased its remit and expanded the 
organisation accordingly. Two permanent exercise squadrons (numbers 296 and 297) 
were formed under the new 38 Wing RAF in January 1942. Despite this effort. the 
RAF did not keep pace with the army's expansion of airborne forces. 38 Wing had still 
not reached their establishment for aircraft by April 1942 and even if all the aircraft had 
been available the numbers in the two exercise squadrons would still have been 
inadequate. 22 There simply were not enough aircraft made available to train the 
throughput of the AFE and to provide exercises and maintain the skills and readiness of 
those units already trained. This fact was recognised by the Secretary of State for Air, 
Sir Archibald Sinclair who signalled the fact to the Ministry of Aircraft Production 
23 (MAP) at the highest level during March 1942 . 
On 16 April 1942 Churchill paid a visit to I Airborne Division expecting to see a 
demonstration of its full capability. He was treated to a repeat performance of the 
display he had witnessed almost exactly a year before. Only twelve Whitleys were 
available, dropping a maximum of one hundred and twenty parachutists. 24 In addition 
nine aging Hawker Hectors each towed and released a single Hotspur glider of which 
one overshot the landing zone and another hit trees and crashed on its approach. Even 
those who took part could tell that Churchill was 'furious at the poverty of numbers' 
involved in the display and that 'fireworks' from the Prime Minister was likely to be the 
resu It. 25 Once again those 'fireworks' lead to a flurry of staff activity. Major General 
Browning, GOC I Airborne Division. wrote a report to the Prime Minister on the same 
day as the lacklustre demonstration. In it he blamed a lack of drive and enthusiasm 
from the War Office and the Air Ministry for the shortages in personnel, aircraft, 
equipment and weapons, which had led to development being disastrously SIOW. 
26 Both 
22 Otwa)'. Airborne Forces, p-49- 
23 NA, AVIA 9/29, Secretary of State Air MinistD of Aircraft Production, 21 March 1942. 
24 OtwaN. Airborne Forces.. p. 5 I. 
2S G. Chatterton. The Wings Of Pegasus (London: MacDonald. 1962), P. 32. 
20 NA. CAB 120/262, The Present Situation of the Airborne Division. 16 April 1942. 
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the General Staff and the Air Staff responded but Churchill v,, as cleark unconvinced by 
their proposals and finally acted decisively to seize the situation. 
On I May the Prime Minister instigated an Airborne Forces Committee and through 
MAP, Sir Robert Renwick, a prominent industrialist, was appointed Chairman. 27 In 
actual fact MAP had already created this committee. Following a letter from Sinclair. 
Colonel The Right Honourable J. J. Llewellin of MAP ordered a Glider Committee to be 
formed with Renwick at the chair on 4 Apri 1.28 On 10 April Renwick's terms of 
reference were determined; they were 'to co-ordinate arrangements for the 
development, production, supply, transport and storage of all equipment for airborne 
forces, and to secure rapid decisions. ' 29 The Airborne Forces Committee met for the 
first time on 24 April 1942 with representatives from the Air Ministry, War Office, 
Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Airborne Division and 38 Wing RAF. It appears 
likely that, following the debacle on 16 April and the dearth of firm proposals to remedy 
the situation, the first meeting of the Airborne Forces Committee was brought to 
Churchill's attention as an example of positive action. He then gave the committee his 
official endorsement and Renwick direct access to himself before its second meeting on 
I May 1942. Although late in the day and not entirely of his own making, Churchill 
had at last used his position as Minister of Defence, in respect to the development 
airborne forces, to enable 'firm decisions to be reached and translated into action far 
more quickly than had hitherto been the case. ' 30 
It is unclear why the Prime Minister had not ordered a full Committee to be formed in 
June 1940. He was certainly a proponent of this method of doing business, the Tank 
Parliament being a well known example. The true advantage of Churchill's hand on the 
tiller became apparent when an issue involved more than one Service. The Battle of the 
Atlantic Committee, set up to combat the U-Boat menace, coordinated the actions of the 
Royal Navy and the RAF. The Night Air Defence Committee desegregated the 
independent actions of all three Services and had a synergistic effect as a result. The 
development of airborne forces would appear to have been a possible candidate for the 
27 lirborne Forces, p. 52. Otway is incorrect with this date, as MAI" had formed the committee on 
4A pri 1 1942. 
Is NA. AVIA 9/29, Hewellin to Sinclair, 4 April 1942. 
29 NA. AVIA 9/29, Hewcllin to Sinclair. 10 April 1942. 
30 IsmaN, Memoirs. p. 159. 
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Prime Minister's personal attention as an invaluable 'progress-chaser*. encompassing as 
it did the most acrimonious of inter-Service rivalries at the very heart of the 
requirement. 31 Churchill's position as Minister of Defence was crucial as the final 
arbiter of policy with respect to the war effort. It was he who had the breadth of vision 
to sift and endorse the requirements being put forward by the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) 
and the authority to ensure that the COS Committee put the organisations. personnel 
and equipment in place to meet those requirements. Churchill's consistent intervention 
might well have 'removed bottlenecks and hastened growth. 32 Instead it took the 
results of two years of apathy, lethargy and procrastination to produce any sort of 
decisive action from the Prime Minister. 
Renwick's Airborne Forces Committee convened approximately fortnightly for nearlý 
a year and made positive progress during that time. However, its remit still fell far short 
of that which was required to ensure smooth and expeditious progress across al I the 
lines of development of the airborne forces capability. For reasons that will be shown 
later, India was an enthusiastic proponent of the airborne concept and had created its 
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own Airborne Forces Committee a full year earlier on 22 April 1941 . It looked 
holistically at the problem of airborne development with separate sub-committees 
studying organisation, training and equipment. In contrast, Renwick's terms of 
reference restricted his committee's activity to solving the problems connected with the 
provision of aircraft and associated airborne equipment. In fact the committee 
deliberately avoided widening its scope. 'I do not think that you need fear that the inter- 
departmental committee, whose terms of reference include the phrase 'Airborne 
Forces', will concern themselves with discussion of the wider questions of policy', 
34 
Llewellin assured Sinclair on 20 April 1942 . So those wider questions were left to the 
COS Committee to tackle, despite the fact that the Air Staff and General Staff still had 
major differences of opinion concerning fundamental questions as to the future airborne 
forces' size, organisation, concept and doctrine. 
Wrangling and jostling for position continued throughout the summer of 1942 
without resolution ever appearing any closer. Finally, on 24 October Ismay was forced 
31 I, cNN I n, R.. Churchillaý Warlord (London: Batsford, 1973). p. 243. 
12 Ibid, p. 245. 
33 NA, AIR 23/5411, First Meeting of the Indian Airborne Forces Committee, 22 April 1941 
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to raise the matter with Churchill. The Chiefs of Staff haý c had scveral discussions 
about airborne forces... CIGS and CAS [Chief of the Air Staff] find themselves. 
however, unable to reach any form of agreement. The Chiefs of Staff therefore have no 
alternative but to refer the matter to arbitration. "' The minute was accompanied by a 
fourteen-page paper by the COS Committee (COS (42) 434). signed off bN CAS. ., \ir 
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, on 21 October. 36 Portal made it clear from the outset 
that a point had been reached where it was clear that there was no prospect of arriving at 
any agreed conclusion as to the future of Britain's airborne forces. He stated that it was 
plain that the two points of view had become so firmly entrenched as to be 
irreconcilable. The paper included an annex on *The Value of Airborne Forces' from 
CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke and a report by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
(AOC-in-C) of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, NN hich will be 
studied in more detail later. The Minister of Defence was requested to make a dccision 
that, if it went the Air Staff s way, would lead to a serious reduction in the striking 
power of the proposed airborne forces and the restriction of their role to minor 
operations only. No decision was forthcoming from Churchill. This caused 
consternation among the General Staff who believed that the Air Staff had assumed that 
they had already won the argument and were acting accordingly. On 7 November 
Ismay wrote to Brigadier Richard Gale, Director of Air in the War Office, 'I do not 
wonder that you are worried about the delay in taking COS (42) 434, but it is a matter 
on which the Prime Minister alone [can] arbitrate, and he is terribly preoccupied at the 
moment. In point of fact I brought it to his notice last night, but without success. 37 
Churchill appeared unwilling or unable to adjudicate at a time when airborne forces 
were about to be committed to action, for the first time in appreciable numbers, as part 
of Operatton TORCH in North Africa. 
At the end of 1942 with the Prime Minister focussed on TORCH, Ismay finally 
drafted a response to the COS Committee on his behalf. 18 In it he made it clear that the 
Air Ministry position should prevail, noting that it was difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the size and organisation of the airborne force has been settled without full regard 
35 NA, CAB 121/97, Ismay to Churchill. 24 October 1942. 
36 NA, CAB 121/97. COS (42) 434, Airbome Forces, 21 October 1942. 
37 N., '%, CAB 121/97, IsmaN to Gale, 7 November 1942. 
'S NA. CAB 120/262. Ismay to Churchill, 9 November 1942 
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to its implications on the war effort as a whole. He went on to conclude it Ný as hard to 
see a point at which mass airborne forces would be required except during the execution 
of Operation ROUNDUP (later OVERLORD) which had already been put off until 
1943 following America's acceptance of Operation TORCH over Operation 
SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942, and would be postponed again to 1944 b\ the SYMBOL 
conference in January 1943. Ismay suggested that any future airborne organisation 
should be limited in size to two parachute brigades and a small glider force of not more 
than two hundred gliders in total. Churchill assented to this view and requested Ismay 
to draft a minute accordingly for his consideration. In actual fact the minute issued to 
the COS Committee by the Prime Minister three days later bore no resemblance to 
Ismay's original draft. It was watered down, non-committal and gave no firm direction. 
Churchill felt instinctively that the airborne programme probably was over ambitious 
but he put off translating his feelings into direction by ordering another revicw of the 
situation. He did not want the Chiefs of Staff to be unduly burdened with the question 
during a period of crucial operations. He believed it would be better if the Vice Chiefs 
gave it special attention, which should not have taken more than two sittings. He hoped 
that their report would give him something to work upon . 
39 The Vice Chiefs had only 
been appointed since 22 April 1940 in order to ease the burden on the Chiefs of Staff 
who had a dual role in advising the government on defence policy as a whole while at 
the same time directing the work of their own individual Service. The Vice Chiefs of 
Staff were directed to hold regular meetings at which they would deal, in the name of 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee, with such matters as were delegated to them. 41 ' The 
stand-off over airborne forces was one such matter but such intractable problems are 
seldom solved through delegation. 
At this point the Air Staff had their case for a reduction in airborne development 
bolstered by the support of another ministry. MAP was not always a leading proponent 
of Air Ministry policy but in this case, either through collusion or coincidence, it 
produced an authoritative and timely intervention. Portal's self-satisfaction can almost 
be detected when he wrote to Churchil I on 14 November to inform him that 'I have just 
received an urgent message from M. A. P. to the effect that unless a stand-still order for 
39 NA. CAB 120/262, Churchill to the COS Committec. 12 No%cnitwr 194. 
40 Ism aý. Memoirs, p. 160. 
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gliders is given within the next two or three days they will be committed to the whole 
order of 2,000, ' adding somewhat superfluously, 'You are familiar ýý ith the seriousness 
and magnitude of the implications of the glider programme. "' Churchill was noý% 
forced to make a decision and that decision, inevitably, had to favour the Air Staff s 
position. Reiterating that it was all a question of balance and emphasis, the Prime 
Minister issued a minute to the COS Committee on 17 November reflecting lsmaý's 
original draft of the 9 November. 42 Anxious that there was no prospect in the near 
future of the Air Ministry being able to provide the necessary aircraft for an airborne 
force of the size contemplated by the War Office, Churchill limited any future 
organisation. to two brigades and a small glider bome force adding that an immediate 
stand-sti II order for glider production should be issued. 
Not withstanding Churchill's caveat that the whole position should be re-examined in 
six months time, British airborne forces appeared to have been struck a serious, if not 
mortal. ) blow that would confine them to the periphery of operations for the remainder 
of the war. The matter appeared to be settled in the Air Ministry's favour. However 
British airborne forces were to receive a swift reprieve. Following SYMBOL, the allied 
conference that opened in Casablanca on 13 January 1943, Sicily was accepted as the 
next objective in the Mediterranean campaign. By early February 1943, although the 
precise requirements for HUSKY were still being worked on, it was clear that 
considerably more airborne forces would be required than were at that time provided 
fo r. 43 The JPS's original plans for an invasion corps had included an airborne 
element. 44 The failure of the Dieppe Raid meant that any capability that might soften 
the impact of a frontal amphibious assault was seen as vital. The original plan for 
Dieppe, Operation RUTTER included an airborne element that was discarded in the 
final plan for JUBILEE. Despite Churchill's six month moratorium it was clear that a 
re-examination could not wait and would have to take place at once. Following further 
protest, the Air Staff had this time to submit to the requirements of the planners. From 
this point on British airborne forces size, organisation, concept and doctrine would owe 
more to the operational imperative and less to political expediencý. By the beginning of 
" NA. CAB 121/97, Portal to Churchill, 14 November 1942. 
42 NA. CAB 120/262, Churchill to the COS Committee. 17 November 1942. 
43 NA, CAB 120/262. IsmaN to the Deputy Prime Minister, I February 1943. 
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June 1943 not only had I Airborne Division been reprieved in its original form but a 
second, 6 Airborne Division, had been added to the order of battle. 45 
Aside from the performance of the gliders and in particular their towing aircraft, those 
in authority who witnessed HUSKY agreed that airborne forces would play an essential 
role in any future invasion of the European mainland. A minute to the Prime Minister 
following the assault on Sicily carried an extract from a report by General Sir Harold 
Alexander: 
We must at once raise, organise, equip and develop an airborne force 
of parachutists and gliders - say, a corps of two divisions..... I knoNN 
the answer will be that it is quite impossible to afford the pilots and 
the aircraft. Well! It is a question of priorities and personally I firml\ 
believe that with our growing air supremacy, priority No. I is for the 
Airborne Corps. 46 
The fact that Churchill was responsible for the vision behind the initial decision to 
form British airborne forces is not disputed. However, it needs also to be recognised 
that on more than one occasion he was also responsible for very nearly terminating the 
entire programme or at least curtailing it at a level where its impact would have been 
negligible. The full effect of his poor initial statement of requirement will be discussed 
further in this chapter as will his failure to initiate a standing committee with a chairman 
with the power to influence all the requisite lines of development. Clearly the Prime 
Minister could not have been expected to constantly follow every step of the 
programme as it evolved. However, at times he appears to have lost interest in his 'bee' 
altogether. Then, when matters were at their lowest, following the contemptible 
demonstrations in the spring of 1941 and 1942 he immersed himself in minutiae, a habit 
that frustrated those around him. Following the April 1941 display he wrote to Ismay, 
'Parachutists who landed on Saturday had their knuckles terribly cut. Has the question 
of protecting their hands and kneecaps been considered? ý47 Ismay does not appear to 
have followed up the enquiry. Again after the shambles in April 1942, on the same day 
as the display having witnessed the glider accident he requested information from the 
45 Otwa). Airborne Forces, p. 94. 
4o -V rom NA. CAB 120/262, I'xtract of Report by General Alcxander, 21" Jul, 1 1943 quoted in minutc I' 
Brooke to Churchill. 28 July 1943. 
17 NA CAB 120/262. Churchill to lsmaý, 29 of April 1941. 
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War Office concerning airborne soldiers' extra pay. 48 Still more difficult to understand 
is how Churchill, who had a clear vision of airborne forces' future utilit"'. allo%Ned 
himself to be persuaded to make decisions on two occasions that would, to all intents 
and purposes, have brought a halt to airborne development, first in September 1940 and 
then again in November 1942. Without a specific committee he had to rel% on the 
judgement and advice of the Chiefs of Staffl men that Churchill considered 'the dead 
hand of inanition, ' and 'ancient weapons" during the early part of the War. 49 The 
Chiefs, in turri, relied upon the judgement of their staff. The Prime Minister's decisions 
were therefore based on the advice of the General Staff and Air Staff. It was advice that 
was often based on the partisan agenda of a single service rather than the objective 
assessment of the requirements of the nation's war effort. 
2.2 The General Staff and Air Staff and Their Resistance 
In addition to those faults with Churchill's initial requirement already referred to there 
was another, not yet alluded to, that was more pervasive and had more far reaching 
consequences than confusion over numbers or the employment of foreign nationals. 
Having not ordered the formation of an airborne forces committee. the Prime Minister 
also failed to designate who was to take the lead in development. He did not nominate a 
single ministry, office or department to coordinate the many lines of development that 
would be required to be brought together to produce an effective airborne capability. 
The minute of 22 June 1940 was addressed to the War Office via Ismay and therefore, 
perhaps, the selection of the army as lead service was intended to be self-evident; after 
all, the decisive act of an airborne force would always take place on the ground. 
However,, the controlling interest of the RAF in any airborne operation might havc 
suggested that they could appropriately take the lead as was the case with Germany's 
airborne forces. The solution was not obvious and the resulting dilemma became 
chron iC. 50 
Churchill made the context from which a decision had to be extracted more difficult 
48 NA. CAB 120/262. Stephenson to Churchill. 16 May 42. 
49 Kcnnedy, 1he Business of War, p. 60. 
50 F. 0. Miksche. Paratroops: The History, Organisation . 
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by designating a particular service, rather than one or more lines of operation. as the 
overall main effort for this early phase of the War. 'The Naý ý can lose us the war. but 
only the Air Force can win it .... The Air Force and its action on the largest scale must 
therefore.... claim the first place over the Navy or the Army. -5 1 This was onl,, ever 
intended by the Prime Minister to be an indication of the priority of suppl" of munitions 
to the RAF in order firstly to, firstly achieve air supremacy over Britain and secondlý . to 
prosecute the bombing campaign over Germany. However, to some in the Air Staff it 
must have appeared to have given them carte blanche to swat away requests for support 
from the other two services. The result was friction between the Air Staff and the 
General Staff that resulted in the case for airborne forces being taken by the Chiefs of 
Staff to the Minister of Defence for arbitration following nearly two and half years of 
development impeded, in part, by inter-service resistance. 
That resistance took three forms. The first was straightforward, old fashioned inter- 
service rivalry. A considerable amount of prejudice, distrust and lack of understanding 
had built up during the inter-war period. 52 The second was a constructive resistance, 
practiced by the Air Staff on two grounds; that the amount of effort expended on 
airborne forces would never produce a commensurate effect and that total commitment 
to the bomber campaign would produce quicker results. The third was a passive 
resistance, practiced by the General Staff. This manifested itself in some parts of the 
War Office as a lack of belief in the potential of airborne forces and a corresponding 
deficiency in the staff effort dedicated to supporting the case for development. Each of 
these forms of resistance will now be studied in more detail in order to assess their 
impact on the evolution of airborne forces. 
A basic rivalry existed between the Air Staff and RAF and the General Staff and army 
that was far from petty. It was 'a long and tortuous dispute between the two Services 
that dated back to the last years of the First World War', born out of a sincerely held 
mistrust of the intentions and actions of the other service. 53 The RAF had a precarious 
youth and during the austere inter-war period had to carve itself a niche from which it 
could defend itself against the perceived hostile intentions of the other services. Under 
51 NA. AIR 20/3732, Churchill, WP(4()) 352, The Munitions Situation, 3 Sep 1940. 
ý2 13.1. Hall, Trom Khaki and Light Blue to Purple', Journal of RUSI, 147. No. 5, October 2002. p. 79. 
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the dominant influence of Sir Hugh Trenchard. the Air Staff developed their 
independent bombing doctrine and regarded any diversion from that concept as a threat 
to their survival. 54 Hence requests for support from the other services %%ere looked on 
with suspicion. They still regarded the General Staff as 'wicked uncles who, although 
ostensibly reformed, might once again revert to predatory instincts. ' 55 A ýý edge %%as 
driven between the two staffs, each of which had its own conception of future war that 
were considered to be divergent. 56 
Having isolated themselves from what they saw as attacks on their independence. the 
RAF's bombing doctrine evolved into dogma. They began to believe their own 
publicity and 'luxuriated in the conviction "We are, ergo we are capable of a strategic 
bombing offensive. ' -) ý 57 This attitude was recognised within the army, some of whom 
believed that the main trouble with the RAF was that since its inception it had been 
encouraged to imagine that it could and should win campaigns and wars through the 
application of air power alone. 58 There were others who considered the Air Staff vision 
of future warfare to be more accurate than those of the other two services. However the 
RAF's unyielding attitude towards their core doctrine of bomber supremacy and their 
corresponding ability to prosecute it remained open to question . 
59 Due to lack of 
investment and the resultant paucity of effective modem aircraft the Air Staff s 
bombing doctrine was revealed for a set of emperor's clothes at the outbreak of war. To 
the General Staff it appeared that their years of prejudice had been justified. The 
relationship became increasingly strained, one result being that cooperation between the 
60 
army and the RAF was, to put it mildly, still in a rudimentary state in 1940 . 
The situation improved as the War progressed but this was due to necessity and 
compulsion as much as it was to any greater degree of mutual appreciation. Although 
the schism may have become less publicly acceptable, mistrust still existed and not 
always without good cause. As late as 1943 there were still senior RAF officers who 
ýregarded every transport aircraft built at the expense of a bomber as a major tactical 
S4 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume H, Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1949), p. 144. 
5ý Kcnncdý, The Business Of War, p. x\. 
56 R. Gale, Call To. Irms (I. ondon: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 90. 
57 M. II astings, Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 56. 
g 1'rost, Nearly There, p. 77. 
59 Ismay, Memoirs, p. 178. 
('0 Churchill, Their Fint, st Hour. p. 139. 
40 
defeat. ' 61 The army's predatory instincts remained intact at the very highest level and 
continued to be revealed privately up until 1942 by CIGS. 62 Basic prejudices, although 
suppressed, continued to influence inter-service cooperation throughout the war. The 
manner in which this manifested itself in the case of the development of airborne forces 
differed markedly between the two services. 
It would be unfair to suggest that the Air Staff had 'failed to recognise the principle 
that any theory or weapon of war is effective only if the means are available to exploit it 
appropriately. 63 At the outbreak of war they were only too aware that appeasement and 
a dearth of defence spending had left their underpinning doctrine dangerously 
undermined. A twin track approach was taken to recover their position; an almost 
fanatical dedication to building up the bomber force while simultaneously denigrating 
any other concept that appeared might encroach on that main effort. The vertical, 
functional command structure of the RAF exacerbated the results and all the RAF 
Commands resented any attempted incursion into their war effort, either from elsewhere 
within their own service or from outside. 64 The idea of using bombers to drop 
paratroopers and tow gliders was 'naturally repugnant to the Air Staff and to Bomber 
Command, ' in particular. 65 As Churchill issued his minute in June 1940 the Air Staff 
were already fighting one political battle. Lord Beaverbrook had recently takcn up the 
position of MAP and was advocating a drastic increase in fighter production at the 
expense of the bomber force. The Air Staff were attempting to counter this along the 
lines that the 'multiplication of fighters was a heresy which appealed only to those who 
were ignorant about air power. ' 66 With the announcement of the inception of airborne 
forces they were quick to state that no new commitments could be accepted without 
detracting from the previously approved expansion programme. If such commitments 
67 
were accepted they would have to be at the expense of the future bomber force . From 
61 Kennedy, The Business Of War. p. xv. 
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this the Air Staff concluded that it was difficult to envisage a situation in ýý hich the 
number of bombers required could be spared from their normal task, to be risked in 
such a hazardous pursuit as an airborne operation 68 
The argument was taken up at the highest level; 'Frankly I regard the bombing of 
German industry as an incomparably greater contribution to the war than the training 
and constant availability of an airborne division' CAS declared 'and, as the two things 
at present seriously conflict, I would certainly accord priority to bombing. 69 The zenith 
of the depletion of the bomber force as an argument against full development of 
airborne forces was reached in the paper presented to Churchill for arbitration in 
October 1942. In two thousand words Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris presented 
the entire argument. His statement contained many lucid points against which it 
appeared difficult to argue; the training burden, the technical unsuitability of most 
bomber aircraft, the impact on the bombing campaign of the intensive training required 
immediately prior to an airborne operation, even the poor meteorological conditions 
prevalent in northern Europe. Harris's summarising remarks are worth reproducing. 
It would require the whole of the existing Bomber Command to be 
taken off operations for a period of four to six weeks ... to transport 
one brigade for one operation; it would require about 2'/2 times the 
strength of the present Bomber Command to do the same for the 
airborne division as a whole ... The crux of the matter 
is this - is 
Bomber Command to continue its offensive action by bombing 
Germany, or is it to be turned into a training and transport Command 
for carrying a few thousand airborne troops to some undetermined 
destination for some vague purpose? There is no possibility of 
compromise ... Finally, I must record my conviction that 
had we 
sufficient air resources to transport an airborne force that could have 
any decisive influence on the outcome of the war, they would be 
sufficient to bring Germany to her knees by the simple process of 70 
carrying sufficient explosives for that purpose . 
It was this argument, in part, that finally persuaded Churchill to reduce the commitment 
to airborne forces and limit their size to two parachute brigades and a small glider force. 
However, the Air Staff could not rely on the bomber supremacy argument alone, after 
all it had not defeated Beaverbrook in 1940. Systematic criticism of the capability of 
68 NA, AIR 32/2. draft CLE paper, Training and Organisation of Air-Landing Troops, July 1940. 
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airborne forces was also required, a task that the Air Staff took to ýý ith enthusiasm. 
Statements decrying the weak initial requirement and the equally weak War Office 
response were reasonable. It was undeniable that there had been no policy published 
governing the type of operations on which it was intended to employ the airborne force. 
Nor had the basic question of the proper composition of the airborne force been fully 
investigated 
.71 The proposition that the airborne commitment had been accepted 
because those involved in the decision were not aware of the governing air factors and 
had therefore agreed to attempt impractical tasks on an unsound basis was also 
essentially fair. The supposition that there was little prospect of repeating in Furope the 
successful airborne operations executed by the Germans in 1940 was more tenuous and 
proved to be S0.72 Nevertheless the pressure was maintained and the perceived 
inadequacy of airborne forces continued to be briefed to and by the most senior 
representatives of the RAF. Slessor was ever sceptical: 'We do not know if we NN-111 
ever have to use a [airborne] force of this nature, and certainly at the present time it 
would be wasting a lot of valuable effort to attempt to produce one. -, 73 Even the War 
Office motives for wanting an airborne force were questioned by the very RAF 
command charged with supporting the army. 'It is possible that the War Office 
insistence on putting in for these large requirements is to ensure that history may be able 
to record that they were not blind to modem developments! ' 74 
The General Staff s response to this constant sniping was poor. The War Office was 
well aware that within the Air Ministry the atmosphere was distinctly unfavourable with 
respect to the provision of airborne forces. 75 The General Staff failed to respond in kind 
and did not counter the bomber supremacy line with any constructive argument of their 
own. Instead they criticised the Air Staff for constantly presenting limitations and 
restrictions. Describing the Air Ministry's lucid and persuasive staff work as 'very wet' 
can hardly be considered constructive. 76 It was also unhelpful when the highest ranked 
army officers publicly displayed no faith in the airborne capability themselves; 'VCIGS 
stated that he could not visualise any substantial success for an isolated airborne 
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invasion, anywhere in Europe ... and that the effort devoted to such an enterprise vould 
be likely to be ill-rewarded. . 77 This view was perhaps not surprising Ný hen the position 
of the British arrny in 1940/41 is considered. Having been driven out of mainland 
Europe it required a huge programme of enlargement, restructuring, retraining and 
rearmament to produce an army equipped to fight its way back. Attention to the basics 
was essential. Airborne forces did not fall into this category and were regarded as an 
expensive luxury in terms of manpower and staff effort. At the end of the war 
experienced airborne officers believed that the endemic trouble with British airborne 
78 forces was that the Army had never really believed in them . This was reflected in 
many cases by the quality of staff work connected with airborne development. This in 
turn provided a convenient hook for those in the Air Staff intent on censuring the 
airborne capability. The response to the General Staff paper on The Value of., firborne 
Forces, was particularly uncompromising. 'The General Staff have succeeded in 
making a singularly unconvincing case for the value of airborne forces. The Paper 
would be a fair effort by a first year student at Camberley, but ... as the supporting case 
for the expenditure of a substantial share of the national war effort at the expense of our 
Bomber offensive, it is a compliment to describe it as weak. ' The Air Staff continued to 
pour scorn on the War Office effort, suggesting that the quotation of the parachute raid 
on Bruneval in February 1942 as an argument for maintaining a large airborne 
establishment demonstrated to what straights the General Staff were reduced in order to 
prove their case . 
79 The army had difficulty defending its case because it had neither the 
technical knowledge nor the political will to do so. 
The latter point is illustrated by the comparative engagement with airborne 
development by the upper tiers of the War Office against the Air Ministry. At the very 
top Sinclair was a consistent if infrequent contributor to the dispute. Similar papers 
from Anthony Eden, Henry Margesson or Sir James Grigg, as successive Ministers for 
War, are practically non-existent. During the early part of the war the respective service 
chiefs were also unequally matched. Despite Dill's pre-war interest in airborne forces 
77 NA, AIR 32/2. Meeting held at the Air Ministr). 5 September 1940. 
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he now had far larger wolves much closer to the cabin door. He considered that he 
spent most of his time 'trying to prevent stupid things being done rather than in doing 
clever things! 80 The CIGS found his task under Churchill intolerably taxing and he had 
little inclination to engage the Air Staff in a battle on a peripheral issue. On the other 
hand, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall was fighting to validate and bring integritN to 
the RAFs central doctrine. Being Chairman of the COS Committee (until October 
1940) enhanced his position but crucially he dictated the direction of the air effort 
because he was prepared to resign over the issue. 81 The arrival of Portal as CAS did not 
alter the situation. A younger man than Dill, Portal had more energy and, as a staunch 
advocate of the bombing policy (having briefly headed Bomber Command), he had the 
strength and the will to oppose airborne forces development. He frequently pressed the 
Air Staff's position both in meetings and on paper. Dill did little to respond. The 
position became more balanced with the arrival of Brooke as CIGS. Brooke was a firm 
promoter of airborne forces and a frequent contributor to their cause. Shortly after his 
arrival in office he issued instructions that development should be pushed to the utmost 
and given preferential treatment and by the end of 1942 he was 'more convinced than 
ever that there is a great future for airborne forces. ' 82 It was Brooke's unwillingness to 
compromise on the issue that forced it to be taken to the Prime Minister for arbitration. 
The fact that the decision fell in favour of the Air Staff, as has been shown, was the 
result of other government departments bolstering their position rather than because the 
General Staff argument was deficient. 
Amidst this sea of resistance there were what appeared to be islands of cooperation 
rising above the rivalry. As has been described, the instinctive adoption of what would 
now be termed 'joint' working practices was a distant vision during the early part of 
Second World War. Special organisations were often required whenever two or more 
services were thrust together as part of the war effort. Airborne forces were no 
exception and the method for handling development and operations was laid down at an 
early stage. 
" A. Danchev, 'Dill', in J. Keegan, (ccl), Churchill's Generals (l. onclon: Cassell, 2005), p. 6o. 
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The development of air-borne forces is partly the responsibilitN of 
the War Office, Air Ministry, and DCO, but the Army Co-operation 
Command has been created for the primary purpose of developing 
all forms of air co-operation with the Army. It is therefore the 
responsibility of the AOC-in-C Army Co-operation Command to 
advise the Air Ministry on the tactical and technical air requirements 
for the development and organisation of air units and air training for 
air-borne forces in the British Isles. All development projects should 
therefore be referred to Headquarters Army Co-operation Command. 
policy matters being referred through the Directorate of Military Co- 
operation. 
The same paper also stated that there might be an immediate requirement for air-borne 
operations, probably on a relatively minor scale, and that DCO should be prepared to 
plan such operations. ' 83 
Responsibility was therefore split during the early phase of development between 
Directorate Military Command (DMC) through Army Co-operation Command (AC 
Comd) for training and development and DCO for operations. Although AC Comd's 
remit had only referred to the air requirements and air training, in reality the boundary 
was wider. The CLE came under their command and therefore, as will be seen later, the 
development of tactics and equipment also came under the responsibility of AC 
Command and ultimately DMC. On the whole AC Comd did drive the development of 
British airborne forces between 1940 and 1942 mainly due to the fact that it was the 
only organisation in a position to do so. However, like many other 'joint' organisations 
of its time it was frequently hamstrung by the mistrust of both the services it was 
attempting to bring together. The Air Ministry was worried that the entire army 
cooperation organisation might 'go native' and attempted to wrest decisions concerning 
support to the army back to the centre. Slessor again was the detractor. 'It is important 
that dealings with them [the army] over this [air requirements] should be done through 
, 84 the proper channels, and the proper channel in this case is me [Director of Plans] . 
DMC must have been acutely aware of his weak position within the Air Ministry. The 
requirements of AOC-in-C AC Command, 'the Cinderella of the Air Staff', 
" did not 
come close to the priority of those of Bomber and Fighter Command and DMC did not 
13 NA. INTE 2/791, Airbome Forces, DMC. 9 December 1940. 
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hold the rank to compete on an equal footing with other departments such as the 
Director of Plans and the Director of Training. In addition Air Commodore R. V. 
Goddard during his tenure as DMC came under fire from the War Office as he was 
perceived as resisting the army's requirements. In fact he was doing his best to ensure 
that the development of airborne forces was based on firm principles in order build 
validity. This did not prevent him coming under sustained attack from VCIGS, Major 
General Archibald Nye. 'To hell with principles - give me the problem... We are faced 
in fact with a practical problem which demands practical steps to be taken to meet it and 
a discussion on abstract principles seems to me will not get us anywhere. . 86 Goddard 
did his best to point out that practical steps were useless if they bore little relation to 
what was required but the over-arching dichotomy made his position difficult. 
The situation improved to a degree with a reorganisation within the War Office. For 
the first two years of airborne development the department charged with providing 
advice concerning the army facet to DMC and AC Comd was part of the DSD. 
Lieutenant Colonel J Stephenson of SD4 appears to have been the War Office's resident 
spokesman concerning airborne forces. He was industrious in trying to assist 
development but lacked practical experience. His Air Ministry counterparts usually 
vastly outnumbered him at meetings. When other General Staff officers did attend they 
frequently out-ranked him and then out-flanked his well-intentioned efforts. 
Stephenson must have been exasperated during the meeting in which VCIGS announced 
that any effort devoted to airborne development would be ill rewarded. However, in 
June 1942 the War Office created a dedicated Air Directorate although it still fell under 
DSD. The new directorate was formed to sponsor the affairs of airborne forces and to 
act as a special link between the War Office and Air Ministry on all air matters. 
Brigadier Richard Gale was chosen to head the branch. Gale was already an 
experienced airborne officer having commanded I Parachute Brigade. His staff 
consisted of other, equally qualified airborne experts such as Lieutenant Colonel Gerald 
Lathbury, many of who went on to distinguished airborne command during operations. 
A single point of contact had been created, with authority born out of experience, which 
could deal with the often conflicting requirements of the Air Ministry, War Office. the 
Airborne Division and the AFE. The Air Directorate provided knowledge and 
96 NA, AIR 2/7470, N)e to Goddard, 7 Fchruarý 1941. 
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continuity within which policy could be developed and relieved the Airborne Divisional 
Headquarters of many of its staff duties. 87 Gale was able to forge ahead ýN ith policý and 
improve links with other departments so that when the order was given for rapid 
expansion in order to achieve the requirements of HUSKY and ROUNDUP in earl% 
1943, the Air Directorate was able to respond swiftly and effectively. Not%k ithstanding 
this the Air Directorate was still essentially a single service organisation %ý ithin the \A'ar 
Office. While it did good work in coordinating the War Office requirements with the 
Air Ministry it still had no power of compulsion over the latter and so the Air Staff 
could still resist or ignore the requirements of the airborne capability if it felt inclined to 
do so. 
The second 'joint' organisation involved with airborne development was the DCO, 'an 
uneasy and unloved organisation - neither flesh. nor fish, nor fowl and distasteful to 
lovers of all three. ' 88 While British airborne forces were still in the early stages of 
development the DCO was charged with identifying and planning those combined 
operations in which parachutists or glider borne forces might be employed. In the 
language of the Second World War all airborne operations were considered combined as 
they required the resources of at least two of the services to be executed. Combined 
operations was another 'Cinderella' concept at the outbreak of the war. Between the 
wars the requirement for combined training was recognised and the Inter-Services 
Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) had been established. However, under- 
funded, the ISTDC was briefly disbanded as war broke OUt. 89 Churchill established 
Combined Operations Command (COC) in July 1940. Lieutenant General Sir Alan 
Bourne of the Royal Marines (RM) was appointed the first Commander of Raiding 
Operations but was soon removed following a dispute over strategy with Churchill and 
replaced by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes in the post of DCO. Combined 
Operations began in an atmosphere of controversy and acrimony. They were disliked 
and mistrusted by all three established Services, and came in for special loathing from 
the Admiralty. " Keyes, despite having won the Victoria Cross at Zeebrugge in 1918, 
87 Otwa)- I irborne Forces, p. 59. 
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did not assist COC's cause. He possessed drive and leadership in abundance, but he 
viewed his position as su ra to rather than intra the services. 91 The COS Committee P 
did not share Keyes's assessment of the position of DCO nor his enthusiasm for raiding 
operations and reached the stage where they were outwardly dismissive of proposed 
projects that bore his signature. In return Keyes considered the COS Committee 'the 
greatest cowards I have ever met. ' 92 This lack of mutual trust manifested itself as a 
lack of willing cooperation, the antithesis of what COC had been established to achieve. 
This can be seen in Slessor's letter to Squadron Leader Louis Strange of the CLS. 
'What I am really writing to you personally and privately about is to ask you very 
earnestly not to go talking to Roger Keyes... we must tread very warily with this DCO 
party. ' 93 
Keyes was sixty-eight years old in 1941 and many of his staff were equally elderly. 
Their enthusiasm outstripped their endurance. Only one airborne operation was 
executed during Keyes period as DCO. Operation COLOSSUS was Britain's first 
parachute raid, designed to destroy the Tragino aqueduct in Italy in February 194 1. 
COLOSSUS will be discussed in more detail later, suffice to say at this stage the 
intelligence it was planned on was poor, as was the escape plan that relied on the 
cooperation of the Royal Navy. The result was that all thirty-five paratroopers that took 
part were captured. Keyes began to lose Churchill's confidence and in August 1941 
Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten joined COC as adviser to DCO. The writing was 
on the wall and on 10 October Mountbatten, aged only forty-one, took over as DCO. 
94 Mountbatten provided the political sense that Keyes lacked . He took over 'a 
formidable inheritance of feuds' and in order to give him the required authority 
Churchill promoted Mountbatten to Vice-Admiral and gave him the equivalent rank in 
the other two services and a seat on the COS Committee. Mountbatten could now act 
decisively, 'There were still a lot of people about who saw nothing virtuous in 
combining the work of the three services. They were no use to me, but had been a pain 
in the neck in the past. Now, not only did I not have to use them, I could over-rule 
91 N/I i Ilett and Murra,,, Military Effecliveness. p. 108. 
Q2 I lol I is and Leasor. War At The Top, p. 121. 
93 NA. AIR 75/45. Slessor to Strange. 12 August 1940. 
94 Millett and Murray, Mifilar: v Effectivenes, p. 109. 
49 
them. And did So., 95 Mountbatten forged a far better relationship ýýith the service 
chiefs and, as will be seen, was able to cut through resistance bý, being in a position to 
state his case personally at the COS Committee. A year after COLOSSUS. Operation 
BITING, Britain's second airborne raid was launched to recover parts of a German 
radar from Bruneval on the coast of France. The operation was a success on all counts 
and the stock of British airborne forces and COC rose accordingly. Throughout the 
remainder of the War the relationship between DCO and COC and airborne forces 
continued to be healthy. Major General R. E. Laycock replaced Mountbatten in the 
autumn of 1943 and from HUSKY onwards, major airborne operations became part of 
the mainstream planning process. Airborne formations became subordinate to 
conventional operational formations as had been prescribed in the JPS's original 
concept for an invasion corps and DCO only retained a role overseeing minor special 
forces airborne operations. 
During the first half of the War the DCO and the DMC within the Air Ministry 
suffered from the same difficulties that they had been established to overcome, namely a 
lack of cooperation between the services. They were subject to the same prejudices and 
friction that existed between the army and RAF in microcosm. Those overarching 
problems were amplified in the case of the development of airborne forces by an 
imprecise and non-prescriptive, politically conceived requirement. Not until the 
planning for HUSKY did the requirement fully crystallise so that development could be 
accelerated and restrictions overcome, just as the War Office had predicted would be the 
case more than two years earlier. 96 
2.3 The Influence of Other Government Departments 
In addition to overcoming resistance caused by internal friction, the War Office and Air 
Ministry also had to deal with pressure from other government departments. There are 
examples of the requirements of other ministers coming into conflict with the needs of 
the service departments; Emest Bevin's harassment of the War Cabinet for extra 
manpower for his Department of Labour is but one. 
97 There were, however, 
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departments that directly influenced the development of Britain's airborne capability. in 
particular MAP and the India Office. These departments brought pressure to bear 
(principally on the Air Ministry) resulting in an observable effect on the evolutionary 
path of British airborne forces. 
Following the First World War the British aircraft industry had been allowed to slip 
slowly into a parlous state. Insufficient funding left the RAF equipped well below its 
own predicted first line requirements in terms of aircraft and by the mid- I 930s the Air 
Staff had some ustification for believing that their service was beino starved out. 9' 
Britain's best fighter and bomber aircraft lacked range, speed and payload. British 
aircraft firms were forced to seek alternative manufacturing outlets in order to staý 
solvent. 99 In 1935 the output of Britain's civilian aircraft industry was worth just 
f 13,000,000, less than three percent of national engineering output. 100 Despite this, 
when rearmament began the Air Ministry considered that it had in place plans which, 
once activated by government decision, could produce an air force second to none. 
These plans were carefully designed to mature in 1942.101 In 1938 the Air Ministry had 
taken positive steps away from the methods of peacetime production by splitting the 
branch of the Air Member for Supply and Research into more focussed organisations 
under an Air member for Supply and a separate Air member for Research and 
Development. 102 These confident actions did not impress politicians who were 
concerned that on the outbreak of war Britain's monthly aircraft production would, with 
luck, not be much more than one half that of Germany, and was likely to be a good deal 
less unless drastic action was taken. 103 In order to counter the poor position of Britain's 
armed forces in terms of equipment and to harness and control the country's industry 
the formation of a Ministry of Supply was considered. There was an opinion that 
suggested that to be effective such a Ministry would have to include the supply 
departments of all three services. 104 The arguments for and against a Ministry of Supplý 
were frequently debated in the press and the commons in the months prior to the 
98 M. M. Postan, British War Supply, (London: HMSO, 1952). p. 5. 
99 Hollis and Leasor, War. -It The Top,, p. 49. 
'00 NA, CAB 21/652. Cabinet briefing note, 21 November 1938. 
101 A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London: I lamish Hamilton, 1972), p. 416. 
102 Postan. British War Production, p. 20. 
103 NA, CAB 21/652. ministerial memorandum, I November 1938. 
104 NA, CAB 2 L'652, Brief to First Lord of the AdmiraltN. 2 November 1938. 
51 
outbreak of war. When Chamberlain announced on 29 March 1939 that the Territorial 
Army would be brought up to war establishment and then doubled he stated that. 'this 
important decision would involve a number of consequential decisions in order to 
provide inter alia for the necessary increases in equipment and reserves. ' 105 The bill for 
the formation of a Ministry of Supply was announced in the House of Commons three 
weeks later. However, because the decision had been linked to the expansion of the 
army the new Ministry's functions were limited to the supply of army needs only. 
Aircraft production, as predicted, was still woefully inadequate at the outbreak of war 
and continued to be so into 1940. Churchill had been one of those who had spoken out 
in support of an all-encompassing Ministry of Supply throughout the early period of 
rearmament. 106 On his appointment as Prime Minister he took swift and decisive action 
to rectify the poor state of aircraft production. He appointed a Minister of Aircraft 
Production on 17 May 1940 whose powers were confirmed in a bill of 20 May 1940. 
The creation of this new ministry reflected the urgency that the government now 
attached to the output of aircraft. 107 
The man appointed as Minister was Lord Beaverbrook, a personal friend of Churchill 
for nearly thirty years. Others did not share the Prime Minister's enthusiasm for the 
Canadian newspaper magnate. The General Statrs opinion of him appears to have been 
divided. Ismay and Major General Leslie Hollis clearly admired the results he achieved 
although the latter did note that he rode roughshod over everyone in order to achieve 
them and that his approach to business did not endear him to others. 108 Lieutenant 
General Sir Henry Pownall was not so generous, describing Beaverbrook as 'a totally 
unscrupulous cad of the Yellow Press' and considered that 'his strategical [sic] 
judgement is of course quite appalling; ... I doubt if 
his political judgement is any 
better. "09 However it was Beaverbrook's relationship with the Air Ministry that had 
the most telling consequences. Shortly after the formation of MAP Sinclair informed 
Churchill that he struggled to keep on good terms with Beaverbrook but that he could be 
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relied upon to continue struggling. "o Their relationship was predictably dý sfunctional. 
after all Beaverbrook had just removed from Sinclair the means to meet his oýý n 
requirements in terms of aircraft and ammunition. Not only had Sinclair lost a crucial 
sector of his ministry but MAP was after more. 
MAP under Beaverbrook had predatory instincts. With each concession that the Air 
Ministry made Beaverbrook demanded more. 'Let me say that your [RAF] problems of 
shortage of aircraft are being solved by this Ministry and by no other agency' he wrote 
to Newall, 'I should think that this service might be recognised by placing at our 
disposal forthwith all those portions of the Air Ministry now engaged on the production 
of aircraft. That is all I ask. And I cannot understand why it isn't given to me at 
once. ý111 Although on the surface reasonable, the Air Staff regarded MAP's requests 
for expansion as dangerous, not just to the autonomy of the Air Ministry but also to the 
war effort itself In particular Beaverbrook's insistence that the department of the 
Deputy Director General of Equipment (DGE) and the whole of Maintenance Command 
be transferred to his authority caused intense rancour. He demanded the shift of these 
departments in June 1940. ' 12 
DGE had only been reorganised in April 1940 in order to streamline aircraft 
production by dividing the department into three. ' 13 The first department was charged 
with provision of complete aircraft along with spare parts and equipment necessary for 
handling and maintenance. The second had responsibility for procuring ancillary 
equipment including ammunition, explosives and supplies. But it was the transfer of the 
third that caused so much acrimony. This department was responsible for equipment 
planning, administration and movement. To the Air Staff the danger was obvious. 
Clearly it is a function of the Air Ministry to formulate the Air Force 
requirements in equipment and to set the task to the Production Staff 
of meeting these requirements. This has always been accepted as a 
sound principle. It is fantastic to expect the Air Council to transfer 
to any other Department the staff that is responsible for formulating 
its equipment requirements and for watching the progress of these 
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demands through the Finance, Contracts, Development. Production 
and Inspection stages and for constantly pressing that the 
requirements are met at the correct times and in the correct 
quantities. ' 14 
Without being able to set its own requirements the Air Ministry could not be held 
accountable to Parliament for the efficiency and effectiveness of the RAF. There Nýas 
also the threat of a tendency for the requirements of 'difficult' items of equipment to be 
reduced so as to meet production capacity rather than vice versa. 115 
The question of the transfer of Maintenance Command was opposed with equal 
vehemence. 'The second and far more serious danger is that the Air Ministry should 
surrender to any other authority the staffs and the Units which control the stocks of 
equipment and the reserves of all kinds which form part of the fighting equipment of the 
Royal Air Force. Such a transfer would take out of the hands of the Air Council a 
function which is vital to the control of aircraft operations. "16 The RAF would in effect 
have lost the ability to decide where the main effort for repair of in-service aircraft 
should be directed and where reserves of ready aircraft should be held in anticipation of 
the threat from Germany. The Air Staff could not tolerate this. 'it [The Air Ministry] 
must have full power to decide where the various reserves are kept because this is 
inseparably linked with Air Force organisation and administration. A few days after 
Lord Beaverbrook obtained responsibility for the manufacture of aircraft he was 
attempting to dictate what use should or should not be made of the aircraft once 
delivered. " 17 
Beaverbrook's demands for control of storage units, the ferry pilot pool and other 
departments had all been met but enough was enough. Sinclair thanked him for his 
request to take over DGE and Maintenance Command but concluded 'This is a proposal 
to which I could not possibly agree and I hope you will not feel it necessary to pursue 
it. " " Newall went a step further and wrote direct to Churchill with reference to the Air 
Ministry's previous sacrifices to MAP. 'I have already gone a great deal further than is 
sound from the point of view of functioning and fighting the Royal Air Force in order to 
114 NA, AIR 8/480. Relationship of DGE with MAP and the Air Ministr,, 28 June 1940. 
115 NA, Air 8/480. AMSO. II June 1940. 
116 NA, AIR 8/480. Relationship ofDGE %% Ith MAP and the Air Ministry. 28 June 1940. 
117 NA, AIR 8/480, Air Ministry. Proposed transfer ot'DGF. Jul. v 1940. 
118 NA, AIR 8/480. Sinclair to Beaverbrook. 12 June 1940. 
54 
meet the views of the MAP and I hope you will see it possible to persuade Lord 
Beaverbrook to accept the arrangements which I propose as a final statement which I 
can assure you, we will do our utmost to operate in a spirit of mutual confidence. " 19 
On I August 1940 an agreement between MAP and the Air MinistrN ýý as written. 
While MAP did gain control of Maintenance Command the distribution and allotment 
of aircraft was specifically retained by the Air Ministry. MAP was also explicith., 
denied the transference of any part of DGE. This particular spat may not have had 
direct impact on the development of airborne forces but it is indicative of the 
acrimonious relationship between the two ministries. That discordant state existed 
almost immediately on the formation of MAP and influenced all discussions ýN ith the 
Air Ministry, including those that would directly affect airborne forces, specifically the 
question of production priorities. 
Beaverbrook clearly had thoughts on where production priorit', should be directed, or 
not directed before he ever became MAP. He was of the opinion in October 1939 that 
'The bomber is a disappointment in war. It cannot stand up to the fighter, and it is 
beaten by the anti-aircraft gun. ' 120 He repeated his assertion in March 1940, 'If mass 
bombing attacks were made on London the attacking force would be fatally damaged 
before they could achieve any real success. " 21 Beaverbrook was prejudiced against the 
bomber and therefore against the RAF's core doctrine. Either deliberately or 
subconsciously he allowed this bias to influence MAP's priorities for aircraft production 
when he first took office. 
Beaverbrook first communicated his revised programme for production to Sinclair on 
II June 1940. However before the Air Staff had the opportunity to respond to the 
document Beaverbrook had written to Churchill complaining that the Air Ministry was 
obstructing his endeavours. He listed all the cases, both real and perceived, in which 
the Air Staff had frustrated him. He then attempted to rescind the letter. 122 This method 
of bluff was frequently practised by Beaverbrook with Churchill and is reflected in his 
many threats to resign. The Air Ministry had much to consider in the revised 
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production programme. The requirements of the bomber offensive ýýere N%oefullv 
catered for. The figures for the Vickers Wellington, the only modem bomber on the 
programme, indicated a production rate of ninety-two aircraft per month in June 1940 
123 rising to 177 in June 1941 . This was compared with 300 Hawker Hurricanes and 135 
Supermarine Spitfires in June 1940 rising to 4 10 and 245 respectively in June 194 1. 
The only other bombers on the programme were the aging Armstrong-Whimorth 
Whitley, which was to be the mainstay of parachute training and operations during cark 
airborne forces development, and the Armstrong-Whitworth Albermarle which did not 
begin production in reasonable numbers until January 1941. The Short Stirling, Avro 
Manchester and Handley-Page Halifax had been ordered in 1937 to begin production in 
1940 in order to attain a target of 3500 deliveries by April 1942. None of these four 
engine types appeared anywhere on Beaverbrook's programme and the original target 
slipped by a year as a result. 124 The ratio of fighter production to bomber production 
stood at just over three to one in June 1940 rising to nearly four to one in June 194 1. 
Understandably the Air Staff s response was not favourable declaring that the 
offensive side of the RAF should not be unduly curtailed in favour of the defensive .1 
25 
They were not happy that the acceleration in fighter production was not matched by 
similar development with regard to bombers. It was pointed out that the Air Ministry's 
pre-war production plans had aimed at a fighter to bomber ratio of less than two to one 
and now that airbases in France and the Low Countries had been denied the requirement 
for long range bombers to strike at Germany had increased further since those plans had 
been made. 126 MAP countered the Air Staff s alarm by explaining that the programme 
was the best that could be achieved with the available resources, in particular raw 
materials. ' 27 There is some substance to this statement as multi-engine aircraft used 
more high tolerance materials than single engine fighters. 
The production programme was issued and debated in the days leading up to 
Churchill's minute calling for the formation of airborne forces. MAP's priorities would 
have far reaching consequences for airborne development, as the bomber would be the 
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only means of airborne delivery for the first two years of their development. Although 
they did not form the link with the bomber at this stage. the Air Staff were quick to 
grasp the effect that Beaverbrook's programme would have for airborne forces. 
Transport aircraft were practically non-existent in MAP's plan despite their importance 
being recognised. 'The [De Havilland] Hertfordshire is a transport aircraft on ýN hich. as 
a class, there have been heavy demands in recent months. Such aircraft have carried out 
work of a most important nature in the past, and there are bound to be even greater 
demands in the future, including possibly the conveyance of parachute troops in 
offensive operations. ' 128 The Hertfordshire did not appear on the programme at all but 
the plea failed to secure any amendment. British transport aircraft numbers never 
reached an adequate level to effectively support airborne forces as will be described in 
the following chapter. Beaverbrook's insistence on accelerating fighter production did 
contribute to victory in the Battle of Britain. However, whether this was due to his 
foresight, considering his 'appalling strategical [sic] judgement' or was simply a 
consequence of his prejudice for the fighter over the bomber can be debated. 
His decision did have enduring consequences for Britain's offensive aspirations. Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert observed, 'Lord Beaverbrook, to put it bluntly, played 
hell with the war policy of the RAF. But he most certainly produced the aircraft that 
won the Battle of Britain. What he did in the summer of 1940 set back the winning of 
the air war over Germany by many months. ' 129 What he did to the air war over 
Germany he also did to airborne development. Airborne forces relied on bomber 
aircraft throughout the war but almost exclusively until late 1942. During this period 
operations and some areas of training were often frustrated by a lack of aircraft as will 
be seen later. As previously examined the Air Staff did resist airborne development in 
the initial stages; however, as Portal pointed out, if somewhat disingenuously, 'the 
disappointments experienced by Army Cooperation Command are due, not to a lack of 
good will on the part of the Air Ministry, but to hard realities of the aircraft supply 
position over an acutely difficult period. ' 
130 
Beaverbrook attempted to resign more than once during his tenure as MAP. more 
128 NA, PREM 3/38, Sinclair to Beavcrbrook, 28 June 1940. 
129 Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 43 1. 
1; 0 D. Richards. Portal Of Hungerford (London: I Icinernann, 1977). p. 205. 
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usually through a fit of pique or in an attempt to bring the perceived machinations of the 
Air Ministry to the attention of the Prime Minister rather than because of aný sincere 
desire to step down from the appointment. However in spring 1941 he did resolve to go 
and at the beginning of May Churchill moved him into the post of Minister of State 
supervising the three supply ministries and acting as referee in priority questions. 
Beaverbrook could not resist one final parting shot at Sinclair. 'It would be better if the 
Air Ministry devoted more time to operations and less attention to the affairs of the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production, which seems to have served their needs so far. ' 131 In 
reality he had served the needs of the nation by sacrificing the wants of the Air 
Ministry. While defending Britain he badly damaged the relationship between the two 
ministries, which had an effect on all negotiations from May 1940 until May 1941 and 
beyond. This in turn had a commensurate effect on airborne development during this 
period. This became manifest not only in the lack of suitable bomber aircraft for 
airborne training and operations but also during the production of gliders and during 
early attempts to secure aircraft through production in the United States. Both these 
subjects will be studied in more detail later. 
The pressure applied by MAP was principally physical in nature and had a negative 
effect on airborne development through the deprivation of suitable aircraft. The 
pressure applied by the India Off-ice is more difficult to define. It was not physical but 
doctrinal in nature and could even be perceived as positive in its effect on the evolution 
of British airborne forces. The chief protagonists were the Viceroy of India, Lord 
Linlithgow, the Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery and Wavell as Commander in 
Chief (C in C) India. Linlithgow made a proclamation of war on behalf of India on 3 
September 1939. He did so without consulting Indian leaders and although most of 
them were happy to support the defence of the British Empire against German 
aggression there was an undercurrent of unease that this initiative did nothing to settle. 
Some saw the promise of support to the empire during the war as a valuable bargaining 
chip for future independence. Others had foreseen more direct benefits and believed 
that Japanese invasion would leave Indians in charge of their own destiny. The countrý' 
was ripe for revolution. Should that revolution break out then maintenance of control 
would become difficult in such a vast country. 
131 ibid, p. 467. 
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Very early during the process of development it had been recognised that there 
appeared to be greater opportunities for operations to be carried out by airborne forces 
in the Middle East than Europe. 132 The factors behind this reasoning included 
topography, meteorology and the lower density of enemy forces in the Middle East 
against those in Europe. The JPS's paper detailing future plans and basic requirements 
called for two invasion corps to be formed, one in Britain and one in the Middle East. 
Each identical invasion corps included an airborne element. ' 33 When the COS 
Committee ratified this requirement and agreed the formation of an airborne brigade in 
India it noted that 'Quite apart from any use for a brigade of this nature overseas the 
Government of India consider that it would be most valuable for employment for the 
Defence of India and for Internal Security. ' 134 Here lies the reason why India became 
so enarnoured with the possibilities of airborne forces and why pressure was brought to 
bear on the War Office,, Air Ministry and the Prime Minister. 
In the spring of 1941, as part of the operations by 10 Indian Division to re-establish 
British control in Iraq, I Battalion, the King's Own Royal Regiment with support was 
flown at short notice onto the airfield at Habbaniya in order to break its siege by Iraqi 
forces. The operation was successful despite losses in aircraft during the approach into 
Habbaniya. 13' The possibilities of using an airborne capability to swiftly counter any 
uprising within the Empire were not lost on observers in India. Linlithgow came to 
adopt the concept as his own declaring 'I have personally nursed our infant airborne 
forces with tender care because I am convinced that their contribution is going to be 
essential. ' 136 However it was Amery who lead the Viceroy along this path. 
Like Beaverbrook, Amery was a personal friend of Churchill, having been at Harrow 
with the Prime Minister. With such a close relationship Amery was disappointed when 
only offered the India Office by the Prime Minister in May 1940. However Amery had 
a long history in colonial affairs and crucially he and Churchill had overlapped by six 
weeks in the Colonial Off-ice in 1921. Amery had taken this opportunity as Churchill's 
subordinate to follow through 'pet' projects and policies. In particular he 
finished the 
132 NA. CAB 120/262. Meeting held in the Air Ministry, 5 September 1940. 
133, NA, AIR 20/3732, JPS, Future Plans and Basic Requirements, 18 October 1940. 
""' NA, CAB 121/97, COS (41) 366, Formation of an Airborne Brigade In India. II June 1941. 
'35 NA. AIR 21/5932. Records of Operation Analysis, 22 April -6 June 1941. 
136 NA, CAB 121/97. Linlithgow to Amery, 31 March 1942. 
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campaign against the 'Mad Mullah' in Somaliland, delivering the final bloýN, using, a 
137 squadron of twelve aircraft from Egypt that bombed the uprising into submission . 
Amery was therefore already well aware of the advantages of the efficient use of air 
power in an imperial internal security role and he knew that Churchill was also 
conscious of the potential. 
Amery, akin to Beaverbrook, aroused mixed emotions among the military communitý 
Pownall was forthright once more describing Amery as 'a hopeless and stupid little 
creature. ' 138 The COS Committee approved the formation of an Indian airborne brigade 
in June 1941 subject to the caveat that at least one of the three constituent battalions 
should be British. 139 Progress was initially slow as it was in Britain but pressure on the 
military establishment from Amery to speed up development began in a polite fashion. 
At first he queried Dill; 'I wonder whether anything more is being done to consider 
Wavell's request for a larger measure of airborne preparation? ,1 40 In reply CIGS 
pointed out that the rate of development was largely rel iant on the avai labi I ity of aircraft 
and gliders and that it would be difficult to allot specialised types of aircraft specifically 
for the use of an airborne formation. 141 Concurrent to his approach to Dill Amery also 
began to broach the subject with the Prime Minister. Again referring to Wavell's 
request and to the success at Habbaniya, Amery presented an extremely well informed 
case for airborne expansion in India and expressed his concerns over lack of progress. 
'I gathered from a memorandum by Pownall which Dill showed me that [airborne 
expansion] is regarded as entirely out of the question as there wil I never be enough 
bombers available to tow gliders. ' 142 Amery thought that this was a negative 
conclusion; however, thanks to Dill, he now had his own idea of where airborne 
development was being obstructed. Despite CIGS pointing out that the lack of suitable 
aircraft was the fault of MAP, Amery aimed his frustration at the Air Ministry. In a 
second letter to Churchill he highlighted once again the success at Habbiniyah and 
postulated that General Sir Claude Auchinleck might have been able to stop Rommel on 
1.; 7 R. W. Louis, In the Name of God Go! (New York: Norton, 1992). p. 82- 
138 Bond, Chiqf qf Staff, p. 15, (Diarý entry for 25 May 1941). Considering Pownall's asscssment of' 
Beaverbrook it is possible that he had a prejudicial low opinion ot'all politicians, in ýkhich case his vaiue 
as a commentator might be questioned. 
1; () NA, CAB 121/97. COS Committee meeting (40211,13 June 194 1. 
140 NA. WO 106/3670, AnicrN to Dill, 28 October 1941. 
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the 'I ripoli road if he had had an airborne brigade to fly forward. Amery also predicted 
the use of an airborne capability in seizing and re-establishing control over areas of the 
Mediterranean and regaining territory in Burma. Airborne forces stationed in the 
Middle East or, more precisiely, India could serve both these objectives. 'I still believe 
that the only way to get the thing on an adequate scale is to insist on having it, on 
whatever scale you decide on, entirely separate from the Air Force. * 143 The Prime 
Minister was obviously impressed by the argument and added a comment to the bottom 
of the letter for the attention of CAS; 'There ought to be an extra Airborne Division - or 
better its equivalent in Bde groups - raised in India as soon as possible. Pray consider 
this and let me have some proposals. ' 144 
Portal's response was understandably robust and well rehearsed as he was already 
under similar pressure directly from the War Office. He stated once again that the rate 
of development was a direct consequence of the availability of aircraft. a state of affairs 
that at this stage of the war could not be accelerated. 'It is an entire fallacy to suppose 
that there is an unused reserve of productive capacity which could be turned on to 
making transport aircraft and special engines for them. So far as this country is 
concerned such capacity could only be found by a cut in the deliveries of some other 
type of aircraft. ' 145 It was a familiar and perfectly logical argument but Amery was not 
satisfied. He summed up the position as he saw it; 'Lack of suitable aircraft and 
statichutes [parachutes] is delaying training of our parachute brigade, and [the] picked 
force which might be employed elsewhere is being wasted at present, ' and it was 
4useless to continue effort to provide these forces in the present atmosphere of lethargy 
and indifference. ' 146 It was at this point that Linlithgow adopted airborne forces as his 
personal 'infant'. Amery appealed to his ally Churchill once more. 'If at this moment 
we could transport and supply even a brigade from India to Burma it might make a big 
difference.... If so, then, whatever the demands of the Air Force for other purposes, 
there should be no question as to the necessity of sparing some proportion, however 
small, of the total for training and building up air transport. ' 
147 The logic was 
143 NA, BAB 120/262. Amery to Churchill, 19 January 1942. 
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inescapable but it was not drawing the desired response. The Air N1 inistrý was only just 
beginning to receive significant numbers of modem bomber aircraft and it ýN as not 
intentionally going to dilute its central doctrine at this stage of the war b% allocating 
bombers to airborne forces or switching production to transport aircraft. Portal was 
already defending this comer against Alanbrooke and while Amen, failed to coordinate 
his campaign with the War Office he was easily fended off. 
Linlithgow, having been convinced of the advantages of airborne forces. was now 
becoming frustrated with the lack of progress. He urged Amery to continue to apply 
pressure to Churchill. 'I have done my utmost personally to encourage the pioneers of 
this branch of warfare from the very start because I felt that we were sure to need thcm 
in this theatre. It is now clear that we shall want them badly. ' 148 The Viceroy was 
correct in his assumption; the arrest of Congress leaders on the evidence of an 
impending revolt was only two months away. It hclped to validate Amery's theory that 
it might be best 'to go back more to the spirit of Mutiny days and revive British Rule in 
its most direct and, if necessary, ruthless form. ' 149 During the riots that followed the 
Congress arrests Indian parachute units were employed in Delhi and although their 
airborne capability was not utilised their utility in the internal security role was 
demonstrated. Despite minor parachute operations being mounted in the Sind Desert 
and in the Myitkyina area of Burma in July and August 1942 even Amery was by mid- 
1942 forced to admit that the chances of building up an airborne division in India 
appeared hopeless. "O 
In fact the situation for British airborne forces was beginning to look hopeless on all 
fronts. In a few months CIGS and CAS would take their disagreement on the subject to 
Churchill for arbitration. By the end of the year the decision would be made to reduce 
the British airborne organisation to two brigades and any possibility of expansion in 
India was lost. It was not until the potential of the airborne capability had been 
demonstrated during TORCH and HUSKY and the means to meet the JPS's future 
requirements were available that development in India was once again considered. In 
September 1943 Browning visited India on the orders of Nye to report on the situation 
148 NA, CAB 120/262, Linlithgow to Amerý. 18 June 1942. 
149 Lou is. In 1he Name of Gooýj Go!, p. 15 1. 
150 NA. CAB 120/262, Amery to Churchill, 14 July 1942. 
62 
of airborne forces. The result of Browning*s report was rapid expansion and the 
formation of 44 Indian Airborne Division dufing 1944. 
Amery was a persistent champion of airborne forces in India during 1941 and 1942. 
He formulated a persuasive argument for the employment of the new capability. His 
original vision did not matefialise, as airborne forces were not required to use their 
strategic mobility for internal security duties within India during the war, although the 
role was fulfilled by 2 Independent Parachute Brigade in Greece in 1944. In fact 
Amery's vision could not begin to be fulfilled until the strategic situation in 1944 
allowed the diversion of suitable aircraft from Europe to India. This came too late for 
British airborne forces in India to have a major role in the war in the Far East. Only one 
major airborne operation was conducted when a composite Gurkha Parachute Battalion 
landed at Elephant Point dufing Operation DRACULA, the assault on Rangoon in May 
1945. Against Amery were his constant attempts to use Churchill to influence the 
situation that put the Air Ministry further on the defensive and increased their resistance 
to the airborne concept. Had Amery and Wavell coordinated their efforts with the War 
Office then resistance might have been more difficult. As is usual when inter- 
departmental conflicts arise the result was the diversion of considerable staff effort that 
could have been more profitably expended elsewhere. The diversion of aircraft, 
manpower and equipment from Europe to India was not in the end significant. There 
was, however, one unforeseen effect of the expansion of India's airborne forces in 1944: 
the European theatre lost the man widely considered at the time to be Britain's most 
proficient airborne commander. The experienced Major General Ernest Down handed 
over command of I Airborne Division to Major General Robert 'Roy' Urquhart in 
January 1944 in order to take over the fledgling 44 Indian Airborne Division and as a 
result he never saw action as an airborne commander. The repercussions of this change 
in command will be explored later. 
2.4 The Political Environment as a Factor in Development 
The political environment was critical to the development of British airborne forces 
particularly between June 1940 and January 1943 and SYMBOL. Prior to the 
Casablanca conference there was no obvious strategic or operational imperative for the 
employment of airborne forces. Britain was locked in a defensive battle on several 
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fronts and an airborne capability appeared to be an expensive luxury. The work of the 
firm model or JPS on the airborne concept was still largely theoretical. Without any i 
requirement on which to base planning the ministries felt justified in doing the 
minimum to satisfy the requirement. Without a clear and imminent case for the 
employment of airborne forces the resistance of the Air Staff and the indifference of the 
General Staff can be understood if notjustified. A strong vision of the future utility of 
airborne forces and the authority and will to promote the concept was necessary to 
ensure progress. This fell to Churchill and the inception of the capability was a result of 
his diktat as opposed to any identified military requirement. However once he 
committed the army and RAF to airborne development Churchill failed to act 
effectively as Lewin's 'progress chaser' and there is little evidence that 'he removed 
bottlenecks and hastened growth. "51 Nor did he act as Gilbert's flawless omnipotence, 
'picking up all the threads and giving them coherent shape and form. ' He certainly did 
not 'continue to pester, nag and bite. ' 152 Lamb's assessment of Churchill as a uniquely 
able but flawed leader most aptly expresses his actions in this situation. In the case of 
airborne development that unique ability was demonstrated by his initial vision but his 
flaws did not manifest themselves as 'blunders and hasty, impetuous decisions, " 53 but 
rather as inconsistent interest and the inability to make a timely and effective decision 
when called upon to do so. He did show interest in airborne forces throughout the first 
part of the war but in an irregular and highly punctuated manner with no real follow up 
to his occasional visits and questions. These aberrations can be excused when they are 
placed beside the Prime Minister's fantastic workload and the list of significant strategic 
priorities that were competing for his time and effort and the lack of consistent advice 
that he was receiving from his staff and advisors. 
It has been claimed that, 'The general effectiveness of the British political-military 
response to the Second World War rested on one of the most efficient decision making 
systems of the major powers involved in the conflict. "-54 This still stands but it should 
be recognised that Churchill's minute of 22 June 1940, vague and open to 
'51 Lewin, Chumhill as Warlord, p. 243. 
152 M. GilbeM ContinUe 10 peger, Nag and Bite - Chw-chill's Wir Leat*rship (London: Pimlico, 2004), 
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misinterpretation, was made more difficult to implement by the fissures in the system of 
defence coordination and planning. Below the Minister of Defence therewas little 
synchronisation between the services. Therefore fundamental disagreements over the 
structure, organisation and employment of future airborne forces became impossible to 
resolve at COS level. Concurrently the JPS were working on the long-term concept and 
doctrine of the capability and how this would contribute to the future direction of the 
war, in particular the invasion of mainland Europe. DCO was meanwhile responsible 
for the employment of Britain's fledgling airborne forces and was therefore learning 
valuable lessons, which could inform future operations. AC Command, operating 
within the RAF's stove-piped infrastructure, was independently developing training and 
tactics. There was little formal constructive interaction between these organisations and 
therefore development was not being managed in a holistic manner. When the Prime 
Minister did intercede his observations and criticisms were generally followed by a 
surge of staff activity but little practical activity. When the organisations did coincide 
on the subject the result was often negative, primarily due to the pervasive scarcity of 
resources. Both these effects were due to the failure to establish a dedicated, cross 
service committee or organisation to specifically deal with the complex requirements of 
airborne development. The overall result was that the evolution of British airborne 
forces was extremely slow up until January 1943. 
Following SYMBOL and the identification of an assault on Sicily as the next allied 
strategic objective the utility for an airborne force became obvious to assist an 
amphibious landing and prevent a repetition of the Dieppe debacle. From that moment 
forward the General Staff and, to less enthusiastic extent, the Air Staff committed 
themselves to the provision of an airborne capability. With a clear military requirement 
the need for political direction receded and strong policy was more forthcoming. Even 
long held inter-service rivalries were overcome to some extent. Political compulsion 
and bureaucratic impediment therefore only contributed one dimension to the 
development of airborne forces during the Second World War. This requires balancing 
against the impact of resource constraints, both equipment and personnel and the effect 
of the strategic purpose on the development of concepts and doctrine in order to create a 
full conclusion tracing the development of British Airborne Forces. 
65 
CHAPTER 3- EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
3.1 Personal and Support Equipment 
To be effective a new military capability requires coherent development across all its 
constituent lines of development. Notwithstanding this it is not unusual for one 
particular aspect of the capability to be identified as being fundamental to its entirety. 
This is often the line of development that initially defines the capability and is the 
primary element around which the other lines are developed. This primary element of a 
new capability is often characterised by a novel piece of equipment or an innovative 
concept. The introduction of the British airborne capability during the Second World 
War was concept-led. There was no single obvious piece of equipment associated with 
the new capability, rather an entire range had to be developed to ensure effective 
progress; from clothing and personal arms, through vehicles and support weapons to 
support aircraft and gliders. All would have to rely on the priority accorded to them in 
order to compete for exiguous resources. Each would present differing degrees of 
technical and engineering complexity and therefore progress across the equipment line 
of development was unlikely to be even. Much of the equipment would have to be 
developed through trial and error as there was little experience in this area within the 
research community. Despite this, most of the equipment that paratroopers or air- 
landing soldiers required once they were on the ground was not very different from that 
required by any other infantryman of that era. This included clothing and personal 
weapons, some form of mobility and fire support if they were to survive in the face of 
the enemy, and communications in order to coordinate their effort. What was crucial 
was that this equipment could be delivered to the battlefield by the same means as the 
soldier. Likewise, engineers, medics and other supporting arms would have to adapt 
their equipment so that it could be successfully delivered from the air. The critical 
factor throughout the range of support equipment was weight and size, which had to be 
minimised wherever possible in order to maximise aircraft capacity. 
When the CLS was formed technical trials, development and experimentation were 
carried out in an ad hoc manner with whatever limited resources were available at the 
time. It was not until the CLS was expanded and renamed the CLE on 19 September 
1940 that a formal Technical Development Section (TDS) was established. However, 
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the CLE was primarily an air-focussed organisation and only one officer was committed 
to working on Army requirements. On 15 February 1942 the TDS became part of a neNN 
unit, the Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment (AFEE), and on I July it moved 
from Ringway to Sherbume-in-Eimet. 1 The AFEE had a greatly expanded 
establishment but still only made a single officer responsible for the development of 
paratroop equipment, albeit he did have a small team to assist with practical trialS. 2 
This level of commitment was clearly not going to be sufficient to develop the plethora 
of new, modified or adapted equipment that paratroops and air-landing soldiers would 
require to be brought into battle with them. The War Office and the airborne units 
themselves would have to adopt some important principles and be receptive to other 
methods of acquisition if the airborne force was to be properly equipped on the ground. 
In some cases the modifications or adaptation of current equipment in order to render 
it fit for its new purpose could be quickly identified and relatively simply accomplished. 
Even personal equipment and clothing had to be scrutinised for potential weight 
reductions. Great-coats and ground sheets were discarded and new windproof, water- 
repelling smocks were produced to compensate. New, warm underclothing was 
developed. The standard British infantry helmet had the protruding rim removed not 
only to save weight but also to reduce the chance of it snagging in the aircraft or during 
landing. Rubber-soled boots were produced to reduce the shock of landing but these 
were later discontinued due to the shortage of rubber and a lack of durability. 3 Much of 
this clothing was based on German designs - so much so that the early British 
paratrooper was practically indistinguishable from hisfallschirmjdger counterpart. 4 
The provision of specialist clothing did not create undue difficulties, as it did not 
present a high level of technical challenge. Nor did the scale of supply cause problems 
as civilian manufacturing capacity in the clothing industry had been drawn upon early in 
the war and had been developed with great rapidity. ' 
' Ot" ay. Airborne Forces, pp 29-30 & 50. 
2 NA, T 162/755, establishment of AFEE, undated. 
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The Lee Enfield rifle and Bren light machine gun remained the standard section 
weapons. The machine carbine Sten was provided on a greater scale than in normal 
infantry units at two per section in order to provide some concentrated firepo,, Aýer from a 
lightweight weapon. On initial scrutiny, in view of the weapon's size and rate of fire, it 
might have been considered effective to issue more Sten guns at an even higher 
allocation per section. However, aside from the issues of range and accuracy when 
compared to the rifle, there were also logistic implications to issuing more Stens. 
Automatic weapons always consume more ammunition than single shot weapons and 
this increase in expenditure has to be sustained. Rifles and Brens were issued to 353 
personnel within a parachute battalion and this required first-line ammunition holdings 
of less than 60,000 rounds. The Sten was issued to 226 soldiers and yet required over 
64,000 rounds of ammunition to be held at first-line. 6 Therefore any increase in the 
issue of Stens would result in an increase in the overall amount of ammunition that had 
to be held within the battalion and delivered to the DZ. This may appear a minor point 
but these are the issues that had to be considered in order to balance firepower against 
the necessity to reduce aircraft loads. The three-inch mortar remained the battalion's 
own integral means of providing indirect fire support in both parachute and air-landing 
un itS. 7 None of these weapons needed any major modifications and served their 
purpose with airborne forces throughout the war. In 1943 a detachment of the Army 
Operational Research Group (AORG) carried out observations on the equipment of an 
airborne battalion and concluded that although minor equipment problems did exist they 
8 
were no different to those experienced by a normal infantry battalion . 
Paratroops and their personal and support equipment had to be delivered from their 
aircraft to the battlefield safely and effectively. The development of the parachute 
through its various types and marks has been described in detail elsewhere. 9 Despite 
occasional accidents resulting in fatalities the British parachute, particular the X-type 
(known initially as the statichute), was remarkably successful. Notwithstanding this, 
the scale of the challenge in providing parachutes to the airborne force is worth further 
6 NA, AIR 39/36, CLE minute, 8 August 1941. 
OtxN a), Ai rborne Forces. p. 46. 
8 NA, WO 291/445. AORG Report, 24 May 1943. 
9 Buckingham, Paras, pp. 91-96 and J. Weeks, Airborne Equipmeni (London: David & Charles, 1976), 
pp. 24-35. 
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examination. Shortly after Churchill's minute of 22 June 1940 the Treasury reported 
that 10,000 parachutes were urgently required for 'highly secret purposes. ' Later that 
year the MAP estimated that it would require 17,200 parachutes per month to equip 
airborne forces. 10 These figures caused consternation within the Treasury. Each 
twenty-eight foot diameter X-type parachute required sixty-eight square yards of silk, 
which would equate to a monthly consumption of over one million square yards. 
MAP's figures meant that the parachute requirement for the twelve months from 
September 1940 would account for eighty-five percent of the national stocks of silk that 
had originally been calculated to be sufficient for two years. Moreover, parachutes 
were not the sole military consumers of silk. Charge bags for naval and military guns 
required approximately 400,000 square yards per month. Silk reserves were unlikely to 
improve as the attitude of Japan, Britain's major supplier, grew increasingly uncertain 
through 1941.1 1 When Japan did enter the war the situation became critical. 
Part of the problem was the expendable nature of the parachute. It was assumed 
correctly that parachutes used during operations would be subject to a one hundred 
percent wastage rate and therefore an entire formation's parachutes had to be held in 
reserve for each projected operation. In addition to this a pool of parachutes was 
required to cover training and maintenance. This calculation indicated that a parachute 
brigade which would deploy 1,880 soldiers by parachute would be required to hold 
5,260 X-type parachutes to enable training and maintenance and to provide an 
operational reserve. 12 Once these figures were extrapolated to cover the entire projected 
airborne organisation, resupply parachutes were added to the equation and then the total 
was multiplied to cover multiple operations, the War Office estimated that the total 
number required for the fifteen to eighteen month period from May 1942 equalled 
approximately 140,000 parachutes. The War Office requested the Air Ministry to 
consider stockpiling raw materials in order to ensure that production was not prejudiced 
but the state of the international silk market made this difficult. 13 
Late in 1942 shortages were having a significant effect on supply. By October only 
17,687 parachutes had been delivered, well below the planned programme. The 
10 NA. T 196/89, Treasury, 27 June 1940 and 4 October 1940. 
11 NA, T 196/89, Treasury, 28 September 1940. 
12 NA, AIR 39/36, HQ No. 70 Group RAF to HQ AC Comd, 5 August 194 1. 
13 NA. AIR 20/2385, War Office to Air Ministry, 30 May 1942. 
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situation was not alleviated by an inability to obtain raw silk from the USA as it NN as 
retaining indigenous production for its own requirements. 14 Silk production in India 
could also not be relied on. India's own airborne development programme was 
outstripping local supply. By mid-1944 Indian airborne forces had a projected deficit of 
403,000 parachutes. 15 MAP attempted to mitigate the apparent shortfall by requesting 
that the USA supplied Britain with completed parachutes and by investigating 
alternative materials suitable for manufacture. Various natural and man-made fibres 
were tested. Cotton was cleared for use for resupply parachutes and a cotton and man- 
made fibre combined material known as Nylex or Ramex was cleared for use in X-type 
manufacture. Nylon was also tested late in 1942 but the results were inconsistent and it 
was not cleared for use at that time. 16 Nylon did not become universally available for 
parachute manufacture until 1944. With this mitigation in place and by reducing the 
overall requirement from 140,000 to 60,000 parachutes, the War Office was satisfied 
that its demands would be met in time for OVERLORD. 
The most noteworthy fact concerning the mass supply of parachutes in Britain during 
the war is that at no point, apart from in India very early during development, does any 
shortage of parachutes appear to have impinged on training or operations. There are a 
number of explanations for this although there is no evidence to support one of them 
above the other. The situation may have been extremely well managed at the front line 
so that shortages were not apparent to the user. Alternatively it is possible that 
production became misaligned with consumption so that even when the manufacturing 
rate fell due to silk shortages output was still sufficient to meet the actual demand. It is 
also probable that the War Office over estimated the requirement for parachutes, 
inadvertently or even deliberately in order to ensure that the actual requirement would 
be met. 
It became clear relatively early in the course of development that a paratrooper could 
not drop while carrying a rifle, Sten or Bren as it greatly increased the chance of injury 
being sustained on landing. " The same was true of radios, mortars and other support 
equipment that a normal infantryman might expect to carry with him as he walked or 
14 NA, AIR 20/4378, MAP Production Summary. 9 October 1942. 
'5 NA, WO 106/4640, C in C India to Air Min, 5 November 1943. 
16 NA. AIR 20/4378, Air Ministn-. 27 November 1942. 
17 NA, AIR 32/2. Notes on the U se o ['Parachute and Air-Bome"Froops, 4 Februan- 1941. 
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rode into battle. A system was required to deliver this essential equipment to the 
battlefield as close as possible to the men who needed it. A number of containers were 
developed capable of carrying weapons, radios and general stores. These could be 
dispatched via the same aperture as the parachutist or from the bomb racks of support 
aircraft. The various types of container and their functions have already been described 
in detail elsewhere but again a brief examination of the scale of supply is ýýarranted .18 
A section of ten men required two containers to be dropped with them containing their 
personal weapons and immediate ammunition requirements. A three-inch mortar 
section required four containers to carry the mortar, bombs and personal ýN capons of the 
men. 19 When the figures were aggregated and a scale for wastage and training was 
applied a parachute battalion required 274 containers of all types. 20 When viewed 
across the entire airborne force the War Office estimated the requirement for eighteen 
months added up to approximately 34,000 containers. 21 Although there was never 
apparently a shortage of containers, the quantities involved did generate an interesting 
debate. 
The provision of aircraft for airborne forces was clearly an Air Ministry responsibility 
while the equipment to be used by the soldiers on the ground belonged to the War 
Office. Containers had to fit onto or into aircraft but also had to be capable of carrying 
the Army's equipment hence the responsibility overlapped the two departments. The 
Air Ministry was positive that it bore the liability for the provision of all aircraft fittings 
including static lines, parachutes and containers and that the War Office was responsible 
for stating what needed to be carried within the containers. 22 The War Office did not 
dispute this but wished it to be confirmed that the Air Ministry was also responsible for 
the storage of containers. Gale, as the Commander of I Parachute Brigade cited the 
argument that the RAF accepted responsibility for airborne operations from 
embarkation until the troops landed on the DZ, therefore the RAF should hold the 
23 
containers on their airfields until required . This was a considerable undertaking as the 
average container was two metres long and nearly half a meter in diameter and some 
" Otway, Airborne Forces, pp. 407-409 and Weeks, Airborne Equipmem, pp. 46-49. 
19 NA, AIR 32/2, Notes on the Use of Parachute and Air-Bome 1'roops, 4 February 194 1. 
20 N A, AIR 39/36, CLE to HQ No. 70 Group RA F. 2 August 194 1. 
2' NA, AIR 20/2385, War Office to Air Ministry, 30 May 1942. 
22 NA, AIR 2/7470, ACAS to CAS. 24 June 1941. 
23 NA, AIR 39/36, Gale to WO. SD4,7 October 194 1. 
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were nearly double this size; the storage of 274 for a single battalion ýýould take up 
substantial space. Unsurprisingly. the RAF resisted this initiative suggesting, that 
24 containers should be held by the airborne units that were going to use them .A 
sensible compromise was reached and it was decreed that the Air Ministry would 
continue to be responsible for the research and provision of parachutes and containers 
and would also be responsible for the storage of parachutes. The War Office would be 
responsible for the storage of containers but the Air Staff agreed to examine the 
possibility of forming RAF holding and packing units to assist airborne units with this 
25 task . 
This relatively minor incident illustrates the schism that existed within the airborne 
equipment development domain. The Air Ministry was not interested in any airborne 
equipment that was not directly linked to the aircraft. Until the AFEE was formed this 
attitude permeated through to the CLE, which essentially had an RAI` chain of 
command. At the same time that Gale was arguing about the storage of containers the 
CLE's superior commander, AOC No. 70 Group RAF, reported, 'little thought or 
development work has yet been given to the special equipment required by the Airborne 
Brigade Group. ' 26 At this point, late in 1941, British airborne forces had already been 
committed to one minor operation and were expecting to be committed imminently to 
others and were busy training for these contingencies. Equipment faults and shortfalls 
were often identified during training and, with the CLE's apparent lack of progress in 
this area, it is unsurprising that the airborne troops themselves developed and adopted 
improvised solutions. Paratroops quickly realised that the container was not an ideal 
method of delivery for personal weapons. Lt Colonel Frost, the commanding officer of 
2 Battalion the Parachute Regiment described the problem. 
The drill was that the weapons containers were dropped either in front 
of the parachutists, or in the middle of a stick of parachutists, or at the 
end. This meant that before the parachutist could be effective he had 
to find the weapon containers in the dark, sort them out and extract the 
weapons. We had found that this was extremely difficult in practice 
14 N A. AIR 39/36, AC Conid to Gaic. 8 October 194 1. 
25 NA, AIR 39/36, DIVIC to AOC-in-CAC ComcL 15 October 194 1. 
26 NA, AIR 39/38, AOC No. 70 Group RAF to HQ AC Comd. 15 October 194 1. 
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and took a lot of valuable time. Indeed some containers were never 
found at all. 27 
Frost gives his own battalion the credit for creating the solution to this problem from its 
own resources although the official history acknowledges Major John Lander of 21 
Independent Parachute Squadron as the pioneer. Which ever is the case the kit-bag and 
valise certainly appear to be have been initially developed from within the front line 
rather than the development community. The kitbag was made of padded canvas and 
leather and was large enough to hold the Sten, radios and other small but bulky pieces 
of equipment. The valise was designed to hold a rifle or Bren. Both were attached to 
the paratrooper during embarkation and while in the aircraft. Once he had jumped a 
quick release was operated and the kitbag or valise was lowered on a rope 
approximately seven meters below the man. This meant that the weight of the 
equipment did not have an undue effect on the paratrooper during landing but his 
equipment was easily retrieved on the end of a rope. This system was successfully 
operated from mid- 1942 onwards although containers continued in service for larger 
28 items of equipment that were not required immediately on the DZ and for resupply. 
For all but the most limited raids an airborne force required more than its personal 
weapons to make any significant impact on the enemy, whether in attack or defence. 
Indirect fire support, mortars and artillery, was necessary to neutralise enemy positions 
prior to an assault and to disrupt and harass the enemy as they prepared to attack. Direct 
fire support, namely anti-tank weapons, was also required if an airborne force stood any 
chance of survival in the face of enemy equipped with armour. Anti-tank firepower was 
extremely limited during the early phases of development. Even dufing TORCH Frost 
complained that I Parachute Bfigade was woefully equipped with only the Boys anti- 
tank rifle and the gammon bomb. These were clearly inadequate weapons with which 
to fight any sort of armoured force. 29 The only option was to withdraw and preserve the 
airborne force to fight again . 
30 Issuing the Projector Infantry Anti-Tank 
(PIAT) gave paratroops some level of protection but with the introduction of gliders 
heavier anti-tank weapons could be delivered to the battlefield. Initiallv the two 
27 FrosL A Drop Too Alany. pp. 172-173. 
28 Otwav, A irborne Forces, pp. 98 & 410-411. 
29 French, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 88. 
30 Frost, A Drop Too Many, p. 7-5. 
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pounder anti-tank gun was allocated for use by airborne forces; however even by 194-1 
this gun was not sufficiently powerful enough to penetrate all but the lightest armour 
and it was never used operationally with airborne forces. The War Office was relatively 
successful at providing heavier weapons for airborne forces. The six pounder required 
only minor modifications to fit into the Horsa glider. A shortened axle width resLilted in 
the Six Pounder Carriage Mark Three. 31 The gun was issued to anti-tank sections 
within air-landing battalions and to specialist airborne anti-tank batteries of the Royal 
Artillery and was first flown into action during HUSKY and used in every following 
airborne operation until the end of the war. With its low profile and armour piercing 
sabot ammunition it was claimed to be the most effective anti-tank gun in service at the 
time . 
32 The seventeen pounder anti-tank gun's introduction into service fortunately 
coincided with that of the Hamilcar, the only glider capable of carrying the gun. As with 
personal weapons, the increase in firepower had inevitable consequences for the size 
and weight of the load., which in turn resulted in operational restrictions in that the 
Hamilcar required a larger LZ than the 11orsa. This principle is clearly demonstrated by 
the provision of indirect fire artillery to airborne forces. 
The gun initially allocated to airborne artillery units was the 3.7 inch mountain 
howitzer. This gun had been introduced into service in 1917; it weighed 773 kilograms 
and fired a nine kilogram shell 5490 metres. 33 It was quickly realised that a weapon 
with a greater weight of fire would be required and the obvious choice to supersede it 
was the twenty-five pounder. 34 Its ubiquity would simplify the logistics of ammunition 
resupply and it had a vastly superior range of 12,253 metres. However the gun was 
more than twice the weight of the mountain gun and just as significantly, despite it 
having a smaller calibre, its ammunition was almost twenty-five percent heavier. The 
twenty-five pounder required extensive modification before it could be flown in a 
Hamilcar and the effort to achieve this was considered excessive. 
35 VARSITY was the 
only operation in which the twenty-five pounder was flown forward when two guns 
were taken to fire smoke shells to spot targets for ground attack aircraft. Fortunately, an 
31 11. Chamberlain and T. Gander, Infantry, Alounlain and. 4irborne Guns (London: MacDonald and Janes. 
1975), p. 44. 
Q P. Wilkinson, The Gunners At Arnhem (Norhampton: Spurwing. 1999). p. 23. 
13 Chamberlain & (jander.. -firborne Guns, p. 46. 
34 NA, AIR 32/2, CLE to WO, SD4.15 January 1941. 
35 Weeks,. 4irborne Equipment, p. 85. 
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appropriate compromise became available in 1942 in the shape of the American 
seventy-five millimetre pack howitzer. The gun had been designed in 1920 but had 
only been recently modified by placing it on the M8 (airborne) carriage. At 610 
kilograms it was even lighter than the mountain gun and a third of the weight of the 
twenty-five pounder. The range of 8930 metres was considerably shorter than the 
twenty-five pounder but more than fifty percent greater than the mountain gun. The 
ammunition also weighed less than that of the mountain gun but was considerably less 
lethal than that of the twenty-five pounder. 36 Despite this, with its high level of 
accuracy, the seventy-five millimetre pack howitzer was considered superior in all 
respects to the mountain gun and was issued to all British airborne artillery units. 37 The 
gun was available for operations with airborne artillery units by D Day but only one 
battery (211 Light Battery Royal Artillery) was flown in during Operation MALLARD, 
38 the remainder coming ashore with the 'sea-tail' . In order to ensure that air transport 
was utilised in the most efficient manner the conflict between size and weight and 
firepower was pragmatically resolved in favour of the former. This is an important 
point as this compromise was only possible because the War Office owned the 
requirement and the resources to meet it. Due to this fact the General Staff could accept 
a reduction firepower in the knowledge that it would expedite the acquisition process. 
In order to be effective firepower had to be matched with mobility. It was widely 
accepted that airborne forces' advantage in strategic and operational mobility quickly 
disappeared once the troops landed . 
39 Their tactical mobility was severely limited, 
particularly during the first half of the war. During TORCH in particular a lack of 
transport was critical in not allowing the parachute units to carry sufficient fire support 
or to evacuate casualties . 
40 Efforts to increase the individual paratrooper's mobility 
were relatively simply achieved. Folding trolleys, bicycles and motorcycles were easily 
procured and simply delivered by container and parachute or glider. However, the fire 
support element required something more capable to move guns and ammunition. This 
also applied to headquarters and supporting arms such as engineers and medics that 
36 Chamberlain & Gander, Airborne Guns, pp. 52-53. 
37 Wilkinson, The Gunners, 41 Arnhem, p. 19. 
38 Otway, Airborne Forces, p. 174. 
39 LHCMA LH 15181148,. -Irmy Training Instruction No. 5. Employment of Parachute Troops, 1941. p. 3 
& NA. WO 231/126, Military Training Pamphlet No. 50, Airborne Troops, August 1941, p. 2. 
40 FrosLA Drop Tooilan. V, pp. 78 & 104. 
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would also have heavy equipment to move once on the battlefield. In 1941 the N eh ic les 
selected to fulfil this role were the militarised Austin Seven and Austin Ten and the 
fifteen hundred-weight truck; however the Austins were underpowered for purpose and 
did not see operational service .41 The Willys Jeep arrived, via the lend lease agreement. 
in time for minor adjustments to be made to the Horsa design to facilitate its carriage. It 
was in service with airborne units in time for HUSKY but only a few were deployed bý 
glider during the operation mainly to tow the six pounders. 42 The Jeep could also to%N 
the seventy-five millimetre guns and experiments were carried out to maximise its 
operating capacity. A shorter working life was accepted for the vehicle in order to 
allow it to carry and tow greater loads. 43 
Each arm and service modified the Jeep to fit its own purposes. Medics fitted racks to 
the front and rear on which stretchers could be placed to assist in the evacuation of 
casualties. One soldier recorded 'those Jeeps certainly took some punishment too, for 
they, like us were loaded to full capacity. We were kept busy for weeks making 
modifications to those Jeeps to adapt them for Airborne [forces]... Those Jeeps were the 
most useful and adaptable trucks produced in the War without a doubt. 44 The Jeeps 
were equipped with trailers to increase capacity. For the artillery, carriage of 
ammunition was a priority and each seventy-five millimetre gun was served by two 
45 
Jeeps and three trailers carrying a total of 137 shells per gun . The airborne REME 
divisional workshop managed to fit all of its required equipment into five trailers 
46 
including generators, lathes, drills, a water still, welding equipment and more . 
Despite its success the Jeep was not capable of towing heavier equipment such as the 
seventeen pounder. More powerful vehicles were required and the thirty hundred- 
weight truck was used as a limber. However, use of this vehicle, like the seventeen 
pounder itself, was predicated on the arrival of the Hamilcar. The Hamilcar had been 
designed to carry two Bren Carriers as a secondary requirement . 
47 These multi-purpose 
" NA, AIR 2/7470, Air Min to WO, 21 May 1941. 
42 Otway, ., I irborne 
Forces, pp. 120-12 1. 
43 ibid, p. 46. 
44 A. Blockwell, Diaiýv ofa RedDevil (Solihull: lielion, 2005), pp. 67-68. 
45 Wilkinson, The Gunners at Arnhem, p. 19. 
46 F. R. Bloor, The Second World War 1939-1945. Army. Royal Electrical and, ttechanical Engineers. 
Volume 11 -- Technical (London: War Office, 195 1), pp. 14-15. 47 NA, AIR 2/7470. Air Min to WO, 21 May 194 1. 
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carriers were issued down to battalion level where they did valuable ýý ork- taking 
forward ammunition and bringing casualties to the rear. 
The ultimate expression of mobility combined with firepower on the battlefield is the 
tank and as early as the autumn of 1940 the War Office had decided that, to be 
sufficiently effective, any airborne force would have to contain a proportion of 
armoured fighting vehicleS. 48 By mid-1941 the Vickers Mark VII light tank had been 
identified as suitable for use by airborne forces and the heavy glider specification was to 
be designed around this option. 49 The history and use of the Mark VII light tank, 
known as the Tetrarch, and its airborne successors has been recorded in detai I and does 
not need to repeated here. However, the development of the airborne tank does 
demonstrate another important principle that the War Office adopted. 50 By the end of 
1941 the Tetrarch, which had first been produced in 1938, was considered obsolete and 
it was accepted that development of a suitable replacement would be undertaken by the 
USA. The T9 (or M22) Locust light tank was proffered as the successor and, being 
slightly smaller than the Tetrarch, would fit inside the existing Hamilcar design. 
Concurrently Vickers-Arm strong were developing the design of their Mark Vill light 
tank, which became known as the Harry Hopkins. This design was better armoured and 
had a marginally more powerful engine than the Locust but was significantly wider and 
heavier by one ton. The Harry Hopkins began production in June 1942 and, as the 
successor to the Tetrarch, was put forward as a suitable airborne tank. 
By September 1942 Britain was still waiting for delivery of the first Locust. Gale 
wrote to Renwick suggesting that as the War Office had no evidence as to the suitabi I ity 
of the Locust, the Harry Hopkins should continue to be considered as a future airborne 
tank. Because its increased width and weight meant it could not be accommodated in 
the Hamilcar further investigations were required to look at alternatives to lift the tank. 51 
The Air Staff considered it absurd to even contemplate designing a new glider 
exclusively to carry the Harry Hopkins and in any case it would take at least two years 
52 to produce a new model . The Air Ministry saw no 
justification to proceed with the 
48 NA, AIR 32/2, summary of airborne brigade group, 26 September 1940. 
49 NA, AIR 2/7470, Air Min to WO, 21 May 1941. 
50 K. F lint. ,I irborne,, Irmour (London: Helion, 2004), pp. 9-34. 
51 NA. AIR 20/2829. Gale to Renwick, 3 September 1942. 
52 NA, AIR 20/2829, WAS to CRD Air Min, 15 September 1942 
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design of another glider and in the face of the evidence the "ar Office had to concur. 
Gale could either accept the fact that the Locust might not meet all of the airborne 
forces requirements but receive it now, or push for the marginally better Harry Hopkins 
but recognise that it could not be lifted for another two years. It was nearly always 
more efficient to accept and adapt current equipment to fit existing aircraft envelopes 
than it was to develop bespoke equipment which might then necessitate major aircraft 
design work. Once again the alignment of requirement and resources together in the 
War Office meant that compromises could be accepted to enable efficient acquisition. 
The airborne tanks never really achieved their predicted potential. The Airborne 
Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment with twenty Tetrarch tanks was landed in the Ome 
bridgehead on D Day and a handful of Locust tanks were landed on the east bank of the 
Rhine during VARSITY but neither action had any significant tactical impact. 
The final class of equipment to be examined presented distinct problems to airborne 
forces. The development of electronic equipment was still relatively immature at the 
outbreak of war. Radio communications would be vital to airborne troops who might 
find themselves scattered on a DZ and need to concentrate and coordinate their actions. 
The state of radio technology throughout the war made the provision of 
communications to airborne forces problematic and has since become the focus of 
attention in a good deal of the popular historiography. Radios of the period relied on 
valve and crystal technology, which was inherently fragile. 54 Ensuring that the 
equipment arrived into battle intact having descended by parachute or glider was not an 
easy proposition. Even with specialised containers it had to be expected that a large 
proportion of radio sets would be damaged beyond repair during delivery. This lead to 
radios being dropped in quantities two or three times higher than that actually required 
in order to try to ensure sufficient working equipment to service a workable network. 
As with the other equipment already described, the provision of radios necessitated a 
compromise between capability and size and weight. Although this was not necessarily 
a major factor between the radio sets themselves it became an issue when power was 
taken into consideration. As an example the No. ] 9 High Power (HP) radio set was 
ý3 NA. AIR 20/2829, VCAS to CRD Air Min. 28 September 1942. 
S4 For a description of the radios commonly used by British airborne forces during the Second World Nk ar 
scc Golden, L.. &-hoes From,, Irnhem (London: Kimber. 1984). pp. 139-169. 
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thirty times more powerful than the No-22 set and consequently could communicate 
over five times the range. Both radios were of comparable size and -ý'eight and both 
were Jeep mounted. However, the No. 19 HP radio had an accordingly higher current 
consumption than the No. 22 and a consequent requirement for more batteries and 
bigger, heavier charging equipment. Therefore, before MARKET GARDEN it ývas 
considered that these size and weight constraints outweighed the No. 19 HP set's 
obvious tactical advantages and hence only two sets were taken on the operation as 
opposed to dozens of No. 22 sets. 55 
Several memoirs illustrate failures in communications and their subsequent effect on 
operations. 56 The official history also stressed the fact that radio sets of the highest 
possible power should have been provided as one of the major lessons to be taken from 
airborne operations during the war. 57 However, airborne forces were hampered by 
exactly the constraints that impinged on the rest of the Army. As the Royal Signals 
official history clearly identifies; 
The ideal [radio] equipment [for airborne forces] had not only to 
give a higher performance than standard types, but had to be more 
portable or more easily transportable and at the same time be capable 
of withstanding very much rougher handling. Since these very same 
ideals had for many years been striven after to a large extent in the 
design of all new standard equipment there could be no rapid 
18 
solution. 
Where problems were blamed on inadequate communications they were in fact little 
different to those being experienced by the rest of the Army. At Arnhem during 
MARKET GARDEN, where communications constraints were identified as a factor in 
the overall failure of the operation, the culpability rested more with procedural 
shortcomings and a failure to adequately mitigate tactical risk than it did with technical 
equipment limitations. 59 
55 NA, WO 219/5137, Report on Operation MARKET GARDEN, Part 111, Index 1, December 1944. 
56 See as examples Urquhart, Arnhem, p. 47 and Frost,., l Drop Too. tfanv, pp. 
85-87. 
57 Otwa), Airborne h'orces, p. 388. 
58 R. F. H. Nalder, The Hislorý, Of British Armj, Signals In The Second World War (London: Royal ý ignals 
Institution, 1953), p. 290. 
59 J. W. Greenacre. 'Assessing the Reasons for Failure: I" British Airborne Division Signal 
Communications during Operation Market Garden', Defence Studies. Vol 4. No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 
283-308. 
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Whereas radio communications were often seen as a constraint during operations 
alternative electronic equipment was recognised as an indispensable enabler. From 
April 1940 Bomber and Coastal Commands had been developing a radar beacon and 
transponder to assist navigation, allow aircraft to automatically locate a position on the 
land or sea and to facilitate a degree of identification for friendly aircraft. The 
corresponding pieces of equipment were code named Rebecca and Eureka. Towards the 
end of 1941 the AFEE began to see the potential of the system to aid the location of 
DZs and LZs from approaching aircraft particularly at night or in poor weather. The 
AFEE approached MAP requesting collaboration on development and soon after the 
first trials were successfully conducted. 60 It would appear from the primary evidence 
that from this point onwards the AFEE took the lead in further development ahead of 
Bomber and Coastal commands. The system was released for use on special operations 
in April 1942 and was first fitted to airborne forces aircraft in the August of the same 
year. The Eureka beacon fitted into the normal paratrooper's kit bag and was carried 
down onto the DZ by advance paratroopers (pathfinders) where it was then assembled 
and switched on in order to guide in the rest of airborne formation. An aircraft carrying 
the Rebecca transponder flying at 2,000 feet could expect to home in on the beacon 
from eight to twelve miles away. 
The system went through a number of iterations described in the official history and 
became an essential aid during airborne operations. 
61 Where the equipment was not 
used, failed or broke, the results were often significant if not disastrous. The failure of 
FRES14MAN in November 1942 was directly attributed to the malfunction of Rebecca 
62 
in the aircraft involved. During HUSKY the system was not used as the equipment 
did not arrive in North Africa in time to be fitted to the aircraft. Although its absence is 
not directly referred to in the post operational report it can be assumed that it did have 
an effect. Only thirty-nine of the 104 aircraft carrying I Parachute Brigade that reached 
the area of the DZ managed to drop their paratroopers within half a mile of the target. 
63 
Again, in Normandy, smashed and faulty Eureka beacons lead to very scattered drops in 
60 NA, AVIA 15/573, AFEE to MAP, 22 October 1941. 
61 Ot%N ay, Airborne Forces, pp. 405-406. 
62 IWM, K. 9996/363, papers of I Airborne Divisional I-ngineers & Wiggan, R., Operafion Freshman 
(London: Kimber. 1986), p. I 11. 
63 Otwaý. Airborne Forces, p. 127. 
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the dark during the early hours of D Day. 9 Parachute Battalion was dropped over fiftý 
square miles and could gather less than a third of its strength for its attack on the 
Merviile Battery. 64 
Despite these minor setbacks the provision of support equipment to British airborne 
forces was generally successful. It was therefore not on the critical path to successful 
airborne development. Excluding the references to the lack of heavy firepower and 
mobility during TORCH there are few accounts of deficiency or inadequacy having any 
direct impact on training or operations. It has to be recognised that much of the 
equipment required was a variation of that already in service elsewhere in the Army and 
therefore the technical and engineering challenges were relatively simple. 
Notwithstanding this the main factor behind the achievement was that the War Office 
owned the requirement and the majority of the resources to fulfil it. This allowed the 
General Staff to compromise, improvise and allocate effort and materiel as necessary in 
order to meet the aim. Where the War Office did not have effective oversight of the 
supply process, such as with parachutes and containers, it appears probable that the 
requirement was over estimated, either inadvertently or deliberately and therefore 
shortages and delays never caused difficulty. 
Underpinning the equipment development procedures the General Staff adopted two 
important, linked principles. First, a less than ideal level of equipment capability, 
especially firepower, had to be accepted in order to meet the constraints of weight and 
size imposed by transport by air. Second, it was more expedient to adapt and modify 
current in-service equipment to fit existing aircraft envelopes than it was to produce 
bespoke airborne equipment that might then require major aircraft design work. With 
these principles established the General Staff investigated and accepted several different 
methods of procurement. As an early measure existing equipment was accepted into 
service with airborne forces even though it was clearly unfit for purpose or obsolete. 
The adoption of the two pounder anti-tank rifle and the Austin Seven are examples of 
this process, which allowed airborne troops to develop training, tactics and procedures 
while more suitable equipment was procured or modified. Development was accepted 
from the bottom upwards and innovation introduced in front line units was often 
adopted as standard equipment. This widened the experimental base to encompass 
64Crookenden, Drop--one Normandy, p. 189 & 204-205. 
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much of the pioneering work that was taking place during training and eýen on 
operations. 
Where new or improved equipment was required the General Staff recognised the 
value of collaboration in order to expedite procurement. The airborne communit\ 
worked with the other services, for example Coastal and Bomber Command RAF in the 
case of Rebecca and Eureka, and with other nations such as the USA in the case of the 
seventy-five millimetre pack howitzer and the Jeep, in order to bring suitable equipment 
into service with reduced effort. The link with American airborne forces was verý' 
important in this respect and was developed throughout the war. From 1943 regular 
liaison letters were exchanged between the British Army Staff in Washington and the 
War Office dealing specifically with the development of airborne equipment. 6 Th is 
collaboration was reciprocal and America took an increasing interest in British 
developments although the method of liaison was not flawless and significant advances 
on one side of the Atlantic were still occasionally overlooked on the other as late as 
66 
mid-1944 . Despite these lapses the War Office had created a system of procuremcnt 
for airborne equipment that had multiple points of supply and therefore where one failed 
others were still available to be drawn upon. Due to this approach, the relatively 
undemanding technical and engineering challenges and, most significantly, the ability to 
direct the allocation of resources to meet the requirement, the provision and quality of 
equipment to support airborne forces on the ground did not adversely impinge on 
training or operations during the course of development. 
3.2 The Availability of Support and Transport Aircraft 
In contrast to the situation surrounding personal and support equipment, the War Office 
had very little control over the provision of aircraft to support airborne forces during 
training and operations. The General Staff were entirely reliant on the attitude and 
efforts of the Air Ministry and MAP. By their own admission. the Air Staff s attitude to 
the provision of transport aircraft during the early part of the war was 'based more upon 
expediency than in conformity with our desired principles. 167 They regarded the 
6S NA. WO 233/10, British Army Staff. Washington to War OtIlicc. 30 November 1943 as an examplc. 
1,6 NA. WO 233/10, British ArrnN Staff. Washington to War Officc. I April 1944. 
67 NA, AIR 20/2926, VCAS, 21 August 1941. 
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Arrny's constant requests for air transport with irritation. Vice Chief of the Air Staff 
(VCAS) Air Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman wrote to CAS statino, 'I am unýý illino that Z-- - 
the Army should raise the question of special transport aircraft, modification to 
bombers, and so forth. Special transport aircraft is -buzzing in the General Staffs 
bonnet" at the present time, and if we are not careful we will find a big proportion of 
our heavy bomber capacity set aside for the production of this particular -bee-. "" 
Despite this attitude the Air Ministry was proactive in providing guidelines for support 
to airborne forces early in the development process. Two principles were laid down to 
guide the provision of support to the training of airborne troops. The first, determined 
that aircraft could not be provided solely for the development of airborne forces, 
parachute dropping had to be an alternative role only. The second principle stated that 
aircraft used in training should also be available and capable of being used during 
airborne operations. It would be pointless to train with one aircraft, no matter how 
suitable, if it could not be employed during operations . 
69 This pragmatic approach 
appears to contradict the Air Staff s active resistance to airborne development-, however 
their motives were not entirely benevolent and having set these criteria they then 
maintained that there was only one aircraft that could fi II them. 
Six Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys had been sent to the CLS at Ringway shortly after 
70 
its establishment in June 1940 . It was admitted that the 
Whitley was far from ideal 
technically. The paratroops had to leave through a hole in the floor, a difficult and 
sometimes dangerous procedure. The best method of exiting an aircraft was through 
large doors in the side of the fuselage as preferred by the Germans with their Junkers 
52. This was recognised and the Air Ministry examined side door options including the 
de Havilland Frobisher and Flamingo (and its military variant the Hertfordshire) and the 
Bristol Bombay. None of these aircraft were deemed to be suitable due to obsolescence 
or technical difficulties concerning the size and position of the exit door. 
71 Despite 
these aircraft types being discounted at this early stage their suitability continued to be a 
matter of debate. The Hertfordshire in particular continued to be offered as a suitable 
platform for airborne forces by those closelý: involved in development. With some 
(38 NA. AIR 20/2926. l-'reeman to Sinclair, 14 April 1942. 
69 NA. AIR 2ýý73-')8,1) Plans. 12 August 1940. 
70 Wood, .I Noble 
Pair of Brolhers. p. 14. 
71 NA. AIR 1,7338. D I'lans, 12 August 1940 
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modification it was believed that the aircraft would be satisfactorý and that the requisite 
numbers could be found for small-scale operations: however, it was accepted that 
72 
modified bombers would still be required for large-scale operation S. In this case, in 
order to meet the Air Ministry's second principle two very different types of aircraft 
would have to be operated in the training environment. This burden was not acceptable 
at this early stage of development. It has been suggested that there was no good reason 
why the Handley Page Harrow could not have been utilised but the Air Ministrý's 
73 figures show only fifteen of these aircraft available in Britain in early 1941 . 
Moreover, MAP's prognosis for aircraft production did not include the Hertfordshire or 
the Harrow. Therefore while there might have been sufficient aircraft for small-scale 
operations and limited training there would have been no possibility of sustaining or 
replacing damaged or destroyed aircraft. The case for the Hertfordshire and other 
similar aircraft types ebbed away. 
What then were the alternatives? The ideal scenario would be the procurcment of a 
bespoke aircraft specifically designed for airborne operations. A set of key 
specifications had been listed: '(i) Long range; without auxiliary tanks. (ii) Low 
stalling speed. (iii) Accommodation for at least 10 men with their equipment. (iv) 
Easy exits (side doors being the best). (v) Availability in large numbers. (vi) Should 
be armed for its own defence. (vii) Should have bornbcells to carry containers. ' 74 
However, bearing in mind Beaverbrook's production priorities the probability of getting 
such a requirement acknowledged and then having the aircraft designed and 
manufactured was low. The Air Ministry maintained that for some considerable time a 
specialist aircraft suitable for parachute operations could not have been developed and 
produced in quantity without serious prejudice to the production of aircraft required for 
other purposes. 75 MAP, supporting the Air Staff in this case, was entirely opposed to 
designing a new transport aircraft and preferred old and obsolete bombers to be used for 
transport and thus for airborne forces. Despite the associated technical and engineering 
challenges being relatively low, the ministry cautiously estimated four years as the time 
72 N. ý\. AIR 39/3811, AOC-in-C No. 70 Group, 9 April 1941. 
73 Buckingham. Paras. p. 102-103 and NA. AIR 20/2926. Aircraft., \\, ailable in R., \I-' transport squadrons. 
'I August 194 1. 
74 NA, AIR 32/'2, Parachute and Airborne Forces. 4 Fcbruarý 1941. 
75 NA. AIR 3212. meeting held at the Air Min, 5 Scptember 1940. 
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76 taken to produce a completely new type of transport aircraft . By 1942 British 
production of transport aircraft was negligible and arrangements for the production of 
future transport aircraft had not even reached the design stage. It was judged unsound 
to initiate plans for the production of transport aircraft in Great Britain at this point in 
time. 77 It was a question of priority and since the Air MinistrNr and MAP controlled the 
resources the War Office could do little to change the situation. 
Since the prospects of indigenous production of a bespoke aircraft were negligible in 
the short and medium term another option was required to fulfil Britain's air transport 
and airborne requirements. Portal believed that the most promising method of 
achieving their needs would be to exert pressure on the Americans to expand the 
production of their transport aircraft, rather than to attempt to modify the British aircraft 
production programme . 
78 Keyes had already identified the American Douglas DC-2 
and DC-3 as very suitable aircraft for airborne forces early on in the development 
proceSS. 79 The military descendant of these aircraft, the Douglas C47 (or Dakota to the 
British), was part of an American programme that the Air Ministry estimated was 
planned to manufacture 7,000 transport aircraft in the short to medium term. 80 The 
COS Committee agreed that the Dakota was probably the most suitable aircraft 
available for work with airborne forces but towards the end of 1942 Portal was forced to 
admit that it would probably be some time before the RAF received sufficient of them 
for the purpose even if the Americans could be persuaded to allocate them. He 
proposed to wait and deal with the requirement when Britain put forward to the 
Americans its entire needs for aircraft for 1943 onwards. It was clear that even by mid- 
1943 there would be insufficient Dakotas, or equivalent aircraft, with which to drop and 
tow the projected numbers of airborne troops and gliders required for future operations 
and training. Therefore prior to that period, as Portal had to admit, *there is, I'm afraid, 
no alternative to the Whitley. 81 
In mid- 1940 the Whitley had been singled out as one of five aircraft types on which 
the main effort of manufacture might be concentrated in order to maximise the 
7(, N A. AIR 2/7882, COS (42) 142 nd meeting, 6 May 1942. 
77 NA. AIR 2/7882, meeting held in the Air Ministry. 28 May 1942. 
78 NA. CAB 121/97, War Cabinet staff conference. 6 klaý 1942. 
79 NA. CA13 120/262. Kc\cs to Churchill, 27 Julý 1940. 
80 N A, CA 13 121/97, War Cabi nct sta IT con Icrence, 6N1 1942. 
81 NA. PREM 3/32/4, Portal to Churchill, 5 October 194-1. 
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acceleration of production. 82 Armstrong Whitworth was, with other manufacturers. 
instructed to continue production on current aircraft types, such as the Whitley, rather 
than increasing the manufacture of new types like the Manchester. 83 Despite this order 
84 the Air Ministry and others regarded the Whitley as alread-v obsolete in 1940 . The 
RAF was eagerly anticipating the arrival of their modem four engine bombers. 
Agreeing to release Whitleys was therefore a means of meeting the requirements of the 
Prime Minister's order to begin the development of airborne forces without seriouslý 
jeopardising the Air Staff s immediate plans for expansion of the bomber force in order 
to ensure the success of their core doctrine. Very early on in the development process 
the Whitley was identified by those having to operate with it as 'thoroughly 
unsatisfactory'. Keyes pointed out its failings to Churchill. 
[The Whitley] can carry only 8 men, who would have to sit 
throughout the passage overseas, huddled up in the bomb tube in (Treat 
discomfort, and then drop through the middle of a small hole, with no 
margin for error in poise, conditions which are calculated to damp the 
light hearted enthusiasm with which these young men volunteered for 
a hazardous adventure. 85 
The first fatality after only a few weeks of training at Ringway did nothing to improve 
that enthusiasm. The first few Whitleys used for airborne training had been 
retrospectively fitted for the task in an ad hoc manner. From the spring of 1941 the 
Whitley V came into production with integral fittings for airborne operations and the 
capacity rose from eight to ten men. Notwithstanding this improvement, it was 
projected that if every available Whitley was committed to airborne operations only 600 
to 700 paratroops could be dropped, a figure far short of Churchill's 5 '000.86 If airborne 
development was to maintain a desired rate of progress more aircraft would be needed. 
With no likelihood of receiving specialist transport aircraft before 1943 the only viable 
option was to expand reliance on the bomber force. 
Naturally the Air Ministry resisted the suggestion that more of their bombers might be 
rnarginalized by their use by airborne forces. It maintained that it had already 
82 NA, AIR 20/4078, WAS to I follis, 25 MaN 1940. 
83 NA, AIR 20/4078, meeting bet\Necn Air Min and MAP, 15 Ma\ 1940. 
14 NA. AIR 19/168, Air Min to MAP. 28 July 1940. 
85 NA, CAB 1201202. Kews to Churchill. 27 Julý 1940. 
So NA. CA13 1201202. DCO to COS Committee secretariat. 231 August 1940. 
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investigated the use of the Shorts Stirling, Handley Page Halifax and the Manchester for 
airborne operations and had found them incompatible. It reluctantly conceded that the 
CLE could conduct its own investigations into the suitabilit" of these new tN pes of 
bombers as long as this did not involve any permanent allotment of aircraft to Ringway 
and the work did not take precedence over operational requirements . 
8' The Air Staff 
was acutely aware of the interference that continuous modifications caused to tile flow 
of MAP and industry's production programmes. 88 The Air Ministry might have been 
expected to mount a more active resistance to this measure although it is probable that 
the Air Staff knew that passive resistance would be enough to ensure that the allocation 
of bombers to airborne forces never reached proportions where it would seriously 
impinge on the strategic offensive. 
Converting or modifying any aircraft once it is in service, while not technically 
difficult, presented serious engineering challenges. As the Air Ministry's Director of 
Operational Requirements (DOR) observed, it was a 'problem which involves 
considerably more than providing seats for the men and space to accommodate 
equipment. '89 Apparently minor alterations took up a disproportionate amount of time 
and effort and many were required before a bomber could be used to drop paratroops. 
Lights in the cabin to indicate the time to drop had to be fitted and connected to the 
cockpit, intercom from cabin to cockpit was required, rigging lines had to be fitted for 
parachute static line attachment, floors had to be raised and reinforced and a dispatch 
hole had to be built. The process could be accelerated in some cases, such as providing 
rear cabin dim lighting, by purchasing 'off the shelf equipment that could be 
temporarily fitted and removed as required. In others progress was tortuously slow; it 
took eight months to make a decision on the type of rubber matting to fit in the cabin in 
order to make the flight more comfortable for the paratroops. 
90 Additionally there was 
one overriding consideration that could render any modifications futile no matter how 
carefully considered. DOR commented once again. 
87 NA, AIR 39/18/1, DMC to AOC-in-C AC Comcl, 7 March 1941. 
88 I'lostan. British War Production. p. 34 1. 
89 NA, AIR 2/7566. Air Min DOR to DMC. 5 l, 'cbruar\ 194-1. 
90 NA. AIR 39/83. correspondcncc from 29 June 1942 to 2 February 1943. 
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It should be impressed upon the War Office that aeroplanes are 
delicately balanced craft which cannot be loaded like Arm,, lorries NN ith 
space as the only limitation. Carefully prepared loading with 
scientifically designed stowages to limit movement during flight are 
indispensable. It requires much elaborate calculation trials and 
technical investigation and the preparation of numerous varied loading 
tables for each type. 9' 
Conducting centre of gravity trials required a huge amount of technical staff effort and a 
lcngthy period of time, particularly when the Air Ministry was reluctant to release 
92 
aircraft . 
The CLE was first given clearance to begin trials on the Vickers Well Ington la, Ic and 
II in May 194 1. This work was to cover 'technical details of the structural alterations 
necessary to convert the Wellington from normal operational work to the role of 
paratroop dropping' and 'air tests with dummy and live troops and full load tests to 
determine the effect under all conditions of the centrc of gravity. 93 It was not until 
June 1942, thirteen months later, that the trials were complete and the Wellington was 
finally given clearance to conduct parachute operations and training. 94 Even then the 
aircraft was only cleared to carry and drop eight paratroops, a capacity inferior to that of 
the Whitley at that time. In response to this I Parachute Brigade ran its own in-service 
trials a month later and concluded that it was perfectly practicable to operate sticks of 
95 
ten men with four containers out of the Wellington . Commander I Parachute Brigade 
urged the AFEE to verify the findings and amend the official aircraft release, which was 
96 
eventually issued in November 1942 . Therefore the entire process took eighteen 
months. 
Even when an aircraft was finally cleared for parachuting it did not necessarily result 
in a commensurate improvement in its availability for training and operations bý, 
airborne forces. The parachute role was always considered secondary: even the 
'obsolete' Whitley had been primarily allocated to Coastal Command by the Air Staff 
91 NA, AIR 2/7566. ibid. 
92 NA, AIR 21/57. This file contains approximately fifty pages ofcalculations, diagrams and tables 
pertaining to Just one modi fication for the Whitley. 
QI NA, AIR 39/82, CLEý 12 klaý 1941. 
04 NA. AIR 39/82, Air Min DOR to AOC-in-C AC Comd. 18 June 1942. 
95 NA, AIR 39/83. Commander I Parachute Brigade, 20 Jul, 19421. 
96 NA, AIR 39/83. Air Min DOR to AOC-in-C AC Comd, 8 No%ember 19422. 
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for anti-U Boat operations. The Air Ministry maintained that it would be difficult to 
concentrate parachute dropping Whitleys in one or two bomber squadrons without 
involving a double move for each replacement aircraft. It was considered that the 
administrative difficulties of concentrating parachute aircraft in one or mo squadrons 
outweighed the training and operational advantages. 97 As Whitlcy Vs left the 
production line they were allocated wherever the Air Ministry believed the priority lay. 
This meant the modified aircraft were spread across the RAF and were difficult to 
concentrate for training or operations. Prioritisation continued to cause impact even 
though the engineering problems had been surmounted. The situation was only 
alleviated when dedicated RAY formations were committed to airborne operations and 
even then the aircraft were frequently committed to other activities. 98 
The technical and engineering challenges of the modification programme NN ere 
exacerbated by organisational limitations. Initially work was restricted by the 
improvised nature of the technical trials, development and experimentation 
establishment at the CLS. When the CLS was expanded to the CLE an Experimental 
Flight was established alongside TDS. 99 These departments, responsible for all trials, 
were still based on a minimum and clearly inadequate level of manpower. The TDS, 
run by a civilian Chief Technical Officer, was split between two productive sections, 
one run by a Senior Technical Officer (STO) and the other by an Engineering Officer. 
Under the former was a small trials section, just a handful of civilian and military 
officers to prepare, set up and report on aircraft trials. The Engineering Officer had one 
subordinate officer, Flight Lieutenant Pithkelly, to work as Contractors' Liaison and 
Modifications Officer, a single man to act as the point of contact between the CLE and 
the numerous manufacturers nationwide who would have to embody all the 
modifications that had been trialled and recommended. All of those trials had to be 
carried out by the Experimental Flight made up of a Flight Lieutenant and a handful of 
pilots. 100 This small organisation struggled to cope with the mass of experimental ýNork 
that was required in these early stages of development. 
97 NA. AIR 39/82. DMC to AOC-jn-C AC Comd, 15 July 1941. 
98 Kenneth Frere, letter to the author, 19 Ma) 2005. Mr Frere was an RAF pilot fl)ing with 38 Group 
RAF and confirms that during this period he was employed 
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With the expanded establishment of the AFEE the Engineering Officer gained his own 
workshop with one hundred and eighteen technicians. There was also a separate 
dedicated Design Section and Glider Trials also had their own TDS. Flight Lieutenant 
Pithkelly was now one of two officers responsible for parachute aircraft technical 
instructions. The same section had dedicated officers working on aircraft loading and 
accommodation and aircraft calculations. This section now had its own experimental 
flight to fly trials solely to test parachute aircraft modifications. 10, The trials process 
does appear to have improved in the second half of 1942 as a result of the formation of 
the AFEE. The level of activity certainly increased as the Armstrong Whitworth 
Albemarle, Avro Lancaster, Halifax, Manchester and others were all cleared for 
airborne operations between mid-] 942 and spring 1943. 
In addition to internal organisational limitations, the CLS, CLE and AFEE also had to 
deal with inter-departmental friction. This was essentially due to a lack of coordination 
across the many ministries and departments necessarily involved in developing aircraft 
capable of being used by airborne forces. With the Air Ministry, the War Officc, MAP 
and the Ministry of Supply all involved no single ministry was given a clear lead role. ' 02 
This lead to nugatory work being carried out by both MAP and the War Office as each 
independently tried to coordinate the aircraft modification programme. MAP was 
directing work to be carried out by aircraft manufacturers without any clear knowledge 
of the War Office's detailed requirements for airborne forces. Concurrently, the War 
Office was making assumptions in its planning of airborne development without any 
technical experience of aircraft capabilities. The CLE was the natural point at which 
these conflicts could be resolved but prior to the formation and separation of the A FEE 
the establishment at Ringway was inadequate to coordinate the often opposing 
standpoints. 
Given the nature of the dilemma it is not surprising that the Air Ministry and MAP 
gained the upper hand over the War Off ice with the Airborne Division being portraycd 
as offenders. The MAP technical staff complained of a general lack of co-ordination 
and were doubtful that production would be ready in time. There was also a feeling that 
the War Office did not fully appreciate the limitations in loading placed on the whole 
101 NA. T 162/755. establishment ol'AFFT'_ undated. 
102 NA, AVIA 1511530. ACAS'rechnical to Air Ministry. 18 February 1942. 
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modification project because of the essential need to balance the aircraft. MAP Ný as 
extremely hesitant of the possibility that a flood of fresh requirements would ensue as 
the Army began to obtain more experience in the field. 103 The Airborne Division NNas 
accused of trying to bypass the official process for conducting trials and getting 
modifications accepted. 
Both the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Air Ministry are 
frequently faced with most embarrassing situations owing to the 
enormous amount of 'backdoor' business which goes on between the 
various Ministries and between the Army and Air Force Departments and 
Headquarters concerned with Airborne Forces and their equipment. As 
often as not these backdoor approaches are made with the object of 
getting something done more quickly than could be expected by the 
official channels and equally frequently the essential partner is short 
circuited. The result of course is confusion. With three Ministries 
concerned,, any departure from official methods requires very careful 
handling. There also seems to be a strong belief among those concerned 
with the operation of Airborne Forces that ordinary Service technical 
procedures are not applicable to their novel equipment. 104 
Considering I Airborne Brigade's independent trials with the Wellington this criticism 
appears justified. The AFEE was warned against accepting these approaches and was 
ordered to co-operate with the Airborne Division in an advisory role only. They were 
able to discuss projects with the Division and advise them regarding the practicability of 
their ideas. However, the AFEE was not empowered to take on experimental work on 
behalf of the Airborne Division. 105 An attempt at the end of 1941 to formalise the 
methods and responsibilities for trials and conversions had not yielded any benefit. ' 06 
Once again the formation of the AFEE appears to have improved the situation and 
complaints and comments receded from mid-] 942. At the end of 1942 DMC accepted 
his department as being formally responsible for coordinating all technical airborne 
requirements, stating that only those requirements placed with DMC would be accepted 
and placed on the official list. DMC sought to reassure the War Office whilst warning 
them against continuing to bypass the system when he wrote 'I realise that a good deal 
103 NA. AVIA 1511530. Air Ministrý DTD to Air Ministrý CRD, 18 February 1942. 
104 NA, AIR 2/7566, ACASTechnical to AOC-in-C AC Comd, 23 December 1942. 
105 NA. AVIA 15/ 1530, ACAS Technical to CLE, 21 Februarý 1942. 
10" NA. AIR 2/7566. niecting held at AFEE, 18 November 1941. 
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of useful development is obtained by direct contact betýýeen members of the Airborne 
Division and manufacturers. While not proposing to damp anýbod, -'s enthusiasm. I 
suggest that no official cognisance should be taken of requirements which do not come 
through official channels. " 07 The War Office accepted this approach and adhered to 
DMC's suggested method of categories and priorities for organising airborne technical t: - 
requirements. 
108 
Regardless of these improvements in organisation and coordination it ýN as becoming 
clear that reliance on the bomber force to transport and drop Britain's airborne forces 
was not only going to prove highly inefficient but was not going to achieve the numbers 
required. The COS Committee was appraised of the situation in April 1942. By this 
time the Whitley was considered obsolete and only suitable for training, hence it was 
omitted from any projected calculations. The Wellington and Avro Lancaster 
conversion programme therefore determined the numbers of paratroops that could be 
dropped during an operation. It was estimated that by I May 1942 enough Wcllingtons 
would be converted to drop 500 men, this number rising to 820 by 15 May. By I June 
Iý 150 paratroops could be dropped by Wellington with a further 450 being dropped by 
Lancaster although this was subject to successful completion of trials. Finally, by I 
July it was projected that a total force of 2,700 could be lifted and dropped, 2,000 in 
Wellingtons and 700 in Lancasters (still subject to the trial results). 109 Although this 
figure met the War Office requirement of being able to operate 2,500 paratroops by 31 
July 1942 it still only equated to a single parachute brigade and required twenty 
squadrons of heavy and medium bombers in order to achieve it. 
' 10 As Britain's airborne 
forces continued to grow towards plus of two divisions a more efficient means of 
transport had to be found. 
The range of Douglas transport aircraft had already been identified as ideal airborne 
aircraft and the USA was acknowledged as the most effective source for procurement. 
The initial proposal for procuring Douglas DC-2s and DC-3s involved Churchill trying 
to influence the Dutch government in order to put pressure on KLM to donate their fexN 
Douglases stranded in Britain. It was estimated that at least 1,500 Douglas aircraft vý ere 
107 NA. AIR 2/7566. In\ estigation of Requirements, DMC to War Office (Air 2). 28 Octobcr 1942. 
N., V AIR 2/7566. meeting to discuss airtx)me forces requirements. 5 Decemtx-r 1942. 
109 NA. CAB 121/97. COS, (42) 122 "d meeting. 17 April 1942. 
110 NA, AIR 2/7470, ACAS (Policy), 24 April 1942. 
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employed in civil aviation worldwide. As an alternative to the KLM plan consideration 
was given to purchasing a number of these aircraft. "' Despite Churchill agreeing to 
approach the Dutch government these initial attempts to obtain Douglas aircraft were 
unsuccessful. Even if a number had been secured the Air Staff believed that the 
employment of these aircraft on the Trans-Africa route was of greater militarý- 
importance than support to airborne forces. " 2 In fact the first American aircraft to be 
used by British airborne forces were not from Douglas. The Consolidated Liberator alid 
Lockheed Hudson were the first candidates for airborne duty in m id- 1941 . 
113 B 
October of that year examples of each aircraft had been secured for trials. 114 However 
both aircraft suffered from the same limitations as the British bombers. Neither was 
designed as a transport aircraft and both required extensive modification, which yielded 
only a poor capacity of eight to ten paratroops. ' 15 
It was the Douglas aircraft's capacity that made it particularly suitable and attractive 
for airborne operations and with the production of the C-47 Dakota a military variant 
was available. All that was required was to persuade the USA to hand them over to the 
RAF in sufficient quantities. Initial enquiries into the possibilities of aircraft production 
in the USA began very soon after Churchill became Prime Minister but in mid- 1940 
these were mostly informal and did not include any reference to transport aircraft. 
concentrating instead unsurprisingly on fighters and bombers., 16 On 7 December 1940 
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt stating that Britain could no longer pay cash for war 
supplies and asked the President to extend aid beyond that which could be immediately 
117 
paid for. Congress passed the Lend Lease Bill in January 1941 . The Lend Lease 
programme would not bear fruit for many months and in the interim negotiations were 
taking place to release to Britain aircraft that had been financed under US Army 
appropriations. Slessor chaired these negotiations for the British beginning in 
... NA, CAB 120/262, Keyes to Churchill, 27 July 1940. 
112 NA. AIR 2/7338, D Plans, 12 August 1940. 
113 NA, AIR 2/7470, Air Ministry, DOR, 25 July 1941. 
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116 NA, AIR 19/168, British Consul General, NeN% York to MAP. 27.1ulN 1940. 
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December 1940. The 'Slessor Agreement' apportioned over mentý five thousand 
aircraft worth nearly two billion dollars to be delivered hy the Americans to Britain bý 
June 1942. Only 147 transport aircraft, all Dakotas, were included in this total. 118 In 
fact these figures were 'unduly optimistic' and monthly production in the USA did not 
achieve even half that required to reach the projected totals by June 1942.119 with 
transport aircraft afforded such a low priority their production was bound to suffer. In 
fact, there is no evidence that any of this initial order for Dakotas was delivered. 
Further bids for transport aircraft do not appear to have been made until the spring of 
1942. In April CAS stated that 312 transport aircraft had been ordered from the USA 
for delivery during 1942. A month later Portal assured Browning that 650 aircraft 
would be delivered during the year but contradicted himself by warning those involved 
in airborne development that they would be deluding themselves if they imagined that 
these aircraft would be available by the end of 1942.120 The first Dakota equipped for 
parachute dropping would not be delivered to the AFFE for initial trials until Alq List 
1942 at the earliest and as the initial trickle of aircraft began to arrive those trials 
imposed further delays. 121 
To date British paratroopers had been despatched through a hole in the floor of their 
aircraft. The side door exit of the Dakota required minor modifications and then 
extensive trials in order to ensure that British parachute equipment, which differed from 
American, could be operated safely. New parachute drills had to be written. This work 
took place between August and October 1942 although the final report was not released 
until March 1943.122 The consequence of these delays was that the Dakota was not 
available for operations with the RAF in appreciable numbers until the formation of 
Number 46 Group on 17 January 1944. This fact, coupled with a lack of suitable 
bombers available in North Africa at the end of 1942, meant that during the airborne 
operations as part of TORCH British paratroops had to jump from United States Arm\ 
118 NA. AIR 20/2905, British Air Commission (BAC) to MAP, 29 March 1941. Although this figure 
appears loxN one hundred and forty seven Dakotas would equate to a lift of 3.675 paratroopers, 
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Air Force (USAAF) aircraft of 51 Wing. These operations were characterised b.,, Poor 
air planning, confusion on the mounting airfields and drops that were scattered and not 
entirely accurate. Despite their best efforts much of this can be blamed on 51 Wing. 
which did not have sufficient experience with British troops and had an inadequate 
combined airborne-air ground base organisation. 123 It was largely luck that prevented 
higher casualties on the drop zones. 
The flow of aircraft to Britain steadily increased to monthly deliveries of t,, \ cnty-fiý c 
to forty-five aircraft from the end of 1942 and into 1943.124 However the RAF Dakota 
never quite achieved the ubiquity with which it has often been credited .1 
25 Taking the I 
British Airborne Division fly-in to Arnhem during MARKET GARDEN as an example. 
on initial examination it would appear that the Dakota bore the bulk of the workload 
with approximately sixty percent of the 1,089 aircraft that flew troops and equipment in 
being of that type. Among the aircraft dropping paratroops dominance was almost total 
with ninety-seven percent of the aircraft being Dakotas. However all of these aircraft 
came from the USAAF; none were flown by the RAF. When the figures for re-supply 
flights are scrutinized the picture is different. Of the 611 re-supply sorties flown by the 
RAF less than forty percent were flown by Dakota the rest being by Stirling. 120 The 
situation was similar with glider towing sorties with only thirty-six percent being flown 
by Dakota, the remainder being flown by a variety of bomber types. 127 This 
arrangement of aircraft, with practically all paratroops being dropped by Dakota while 
bombers towed the majority of gliders, represents an efficient solution. In terms of 
carrying paratroops the Dakota was two and a half times more efficicnt than the 
bombers in this role while one aircraft was required to tow one glider whether Dakota or 
bomber. In fact this efficiency occurred more through accident than design. It had been 
decided that all paratroops across the entire operation would be dropped by the 
American Troop Carrier Command in order to simplify administration and the allotment 
of troops to airfields in England. 128 Troop Carrier Command only operated the Dakota. 
123 Otway.. -firborne Forces, pp. 74-81. 
124 NA, AIR 8/916, MAP, aircraft deliveries from USA. 3 Julý 1941. 
125 
, Vs an example see 
Smith, The Glider Pilot Regiment, p. 29. 
126 36. I`igures extracted from Steer.. Irnhem: The Fight To Sustain. pp 93 1 -1 
127 Hgures extracted from Wood-4 YoNc Pair of Brothers. pp. 68-70. 
129 01\\aý.. -Iirborne Forces. p. 266. 
95 
Additionally some gliders were too heavy to be towed by the Dakota and therefore the\ 
had to be paired with the heavy bombers. 
If the provision of aircraft to support paratroopers was difficult then the challenge of 
providing aircraft to tow gliders was more so. In general terms the problems \ý ere the 
same: there was no chance of a specialist tug aircraft being procured, any assistance 
from America would not become apparent until the end of 1942 and therefore prior to 
that time RAF aircraft would have to be modified for purpose. However, t\,, o factors 
particular to supporting glider operations aggravated those problems already described 
for parachute aircraft. First, the conversion of an aircraft for towing gliders \Nas a more 
daunting engineering prospect even than modification for parachute operations. The 
stress placed on an airframe by pulling a fully loaded glider weighing up to sixteen 
tonnes was phenomenal; considerable structural modification was required followed by 
lengthy trials. By mid-] 941 design work was proceeding to devise a means of avoiding 
the removal of the rear turret in the Wellington III when it was being used as a glider 
tug. This was expected to take five or six weeks and a trial installation would then have 
to be carried out before the towing modifications could be incorporated in production 
aircraft. Halifax and Lancaster trial installations were also progressing but it was 
estimated that it would be five or six months before production aircraft could be fitted 
for towing. 129 Second, the number of aircraft required for glider towing within an 
airborne formation was greater than that for parachute dropping. It was estimated that 
an air-landing brigade would required twenty-five percent more aircraft than a 
parachute brigade. 130 In fact the Arnhem example suggests that the figure was more 
like seventy-five percent. 13 1 Attempts were made to reduce this number by trialling 
double tows, i. e. two gliders behind one tug, but the experiments were not entirely 
successful, particularly for the heavy gliders, and the decision was made to adhere to 
one glider per tUg. 132 
There was one prevailing issue that aggravated all other factors when dealing with the 
development of the air-landing component. Glider development lagged behind that of 
the parachute element. Essentially the Air Ministry, War Office and MAP \% ere 
'2" NA, AIR 2/7470, Air Min DOR, 25 July 1941. 
130 NA. CAB 12 1/97. CIGS. Airborne Forces, 15 August 1942. 
131 \A'ood. 4 Noble Pair (? f Brothers, pp. 68-70. 
I"2 NA. AIR 2/7470. Air Ministr\. Towing 25-Seater Glider. 12 April 194 1. 
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attempting to develop a capability that was a technological unknown. Due to a lack of' 
practical knowledge and experience, mistakes were made which often did not come to 
light until they had become severe problems. As with parachute training and 
operations, the Air Ministry had allocated only the Whitley to support air-landing 
development. While there were advantages in operating only one aircraft type to tug 
gliders and drop paratroops, as heavier gliders were developed it was discovered that the 
Whitley was inadequate as a tug. Ismay considered that the provision of a suitable 
towing aircraft was not being pressed forward with the urgency it deserved and Xý as 
concerned enough to urge Churchill to become personally involved. 
The Prime Minister was deeply unimpressed to discover that the Whitley, the only 
aircraft with which the Airborne Division was equipped, had proved to be unsuitable for 
towing gliders, leaving Britain's air-landing troops with no aircraft suitable for this 
purpose. He demanded an explanation. 133 CIGS outlined the General Staff s view that 
the Whitley aircraft could not tow a fully laden Horsa owing to a defect that meant the 
engines could not be sufficiently cooled when in this configuration. This resulted in 
training being confined to Hotspur gliders. This was not satisfactory due to the Hotspur 
being a non-operational glider, designed for glider pilot training only. ' 34 CAS 
attempted to paint a less negative picture of a situation, which he justifiably claimed, 
was a result of the very little practical experience of glider towing. He did not however 
consider that the Whitley was entirely unsuitable for training purposes. He conceded 
that it could not tow a fully laden Horsa without overheating but was content that MAP 
was trying to improve the cooling and that their efforts would be helped by the colder 
weather of winter. Churchill was unimpressed by Portal's explanation and noted; 
'There may well be a scandal about this. What action do you propose? ' 
135 The Minister 
of Production, Oliver Lyttelton, supported the Air Staff in this case stating that it was 
quite untrue that the Whitley could not take off with a fully loaded Horsa. It had to 
admit that the operational range would be reduced to 180 miles but was confident that 
this was sufficient for training purposes. 136 However, the use of the Whitley was 
patently not sufficient for use during air-landing operations, restricted as it was b,, 
13 '1 NA. PRFIM 3/32/4, Churchill to CIGS and CAS. 30 September 1942. 
134 NA, PRFM 3/32/4. CIGS to Churchill, 3 October 1942. 
1 `5 NA. PREm 3/32/4, CAS to Churchill, 5 October 1942. 
1.16 NA, PRFM 3/32/4, MAP to Churchill, 27 October 1942. 
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climate and range, and therefore, following the Air Ministry's own criteria, it \\as also 
unsuitable for training. 
One thing all the ministries involved did agree on was that the ans\ýer to the glider- 
towing problem lay with the Dakota. However, the wait for initial deliveries of the 
aircraft had the same impact as it had on parachute development, and in a similar 
response alternative available aircraft were pressed into service. The full inventory of 
heavy bombers was considered for conversion and many were modified with aircraft 
becoming available from the end of 1941 onwards. In addition to these, more novcl 
combinations were considered and trialled, including the Bristol Beaufighter towino the 
Horsa and the Supermarine Spitfire towing the Hotspur, although neither was used 
operationally. 137 By mid-1942 the specifications of standard British towing equipment 
had been forwarded to Douglas so that C-47s coming off their production line and 
destined for the RAF would have the necessary modifications built in. ' 38The Dakota 
still required trials when it arrived in Britain as the Horsa glider was considerably 
heavier than the standard American glider. By the end of 1942 the Dakota had only 
been cleared as a tug for the Horsa in 'British winter conditions. ', 39 The numbers 
slowly rose and trials continued into 1943 but the Dakota was not operationally 
available in significant numbers until the beginning of 1944. 
With Churchill insisting that HUSKY had to take place in June 1943 the British 
airborne element suffered in the same manner as TORCH. Sufficient converted 
bombers could not be released either from the Middle East or from Britain and so the 
majority of I Airlanding Brigade had to be towed into battle by the American Troop 
Carrier Command. Of the 145 tugs that took part seventy-five percent were American 
C-47s with the remainder being made up of RAF Halifaxes and Albermarles. From the 
American towed gliders only thirty-four percent successfully landed on Sicily with over 
fifty percent ditching in the Mediterranean. 140 Churchill believed that this constituted 'a 
serious disaster. ' 14 1 There were several reasons for this poor performance, the chief 
137 Chatterton, The Wings Of Pegasus. p. 133 
138 NA, AVIA 15/1530, summarý of technical development on airborne torccs requirements. 25 June 
1942. 
1 IQ NA, AVIA 15/1530, MAP Airborne Forces Programmc Monthk Progress Report, 30 November 1941 
14o Figures cxtracted from Wood,, I Noble Pair (? f Brothers, p. 43) and Smith. The Histon, (Y'The Gli(ler 
Pilot Regiment. pp. 5 5-66 
14 ' NA. PREM 3/32/5. Churchill's note on minute Portal to Churchill, II August 1941. 
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among them being the unfamiliarity of the American pilots with airborne operation-s. a 
situation forced by the lack of RAF aircraft available in the theatre along NvIth their 
experienced crews and a truncated training period. The Deputy Supreme Commander 
of HUSKY, General Alexander, was in no doubt of the lessons that had to bc learned. 
RAF pilots, crews and machines had to be made available and put aside for airbonle 
forces with whom they should live, work and train to the exclusion of everything 
else. 
142 
One result of the British airborne experience during HUSKY was that a lack of 
confidence in the C47 Dakota began to manifest itself 
The C-47 is a very poor plane for transporting paratroops. It is 
helpless in the presence of armed enemy air of any description, one 
bullet in the gas tank will bring it down in flames and it mounts no 
weapons of any description, which has a bad eflCct on the morale of 
both passengers and crew. This nervousness was evidenced in many 
cases in HUSKY by the pilots' failure to reduce speed over the 
dropping ground with resultant increase in the hazard to the 
paratrooper when his parachute opened. 143 
The problems with dropping paratroopers also applied to glider operations over Sicily. 
Many gliders were dropped short in the sea because of tug pilots' reluctance to approach 
too close to the coast where the anti-aircraft fire was believed to be concentrated. 
Another event also had significant impact on the use of the Dakota as a glider tug. 
The sixteen-tonne Hamilcar glider began to enter service in the second half of 1943. As 
training with the giant glider began in November 1943 it became clear that the Dakota 
did not have the power to tow it. Therefore at a time when the War Office was content 
that,, with the growth in numbers of the Dakota, parachute fittings could be discontinued 
in some bombers, glider-towing fittings had to be retained. 144 This decision was 
essential in order to enable the large scale air-landing operations in North West Europc 
in 1944 and 1945. The thirty-six percent of Dakotas used to tow British gliders during 
MARKET GARDEN was the highest achieved, the figures for the British OVERLORD 
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operations and VARSITY being twenty-eight and twenty-four percent respectiN! ely. 145 
The majority of the workload was still borne by the modified bomber fleet. 
The provision of transport aircraft during the Second World War was based on 
expediency rather than planned principles and this included support to Britain's airborne 
forces. The parlous state of Britain's aircraft industry immediately prior to the outbreak 
of war has already been described. Even when indigenous aircraft production Ný as at 
peak capacity it never achieved its full potential. The industry suffered from the det'ects 
inherited from its small-time origins, weaknesses resulting from the haste of its 
expansion, the retarding force exerted by the trade unions and restrictive practices in 
manning and demarcation. 146 The aircraft industry appeared to have an inherent limit to 
capacity. At peak effort human resources were strained and 'unpredictable and 
intangible influences' appeared to hold back output. 147 In the case of transport aircraft 
this was exacerbated by the very low priority that the case attracted. The Air MinistrN 
were utterly dismissive of the notion that a specialist aircraft type could be provided 
from national resources. By the time that the Air Staff realised that the requirement for 
specialised transport aircraft was of sufficient importance to justify the necessary 
diversion of productive capacity from heavy bombers it was too late. 14 ' The estimate of 
four years for production precluded any new type entering service in time to be Of LISC. 
Instead the Air Ministry was relying on the production capacity of the USA to fulfil the 
RAF's transport aircraft requirements. 
However, the Air Ministry at the very highest level knew that this was an unrealistic 
prognosis in the short and medium term. Portal realised that very large increases in the 
output of the American aircraft industry could not be made in 1942 because of the time 
taken to create new capacity. 149 Joint estimates of the quantity of aircraft that the USA 
could supply to Britain were dangerously over-optimistic. When the American 
production programme failed to deliver transport aircraft at the agreed rate it caused a 
clash between the Air Ministry and MAP as to which was to blame. The Air Ministry 
prepared defensive briefs, concerned that an attempt might be made to pursue the inatter 
145 Figures extracted from Wood- 1 Noble Pair of Brothers. pp. 60.63, and 81. 
14o 1 larnett, C., The A udit (? f I Gir (London: Pan, 200 1 ), p. 14 8. 
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back beyond the spring of 1942 accusing the Air Staff of neglecting air transport during 
the early stages of the war and therefore leaving MAP ýý ith no choice in 1942 but to 
accept production in the USA. It required detailed examination to refute this thoroughly 
as the Air Staff had already accepted in 1941 that the main source of supplý of transport 
aircraft would have to be the USA. They were then left exposed when American 
production only allowed a very small number of transport aircraft to be allotted to 
Britain during 1941. The situation never recovered as American production of transport 
aircraft lagged continually behind the projected programme. 150 
The general neglect of transport aircraft, deliberate or otherwise, suited the aspirations 
of both the Air Ministry and MAP and allowed them to proceed with their core plans for 
expansion either in bombers or fighters respectively without being distracted. Anyone 
with a requirement for large scale transport by air, and this of course included Britain's 
developing airborne forces, was forced to adopt a 'make do and mend" strategy. The 
War Office could do little to influence the situation because, although it owned the 
requirement, the Air Staff controlled the resources to fulfil it. The Air Ministry's 
6expediency' translated into a requirement for improvisation as less than suitable 
aircraft had to be pressed into service. Paratroopers and glider pilots were forced to 
adapt to cope with working with British and American procedures across the multiple 
aircraft types required to generate the necessary lift capacity. 
3.3 The Development and Production of Gliders 
If the provision of support aircraft to airborne forces proved to be challenging at least a 
solution was available. Aside from priorities and resource control, the principal 
difficulty in producing transport aircraft and converting bombers for airborne support 
lay with the engineering rather than the technical aspects. The desired result was known; 
it was the method of achieving it that proved somewhat tortuous. The staff grappling 
with the development of the glider were not so fortunate. They had to attempt to turn a 
nebulous concept with no precedent into solid reality within the constraints of time. It 
was a massive technical challenge that also presented its own unique engineerino 
problems. Before the war the Air Staff was not even certain whether gliders represented 
150 NA, AIR 2/7882, briefing note to Air Min PUS. 9 October 1944. 
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merely a sporting activity or might prove to be a novel weapon system., Theconcept 
and doctrine of air-landing operations utilising gliders was subject to continuous 
development throughout the war, the progress of which will be examined later. Suffice 
to say at this stage, those responsible for the production of gliders had to do so against 
an ambiguous requirement that remained fluid for much of the war. The tactical and 
technical aspects of glider development were indivisibly linked: however the technical 
aspects will be dealt with first in this chapter. 
The Air Ministry had shown some interest in gliding at least as early as 1922 ýN lien it 
sent Squadron Leader Wright to Germany to observe sport gliding trials. Wright's 
report concluded that no direct commercial or military value could be attached to the 
use of gliders. 152 This remained the Air Ministry position until the German assault on 
the Belgian fort at Eben Emael proved otherwise. As Britain embarked on its own 
airborne project early estimates indicated that an airborne brigade group would require 
approximately 1,340 tons of equipment to be lifted by air. 153 There were essentially 
three methods of delivering this equipment to the battlefield; either by transport aircraft, 
dropped by parachute or in gliders. The Germans employed transport aircraft to deliver 
men and equipment directly in the assault in Norway, The Netherlands and Crete. 
However, this technique was incredibly wasteful and in the case of Crete in particular it 
resulted in high losses. Unless an aerodrome was seized and held aircraft were forced to 
land on unsuitable ground, such as the beach at Maleme, normally resulting in the loss 
of the aircraft. 154 These aircraft losses were unacceptable even to the Germans with 
their surfeit of Junkers JU-52; to the British, with the dearth of transport aircraft already 
described, the concept was anathema. 
Dropping heavy equipment by parachute also brought its own challenges both 
technical and tactical. The technical difficulties initially centred on the load constraints 
imposed by the available parachute technology. In mid- 1941 the heaviest loads being 
trialled for dropping were crates of twenty-five pounder ammunition weighing just over 
fifty kilograms. Heavy air drop was another example of an essentially Army problem. 
151 NA, AIR 5/278, Sccretarý ot'State lor Air to Air Member for'Supplý. 24 August 1922. 
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supply by air to isolated units on the ground, that could only be solved by the PAF. 15 5 
Because of this progress in this area was slow and it was 1944 before the means had 
been developed to drop the Jeep and the six pounder anti-tank gun from the bomb bays 
of the Halifax and the Lancaster. However the technique required an inordinate amount 
of effort to rig the loads to withstand impact on landing and even then engineering 
problems still existed such as parachutes that conflicted with aircraft antennae as theý 
deployed. 156 Added to the technical challenges there were also tactical concerns. Both 
the seventy-five millimetre gun and the twenty-five pounder could be disassembled to 
be dropped in several loads by parachute. The seventy-five millimetre gun broke down 
into nine separate parachute loads and the twenty-five pounder into twelve. The twelve 
twenty-five ponder loads could be dropped from a single Dakota with ninety-six rounds 
of ammunition dropped from a following aircraft. The problem was the amount of time 
it then took to bring the gun into action as the loads had to be found, brought together 
and then the gun assembled. If one load was lost or damaged then the entire gun was 
rendered useless. 157 The technical and tactical challenges combined meant that heavy 
air drop never became a common technique used by British airborne forces although it 
was utilised for limited special forces operations. 
The only practical method of delivering large quantities of heavy equipment by air to 
the battlefield was therefore by glider and early attempts to define the precise 
requirement appeared promising. Even before Churchill's minute in June 1940 it had 
become apparent that the prospect of towing large gliders behind bombers warranted 
further investigation. "' An initial report by the Air Ministry's Director of Scientific 
Research (DSR) concluded that a glider with a useful payload of around one tonne was 
not an unreasonable proposition. These gliders, it was supposed, might hold four or five 
troops and could be towed normally in trains of three behind a suitable towing unit 
although new aircraft, such as the Wellington, might be capable of towing up to five. 
Furthermore DSR reported that the time required to design and construct these gliders 
would not be excessive, indeed experimental designs were already being produced in 
'55 NA, AIR 2/5411, Air Supply Apparatus, 2 August 1941. 
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mid- 1940.159 At a subsequent meeting DSR's technical prognosis Ný as enhanced and 
amended by the application of military judgement. War Office representatk-cs agreed 
that gliders with a capacity of seven to eight men would be tactically acceptable as this 
represented the size of a standard infantry section at that point in time. ' 60 
Notwithstanding this concurrence senior Air Staff were adamant that no larg'e 
production orders should be placed until prototypes had been cleared and the 
requirement was clearly understood. The technical challenges should be addressed 
before manufacturing began, or as ACAS (Technical) succinctly put it, 'We must %% alk 
before we can run. ' 161 
By the beginning of 1941 the War Office was beginning to complain about a lack of 
progress in air-landing development and the Air Staff had to concede that this was due 
mainly to a deficiency of training gliders. 162 Until this time the only training aircraft 
available were converted civilian, single-seat Kirby Kite sailplane gliders. In March 
1941 it was confirmed that an order had been placed with the General Aircraft Company 
for 400 cight-man Hotspur gliders. It was made clear that these gliders were intended 
for training only. 163 This was fortuitous as concurrently it was decided that there were 
tactical objections to eight-man gliders. These included the obvious advantages of 
landing men compactly in larger numbers than eight, the difficulty in towing gliders in 
tandem through bad weather or at night and the high number of towing aircraft that 
would be required to land large groups of men simultaneously. Added to this might 
have been the fact that smaller gliders would require a proportionately higher number of 
glider pilots to fly the same amount of men and equipment. Despite this it was decided 
that the Hotspur could be employed if an airborne operation was required before larger 
gliders were available. 164 Although the General Staff had explicitly stated that an eight- 
man capacity was inadequate except in extremis, the accepted training role of the 
Hotspur began to drift towards an operational purpose. By September 1941 a 
deficiency of larger gliders was still apparent and it appeared that the Hotspur would 
indeed have to be pressed into operational service. 
159 NA, AIR 20/5256, memorandum on the militar-ý employment of gliders, 25 Juk 1940. 
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Converting a training glider to operational use was not a simple task and problems 
associated with operating the Hotspur at a higher weight with tactical loads had alreadý 
been identified. These included a low maximum towing speed, a high landing speed 
requiring a long run on, a cramped and fragile hull. heavy controls and problems ýN ith 
jettisoning the undercarriage. In addition to this it was doubtful whether the Hotspur 
could manage a full load of eight troops with equipment and it was estimated that a 
more normal load was likely to be five troops. 165 Trials with operationally loaded 
Hotspurs were conducted through September and October 1941 with a report being 
published in November. It was considered that the hull fragility and high landing 
speeds could be coped with but the fact remained that its capacity of five equipped 
soldiers was simply uneconomical. In the event the Hotspur was never used 
operationally although considerable staff and technical effort were expended in order to 
cover the contingency. The Hotspur remained the principal training glider and once 
introduced it effectively met the requirement for the initial training of glider pilots 
throughout the war but by the time gliders were required operationally (the first 
occasion being FRESHMAN in November 1942) it had been superseded by a larger 
more useful aircraft. 
The War Office agreed the specifications of a twenty five-seat glider in October 1940 
and the initial production order for 440 aircraft to specification X26/40 was placed with 
Airspeed Limited as the Horsa. 166 By January 1941 jigs were being produced ready for 
manufacture and a mock up conference had been held with very few modifications 
required to the initial design as a result. 167 The first flight trials commenced in August 
1941 and by June 1942 the Horsa had been cleared for daylight troop carrying 
operations with further trials being conducted to clear it for night and poor weather 
flying. 168 The Horsa became the mainstay of the British glider fleet and only underwent 
one major modification during its life in order to simplify the offloading of equipment 
via a hinged cockpit rather than having to remove the tail. It proved to be robust and 
capable on operations and was respected by those that operated with it. 
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relatively unproblematic development of the Horsa was a remarkable achievement 
considering the scale of the technical challenge. However the risks of ordering stral_(-, ht 
from the drawing board were recognised and the development of a second specification. 
X25/40, for a fifteen-seat glider was progressed in tandem with the I lorsa for insurance. 
Slingsby Sailplanes Limited were handed the fifteen-seat specification that the\ 
produced as the Hengist. Partly due to the success of the Horsa and partl,, due to 
structural failings the Hengist, which incorporated many novel design features. x., as onk 
produced on a very small scale and was never flown operationally. 
The final British glider produced in response to the airborne requirement represented 
an immense technical problem and hence it had a more complicated gestation. It was 
accepted that airborne forces would be vulnerable on the ground without support 
equipment such as vehicles to provide mobility, artillery, anti-tank weapons and 
preferably armoured support. It was also clear that, despite experiments in parachute 
delivery continuing throughout the war, the most efficient means of bringing this 
equipment to the battlefield was by glider. In October 1940 the War Oft-ice decided that 
its heavy glider should be capable of carrying an eight and a half ton tank (the Mark VI I 
Tetrarch) or equivalent loads. It was subsequently suggested that rather than being 
designed to carry a specific vehicle a generic load with limits from five to nine tons 
might prove more efficient. In either case the War Office emphasised the urgency of 
the requirement and urged the Air Ministry to do everything in its power to reduce the 
period of experiment and trials. 170 A new debate was opened when it was proposed that 
the carriage of armoured vehicles was not as essential as being able to deliver transport 
vehicles and supporting weapons to the battlefield. If this was accepted then the Horsa 
might be adequate without the need for a larger glider with all the technical challenges 
that its development represented. 17 1 Lieutenant Colonel Rock, in command of air- 
landing development at CLE, emphasised the advantages if loads could be restricted to 
a size and weight that could be lifted by the Horsa. He argued that the tank carrying 
idider represented a reduction in tactical flexibility in that its size, weight and landing 
run Would restrict it, and therefore the rest of the airborne force. to very few suitable 
landing zones. Support equipment should be adapted and developed to fit the Horsa 
170 NA. AIR 31'2. War Officc to Air Ministry, 26 October 1940. 
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rather than a new glider being produced to cater for current equipment. As has been 
shown, the technical challenges in producing support equipment were relatively minor 
compared to designing new gliders. 172 By mid-1941 a compromise had been reached. 
The tank-carrying glider would be produced but its maximum load was reduced to 
seven tons, enough to carry one Mark VII tank or two Bren Carriers or an equivalent 
load. In parallel to the development of this new model the specification of the Horsa 
would also be reviewed in order to ascertain if it could be adapted to carry a Bren 
Carrier, scout car or fifteen hundred-weight truck. 173 
The new tank carrier specification, X 27/40, was delivered to the General Aircraft 
Company for manufacture as the Hamilcar. By July 1941 a mock up had been 
inspected and prototypes were under construction. Flight tests took place throughout 
1942. The production of the Hamilcar was even more remarkable than the Horsa for its 
relatively trouble free development. The Hamilcar was an astounding aircraft; a glider 
weighing over sixteen tonnes with a useful load capacity of eight tonnes, it was over 
twenty metres long, had a wing span of thirty four metres and the pilot sat over seven 
metres above the ground, dimensions comparable to the Halifax. 174 The Hamilcar did 
not really achieve significant impact delivering tanks to the battlefield as originally 
envisaged. It did however prove invaluable in bringing heavy loads to the landing 
zones such as Bren Carriers, 17 Pounder anti-tank guns and limbers, bulldozers and 
stores. 
Despite the unavoidable policy of ordering direct from the drawing board the design 
and production of these bespoke glider types progressed remarkable smoothly. The 
Hotspur was a sound training aircraft and the Horsa and Hamilcar were highly effective 
operationally. Only the Hengist could be considered a failure and that aircraft had only 
been ordered as an insurance policy. However, all British gliders suffered from a 
common design fault that had not been fully anticipated and was to prove a major 
problem. All these gliders were manufactured almost entirely from wood with a 
plywood skin covering a robust wooden frame. This policy was positively encouraged 
from the beginning as it would not interfere with mainstream aircraft construction and 
H2 NA. AIR 32/2. Rock to War Off icc. 15 January 1941. 
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would therefore not compete with the Air Ministry's priority aircraft for resources. The 
furniture industry, a manufacturing sector previously without a direct war role. Could be 
used for production . 
17' This all-wood method of construction resulted in aircraft that. 
while physically robust, could not readily be broken down and reassembled for the 
purposes of transport. The wings could be removed and replaced by expert technicians 
but this still left a hull the same size as a medium bomber to fit onto a truck or into a 
ship. The effort required in doing this provoked a deliberate policy that gliders N% ould 
not be transported by road. 176 This did not present a problem ýý hen gliders had to be 
delivered between airfields in Britain as they could be towed by air. However, transport 
overseas presented a greater challenge as the aircraft took up too much space to be 
economical to move by ship. There was therefore no option but to fly them to foreign 
theatres but the effort required to do this was incredible. Between 3 June and 7 July 
1943 thirty-one Horsas were towed from Britain to Sale in Morocco under operation 
BEGGAR. The operation required eleven weeks training and during the 1,400 mile 
journey one glider went missing, two ditched in the sea and one had to return to Britain. 
During the onward transit to Kairouan in Tunisia another seven gliders had to be 
released over the desert due to technical difficulties. BEGGAR cost the lives of seven 
glider PilotS. 177 
Clearly this rate of attrition was unacceptable during a move for logistic purposes. 
BEGGAR was conducted in order to build up a glider force for HUSKY, however more 
gliders were required for the operation than could be efficiently delivered in this 
manner. The answer came in the shape of the American Waco CG4A glider, henceforth 
referred to by its British name, the Hadrian. The Hadrian was built from a tubular steel 
frame with a canvas skin. This meant that it could readily be unbolted, broken down 
and crated for transport and could then be rebuilt under supervision by unskilled labour. 
346 Hadrians had been delivered to North Africa by 13 June 1943. Of the 163 gliders 
flown by British glider pilots during HUSKY 145 of them were Hadrians., 78 This in 
itself had serious repercussions. The Hadrian had a small payload of less than three and 
a half tonnes, which meant it could only carry a jeep or an artillery piece, or artillery 
175 NA, AIR 32/2. notes from a conference held at the Air Ministry. 5 September 1940. 
176 NA. AIR 2/7470. notes from a conference held at the Air MinistrN. 29 July 194 1. 
177 S 
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ammunition not the entire combination as the Horsa could. This presented ob% iou-s 
tactical disadvantages. Further to this the Hadrian, due to a different s\ stem of flight 
controls, had different flight characteristics to British gliders, in particular it had a much 
shallower glide angle which made a precise landing spot much more difficult to identify 
and then achieve. 179 This was considered a distinct handicap when landing on 
unprepared ground and was made worse at night. In Sicily where the landing zones 
were small and bounded by thick stone walls this characteristic. coupled with the 
Hadrians' less robust construction caused a high casualty rate amongst glider pilots and 
their passengers. 180 
The delivery by air of British built gliders to the Far East was obviously not practical. 
It was recognised that if India was to achieve its aspiration to operate its own airbome 
forces it would have to rely on the indigenous manufacturing industry to produce 
gliders. Considerable staff effort was expended on this issue and it was proposed that 
the furniture industry and railway wagon manufactures could provide the necessary 
industrial base. 18 1 This proved not to be viable due to the lack of high quality timber 
required to build the Horsa and Hamilcar. Production in India would entail importing 
timber and this was evidently uneconomic. 182 By August 1942 any plan to manufacture 
gliders in India had been officially halted. 183 After this decision the only recourse was 
to import Hadrians from America. It was estimated that over 2,000 Hadrians would be 
required in 1944 and 1945 however the only glider operation in the Far East involving 
British troops, Major General Orde Wingate's operation THURSDAY, used less than 
100 gliders in total. 
While the technical and engineering challenges associated with glider production were 
dealt with relatively efficiently the question of the quantity required was less simple to 
answer. The two subjects were, of course, mutually dependent. The important factor 
was the final capacity of troops and equipment that could be delivered to the battlefield. 
That overall capacity was the result of a calculation of individual glider capacity, 
depending on type, multiplied by the overall number of gliders available. However, this 
179 Chattcrton, The it ings Of Pegasus. p. 43. 
180 NA, AVIA 15/2645, report by MAP, 13 August 1943. 
18 1 NA, AIR 2/755 1. note bý, MAP, 30 December 1941. 
182 NA. CA13 120/2(ý2. I)etcncc Department India to WO, 31 March 1942. 
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apparently simple process was complicated by a number of issues. Initial difficult\ and 
disparity were caused by this simple equation either not being employed or hy basing 
the calculation on uncertain assumptions. The CLE's initial attempts to estimate the 
number of gliders required for a brigade operation varied between 180 and 380.184 
Despite several attempts to arrive at this figure in a more scientific manner the proJected 
total required to lift a brigade continued to fluctuate up until early 1944. The process 
was made more difficult by the equivocation over the operational status of the Hotspur 
as well as constant amendments to airborne formation establishments by the War 
Office. DMC expended considerable staff effort in order to create bareb" interpretable 
equations in an effort to produce reliable figures. 185 HQ AC Coi-nd concluded that an 
accurate calculation was not worth the effort required to prepare it and that it was better 
to estimate a relatively safe figure and endorse it rather than to prolong ambigu ity. 186 
A second area of uncertainty concerned the proportion of gliders required above the 
number necessary for a formation to conduct a single operation. This was important in 
order to inform manufacturers of the rate and target for production. Initially a figure of 
ten percent was assessed as sufficient to allow for wastage and training. 187 This was 
clearly a severe underestimate and was subsequently revised. Although glider recovery 
units were established, gliders used on operations had to be considered consumable and 
therefore each repeat operation would need a full complement to be manufactured. On 
top of this each operation would require a reserve to cover gliders damaged during 
transit or assembly. The training establishment also had to be provisioned including a 
percentage for wastage through training accidents and wear and tear. This calculation 
resulted in a figure 250 percent higher than the initial number of gliders required for a 
single operation. 188 Once the decision was made that planning should be based on three 
ftill-scale airborne operations being executed per year it became obvious that the annual 
production requirement for gliders was going to be immense. 
189 
The practicalities of production could not wait for the War Office to arrive at a final 
figure for glider numbers from which a rate of manufacture could be deduced. If glider 
184 NA, AIR. 332/2. papers by CIT. 14 November 1940 and 15 January 1941. 
185 NA, AIR 2/7566, paper by DIVIC, 24 October 1941. 
18') NA. AIR 32/3.1 IQ AC Comd to CI. E. 4 September 194 1. 
187 NA. AIR 2/75 5 1. D Plans, Air Min, 13 June 194 1. 
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production was to reach any useful level design and assembly had to be started vý ithout 
delay. At the beginning of 1941 VCAS was instructed by CAS to place an order ýý ith 
MAP as soon as possible. This was months before any sort of rational estimate had 
been made and therefore any figure proposed by VCAS would represent little more than 
an informed guess based on early War Office predictions of the requirement. '" 
Nevertheless the order was placed and schedules for monthly production ýý ere 
developed based on this supposition. The Air Ministry was content with this approach 
as it represented a minimum diversion of staff effort in accordance with the priority it 
attached to airborne forces in general. MAP was also initially happy to proceed on this 
basis but six months later the Minister, John Moore-Brabazon was concerned that the 
requirement had not been sufficiently refined. He was content that the initial order 
placed by VCAS would be met and therefore the War Office's immediate needs could 
be satisfied. However, it was clear to MAP that this only represented the initial order 
and that unless continuation orders were placed quickly production would come to a 
halt in mid-1942 with only a single brigade's lift having been manufactured. 
Unfortunately, with a firm and final estimate of numbers still not available at this stage 
the Air Ministry felt unable to provide anything other than a partial reply to MAP's 
request which, by its own admission amounted to no more than 'helpful directions. "91 
The Air Ministry was not going to volunteer a request for increased production to MAP 
if it did not have to. While glider production did not directly challenge the Air 
Ministry's priorities for resources it did represent an indirect threat, as each glider 
produced required an aircraft to tow it. The scale of that indirect threat was now 
apparent and continued ambiguity in the requirement therefore suited the Air Staff s 
purposes, an example of passive resistance through inactivity. 
A lack of useful engagement from the Air Ministry meant that any shortfall in glider 
production went largely unchecked. Early in 1942 Browning was uncertain that more 
than a fraction of the production target would be met and that this would affect the 
progress and morale of the AFE. The Air Ministry agreed with Browning confessing 
that it also placed little faith in the output predictions but did little to refute MAP's 
1Q0 NA. AIR 2/7470. Air Ministry minutes. 19 Fcbruaj-ý 1941. 
191 NA, AIR 2/755 1. Moore-Brabazon to Sinclair, 16 August 1941- 
assurances that the production rate had reached its ceiling. 192 The situation changed 
when Browning gained direct access to MAP via Renwick's committee and, although 
production continued to lag behind schedule, by May 1942 the \Var Officc was content 
that its requirements would be met by March 1943.193 
Considering this accepted lag in production it must have come as a surprise %N hcn Sir 
Stafford Cripps wrote to Churchill later in 1942 suggesting that production was 
exceeding the point at which the number of gliders being manufactured could be 
usefully employed. He suggested to the Prime Minister that consideration should be 
given to discontinuing the programme altogether. 194 This came at the point NN hen the 
entire question of the future of airborne forces was being referred to the Prime Mimster 
for arbitration and the Air Ministry co-opted Cripps's views as part of their argument 
for a reduction in airborne development. Lord Cherwell. Churchill's chief scientific 
advisor, also concluded that a substantial reduction of the glider programme should be 
considered. 195 The Prime Minister acquiesced and ordered an immediate curtailment of 
Horsa production. 196 
Fortunately for glider production, along with British airborne forces as a whole, 
SYMBOL and the decision to begin planning for HUSKY countermanded Churchill's 
original decree. Any temporary recession in glider numbers due to his order to curtail 
production was compensated by the influx of American gliders into North Africa in 
preparation for the invasion of Sicily. With a lull in airborne operations between 
HUSKY and OVERLORD glider numbers recovered to the extent that by the end of 
1943 the War Office felt confident enough to offer the Americans an allotment of 
Horsas and Hamilcars for their training in Britain. 
' 97 By the time OVERLORD was 
imminent the War Office had learnt a lesson and kept a close eye on production levels 
through an inter-departmental glider committee, an offshoot of Renwick's committee. 
Six divisional level airborne operations were predicted for 1945 and gliders N%rere 
102 NA. AIR 2/755 1, DMC to Air Min, March 1942. 
193 NA. CAB 120/2162, note hN IsmaN, 6 MaN 1942. 
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ordered to meet this requirement. Even after D Day the War Office warned against 
curbing the programme without very careful consideration. 198 
The British glider programme between 1940 and 1945 represents a remarkable 
success. The technical problems were immense and the engineering challenges Nvere 
also not inconsiderable. Despite this new aircraft types were developed from scratch. a 
feat accomplished with very few failures. Working out the number of gliders required 
was less straightforward but this is understandable considering the constantly 
fluctuating baseline on which the estimates were built. The General Staff N% as 
continually refining the order of battle of air-landing units and more extensive 
adjustments to the establishments were forced by the War Office and Air Ministry's 
divergence over the size, shape and future of Britain's airborne capability. Less 
explicable is how a perceived deficit in numbers was so quickly transformed into an 
alleged surplus which in turn influenced Churchill in making his decision to 
significantly reduce airborne development, albeit temporarily. Certainly the Air 
Ministry, concerned by an indirect threat to its resources, was reluctant to engage 
closely with the problems associated with glider production and this did not assist. It 
did little to support the CLE and AFE to formulate a workable solution nor did it help 
MAP to understand the nature of the problem. The assessment that any Air Ministry 
enthusiasm on paper did not translate into practical assistance is probably accurate. 199 
The most significant fact concerning glider production during the war is that the 
challenges that arose appear not to have seriously impinged on air-landing training and 
operations. This is despite many factors that threatened glider production throughout 
the war. The adequate supply of plywood was a persistent problem and the Air Ministry 
frequently sought to impose priority to the De Havilland Mosquito and training aircraft 
types over glider manufacture in order to overcome this direct, albeit minor threat to its 
resources. 200 Other potential engineering threats to production included a shortage of 
draughtsmen and a lack of suitable storage facilities for gliders coming off the 
production line. The War Officc also caused difficulties by appearing to be unable to 
produce a list of the standard loads to be carried by glider. It constantly amended and 
198 NA, WO 233/43, D Air, War Office, 12 September 1944. 
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added to the inventory as new equipment became available and the organisation 
expanded. This had impact on the CLE, which either expended nugator,, effort on trials 
for equipment no longer required or was forced to wait before equipment Ný as confirmed 
201 
and trials could be conducted . 
However, the main threat came from the lack of engagement from the Air Ministry 
and its attempt to protect its resources indirectly required for air-landing dcýclopment 
through passive resistance. Nevertheless there is no evidence in the various published 
memoirs of glider pilots that there was any significant shortage of gliders at any stage 
except in the very early stages of development and briefly in North Africa prior to 
HUSKY. Glider pilots achieved high rates of flying during training and 200 'lifts' per 
pilot per year was considered to be only slightly above average. 202 Brigadier George 
Chatterton, the Commander Glider Pilots, confirms that it was not a deficit of gliders 
that caused training problems. In fact the opposite seerns to have been true when lic 
commented, 'a curious situation was arising with regard to the Horsa gliders. Many 
were coming from the factories, hundreds in fact, and they were parked all around RAF 
Netheravon, but they were hardly any tugs that could be spared to tow them into the 
sky. 203 Chatterton's observation appears to support Stafford Cripps and Cherwel I's 
assertion that gliders were being produced in surplus quantities. It also demonstrates the 
relative impact on training of the availability of support aircraft versus the provision of 
gliders. 
3.4 Procurement and Supply as a Factor in Development 
The availability of suitable aircraft both to drop paratroops and to tow gliders was the 
dominant equipment factor that affected the development of Britain's airborne forces. 
far more so than the provision of personal and support equipment or the procurement 
and supply of gliders. Shortfalls in aircraft availability impinged to some degree on 
individual and collective training and exercises, which were consequently sometimes 
constrained in scale and scope. '04 Whether that impact on training had any compound 
2"' NA. AIR 
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significant effect on the overall progress of airborne development and hence military 
effectiveness will be assessed in the following chapter. However, it is alread\ possible 
to see how this line of development was an immediate factor in military effecti%cness. 
A deficiency of aircraft directly reduced the size of an airborne force that could be 
committed to an operation. If this was unacceptable then aircraft had to be provided 
from other sources. This substitution of aircraft by the USAAF and Troop Carrier 
Command had significant operational consequences during TORCH and HUSKY. 
Following TORCH CIGS implored the COS Committee to accelerate the provision of 
transport aircraft by every available means and Alexander clearly identified similar 
205 lessons post HUSKY . Cooperation did improve between American aircreNN and 
British airborne troops, through compulsion as much as any other factor, as American 
aircraft were required to lift British airborne forces in all the major airborne operations 
of the Second World War. The only exception was D Day where the short flight 
distance allowed RAF crews to fly multiple sorties in the same day between England 
and Normandy. Aircraft shortages also caused commanders to adapt their tactical 
doctrine to fit the availability of lift, which then had an effect on the manner in '. N hich an 
operation was conducted. This subject will be examined in depth later. 
It is worth considering why the availability of transport and support aircraft proved to 
be such a chronic problem throughout the development process. Financial constraints 
can be disregarded as a significant factor as the Cabinet had already decided as early as 
April 1938 that the scale of re-equipping the RAF would not be defined in financial 
terms but would be dictated solely by industrial capac ity. 206 Barnett and Postan's 
assertions that the British aircraft industry had an innate production ceiling caused by 
industrial torpor and other unpredictable and intangible influences can only be regarded 
as a backdrop to this specific problem. This situation would have created equal drag 
across aircraft production where as in fact the provision of transport aircraft and the 
modification of bombers for airborne forces were more acutely inhibited than other 
areas of the programme. It could also be assumed that the relative levels of technical 
and engineering effort required to provide suitable support aircraft was an under]N, in(, 
factor. As a comparison it is undeniably true that the technical and engineering 
205 NA. PREM 3/32/4. COS (43) 17,11 January 1943. 
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endeavour required to supply personal and support equipment to airborne troops on the 
ground was relatively low and this was a contributory factor to its efficient provision. 
However it can also be argued that the technical and engineering challenges associated 
with manufacturing gliders were greater than those required to modifN bombers for 
airborne operations or even to produce a new model of transport aircraft. Despite this 
the provision of gliders was less problematic than the availability of support aircraft. 
The actual reasons behind the situation can be deduced by comparing who owned the 
requirement for the equipment against where control of the resources required to fulf-li it 
was invested. The requirement to acquire the entire range of equipment necessarý to 
support airborne forces was owned by the War Office. In the case of personal and 
ground support equipment the General Staff also principally controlled the resources. 
via the Ministry of Supply, to fulfil that requirement. This meant that the War Oft-ice 
could allocate the priority that they saw fit to the provision of this equipment. It could 
also plan its own acquisition strategy that would most efficiently meet the requirement 
such as adapting and modifying equipment already in service or collaborating with the 
USA. Postan asserts that the provision of this class of equipment was an added 
demanding burden on the Ministry of Supply but in fact the relatively small scale and 
low complexity of ground equipment for airborne forces resulted in the requirement 
207 being met with comparative ease . In contrast, control of the resources required to 
supply gliders was exercised by the Air Ministry via MAP. However the use of wood in 
their construction and the unconventional manufacturing base meant that the provision 
of gliders did not directly compete with other Air Ministry programmes and hence it 
was initially allowed to proceed unhindered. It was only when the scale of the glider 
force became apparent that the Air Staff became concerned about the indirect impact 
that it would have on its resources, that is the use of bombers to tow them. By that time 
most of the technical and engineering challenges had been overcome and it was only the 
question of quantity that became an issue. 
The Air Ministry and MAP also had control of the resources required to provide 
F support aircraft but in that case there was a real and direct threat to the Air Staf s 
priority programmes. In the early part of the war precedence was (,, iven to the 
207 ibid, pp. 129 & 276 
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manufacture of fighter aircraft and Beaverbrook strenuously opposed any diversions. 
As the threat of invasion subsided the main effort for production began to sýN itch to the 
bomber force. There had been great difficulties in the development and initial 
production of the modem bombers which were obstinately slow to reach the front I inc 
throughout 1941 and with only eighty-five percent of the projected force available at the 
end of that year the RAF was loathe to commit them to any activity outside its core 
doctrine. 208 With control of the resources the Air Staff, through MAP, were able to 
passively resist the parachute and glider modification programmes by simply not 
allocating them adequate labour, materiel and staff effort. There was very little the War 
Office could do to expedite the process. The requirement for effective transport aircraft 
had been self evident from the beginning of the war, however, as their utility was 
chiefly in supporting land formations their production represented a serious diversion 
from both the Air Ministry and MAP's central priorities. Transport aircraft therefore 
never achieved a priority that allowed them to compete for production resources with 
bomber and fighter aircraft. The Air Staff could easily resist War Office demands by 
stating the false assumption that British requirements could be fulfilled by American 
production. By the time it was apparent that this claim could not be achieved it was too 
late to effectively recover the situation with the results that have been described. 
Finally, the Air Staff actively resisted opportunities to provide transport aircraft to 
support airborne forces. When General Staff members of Renwick's committee visited 
the USA in May 1944 they were impressed with the potential of two new transport 
aircraft being produced by the Americans; the Fairchild C-82 and the Budd (Conestoga) 
C-93. The Director of Air from the War Office was therefore dismayed to discover on 
his return to Britain that the C-93 had been offered on Lend Lease several months 
before but had been turned down by the Air Ministry without reference to the General 
Staff. 209 Even when transport aircraft did become available the War Office could do 
little to influence where the Air Ministry allocated these resources, hence the first 
Dakotas that became available in Britain were assigned to mail delivery rather than to 
supporting the General Staff s requirements. The misalignment of the requirement for 
equipment with the authority to control the resources to fulfil it was the critical factor 
208 
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that created the chronic shortage of aircraft to support British airborne forces during the 
Second World War. 
However, the Air Ministry cannot be directly blamed for adopting a less than fullN 
committed approach to airborne development. It had other priorities to pursue and 
before 1943 it could perceive no obvious imperative to alter its stance. This situation 
was perpetuated by the failure to create anyjoint establishment with the power to 
influence and align the requirements and effort of both the War Office and the Air 
Ministry with respect to airborne development. Without this the priority placed on 
development was disjointed and situations such as the paucity of transport aircraft . %cre 
inevitable. 
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CHAPTER 4- Personnel and Training 
4.1 Manpower 
Manpower was one of the major resources required to generate British airborne forces 
during the Second World War. Human resources in Britain were at a premium 
throu hout the War and never less so than during the period of rapid expansion during 9 Z, 
the first half of the war. Between June 1939 and June 1943 the armed forces grew bý 
nearly 800 percent from 480,000 to 4,300,000 men. The needs of the an-ned forces, the 
national services and labour supply were not effectively coordinated until a Director- 
General of Manpower was appointed within the Ministry of Labour in August 194 L' 
Prior to this date the army and other services were at liberty to recruit towards the 
projected size of their forces, as they considered necessary. Up unti I the outbreak of 
war the Army was losing the recruiting battle with men preferring to go to the Royal 
Navy and RAF where pay and prospects were better. 2 Every Army recruit was 
therefore valuable as it represented a minor victory over the other services and flic 
Ministry of Labour. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the War Office took exception 
to Churchill's frequent requests to give up manpower to provide the resources for his 
many irregular schemes and ideas, the merits of which were often considered dubious at 
best. For example the Prime Minister, against opposition, had to personally fight 
through the formation of the first commando un itS. 3 
Early in 1941, in order to halt its spiralling demands the Prime Minister proposed a 
net entitlement for manpower above which the Army would not be permitted to recruit. 
Churchill ordered the War Office to make best use of this entitlement 'by wise 
economies, by thrifty and ingenious use of manpower, by altering establishments to fit 
resources. ' The cap was set in March 1941 at 2,195,000 and, although this figure was 
increased to 2,374,800 by autumn 1941, this represented an absolute ceiling to the 
establishment of the Army. Any increases due to new formations being raised from that 
point forwards, such as airborne forces would have to be met through internal recruitino 
and re-appointing existing unitS. 4 Lateral thinking and pragmatism would have to be 
I II. M. D. Parker. Manpower (London: I IMSO, 1957), p. 216. 
Froich, Raising Churchill's Army, p. 86. 
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exercised by the General Staff in order to meet the airborne forces manpower 
requirement. 
Manpower implies a raw resource and therefore training, both individual and 
collective, would also be required in order to produce an effective physical component. 
The training of airborne forces, principally paratroops and glider pilots posed scý cral 
challenges. Obviously training had to precede any thought of operations; however 
Britain had no experience on which to base the training requirement. Timothy Harrison 
Place has suggested that the British Army at home between 1940 and 1944 trained on 
the basis of the experience being gained in the Mediterranean and therefore it did not 
have to rely on theoretical precepts. 5 However these conditions were not applicable to 
airborne forces. There were no major British parachute operations until the end of 1942 
and no full airborne operations until mid- 1943. Therefore training, particularIN 
collective training was a theoretical pursuit for the first half of the war. Without 
indigenous experience the early trainers would have to look elsewhere. The War Office 
investigation into other nation's airborne capability in the mid-1930s was not conducted 
in sufficient depth to reveal their detailed training methods. An article translated from 
the French La Revue dInfanterie in 1936 may have given the War Office some insight 
into 'a new sub . ect and how engrossing for your officers! ' The French had identified 
the requirement for tactical training, collective training and technical parachute 
training. 6A report submitted by the Air Attachd in Berlin in 1938 provided information 
that had appeared in the German press. This covered in brief detail the parachute 
training process including the objectives of ground training and the process of a training 
Jump from an aircraft. ' However this short-lived period of information gathering, 
instigated in part by Dill, was left largely ignored at the beginning of the war. Airborne 
training was an unknown in 1940 and it would require a degree of vision and 
considerable ingenuity with both processes and systems in order to develop a successful 
comprehensive training programme. 
51 1'. 1 larrison Pkice. Military Training In The Brilish. 4rmy 1940-1944, Dunkirk to D Dav (London: Frank 
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4.2 The Recruitment and Selection of Paratroops 
In a minute to Ismay on 3 June 1940 Churchill ordered the formation of 
geographically discrete, well-equipped., self-contained commando units of 
approximately 1,000 men each. 8 Less than three weeks later the War Office %N as 
instructed to find another 5,000 men for the Prime Minister's parachute force. The 
General Staff took the pragmatic, although perhaps slightly disingenuous decision to 
combine the two requirements. By 23 June 1940 twelve commandos had been 
designated for establishment, two each under the control of Southem, Eastern, Western 
and Northern Command and one each in Scottish Command and Northern Ireland 
District. The remaining two commandos were to be under direct control of the War 
Office. No. I Commando had already been formed from personnel in existing 
Independent Companies and was based in Southampton. No. 2 Commando was 
designated as the parachute commando to be based at Ringway near Manchester. No. 2 
Commando was to be formed as a priority from an amalgamation of commando troops 
recruited by the various Commands across the countrY-9 
On formation No. 2 Commando, despite its unique role, was subject to the policies 
and regulations governing all of the irregular commandos. The initial paratroopers were 
therefore recruited against the standards required of all commando troops. These were 
not particularly specific. In general all the men were to be volunteers, young and 
absolutely fit. In addition officers were expected to have tactical ability and 
imagination and soldiers were to display a good level of independence and total 
reliability. ' 0 Additional, more specific prerequisites were subsequently applied to 
volunteers for No. 2 Commando to ensure they were suitable for parachute duties. 
These were a maximum personal weight when clothed and lightly equipped of not more 
than 250 pounds, the ability to pass comfortably through a circular aperture of 3 feet 
diameter with equipment and an absence of physical disabilities such as thin skulls and 
weak ankles. 11 
Before parachute training could begin it was recognised that a programme of basic 
tactical training would be required. The commando volunteers came from cvcrN arm of 
8 NA, CAB 120/414. Churchill to Ismay, 3 June 1940. 
NA. WO 32/4723. Formation ofirregular Commandos, 23 June 1940. 
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the Army including cavalry, infantry, Royal Artillery (RA), Royal Engineers (RE) and 
Royal Army Service Corps (RASC). Hence standards and experience would be 
different depending upon the origin of the volunteer. Therefore to standardise the skills 
across the Commando basic weapon and tactical training was considered essential. 
Physical fitness was also emphasised in order to equip the commandos to cope Ný ith the 
harshness of raiding operations. " Aside from these physical requirements there were 
also a number of psychological pressures that were unique to airborne operations and 
would have to be addressed in order to produce effective paratroops. First there was tile 
obvious fact that parachuting was an unnatural process that produced strong natural 
reactions against it. 13 Second was the mental dislocation caused by an airborne soldier 
departing his domestic station in England and dropping into the heat of battle just a few 
hours later. Frost observed this phenomenon. 'We had not appreciated the effects of 
the sudden transition to which the airborne soldier may be subjected. From comfortable 
billets with beds9 clean clothes, hot water, extra rations and a very fair share of drink 
[the airborne soldier] then finds himself struggling over hostile territory with no 
creature comforts at hand. ' 14 Lieutenant Colonel Napier Crookenden, the commanding 
officer of 9 Parachute Battalion. ) recorded on the eve of Operation VARSITY, 'One of 
the hardest things to realise as I sit here in the English sunshine is the fact of our 
translation in a few hours in both a different country and a very different 
environment. ' 15 The effect of these two psychological stresses and attempts to mitigate 
them will be examined later. 
A third form of mental pressure might also be experienced by paratroopers who 
became separated from their comrades during an operational parachute drop and found 
themselves isolated on the battlefield. British doctrine attempted to define this 
phenomenon. 'The qualities of individual resource and initiative are desirable in all 
fighting troops, but are particularly necessary to parachute troops in the period between 
dropping and reaching the unit RV [rendezvous], when they may be deprived of the 
12 NA, CA13 120/262. KeNcs to Churchill, 27 July 1940. 
13 ABFM, File ]A/2, Mz(jor A. Cotterell (War Staff Writer), Parachuting As A Career, War No. 59, 
No\ ember 194 1. 
14 Frost. A Drop Too. Afan 
* 
v. p. 88. 
15 IWM, I'apers of' Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookenden KCB DSO OBF Dl- diary entry for 2' 
March 1945 
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leadership of their officers and NCOs and the support of their comrades. ' 16 Reduced to 
an individual with no group for reassurance this experience, particularly at night, had 
the potential to paralyse a soldier. Many paratroops referred to this reaction. 'I must 
admit when I hit the ground and looked around, I thought I was the onlý bugger there! 
It was so quiet... There was a deadly silence, all I could hear was the wind blowing 
through the grass. This was the moment I was really scared. ' 17 Many paratroopers 
describe '... the feeling of horror and the rapid draining away of self-confidence.. .' 
18 
British doctrine recognised that at this moment paratroopers were particularly 
vulnerable. 'The most critical period for airborne troops is the few minutes 
immediately after landing... Taking into consideration also the nervous strain imposed 
on parachute troops immediately before they descend, it follows that their morale in the 
early stages [of an airborne landing] is likely to be very low. ' 19 Steps had to be taken to 
ensure that paratroopers were mentally equipped to cope with the pressure of this stage 
of the battle. Personal independence was identified as the key factor. This went against 
the prevalent attitude towards training, which taught soldiers that their first duty was 
instant, unhesitating and exact obedience to their superior's orders. 20 However, airborne 
soldiers had to be selected or trained to act under their own initiative until they could 
meet up with their comrades and become an effective team member. 
The generic selection criteria for commando personnel stressed the requirement for a 
good level of independence and total reliability. It was initially believed that this could 
be achieved by selecting 'tough' men. The commander of No. I Parachute Training 
School (PTS) confirmed, 'the standard of men accepted [for service in No. 2 
Commando] was indeed 'tough' .. )2 
1 However, this policy was exposed during an 
inspection of Ringway in August 1940 as not necessarily producing the correct calibre 
and quality of volunteer. The inspecting officer recorded his concern. 
I am of the opinion that far too many of the men looked 'tough', but 
not mentally alert and it is suggested that the type required is rather 
"' IWM, Papers of Brigadier P. N. R. Stewart- Richardson MBE. draft pamphlet 'Airborne Operations', 
undated. 
17 N. Barber, The Dav The Devils Dropped In (London: Leo Cooper, 2002). p. 59 and 64. 
18 R. Miller, Nolhing 1, ess Than Ficlory, The Oral Hislory of D-Day (l, ondon: Pimlico. 1993). p. 212. 
I') N A. WO 231/126. Mililary Training Pamphlel. Vo. 50, A irborne Troops, A ugust 194 1, p. 2. 
20 French, Raising Churchill'sArm 
, v, 
pp. 55 & 153. 
2' M. Newnham, Prelude To Glory (London: Sampson I. ow, 1948), p. 2 1. 
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of the dirt-track racing, professional footballer, or rugger player t\ pe 
who presumably have both toughness and mental alertness combined 
with willingness to accept risks and go hard, rather than the man ýý ho 
is tough because he has not the mental equipment to think of the 
consequences of his actions. 22 
Trying to inculcate personal independence through the men's living conditions ýN as also 
unsuccessful. The commandos, including those in No. 2 Commando, were not proN ided 
with food or accommodation. Instead they were paid a daily allowance of six shillings 
and eight pence in order to cover lodging, feeding and transport. Looking after 
themselves was supposed to encourage independence and initiative. I lowevcr it was 
found that living away from a military environment encouraged late nights and was 
therefore detrimental to physical fitness. The system was difficult to administrate and it 
was considered doubtful whether independence and initiative really Nverc improved to 
23 any great extent . 
The only sure way to improve a soldier's ability to act effectively when isolated NN as 
through training. This had in fact been identified prior to the war in order to equip 1-nen 
24 
to cope with dispersal on a modem battlefield . Even during the 
brief surge of staff 
activity connected to airborne forces during the 1930s it was recognised that particular 
training techniques were required to produce men with the right attitude. Periods of 
'hard living' were included in projected training schedules. 25 With the formal 
establishment of parachute training in July 1940 mental fortitude was linked to physical 
fitness. Parachute troops were to be kept at the highest pitch of physical fitness in order 
to withstand the mental as well as the physical rigours of airborne operations. Provision 
was made in the syllabus for intensive physical training instruction. 
26 When I 
Parachute Brigade was established in September 1941 the headquarters was located at 
Hardwick Hall near Chesterfield. A formal programme of ground training was 
introduced at the new centre for recruits prior to parachute training and for the trained 
paratroops of the expanding brigade. Hard physical and tactical training was used to 
instil a sense of confidence, which was intended to assist in overcoming the 
22 NA, AIR 2/7338, Report on the Central Landing School. Ringwaý. 31 August 1940. 
NA, AIR 32/2, Training and Organisation of Air-Landing'Froops, Juk 
1940. 
24 French. Raising 0turchill's. Irmy. p. 56. 
NA. Wo 321,437 1. Parachute Group, Employment, Training and Organisation. 19 \pril 1938. 
" NA. AIR 39/921. Formation ofthe CLE. November 11)40 
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psychological pressure of isolation on landing. The s,,, rliabus was designed to test 
officers and soldiers to the very limits of their physical endurance and trainees recount 
the mental effort required to prevent themselves from giving up. 27 Despite this some 
individuals such as Crookenden appear to have enjoyed the experience. *ItN%illbea 
pleasant change from my present work, as I shall spend 10 days on the equivalent of a 
P. T. course - No thinking, but plenty of action. ' 28 
This approach to training appears to have achieved its aim based on the evidence of 
individual paratroopers' conduct immediately on landing during operations. particularly 
during OVERLORD where the drop was at night and scattered. Many soldiers who 
were temporarily isolated reported feeling apprehension or even fear but all appear to 
have been able to overcome their base instincts and make efforts towards achievin(,, 
their mission such as navigating to a rendezvous or reacting to enemy activity in the 
most appropriate manner. Some managed to survive and evade the enemy for days on 
their own initiative having inadvertently landed many miles from their DZ. As doctrine 
had correctly identified the moments immediately after landing were the most critical 
for paratroops but sound training could reduce the time a soldier was isolated. Brigadier 
Poett, Commander 5 Parachute Brigade, recalled his reaction after landing in 
Normandy. 'I had no idea where I was. It was too dark to see the church or any of the 
landmarks on which we had been briefed, but I could see the exhaust of the aircraft 
disappearing and I knew that it would be going over Ranville. I knew my direction 
therefore.... I moved in the direction of flight of my aircraft, and sure enough I came 
across one of my men. 29 
In mid- 1941 the War Office ordered an expansion of the airborne establishment from 
a single battalion to a complete brigade. In doing so the General Staff adhered to its 
policy of all paratroopers being volunteers . 
30 No. 2 Commando, which had been 
renamed II Special Air Service (SAS) Battalion in October 1940, formed the nucleLis of 
I Parachute Brigade and was renamed yet again as I Parachute Battalion. The 
remaining battalions would be formed as new units by extracting volunteer manpo,, Ner 
27 See for example Pine-Cotrin, The Tale OfTjj, o Bridges, p. 4. 
IWM, Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookenden KCB DSO OBE DL. diary entrN lor 12 
Julý 1943. 
29 N. Poett, Pure Poett, The futobiography of General Sir Nigel Poeu (London: Lco Cooper, 1991). 
pp. 64-05. 
10 NA, AIR 23/5411, meeting held on II Jul, % 1941. 
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from across the Army. When the request for volunteers from all British infantry 
resources in the United Kingdom was promulgated in August 1941 a limit of a 
maximum of ten other ranks volunteering per unit was set so as not to deplete aný one 
unit unduly. 31 
Even with this limit imposed the policy of recruiting volunteers from the infantrN in 
particular created resentment in many commanders. The difficulty was not necessarilý 
the quantity of volunteers required but the quality of the soldiers that it drew aNN ý1ý from 
other units. General Sir Brian Horrocks described the problem. 
It would be safe to say that out of a section of, say, ten men, two 
lead, seven are perfectly prepared to follow where they are led, and 
one would much prefer not to be there at all.... One of the reasons 
why so many generals objected to men being asked to volunteer for 
special cloak-and-dagger private armies was it was always the 
leaders who volunteered. In these special formations.... each leader 
represented only himself as they were all of the same type; but in his 
regiment he was worth almost a whole section, for he was the man 
the others would follow. 32 
Gale was certain that the exceptionally high physical and mental standards required of 
paratroopers necessitated a volunteer intake and was worth this criticism from the rest 
of the Army. 33 Certainly later in the war there is evidence that calls for recruits for 
airborne forces were obstructed through such methods as deliberately not circulating the 
34 
Army Council Instructions calling for volunteers down to unit level . 
Although training had been recognised as the only sure way of producing a 
paratrooper with the necessary qualities of independence and initiative a selection 
process was maintained. More precise physical standards were drawn up. Prospective 
paratroops had to be between nineteen and forty years old, not over six feet two inches 
tall and weighing no more than 182 pounds. Visual acuity had to be not below 6/12 in 
each eye without correction and hearing had to be up to Hearing Standard 2 . 
35 There is 
not much evidence for selection procedures beyond a medical to confirm physical 
standards. In June 1941 the Adjutant General, General Sir Ronald Adam recommended 
31 ()t\\ a\, Airborne Forces, p. 34. 
B. G. 1 lorrocks, A Full Life (I ondon: Collins, 1960). p. 187. 
33 Gale, Call ToArms. p. 117. 
34 NA. CA13 120, "02. Prcsctit Position of the Airlx)me Diý ision. 16 April 1942. 
NA. WO 205/75 1, Instructions 6or all ranks attending parachute courses, -1 December 1943. 
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to the Executive Committee of the Army Council that psychological testing should be 
introduced in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of recruit sclection 
across the Army. 36 Gale confirms that the introduction of psychological testing for 
potential parachute recruits reduced the wastage rate during training. 37 Although no 
primary evidence appears to exist concerning this selection procedure it is probable that 
it was part of Adams's wider reforms rather than any unique innovation on the part of 
airborne forces. 
The reasons for a man volunteering to become a paratrooper were many and varied. 
some altruistic and others more basic. Undoubtedly there were some vvho were not 
altogether aware of exactly what they were volunteering for. Both Frost and Brigadier 
Alistair Pearson recall, asjunior officers, not knowing that the 'special service' they had 
volunteered for involved parachuting until they were already most of the way through 
the selection proceSS. 38 Still others knew exactly what they were doing and, particularlý 
during the early part of the war, volunteered as a means to take the battle to the enemy 
more quickly than might otherwise have been the case. 39 Some volunteered because the 
glamour appealed to them and others just to escape their current situation . 
4( ' During late 
1943 and early 1944 men serving in the Middle East applied to secure a posting back in 
Britain 
.4' 
The various badges and symbols enhanced the perceived glarnour of airborne 
forces. The maroon beret and the badge depicting Bellerophon astride a winged 
Pegasus in sky blue on a maroon background were chosen personally by Major General 
Frederick Browning in order to foster the principles of high morale and a Corp. V d'elite. 4 
The qualified paratrooper's badge (a pair of blue wings with a parachute in the centre) 
and the maroon beret in particular quickly became synonymous with British airborne 
forces and while it may not have directly induced men to volunteer there is evidence 
36 I. A. Crang, The British Army and the People's War1939-1945 (Manchester: Manchester Unlýcrsivv 
Press, 2000), pp. 9- 10. 
37 Gale. Call ToArms. p. 1 15. 
38 Frost- I Drop Too A fanY, p. 18 and J. James. A Fierce Quality (London: Leo Cooper, 1989). p. 22. 
31) An extraordinary example of this phenomena was the fact that one unit. 22 Independent Parachute 
Companý, was made up of sixt) percent of German Jeý%s who had fled Nazi Nrsecution andjolned the 
British Army with assumed names. Bernage. G., Red Devils In Normanqý, (Ba,, cux: llcimdal, 2002). 
p. 17. 
40 Gale, Call To Arms, p. 115. 
41 1). Englander & 1'. Mason. The British Soldier In World iGn- Two (War%k ick: Warwick Working Papers 
In Social I listory, 1989), p. 2. 
42 01way- I irborne Forces, p. 47. 
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that it became a coveted item by those already considering volunteering. Crookenden. 
on being posted to 6 Airborne Division after Staff College in 1943 wrote to his parents 
commenting, 'I look very swell in my purple [sic] hat. ! 43 
Money was certainly a motivating factor. The normal pay of soldiers was a constant 
cause of irritation and criticism. The War Office Committee on Morale in the Army 
reported that of a sample of the negative letters received by the British media during 
1942 and 1943 fifty-nine percent were complaints over pay and allowances. 44 The 
promise of extra pay would have been a strong attraction to many soldiers. When the 
independent living experiment of No. 2 Commando failed the subsistence allowance was 
withdrawn and replaced by parachute pay. The rate was set at four shillings per day for 
officers and two shillings per day for other ranks. The commanding officer of II SAS 
Battalion questioned this disparity and suggested that the two rates should be made 
equal at three shillings per day but there is no evidence that this was achieved. 45 This 
did not appear to cause problems as one soldier recalled his comradcs in training as, 
volunteers, for many of whom no doubt the extra 2/- per day when qualified was a 
powerful incentive to succeed. -)46 
The role of propaganda has also been cited as one reason for soldiers volunteering for 
service as paratroopers. 47 Propaganda in the shape of a recruiting campaign was 
required in the early months and years of the war to advertise what was a virtually 
unknown form of soldiering. Later it was needed to keep airborne forces, whose 
operations were few and far between, in the public eye in order to maintain a steady 
stream of recruits. The propaganda took two forms, direct and indirect. Direct 
propaganda was official War Office material, aimed directly at serving soldiers via the 
chain of command to persuade men to volunteer for parachuting. Lecture tours were 
organised where parachute trained officers could describe their experiences and answer 
questions from units around the country. 48 However it would appear that the effect of 
the appearance of the lecturers on the audience was not always taken into consideration. 
As one prospective paratrooper recalls, 'Of the two officers who presided, the first. 
411WM, Crookenden, diary entr,. for 16 M aý 1943. 
44 1 `, nglander& Mason, The British Soldier in World War Two, p. 13). 
45 NA, WO 32/9778 meeting to discuss formation of neN% air battalions. 26 August 194 1. 
46 1 \k M, Papers of D. A. Kerven. p. 6. 
47 Peat\, British. IrmY Manpower Crisis 1944, p. 137. 
48 ABIN, I A/2. Captain Bradish conducted one Such lecture tour in lIngland in Julý 194 1. 
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Brigadier Bill Gough (commander 50 Indian Parachute Brigade], had his leg in plaster. 
while his Brigade-Major was encased from hips to armpits. The brigadier announced. 
'We are scarcely good advertisements for parachuting: none the less xNe inN ite you to 
volunteer. " 49 
Official literature was also produced with the intention of non-airborne regimental 
officers using it to deliver lectures to their own soldiers in order to persuade them to 
volunteer. An example of this was a two part article entitled 'Parachuting as a Career', 
written by a War Office staff writer Major Anthony Cotterell. The article appeared in 
the official periodical 'War' issues number fifty-nine and sixty in November and 
December 1941. The article was a detailed and humorous account of parachute 
training. At the end of the article there were a number of lines of thought and specific 
points for the presiding officer to introduce into any subsequent discussion. There was 
even the suggestion that the officer running the session might demonstrate a parachute 
landing roll, 'When done correctly it is infectious' . 
50 The value of this approach must 
be considered dubious. There is more than a touch of the blind leading the blind and, 
bearing in mind some commanders' reluctance to release volunteers, it is probabic that 
these internal lecture sessions were delivered with a lack of enthusiasm if at all. 
Indirect propaganda appears likely to have attracted more volunteers, reaching a wider 
audience and being presented in a more appealing format. This involved ensuring that 
suitably targeted articles on parachuting and airborne forces appeared regularly in 
national periodicals, publications and featured on national newsreels and in films where 
security allowed. In October 1941 Ringway organised a three-day media event during 
which press photographers, correspondents, journalists, filmmakers and representatives 
of the BBC were invited to attend. As a result, the following month Gaumont released a 
newsreel to cinemas across the country describing some of the training of paratroops, 
demonstrating a mock operation and ending with the stirring proclamation (if somewhat 
opti rn istic at the end of 194 1 ), 'And that's what Britain's paratroops are doing. So look 
out, Mr Nazi; we'll be seeing YOU!, 51 Most magazine articles were equally fervent in 
keeping with the national mood although the tone was often tailored to a specific 
49 11. Bankhead. Salute To The Sfeac#iul (London: Ramsay Press, 2002). p-27- 
so "\ BFM, I A/2. MaJor A. Cotterell (War Staff Writer), Parachuting. 
IsA Career, War No. 59 & 60. 
No\ ember and December 194 1. 
51 Newnham. Prelude to Gloiý-, pp. 75-77. 
129 
audience. Therefore an article in Picture Post was detailed and lavishly illustrated NN ith 
black and white photographs with the reporter's account of his own training and 
parachute jump experience. The Boy's Own Paper took a more adventurous approach 
while Flight Magazine contained much technical detai 1.52 The potential impact of this 
indirect propaganda was such that in early 1942 an officer, Lieutenant Colonel W. A. 
Sinclair, was posted permanently to the central airborne staff to coordinate the publicity 
e ffo rt. 53 It is difficult to assess the success of all propaganda in persuading men to 
volunteer. References in memoirs confirming the authors or their colleagues being 
influenced by lectures, films or magazine articles are infrequent. Whatever the true 
influences were that persuaded men to become paratroops, volunteers were Initially 
forthcoming in sufficient numbers to fulfil the requirement up to the strength of a 
parachute brigade. 
However in 1942 Britain's airborne capability began to expand exponentialk. In the 
spring the War Office decided to form a second parachute brigade in England to make 
up the formation of I Airborne Division and in response on 17 July 2 Parachute Brigade 
began to form. In November 1942 orders were issued for the formation of 4 Parachute 
Brigade in the Middle East. On 23 April 1943 the War Office ordered the formation of 
6 Airborne Division, which necessitated the establishment of another two parachute 
brigades through that year. The manpower requirements to meet this rapid expansion 
were unlikely to be met through a purely volunteer intake and a different approach had 
54 to be considered . Detailed thought 
had been given to the methods of raising parachute 
battalions in mid-1941. One of the options discussed was to discard the volunteer 
principle and detail entire battalions to undergo parachute training, replacing those 
individuals that were found to be unfit. The advantages of this method were clear. It 
was the quickest way of forming a parachute battalion; it provided an administratively 
efficient solution and the hierarchy and esprit de corps of the unit would be retained. 
However, disregarding the volunteer principle was an unknown quantity and the 
52 ABI-'M, I A/2: Picture Post, Vol 22, No. 12.18 March 1944, pp. 7-13. Boy's Own Paper, Vol 65, No. 1. 
October 1942, pp. 4-6. Flight Uaga: ine. 30 October 1941 ý pp. 
297-300. Not all propoganda %ý as positive. 
An short article in Tatler by Wing Commander E. G. Oaklcy-Beuttlcr was accompanied b,, a cartoon of 
parzaroops tangled in their lines, descending upside down and landing on their heads %%ith the caption 
'An\ more volunteers? ' Oakley-Beuttler, 'A School t1or Paratroops', Taller and Bystander, ianuarý- 
20 194-3). 
5-' Nc\\ nham, Prelude to Glory, pp. -3 ) 
10. 
54 Ot\%, i\,, 4irborne Forces. pp. 54,94 & 108. 
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repercussions were considered possibly dangerous. Nevertheless, if speed of 
establishment was the main consideration then this option was recommended. Rock 
was less concerned with the possible disadvantages of mass conversion of battalions to 
the parachute role. He was not sure whether a volunteer was any better than a pressed 
man as very few volunteers had any real conception of what they had let themselves in 
for anyway. 56 
In mid-] 941 the decision had been taken to retain the principle of a volunteer-only 
force during the expansion to form I Parachute Brigade. From mid- 1942 the situation 
had changed and, although no operational imperative yet necessitated speed of 
formation, the scale of expansion required the most administratively efficient process 
possible. Entire infantry battalions were allocated for conversion to parachute 
battalions. On initial examination it would appear that the potential results of this 
scheme could have been estimated. ) after all No. 2 Commando had been converted en 
masse to paratroops and eighty-five percent of the men successfully made the transition 
to the parachute role. However, these were men who had already been selected for their 
character and physical attributes, unlike standard infantry battalions. The infantry units 
of 31 Independent Brigade Group had been converted to air-landing infantry from 
October 1941 to form I Air-Landing Brigade as were its supporting arms such as 
engineer squadrons and artillery batteries. However, the parachute role was more 
demanding than that of air-landing infantry so this process also did not provide a 
satisfactory model. Therefore, as had been identified in 194 1, the result of converting 
complete battalions could not be predicted. Certainly taking No. 2 Commando's eighty- 
five percent conversion rate would have been over optimistic. Lieutenant Colonel Pine- 
Coffin, the commanding officer of 7 Parachute Battalion, recalls a seventy percent 
57 
success rate when 10 Battalion, Somerset Light Infantry converted . However, the 
primary evidence appears to question this figure as improbably high. When 10 
Battalion, The Green Howards converted to 12 Parachute Battalion only fourteen out of 
twentY-four officers were successful and 147 out of 636 other ranks. Th is equates to 
approximately twenty-five percent of the original battalion. Similarly, when 2/4 
55 NA. WO 32/9778, Formation offurther parachute battalions. 7 July 1941. 
56 NA, WO 32/9778, meeting held to discuss the raising of additional parachute battalions. 23 Julý 194 1. 
57 Pine-Coll'in. I'ale- qf Two Bridges, p. 5. 
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Battalion, The South Lancashire Regiment became 13 Parachute Battalion only thirteen 
out of twenty-four officers and 210 of 766 other ranks converted, a rate of less than 
58 thirty percent . These 
figures were offset to a degree by the reduced establishment of a 
parachute battalion compared to a regular infantry battalion. A parachute battalion 
consisted of approximately 450 men of all ranks. Therefore the post conversion figures 
would have equated to thirty-five and fifty percent of the manpower required for 12 and 
13 Parachute Battalions respectively. Even so there was still a significant shortfall that 
had to be made up by volunteers from other infantry battalions across the Anný - 
Despite this wastage rate and continued reliance on volunteers to provide the mzkjorit\ 
of paratroops this system did still have advantages. The figures show that over fiftý 
percent of a battalion's officers were successful at conversion. Also, of the percentage 
of other ranks that did convert a high proportion were the NCOs of the battalion. 
Therefore the integrity of the hierarchy and the unit identity were still retained. 59 This 
was an important fact as the command and control mechanism within a battalion 
remained intact, which could improve efficiency, particularly during training and 
operations. The process also allowed a unit to shed its undesirable individuals \ý ithout 
the usual bureaucracy. One artillery officer considered that it was a privilege to be able 
to rid themselves of the personnel that they assessed as detrimental to unit 
effectiveness. 60 In many cases it is unlikely that the victims of this process were even 
aware of the reasons why they had failed to make the grade. 61 In retrospect this policy 
might be considered misguided, breaking up perfectly serviceable infantry battalions 
and still requiring a significant recruiting effort. However the operational record of 
those converted battalions is at least equal to those raised from a purely volunteer 
intake. Thus, this process of selecting a battalion for conversion and then back filling 
with volunteers proved to be a satisfactory compromise between speed and efficiency of 
formation while still retaining the volunteer ethos. 
58 NA. WO 205/75 1, Formation of 6 Airborne Division, 6 August 1941. 
59 A. Jefferson. Assaull On The Guns Of Herville (London: John MurraN. 1987). p. 28. 
60 Peter Wilkinson, letter to the author, 21 May 2005. 
61 CompanN Sergeant Major Swanston of 7 Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers recalled, 
ý\ ceding-out process started and fior my own companý this process turned out to 
be satisfactorý. The 
method \k as an casý one. I marched the men in one by one to the medical oft-iccr. 
I was to stand just 
behind the man to he examined and then I would just nod ý es or no to the doctor. Mis resulting in a 
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Recruitment at the beginning of the development process xkas retarded to some extent 
by the all-volunteer policy and the rest of the Army's understandable reluctance to 
release high quality manpower to the new establishment. This suited the War Office's 
aspirations, which in the early part of the war was eager to maintain the manpoNN er 
requirement at a low level. In fact there would have been little benefit in increasing the 
rate of recruitment early in the development process and before the training 
establishment was in a position to cope with the throughput. From 1942 onwards the 
willingness to compromise the volunteer principle allowed flexibility in the recruitment 
process, which in turn facilitated rapid expansion while retaining the qualities that made 
parachute units unique. Less easy to identify are those factors that drove individuals to 
volunteer for such an unknown and dangerous profession, often in the face of resistance 
from their superiors. Certainly ignorance, pay, image and propaganda played their part 
but none of these factors could compel a man to volunteer against his own volition. 
Even after D Day and the losses suffered by 6 Airborne Division during Operation 
OVERLORD (June 1944) and by I Airborne Division during Operation MARKET 
GARDEN (September 1944) there was still a steady stream of volunteers willing to fill 
the vacancies. 62 However, as recruits were secured they still only represented a raw 
manpower figure. Specialist parachute training was required to produce effective 
paratroopers and the rate of training would have to keep pace with expansion if 
bottlenecks in development were to be avoided. 
4.3 Parachute Training 
Following Churchill's minute of 20 June 1940 parachute training facilities were 
established with remarkable speed. Before that date military parachuting in Britain was 
practically non-existent. There was a small parachute section at RAF Henlow but this 
was for the provision of life-saving parachutes for aircrew, not the deliberate insertion 
of soldiers. Manchester Corporation's civil airport at Ringway was chosen as the site 
for parachute training despite reservations, which will be examined later. There were 
no qualified parachutejump instructors available. Instead a handful of airmen. fabric 
"2 One officcr with I Airborne Division after Operation MARKFT claims that maný ofthe post Arnhem 
replacements werc rccruited direct from Borstals as an alternati\ e to incarccration but there is no pri man 
c\ idcnce of this policN . N. Rilcý. 
One Jump. 4head (London: John Clare. 1984) p. 145. 
133 
workers at Henlow, who had formed a semi-official parachute display team, were 
drafted in to teach parachuting. These were joined by a few NCOs from the Army 
Physical Training Corps (APTC) who had volunteered for parachute instructing duties 
despite having no experience of the process themselves. By 8 July most of the initial 
instructors and staff were present at RAF Ringway and the first 100 men from No. 2 
Commando arrived on the same day. The first live drops took place on 13 Jul . 
63 
The pace at which these initial developments were made caused nervousness in some 
areas of the Air Ministry. Slessor expressed his disquiet as he often did over airborne 
forces. 
I am rather uneasy about the air side of the development of parachute 
troops, and am afraid if we are not careful that it will be a case of 
more haste less speed; I am also a bit afraid that if we try to go too fast 
we may have unnecessary training casualties which wi II be a set-back 
to the development of the parachute units..... I am very anxious not to 
prejudice the success of the new organisation by trying to rush it 
unduly at the beginning, especially as morale and confidence are such 64 
an important factor in this respect . 
On this occasion Slcssor's fears were well founded. Minor injuries were apparent 
from the very first drop at No. I PTS, Ringway and on 25 July 1940 Driver Evans, 
RASC, became the first fatality when his parachute failed to function correctly. 65 
Parachuting was an inherently dangerous pastime even under perfect conditions. Under 
military conditions, in an experimental environment and under time pressure fatalities 
were inevitable. There were forty-six parachute training deaths at Ringway between 
Driver Evans's demise and 8 March 1945. This represents a minute percentage of the 
estimated 60,000 men (maybe equating to approximately 300,000 jumps) that were 
trained during the corresponding period. However, the proportion of fatalities to jumps 
was much highcr than this during the initial stages. There were five deaths in the first 
66 6,53.21 jumps up until 20 June 1941 . The reaction to 
fatalities was mixed. Not 
Surprisingly Gale considered fatal accidents sickening, dreaded by all but someýý hat 
63 NA, AIR 29/5 12, CLE Operational Record Book, introduction and entrN for I') Jul, 11940. 
64 NA, DFFL2/791, letter from Slessor to Major General Bourne, DCO. 4 Jul, 1940. 
65 NeNN nham, Prelude lo Glorý% p. 16. 
6' Figures lor training fatalities are extracted from ABFM LIV12. Summary ol'i-atalitics at Ringx%a\. 
undated. 
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inevitable. 67 Frost was more philosophical, * It always seemed that some curious or 
freakish fault had occurred when a man fell to his death. I think most of us felt that this 
was inevitable at the beginning and that only by trial and error could perfection be 
attained; in any case these things only happened to other people and ýýe ourselves were 
perfectly safe. ')6' Before the war the War Office had considered parachuting 'a 
precarious occupation' the danger of which might render it undesirable during 
peacetime . 
69 By 1940 the Air Ministry believed that the accident rate was ajustified 
risk when considered against the much higher level of risk paratroops would be exposed 
to once they had landed and were in the midst of battle. 70 
However, no matter what the official attitude was, at No. I PTS training fatalities were 
having a discernable effect. After the first three deaths Captain Lindsay on the staff at 
Ringway recorded that 'morale in the [No. 2] commando was not good with distrust of 
the parachutes. ' 7' Although fatalities had a strong moral effect they did not 
significantly affect the training rate due to the small numbers. Nonetheless, for every 
death there were many accidents causing injuries of varying degrees which did take 
many men away from training for weeks, months or even permanently dependent on the 
severity. Jumping through the floor apertures of bomber aircraft brought its own 
dangers, as pupils were liable to hit their heads and faces on the way out. Sometimes 
this was superficial with the medics at Ringway being called on to stitch approximately 
five facial injuries a week. Paratroops who left the aircraft semi-conscious or 
unconscious due to 'ringing the bell' were liable to break ankles and legs on landing. 
Even a good jump could result in broken limbs if the landing was on uneven ground. 72 
On top of injuries there was also a high proportion of refusals to jump amongst the 
'tough' men of No. 2 Commando. Of the first 342 men to be trained thirty refused to 
jump. Although not considered a disgrace by any means, a refusal tojump did result in 
a man being removed from the parachute course. Refusals were considered indicative 
"' Gale. Call lo., Ims. p. 117. 
68 Frost, /I Drop Too. lfany, p. 34. 
t, C) NA, WO 32/4371, file notes, 13 December 1935. 
70 NA, CAB 120/262,1) Plans, Air Ministry, 12 August 1940. 
71 ABFM I A/2, note hý Capt M. Lindsay. undated. 
72 ABFNI I A/2. notes hN R. 1 I Lcvicn, undated. Squadron Leader B. J. 0. \vVinfield dated 31 Maý 1943 and 
J. Kilkenny, instructor at No. 1 undated. 'Ringing the bell' was the phrase used to describe hitting 
ones face or head on the aperture on lcaý ing a bomber aircrall. 
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of low morale and were apt to be contagious in a unit and therefore every effort had to 
73 be made to keep them to a minimum . 
A new approach to training was required to reduce fatalities, the general accident rate 
and the number of men who were succumbing to their natural psychological instincts bý 
refusing to leave the aircraft. Another factor was also driving the need for alternative 
training methods. There was an acute shortage of aircraft available at No. I PTS during 
the war for all those reasons described in the previous chapter. A lack of aircraft was 
recognised as a constraining factor on the training rate almost as soon as Ringwaý 
opened for business. 74 The six Whitleys initially allocated to the PTS NNcre bareIN 
adequate to cope with the requirements of training for No. 2 Commando. As the training 
requirement expanded the complement of aircraft available for training did not increase 
at a similar rate. In March 1942, when the additional battalions for I Parachute BriOade 
were being trained the establishment was increased to twelve Whitley's and an Avro 
Anson for liaison duties . 
75 The Air Ministry was always reluctant to release aircraft to 
Ringway for training. Following Operations TORCH and HUSKY the requirement to 
train from the C-47 Dakota became obvious. The War Office made a request to this 
effect but the Air Ministry regarded it as inopportune at that timc to release any Dakotas 
to the PTS although it promised to bear the appeal in mind in the future. 76 As the 
Operational Record Book of the CLE records, No. I PTS 'conceived in haste and born in 
a spirit of mental confusion, always lacking sufficient staff, accommodation and 
equipment, soon learnt the art of making shi ft., 
77 
That art was practiced to great effect in No. I PTS and manifested itself as the 
ingenious application of synthetic training. Synthetic training of any description was 
still a new concept at the beginning of the war. Applying synthetic methods to any 
training process required a deep understanding of the system of instruction and the 
required end state. With parachute training still in its infancy a high degree of vision 
and confidence was necessary. Nevertheless some of the methods, devices and 
apparatus developed at Ringway during the early part of the war were so successful that 
73 Ne\\nham, Prelude lo Glory, pp. 21 & 151. Although no disgrace during initial training aný rct*usal to 
jump from a trained paratrooper attracted a compulsory court martial. 
74 NA. CAll 120/262, COS Committec meeting. 6 August 1940. 
75 NA. AIR IQ'92, HQ AC Comd to Air Ministr\. 10 September 
1941. 
76 NA. AIR 39/83. I)MC, Air Ministry to D. Air. War Oflicc. 
77 NA, AIR 29/512. CLE Operational Record [look, introduction. undated. 
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many are still used today in one form or another by airborne forces around the world. 
That is not to say that failures were totally non-existent. One of the first methods 
instigated was to make trainees jump from the back of a moving truck on to a grass 
verge to simulate a parachute landing. As one instructor at the PTS recalls. 'I think the 
grass was just as hard as the tarmac. It didn't encourage us very much and we had lots 
of accidents and it was stopped. )78 
Static training apparatus, housed in the hangars at Ringway. proved highly successful 
and popular. In order to attain a training output rate of 100 paratroops per \ý cek the 
CLE listed the required equipment as eight mock-up apertures, eight trapezes, four lo\\ 
jumping towers, four aircraft wind engines and eight trestled fuselages equipped with 
panels, strops and lights . 
79 All of this equipment was designed and built by the 
Technical Development Section (TDS) and workshops at Ringway. The trapeze 
resembled a suspended aerial maypole from which trainees could swing and then, on 
letting go free-fall a short distance and roll as they hit the ground. Platforins were 
constructed approximately eight feet high on the sidewalls of the hangars which 
students pushed them selves from, also to practice their roll when hitting the ground. 
Slides were constructed, propelling trainees from nine feet up and releasing them at 
speed about three feet from the ground, again to practice the necessary landing drills. A 
high platform, approximately twenty feet up, was fitted with a parachute harness 
attached to a cable wound round a drum fitted with paddles. The student jumped from 
the platform and the paddles slowed his descent as the cable unwound approximating 
the speed of a real parachute drop. There were also mock apertures built to resemble 
the hole in the floor of a Whitley through which a trainee could practice his exit. All of 
these pieces of equipment (some of which were given enticing names such as 'the 
gallows') allowed soldiers to practice the techniques required on landing without the 
risk of significant injury. It also allowed the entire process of parachuting, from leaving 
the aircraft to landing, to be broken down into a series of drills that could be learned bv 
80 rote . 
78 A BFM I A/2, note bN A. L. Shepherd, Fhe Suffolk Regiment, instructor at No. 1 PTS. undated. 
79 NA, AIR 39/92, schenic fior the formation of an Army ground training centre for British parachutc 
troops. 9 September 194 1. 
80 ABFM I A/2. note b,, T. Goode. engineer in CLI-'workshop, undated. 
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Mock-up fuselages were accurately constructed to represent the interior of varioull 
aircraft. In these students could practice the procedures for hooking up their parachutes 
and the drills to be followed immediately prior to leaving the aircraft. This released 
actual aircraft for live parachuting that might otherwise have been kept on the ground to 
cater for these periods of instruction. All of this apparatus could be used simultaneousl" 
by different groups of students at various points of their training. Much of the synthetic 
equipment was housed in hangars, which allowed it to be used despite the vagaries of 
the weather. Another innovation that released aircraft flying hours was the use of a 
tethered balloon from which parachute drops could be conducted. The idea of 
parachuting from a stationary platform as opposed to a moving aircraft was not 
completely unique. The Russians and the Poles had built towers all across their 
countries pre-war in order to allow civilians to experience parachuting. The balloon 
was a more flexible solution to the tower as it was not permanently fixed in one spot. " 
The advantage of jumping from the balloon was that it allowed the trainee to exit the 
aperture in the floor of the balloon cage without being buffeted by the slipstream that 
would be apparent with an aircraft. This reduced the risk of tumbling and of 
consequential serious if not fatal accidents occurring. 82 Also a balloon drop allowed an 
instructor on the ground to criticise a student's technique via a megaphone as he 
descended. There were disadvantages; the lack of noise and bustle associated with an 
aircraft fuselage made the balloon cage a far more contcmplative environment 
immediately before jumping. As the commanding officer of No. I PTS commented, 'in 
the case of the balloon everything seemed so much more cold-blooded, and on first 
, 83 experience many men regarded the procedure as positively diabolical . 
As well as relieving aircraft flying hours this intensive and scientific ground training, 
followed by twojumps from the balloon reduced the accident rate, if the fatality rate can 
be considered indicative. Following the first five fatalities from 6,532 jumps the next 
death did not occur until more than a further 5,000 jumps had been conducted in 
September 1941. The next fatal accident after this did not take place until plus of a 
81 Parachutes had been used as a means of escape hý battlefield observers posted in tethered balkx)w, 
during the First World War. 
82 Ofthe torty-six fatalities thatoccurred atNo. 1 PTS duringthc \ýarM \wrc attributed to somersaulting 
and subscquent t\\istingot'rigging lines. ABFNI IAJ22, summary of fatalities at Ringx\aý. undated. 
93 Ncwnham. Pi-elude Io Gloi: v. p. 50. 
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further 13,000jumps had occurred in January 1942. The accident rate leýelled off 
during 1943 and despite the much higher training rate only nine deaths occurred 
throughout 1944 and 1945 . 
84 A by-product of synthetic training was a reduction of the 
psychological impact of the physical act of parachuting. This ýý as largely due to the 
procedures being reduced to a drill, which on the appropriate command became an 
involuntary reaction. MacDonald Hastings, a feature journalist with Picture Post, 
recalls this experience, 'it was his voice, not my muscles that did it. I went in spite ot 
myself. 85 Another trainee elaborated on the effect when exiting from the balloon, *1 
was jumping No. 2 and sitting on the edge of that aperture I was convinced that I %%oL]ld 
never be able to launch myself into space. I looked up at the instructor's hand as hc said 
to me 'good exit No. 2' and I still did not believe that I could get out of that cage, but all 
the aperture training took over and on the word 'GO' my body reacted automaticallý 
and out I went. ' 86 
In order to maintain this psychological advantage paratroops had to continue to jump 
at regular intervals after their basic training. It was recognised that if men did notjump 
87 frequently then they could lose their nerve . Also new techniques were developed 
throughout the war and new equipment, such as leg bags and valises were introduced 
which required further instruction. Therefore a programme of continuation training was 
required. By the time the second and third parachute battalions were being established 
in late 1941 the ideal basic training course for ab initio paratroops was considered to be 
fourteen days during which time two balloon jumps and five descents from aircraft were 
completed. Courses could be shortened in extremis to deal with sudden influxes of 
soldiers requiring training. Each of these standard courses took 240 trainees split into 
four syndicates of sixty each. This therefore resulted in approximately 200 trained 
88 
paratroops leaving Ringway every two weeks or an average of 100 per week . This 
figure had been identified as the output capacity of No. I PTS from its inception 
although it represented a significant target against the original training rate which saýý 
84 Figures extracted from ABFM I A/2, summarý of fatalities at Ringway. undated. 
85 A BFM, I A/2, Picture Post, Vol 22, No. 12,18 March 1944, p. 10. 
8"ABFM. I A/2, letter from G. D. I'hompson, undated. 
87 NA, WO 32/9778, formation of further parachute battalions. 7 JuIN 1941. 
88 ABI'M. IA/2. notes tor infiormation and guidance in connection N%Ith No. 1 course of instruction on 
parachutino. 3 November 194 1. t, 
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only 500 members of II SAS trained in approximately eight months. or an approximate 
89 
average of less than twenty per week . 
It was considered that there was potential for growth in the training capacitN at 
Ringway and that the 100 per week output standard set in late 1941 could be quadrupled 
in order to achieve 5,000 trained paratroops by May 1942, the equivalent of 
approximately two and a half parachute brigades. However this remained a projected 
training rate only. 90 In fact approximately 2,500 men were trained by mid- 1942. This 
represented a low average actual training rate between March 1941 and July 1942 of 
less than fifty paratroops per week. However, it was sufficient to supply the formations 
that had been established at that time and the training rate did increase significanW, 
during this period so that at the end of 1941 it had reached the projected 100 per week. 
Also in mid-] 942 the feasibility of establishing a second airborne division was under 
consideration. To achieve this by the end of 1942 a further 5,500 paratroops would 
92 have to be trained in six months equating to a training rate of just over 200 per week . 
This would have been achievable by increasing the establishment of No. I PTS and 
allowing courses to overlap and run concurrently. There was also capacity in parachute 
schools that were being established in other theatres such as the Indian Parachute 
School at Chaklala near Rawalpindi and No. 4 Middle East Training School, originally 
in Kabrit in the Canal Zone of Egypt. Much of 4 Parachute Brigade was trained in India 
and the Middle East. In the event a second airborne division was not established until 
spring 1943 and so no drastic increase in the training rate was necessary and courses at 
No. I PTS continued at 200 to 250 trainees at any one time (approximately 100 per week 
93 on average) through to early 1944 . 
By June 1944 all of Britain's airborne forces in Europe were fully established at two 
divisions and an independent brigade. From then on training was only required for 
battle casualty replacements and for continuation training and, as a result, the output 
89 NA. AIR 2/7470, policy for airbome lorces, 17 March 1941 and DEFF 2/791, meeting to discuss 
parachute training, 19July 1940. 
')0 NA, AIR 2/7470, Ismay to Churchill. 29 May 194 1. 
NA, AIR 29/512, C1 F'Operational Record Book. entry for 13 December 1941. 
Q2 NA, AIR 2/7470, Joint General Staff/Air Stal'I'memorandurn on airborne forces. 4 July 1942. 
Q 1, N A. AIR 29/5 12, CL E Operational Record Book. comparing the entries for 13 Deccmber 1941.7 
February 1942.26 August 1943 and 8 April 1944. 
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94 
rate eased somewhat. During this time an important principle was recoonised NN hich 
linked training to the readiness of formations. For example, two allied airborne task 
forces, each of approximately 1,500 paratroops were being held in the Mediterranean in 
preparation for the invasion of the south of France. One of these task forces was held at 
one week's notice to move, the other at three weeks notice to move. This allo"ed 
training resources to be prioritised and directed at the formation on the shortest notice to 
move in recognition of the fact that the second formation would have a further two 
weeks of dedicated training once the first was deployed. 95 This method was also used at 
Ringway and priorities were continually revised and allocated in order to ensure that 
training was delivered where it was most urgently required. The priority shifted back 
and forth between I and 6 Airborne Division between January 1944 and m id- 1945 
dependent upon which division was assigned to operations next. 
The individual training of paratroops was not a major factor in the progress of 
airborne development during the Second World War. The initial training rate was slow 
but was sufficient to meet the requirements of the equally steady pace of recruitment. 
The lack of aircraft released to the training establishment did initially have an effect on 
the throughput at the CLS and CLE. However, when the airborne capability began 
rapid expansion the training apparatus was sufficient to meet the increased requirement. 
Critical factors were the ingenuity required and willingness to adopt and develop novel 
training methods such as synthetic training. This maximised the use of resources, in 
particular aircraft and time, and ensured the efficient processing of manpower by 
reducing the injury and fatality rate and overcoming the psychological barriers that 
caused men to refuse tojump. Therefore a high proportion of the men recruited for 
parachuting duties became trained paratroops. The pass rate for initial parachute 
courses at No. I PTS appears to have been between eighty-five and ninety-five percent 
throughout the war. 96 The training regime was developed while the required output rate 
was low so that when the requirement was raised the PTS was able to respond 
effcctively. Priorities were allocated and switched between formations allowing 
04 NA, AIR 29/512, CLE Operational Record Book, entr\ for 7 October 1944 shows a course strength of 
Just sixty-eight of which fifty passed. 
95 NA. WO 204/4195, AFHQ minute, 22 June 1944. 
96 NA. AIR 29/512, CLE Operational Record Book. comparing the entries for 13 I)cccmber 1941.7 
FcbrijarN 1942,20 August 1943 and 8 April 1944. 
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efficient targeting of training to cope with the particular conditions at different ýta-ges of 
the war. 
4.4 Glider Pilot Selection and Training 
Besides paratroops the other specialist human resource that would be N ital to the 
development of British airborne forces was glider pilots. The selection and training of 
glider pilots presented very different challenges to that of the parachute troops. The 
numbers involved were much lower but the technical aspects of training were far more 
demanding. 97 There were two main obstacles that had a detrimental effect on selection 
and training. The glider pilot, more than any other area of airborne forces straddled the 
spheres of influence of both the Army and the RAF. Because of this their selection and 
role bore the brunt of prejudicial inter-service rivalry between the War Office and the 
Air Ministry. This complicated and slowed the initial selection process. Also the 
training regime for glider pilots was far less robust than that of paratroops. Because of 
this outside influences could very quickly have an effect on the training output rate. 
The Glider Pilot Regiment (GPR) was unique among British Army units. Conceived 
and established during the war it was obsolete, declined and disbanded shortly after 
victory. The qualities required of glider pilots, certainly according to the Army were 
unique. Brigadier George Chatterton, the commander of the glider pilots for most of the 
war summed up the requirement, 'It is the most unusual unit ever conceived by the 
British Army. A soldier who will pilot an aircraft, and then fight in the battle, a task 
indeed. '98 The initial recruits, like those for parachuting were drawn from No. 2 
Commando, therefore the standards required were again those of the commandos and 
not specific to this new discipline. The only added requirement was that they should 
have some flying experience. 99 Chatterton set out the qualities he believed were 
required including high general standards, intelligence, initiative, the ability to 
command and competence in all methods of warfare. 
100 In late 1940 the CLE formally 
97 , I'lic total cstablishment ofthc Glider Pilot Regiment never rose aN)ýc 2,500 men throughout the war. 
Ot wa\. ,I irborne 
Forces. p. 56. 
" IWM, Papers of'Brigadier A. G. Walch 0131'. Opening Address bý Colonel Chatterton to Glider Pilot 
Recruits. undated. 
99 Ot\\aý.. -Iirborne Forces, p. is. 
100 MAI. Papers of*13rigadicr A. G. Walch OBF- Directi\e on theTraining of(ilidcr Pilots bý Colonel 
Chatterton. November 1944. pp. 4-5 
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listed the requirements for a successful glider pilot in order of importance. These were 
judged to be initiative, fearlessness, intelligence, robustness, flying experience with 
powered aircraft and flying experience with glider aircraft. 101 Already, soldierly 
qualities were being ranked above those of airmanship. The CLE had determined that it 
was better to select a proficient soldier and train him as a pilot than vice versa. This 
proved in time to be the more efficient approach to the requirement. Also at this time 
procedures for processing volunteer glider pilots were published. This involved Army 
commands calling for volunteers followed by an interview of the applicants by the 
Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) of the respective command. Recruits were sent to 
selected RAF squadrons for a medical examination and finally the names of successful 
volunteers were to be forwarded to HQ No. 22 Group of AC Comd for transmission to 
the War Office. 102 These procedures and standards were not revised until the period of 
expansion in late 1941. It was not until 26 September 1941 that glider pilot selection 
was ordered to conform to the mental and physical standards of RAF aircrews. A joint 
RAF/Army interview board was also convened. 103 
The psychological factors affecting glider pilots were different to those of paratroops. 
It was unlikely that a glider pilot would find himself initially isolated on the battlefield, 
nor did he have to overcome the reactions against jumping from an aircraft. However, 
the effect of mental dislocation between an airfield in England and a battlefield on the 
continent was still apparent and, if anything exacerbated by the task of the glider pilot. 
Once again Chatterton sums up this concern. 
I assumed that flying a glider on tow must impose a severe strain on the 
pilot, a strain that would in no way be alleviated by the knowledge that 
on landing in the battlefield there would be no prospect of an immediate 
return. Now, I knew that on landing, after flying a powered aircraft for a 
long time, there is an overwhelming desire to relax completely and to 
sleep. Such facilities are available for pilots landing at an air station; but. 
I asked m self, what would happen to the pilot who landed in the middle 
of battle? 
ý04 
101, Me order of the final two qualities appears to be anomalous. NA, AIR 2/7422. notes for examiners of 
glider pilot applicants. 17 November 1940. 
102 NA. AIR 2/7422, training of glider pilots, 15 December 1940. 
103 Otwa\-4irborne Forces. p. 36. 
104 Chatterton, The Wings Of Pegasus, p. 20. 
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The glider pilot would have to cope not only with a change in environment but also a 
severe change of role. Being recruited as a proficient soldier would help him to do so. 
He would find it more natural to revert to his initial role than an airman would to adapt 
to the relatively unnatural tasks of an infantry soldier. Potential glider pilots were 
induced to volunteer by many of the same incentives as paratroopers although it appears 
there was not quite the same level of direct propaganda. Officers who qualified %%ould 
be paid an extra two shillings per day. Other ranks would be paid the same on initial 
qualification but this would be on a sliding scale, dependent on rank and experience up 
to an extra three shillings and sixpence a day. 105 Glider pilots wore the distinctive 
maroon beret and with the formal establishment of the GPR in February 1942 the,, had 
their own cap badge. The question of a unique flying badge for glider pilots was raised 
in late 1940 but the issue was clouded by spurious inter-service considerations. ' 06 1t 
was not until a year later that the Air Ministry agreed that a winged badge could be 
worn on the left breast akin to the RAF, although it did obýject to the 'bilious red' of the 
prototype badge submitted for approval. 107 As well as these material incentives the War 
Office also ran a carefully targeted direct recruitment campaign. Soldiers who had 
previously passed aircrew selection with the RAF but for whatever reason had ended up 
in the Army were identified, traced and given a direct opportunity to volunteer for the 
GPR. Most men approached in this manner appear to have been only too keen to 
accept. 1 08 
Due to these schemes and incentives and because of the low numbers involved there 
were no undue problems producing the manpower required to fulfil the glider pilot role. 
However, the invidiousness of basic inter-service friction was to have a stalling effect 
on the initial production of glider pilots and take up an unnecessary amount of staff 
effort. The General Staff firmly believed that a glider pilot had to be a soldier capable 
of being effective in battle once he had landed his troops and equipment. They should 
be capable of grouping together on the landing zone into formed units in order to carr", ' 
out specific military tasks such as conducting special raid parties, special weapon 
105 NA, WO 32/9845, fiormation ol-an Army glider pilot regiment, 3) 1 Octobcr 1941. 
106 NA, AIR 2/738, glider pilots. 14 Decembcr 1940. 
10 NA, AIR 2/7422. Air Ministr-*, 25 No\ember 1941. 
108 Sec lor example Andrc\Ns,, I; o You Wanledto Learn to F/y. Eh". pp. ] S-18 and M. Dank. The Gh(ier 
Gaikiý (London: Cassell, 1977). p-42 
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parties or acting in the general light infantry role. 109 They should be capable ofjoining 
in the battle and even leading the troops that they had just landed in the rear of the 
glider. A joint committee had very quickly agreed with this view and confirmed that 
glider pilots should be Army soldiers trained by the RAR'10 Understandabl" though. 
the Air Staff emphasised the difficulty of landing gliders en masse at a pre-determined 
place and time, at night, on unknown ground and possibly in the face of enemy fire. It 
logically concluded that, 'This is no task for a beginner in flying who is primarilý a 
soldier. ' III On II December 1940 Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris made the follo\ý ing 
statement that was to become infamous within the GPR. 
The idea that semi-skilled, unpicked personnel (infantry corporals have. I 
believe, even been suggested) could with a maximum of training be 
entrusted with the piloting of these troop carriers is fantastic. Their 
operation is the equivalent to forced landing the largest sized aircraft 
without engine aid - than which there is no higher test of piloting skill. 
' 12 
As they proved themselves on operations the glider pilots wore this quote as a badge of 
honour. ' 13 
The General Staff refuted the Air Staff assessment of the difficulty of glider flying. 
They advised that the gliders in development would have an elaborate arrangement of 
flaps and air brakes so that control of the aircraft and the approach to the landing point 
would be a relatively straight forward operation. The reasons for the pilots being 
experienced soldiers capable of command were reiterated. 
The glider coxswain [pilot] on touching down will be the only man 
present who will know exactly where the landing has been made and in 
which direction the troops should go. He has the best forward view, he is 
highly trained in map reading and studying ground from the air, and he 
will have noted the lie of the land to the objective. Even if only a 
Corporal, he will be the one to lead the other 23 officers and men to the 
right place. 114 
109 1 WM, Papers of Papers of Brigadier A. G. Walch OBI -', op cit, p. 6. 
'10 NA, AIR 32/2, meeting held in the Air Ministry, 5 September 1940. 
... ibid, Air Ministry to CLF. II November 1940. 
112 Otway-4irborne Forces. p. 35. 
'"' J. H. Wallwork. '... No Ihi)hcrTcst ot'Piloting Skill. ', Supplemeni to . 4eroplane Alonihly. Nla'. 1994. 
pp. 15. 
11-4 NA. AIR 32/2, CLE paper, 14 November 1940. Coxswain %%as a term bricflý adopted h-, the \ý ar 
Office to describe glider pilots. Although there are recorded examples. the suggestion that the glider pilot 
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Once again the Air Ministry would not concede that using soldiers as pilots , vas a 
satisfactory arrangement. However, the Air Staff was in danger of arguin-gy Itself into a 
comer. The RAF did not have pilots to spare at the end of 1940. It was alread\ arguing I t4 
against the development of airborne forces due to the drain it would have on the bomber 
effort. It could not then in good faith now offer bomber pilots to fly gliders. The Air 
Staff came up with increasingly desperate solutions to get around this. It \k as sLnggested 
that 'war-weary and ex-operational pilots' who could be quickly converted to olider 
flying might be suitable. The psychological impact on such aircrew of deliberately 
landing in the middle of a battle does not appear to have been considered. 
One of the arguments against the General Staff s insistence on combat-trained pilots 
could have been that it was not a universally held position. Whcn America began to 
train glider pilots they did not recognise the requirement for theill also to be fighting 
soldiers. 116 This approach did have some advantages. A glider pilot who had not been 
trained to fight would be unlikely to commit himself to combat and on landing would be 
more inclined to preserve his own safety by making for a designated RV. This scheme 
would help conserve an extremely valuable human resource. However the General 
Staff did not adopt the American scheme, which was later proved to be detrimental on 
operations. During Operation MARKET GARDEN over 1,000 American glider pilots 
who could have been usefully employed in the battle sat ineffectively around Eindhoven 
and Nijmegen waiting for evacuation. ' 17 
Despite this the Air Staff maintained its position that glider pilots must come from the 
RAF into 194 1. A scheme was proposed where operational bomber pilots would be 
taken off front line duties very briefly and given the minimum training required to 
enable them to fly gliders. They would then return to their bomber squadrons and form 
a virtual pool of glider pilots ready for airborne operations as required. 118 However this 
approach overlooked the need for combined training, for glider pilots to regularl"', train 
en masse and with air-landing infantry and supporting arms. This proposition ignored 
might lead his passengers is perhaps taking the argument to its extreme. *Guide' might be a more 
acctirate term. 
NA, AIR 2/7338, Air Ministry, 24 November 1940. 
Dank, The Glidei- Gang. pp. 206-207. 
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the probable requirement for maximum bomber effort immediately prior to a major 
operation that might employ an airborne element. It also contradicted the Air Staff s 
own assessment of the difficulty attached to flying and landing gliders. As expansion of 
the airborne capability began in mid-1941 and more experience was gained in operating 
gliders and the tactics associated with air-landing units, the logic of the General Staff s 
argument became inescapable. In August 1941 the Air Ministry finally acceded and 
agreed that glider pilots should be fighting soldiers. They further agreed that they could 
be officers or NCOs and that they would be seconded to the RAF for training. 119 
This decision had taken over a year to reach and consumed considerable staff effort. 
During this time the recruitment of glider pilots had been slow as neither service wanted 
to commit time and effort to a scheme that might then have to be handed over to the 
other. The direction and process of training also suffered. It was difficult to formulate a 
firm training policy when the basis of ownership was in dispute. The Air Staff, keen to 
protect aircraft from secondary activities, continued to argue whether specialist training 
was required at all. Why establish an elaborate and costly glider training system when 
existing RAF pilots could be quickly converted immediately prior to a planned airborne 
operation? 120 
Despite this protracted dispute an initial glider section was established at Ringway as 
early as 23 August 1940.12 1 Three pilots were brought from the Special Duties Flight at 
Christchurch, which had been established to conduct radar experiments on gliders for 
anti-invasion purposes. Squadron Leader Robert Fender and two colleagues landed at 
Ringway unannounced in two Avro 504s on 8 August 1940. A few days later four 
single-seat gliders arrived by road and were re-assembled. 122 Once at Ringway the 
glider section's remit continued to lay with experimentation; it was not designed to 
conduct training. It was accepted that potential glider pilots would first have to receive 
tuition on powered aircraft in order to learn basic airmanship principles. The RAF's 
Elementary Flying Training Schools (EFTS) were full to capacity and therefore the 
initial intake of glider pilots was attached to Army Cooperation squadrons for their 
119 NA. AIR 39/38, Air Ministry meeting, 22 August 1941. 
120 NA, AIR 2/7470, joint memo on glider-borne forces, 20 May 1940. 
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initial training. This began in November 1940. The syllabus was limited to achieý ing 
the ability to complete at least three successful solo landings Ný ithout using the 
engine. ' 23 The first twelve pilots were ready to progress to glider training bý Februarý, 
1941 having been graded from average through competent to very steady. 124 As the 
glider training establishment grew through the war this initial powered flight phase 
became more formal. Space was made in EFTSs around the country. such as those at 
Burnaston (No. 16), Booker (No. 21) and Shellingford (No. 3) and an official syllabus for 
a twelve-week course with eighty hours of flying was drafted. 12' Later in the war glider 
pilots were drawn from EFTSs as far away as Canada and the USA, such as No. I Basic 
Flying Training School (BFTS) at Terrell, Texas and No. 3 BF-TS in Miami, 
Oklahoma. 126 This phase of training was essential to ground new pilots in airmanship 
and to allow initial training in an aircraft that, with power available. was inherently 
more forgiving than a glider. An aircraft with power also allowed morc take offis and 
landings to be practised than a glider might manage in the same time. However, despite 
this necessity, eighty hours flying over a twelve-week period could be considered to 
represent an excessively comprehensive programme. 
The first dedicated Glider Training School (GTS) had been opened at Haddenham, 
subsequently renamed Thame in December 1940. It was established by moving limited 
resources from Ringway. This included just a handful of converted single-seat civilian 
gliders and five aging Tiger Moths for tugs. Fifteen members of the RAF with pre-war 
gliding experience had been drafted in as instructors. 127 On 12 March 1941 the first 
pupils arrived at No. I GTS by which time a single Hotspur was available. The initial 
syllabus allowed six weeks for thirty-one hours flying. This was later cut to four weeks 
and approximately fifteen hours flying time. As the system expanded No. 2 GTS was 
opened at Weston-on-the-Green in December 1941 followed subsequently by No. 3 at 
Stoke Orchard, No. 4 at Kidlington and No. 5 at Shobden. ' 28 
The GTS only qualified the pilot to fly the Hotspur and that was a non-operational 
glider. Conversion and further training were required on the Horsa and took place at 
123 NA, AIR 39/92, note on the formation of the (T I '. Novcmk-r 1940. 
124 NA, AIR 2/7422. [IQ AC Comd to Air Ministry, II February 1941. 
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Glider Operational Training Units (GOTU). Nos. 10 1 and 102 GOTUs were established 
on I January and I February 1942 at Netheravon and Kidlington respectivelý. Pilots 
spent a further four weeks at a GOTU learning to operate the troop-cam, ing glider. The 
advent of the Hamilcar brought the requirement for further conversion and to cope ýN ith 
this Heavy Glider Conversion Units (HGCU) were opened from mid-1942 at Shrewton 
and Fairford and later at Peplow and North Luffenharn. HGCU's required pilots to train 
for a further two weeks. 129 This meant that the entire glider training process took 
eighteen weeks not taking into account delays, movement between sites and 
administration. 
However, the length of the training system had been anticipated to a certain extent and 
was not a problem in itself. The greatest challenge arose from the complexity of the 
system. There were up to four separate stages (EFTS, GTS, GOTU and HGCU), which 
were of different lengths, making it difficult to coordinate the output from one course 
with the intake of another. Also the courses at different stages were designed to cope 
with different numbers of pupils at any given time. Add to this the geographic 
dispersion of many of the training units and the result was a training process that was 
unduly complex which in turn led to fragility. This weakness meant that any outside 
pressure or influence could cause the system to stall and begin to break down. 
The training process proved to be very disjointed. For instance in early 1942 a single 
EFTS (No. 16, Derby) had an output of forty-five pilots every three weeks following 
their twelve-week course. The two GTSs available at that time could only take sixteen 
pupils at each school once per fortnight for a six-week course. The output of one phase 
of the system did not match the intake requirements of the next part. Hence gaps or 
bottlenecks were likely to occur. 130 Changes in policy, often reactive rather than 
considered, exacerbated this effect. In mid- 1941 the War Office requirement for glider 
pilots stood at 800 but was reduced to 600 later that year. 
13 1 This reduction in numbers 
led to a decrease or pause in recruiting. This in turn meant that there was at one stage in 
mid- 1942 temporarily insufficient potential pilots at the glider pilot depot in Tilshead to 
feed the input for the EFTSs. This meant either accepting gaps that would have a knock 
11-9 NA. AIR 39/31). Air Ministry meeting, 5 May 1942. 
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on effect through the system and leave valuable instructors and aircraft standing idle for 
up to a fortnight or reducing the output of the EFTSs by a significant amount to keep the 
system ticking over. The Air Ministry was understandably unhappy with this situation 
considering the resources invested in the glider pilot flying system. ' 32 
Bottlenecks could also quickly occur. The most obvious cause was the number of 
suitable gliders and tugs available for training. In early 1942 faulty manufacture of 
parts slowed the production of Hotspurs. This impeded the training rate to such an 
extent that raising the matter to ministerial level was considered. At the same time this 
problem was compounded by difficulties in securing tug aircraft. Glider training \N as 
more expensive in terms of flying hours than parachute training. A single parachute 
training sortie could benefit between ten (with the Whitley) and twenty-five (with the 
Dakota) students. A single glider training sortie could only ever benefit a maximum of 
two students. Aircraft shortages impacted on the GTSs, which then had subsequent 
impact on the GOTUs. 133 The GOTUs had been established before the Horsa had been 
cleared for flying with troops on board and had to initially make do with the Hotspur. 
The initial production of Horsas lagged behind schedule and in mid-] 942 this was 
having an effect on the output of the GOTUs. 134 As numbers going through the GOTUs 
slowed so those waiting to move forward from the GTSs and EFTSs were held up in the 
system. This had impact all the way back to the GPR depot in Tilshead where potential 
pilots were held inactive and prone to the influence of Army 'bull'. The fragility of the 
system led to these gaps and bottlenecks persisting as the process attempted to 
compensate. This prompted one group of glider pilots to make a complaint over the 
hiatus in training and the excess of spit and polish to their local Member of Parliament, 
Mr D. N. Pritt. Pritt in turn brought the grievances to the attention of Churchill. The 
Prime Minister was unimpressed by Pritt's representations and considered him to be 'a 
bad man' for raising the matter. 135 Nevertheless the Minister for Air, the Minister for 
War, CIGS and CAS were asked to comment. Sinclair admitted that there were 
problems with the training process and blamed them on the uncertainty in overall 
rm,, 132 NA. AIR 2/4894. War Oftice. Training of Glider Pilots, 2 July 1942 and Air Ministry. A Personnel 
fiorTraining as Glider Pilots, 17 July 1942. 
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airborne policy that had existed in late 1942. He maintained that the situation would 
improve as the coordination of airborne training became more robust. "' 
Despite the inherent vulnerability of the training system there is no record or eý idence 
that there was ever a significant shortfall in glider pilots available for operations. This 
was due to the relatively low numbers required and the incremental nature of the 
increase in the air-landing organisation. In September 1940 the number of glider pilots 
required was initially estimated as 350. The Air Ministry was confident that these could 
137 be trained by the spring of 1941 . 
This proved to be over optimistic and by April 1941 
of the sixty-six soldiers originally identified for training only thirty-seven had 
demonstrated the necessary aptitude of whom twenty-four were undergoing glider 
training. 138 However, even this initial low estimate of the requirement, which was 
proving difficult to achieve, had been formulated against flaNvcd assumptions. First it 
was assumed that the wastage rate in glider pilots during operations would be low. This 
was proved to be a false hope although the casualty rate did decrease during the course 
of the war. 139 The second supposition was that each glider would require one pilot. "" 
This was not an unreasonable assumption as American airborne forces flew gliders with 
a single pilot throughout the war. 14 1 However, the slow start to British glider training 
allowed more time for experimentation and through this it became clear that two pilots 
were required. The second pilot had a number of duties including map reading to the 
landing point, calling out altitude and distance during the approach, making radio and 
intercom calls, liaison with the passengers during flight, taking some of the physical 
strain from the first pilot during long tows and taking control if the first pilot was 
injured or killed. 142 
The correction of these false assumptions resulted in a recalculation and a sudden 
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increase in the requirement for glider pilots. In May 1942 the total was set at 640 to be 
reached by 31 December 1942.143 Just two months later the Air Ministry was working 
towards a target of 1,200 glider pilots trained by I July 1943.144 The expansion of the 
airborne establishment through this period necessitated a further increase in the training 
rate. However the decision to commit to the recruiting and training of further pilots N%as 
delayed by the COS Committee in order to assess the results of Operation IIUSKY. 
Following the operation, judged as a success for British airborne forces despite the 
losses, the Air Ministry agreed to train a further 800 men by June 1944.145 By D Daý 
the training rate reduced and levelled off but in July 1944 the question of RAF 
personnel being converted to the glider role was raised again. The overall casualty rate 
for Operation OVERLORD had been lower than expected. Prior to the invasion the Air 
Staff had offered to transfer approximately 10,000 men from the RAF deferred I ist to 
the Army. However, the War Office was content that it could produce the monthlý 
intake of 135 trainees required to maintain the glider pilot pool from its own 
resources. 146 The Air Ministry pointed out that this situation was irrational. The RAF 
had thousands of surplus and potential aircrew on the deferred list and yet the Army was 
putting inordinate effort into recruiting 135 soldiers suitable for flying every month. 
These would then require many weeks training before they would be ready for 
operations. Additional to this the RAF had 1,500 RAF personnel; many of them pilot 
instructors, tied up in the glider pilot training system. In an act of commendable 
pragmatism the Air Ministry was offering a more efficient solution to the production of 
glider pilots. The Air Staff even displayed sensitivity towards the concerns of the 
Glider Pilot Regiment and was keen not to dilute their prestige by a sudden influx of 
RAF piI OtS. 147 
The General Staff accepted the Air Ministry's offer and on 28 August 1944 ACAS 
(Plans) ordered the conversion of 228 surplus RAF pilots to the glider role. This Nýas to 
143 NA, CAB 120/262, Brict'for COS (42) 138 th Meeting, 6 Maý 1942. 
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take place in October and November 1944.148 This was a timely decision as the scale of 
casualties from Operation MARKET and the future requirements for airborne forces in 
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) began to become clear. Approximately 830 glider 
pilots did not return from Arnhem, the ma ority becoming prisoners of war. Of the 500 
who were available for further operations the balance was uneven between first and 
second pilots resulting in only 230 complete crews being available. The War Office 
estimated an immediate shortfall of at least 335 pilots for future operations in all 
theatres. 149 In order to maintain the glider pilot establishment it was stated that a 
monthly output of 160 trained pilots would be required. It was agreed that this monthly 
rate would be achieved by training eighty Army and eighty RAF personnel. Detailed 
plans were drawn up to maintain this rate through to February 1945.150 By that time 
there were 708 RAF glider crews held in readiness within SEAC. 15 1 However. it had 
become clear that the rapid advance of allied ground forces across Burma had resulted 
in planned glider operations becoming unnecessary. The original plan for Operation 
DRACULA, the assault on Rangoon was revised and the glider element was discarded. 
This signalled the end of the requirement for British glider pilots in the theatre. 
Members of the RAF and the GPR returned to Britain as the war in Europe ended. 15, 
Operation VARSITY was the final airborne operation of the war in Europe. The 
casualty rate amongst glider pilots was relatively light and had further operations been 
mounted, such as Operation JUBILANT, a plan to secure German POW camps to 
prevent atrocities being committed, there was sufficient glider pilots to sustain the 
requirement. 
The recruiting and training of glider pilots did not affect the rate of development of 
British airborne forces during the Second World War. This was despite the fragility of 
the training system that was employed. Success was due in large part to the relatively 
low numbers required throughout the war. As with paratroops, the low level of 
operational activity from mid- 1940 to mid- 1943 allowed the training system to be 
developed and refined and for a reserve of pilots to be built up before they were 
148 NA, AIR 20/466 1, Air Ministry, Training of RAF Pilots as G1 ldcr Pilots, 6 September 1944. 
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required for Operation HUSKY and then OVERLORD. The War Office remained open 
to suggestions to improve the efficiency of the training system. When it became clear 
that the RAF could provide glider pilots at less cost than recruiting them from the 
Army, the General Staff accepted the idea despite having fought so hard to ensure that 
pilots would be soldiers only a few years before. It has been commonk assumed that 
the War Office was forced to accept RAF pilots due to the high casualty rate sustained 
at Arnhem. ' 53 However, it has been shown that this policy was put in place before 
Operation MARKET GARDEN took place and was a pragmatic solution to the efficient 
employment of resources. This pragmatism helped ensure an adequate supplN of pilots 
throughout the war. 
The build up to the invasion of Sicily provides the only consistent example of poor 
training directly affecting glider operations. It did not affect the number of pilots 
available but rather the quality of their performance. This was due to a nL]mber of 
factors. The training rate in England during the winter of 1942 had been low, due in 
part to a lack of tug aircraft. Some glider pilots were reduced to a training rate as lo%N as 
just seven hours flying throughout the entire winter period. ' 54 Further to this, the 
difficulty in moving Horsa gliders overseas meant that most of the British glider pilots 
would have to fly the Hadrian into battle, an aircraft that they were not familiar with. 
This was exacerbated by an extremely short period available for training in North Africa 
prior to the invasion of Sicily. Glider pilots arrived by sea in Algeria late in April 1943 
leaving only two months for training in the theatre prior to the invasion. This period 
was further truncated once the gliders had been assembled and administrative moves 
across North Africa had been carried out. During the time available just fourteen short 
flights of only ten minutes each has been quoted as a typical training rate. 155 Chatterton 
believed the lack of training had a detrimental effect on the morale of his pilots during 
the build up to the invasion. 156 
Finally and most critically the lack of RAF tug aircraft in North Africa meant that the 
glider pilots who would fly I Air-Landing Brigade on to Sicily had to be towed by 
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aircraft and pilots from the USAAF Troop Carrier Command. There Ný as verý little 
time for the British glider pilots to conduct collective training with thcir American tu(-, 
pilots. This was the primary factor in the poor military effectiveness of British gliders 
during HUSKY, an operation that emphasised the importance of collective training. 
4.5 The Coordination of Collective Training and Exercises 
The training examined thus far concentrated on the individual, allowing him and his 
comrades to be delivered to the battlefield efficiently. This phase of training did not in 
itself prepare airborne soldiers for the battle once they landed. Commanders often 
stressed this point, highlighting parachuting and gliding as a means to an end only. 
'Every paratroop has instilled into him the fact that jumping from an aircraft is merelý 
an incident on the way to battle... It is not allowed to assume greater importance in his 
mental make up. Every operational paratrooper, no matter what position in a unit he 
may fill, is first and foremost a fighting soldier and is trained as such. ' 157 Some 
commentators extrapolated this view and postulated that paratroops and air-landing 
infantry would require no form of specialist training beyond their delivery, as once on 
the ground they would fight as conventional infantry. 158 This was not a sound 
argument, a fact identified early by the CLE. It recognised the unique tactical 
circumstances that airborne troops would find themselves in post landing. Probably 
dispersed, they would have to find their way in unfamiliar country possibly to a distant 
objective. They would have to fight with open flanks and an unguarded rear. Due to 
the lightweight nature of their arms they would have to generate speed during the attack 
in order to produce sufficient momentum of force. For these reasons it was considered 
that airborne units and formations would require specialist tactics and training. 
159 
Training at unit and formation level would require close coordination across all arms 
and services to produce combat effectiveness. This principle had gained increased 
credence between the wars and been succinctly expounded by CIGS General Sir George 
Milne in 1927. 'it is the co-operation of all necessary arms that wins battles and that is 
157 NA, WO 205/75 1, Airborne Liaison Report No. 11.13 October 1943. 
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your basis for training in the future. I want that to be your principle in training - 
combination and co-operation of arms. ' 160 
Air-landing infantry would need to coordinate their training with that of the glider 
pilots. As Harrison Place correctly identifies infantry, including air-landing and 
paratroops, would need to train with their supporting arms, artillery, engineers, 
reconnaissance and logistics, to build a high level of mutual understand in g. 16 ' Airborne 
forces would need to train alongside the conventional units and formations with %N h ich 
close liaison would be required during operations. Above all these Army units and 
formations would require close coordination with the RAF to ensure their efficient 
delivery on to the battlefield. Initially, like so many other aspects of Britain's airborne 
forces, this coordination function was entrusted to the CLE. However, the location at 
Ringway generated doubt as to whether the CLE would be able to deliver the breadth 
and intensity of training required. Its position on the Cheshire Plain made it particularly 
vulnerable to the bad weather often prevalent in that area. Numerous days of rain made 
drying parachutes and other drop equipment difficult. The above average mean wind 
speeds often curtailed parachute and glider training. Nevertheless time and resourccs 
were being heavily invested in Ringway during this period making a sudden change of 
location difficult. The CLE already occupied 68,700 square feet of covered floor space 
by November 1940. The relatively free and unthreatened airspace around Manchester 
and the extensive runways and accommodation more than made up for the vagaries of 
the weather and Ringway remained the centre of coordination, certainly for parachute 
training, throughout the war. 162 The CLE, under the administrative supervision of HQ 
No. 22 Group RAF quickly established its roles and delineated internal responsibilities. 
Training was divided into three areas; individual parachute and glider flying training, 
individual battle training and collective training and exercises. It was initially 
envisioned that the CLE would coordinate and control all of these activities. 163 
The staff at Ringway was directly tasked with organising co-operational training 
across all branches of airborne forces and with conventional units and formations. This 
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prompted calls for the 'considerable expansion' of the training organisation in order to 
keep pace with the enlargement of airborne forces through 194 1.164 This expansion NNas 
often rapid and as a result haphazard leading to tension in the wider training 
establishment. The glider exercise organisation, created to allow coordinated training of 
glider pilots and air-landing troops, suffered under dual control. The training itself \Nas 
controlled through the CLE initially but the tow aircraft required to facilitate that 
training still came under Bomber Command. The situation became more complicated 
c 6, once control of glider exercise units was devolved down to the airborne divisions., 
This situation also extended to collective parachute training. The requirement for 
dedicated RAF assets to support airborne training became apparent. This principle had 
been adopted on a small scale in mid- 1941 at the CLE with the formation of the first 
glider exercise flight. The flight was established with up to ten Hotspur gliders and up 
to ten light aircraft (Hectors or Westland Lysanders) to act as dedicated tugs. 166 
The level of training of those bomber crews that took part in Operation COLOSSI JS 
was criticised by the CLE. Some of the pilots had only four days to absorb the 
intricacies of parachute dropping by night in hostile terrain and weather and although 
the operational drop was relatively successful substantial errors were apparent during 
the final rehearsal. 167 This and the general expansion through 1941 resulted in it being 
considered essential that permanent RAF squadrons were formed adjacent to the 
operational parachute and air-landing brigades to solely service their collective training 
requirements. 168 On I January 1942 296 Squadron RAF was formed as a dedicated 
glider support squadron. The initial establishment of this squadron was drawn up as 
sixteen Wellingtons with fifteen complete aircrews. Assuming seventy-five percent 
availability this would have meant that twelve Horsas could be towed at any time 
carrying around 300 troops or approximately two companies that could be exercised in 
any one lift. The aircrew for 296 Squadron were to be regarded as a select body of 
glider experts who would be able to assist in training, experimentation and the 
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development of air-landing tactics. 169 297 Squadron was also established to service 
operational parachute training and later in January 1942 38 Wing RAF was created as a 
headquarters to the RAF airborne training establishment, able to coordinate the 
requirements of the developing I Airborne Division HQ. 170 38 Wing was the 
manifestation of an idea that had been formulated in the Air Ministrý, ', championed by 
Browning and enthusiastically accepted at the highest levels, including Churchill. This 
was the concept of a 'Nucleus Force', a group of RAF aircrews who would be in 
constant training with airborne forces and would also be available with their aircraft for 
short-notice, small-scale operations. A lengthy paper written in HQ 38 Wino RAF 
convincingly argued the efficiency of expanding that organisation so that operations as 
well as training could be managed without having to divert resources from Bomber 
Command. The aircraft would also be available for air re-supply operations and in 
extremis could bolster the bombing effort. Browning took this paper to CIGS. CAS and 
the Prime Minister who, in Browning's words, 'clutched at it as a drowning man would 
a straw, and demanded that more copies of the paper be prepared. -) ,7, 
In July 1942 295 and 298 Squadrons were ordered to form as additional units for 38 
Wing. It was assessed that these four squadrons in total would be sufficient to meet 
contemporary airborne training requirements although the formation of a second 
division might have required further expansion. 172 In October 1943 38 Wing was 
expanded and became 38 Group RAF. The Group contained nine squadrons, four 
equipped with the Albermarle, four with Stirling and one with Halifax aircraft. In 
January 1944 a second RAF Group, No. 46 was formed. No. 46 Group belonged to 
Transport Command and was tasked to conduct normal transport duties but when the 
demands of airborne operations and training arose the Group would come under 
command No. 38 Group. It had an establishment of 150 Dakotas. These two groups 
remained the principal air support formations to Britain's airborne forces through to the 
end of the war. ' 73 During this period of expansion the Air Ministry also produced 
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detailed air tactical doctrine to support airborne operations. This work emphasised the 
importance of joint training and rehearsals with airborne forces, particularly during the 
period leading up to operations. 174 Specific training tasks and standards were stated for 
aircrews taking part in airborne operations. 175 The aircrews of 38 and 46 Group took to 
their new role with 'a total commitment' and 'felt properly trained for all airborne 
duties, although these did require flying skills not normally demanded of other 
aircrews. ' 176 
The development of the RAF component dedicated to airborne forces was initiallý 
slow. This is unsurprising considering the Air Ministry's resistance to the progress of 
the concept and the shortage of suitable and available aircraft. It took the first eighteen 
months of development up to January 1942 to establish just two RAF squadrons 
allocated to parachute and glider training. Following the consideration of the 38 Wing 
paper by the Prime Minister the rate of expansion increased and was given added 
momentum by the decisions made at Casablanca and the experiences in North Africa 
and Sicily. Hence in the twenty-two months following January 1942 a further seven 
squadrons were added to the airborne establishment and the services of a second Group, 
No. 46 were also made available. Therefore by October 1943 the dedicated aircraft 
available were sufficient to service the onset of training for the invasion of Normandy. 
Despite these advances and obvious enthusiasm, the combined training of all arms of 
the airborne division was still not straightforward. The operational integration of air- 
landing formations with parachute formations provoked prolonged doctrinal debate, 
which will be examined later. However, it was quickly grasped as early as September 
1940 that air-landing troops and paratroops would have to train together if they were to 
operate together to any degree. Their roles were envisioned as distinct but mutually 
supportive and therefore required close coordination. 177 Training together on a routine 
basis was not as simple as it first appeared due to the geographic dispersion of parachute 
and air-landing units across Britain. A subset of this problem was the difficulty in 
integrating air-landing infantry and supporting arms with their glider transports during 
174 NA, AIR 37/280, AirTactics- Airborne Warfare, 26 August 1942. 
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training. Gliding was inherently dangerous, even during training. A poor landing ýN ith 
a mixed load of heavy equipment and troops could have fatal consequences. During the 
training for D Day there were seven fatal accidents to glider pilots, three where carried 
troops were killed also. Chatterton witnessed one such event. 
The last glider to come in, a Hamilcar, came in somewhat fast, at 
about I 10 mi les an hour. She bounced, half took off again, landed 
again and bounced, then careered across the airfield and crashed into a 
group of Nissen huts, which disintegrated. The two pilots in their 
cockpit remained on top of the rubble, but the tank, which must have 
hit the building at eighty miles an hour, went straight on before 
coming to a stop some fifty yards away. "' 
This level of risk to equipment and, more importantly to trained personnel was 
considered unacceptable during training. Remarkably this situation could lead to air- 
landing troops gaining their first experience of landing with full equipment during their 
first operation. 179 This was clearly not an ideal situation and in attempted mitigation 
glider pilots flew with representative loads (often blocks of concrete) and air-landing 
troops practised unloading equipment from static, pre-positioned gliders. However, this 
could not recreate the adrenalin of a landing or the difficulty of unloading from a glider 
that may have partially broken up on landing. 
Despite these challenges airborne training could be successfully coordinated for 
specific purposes and events even if it was difficult to integrate all the facets on a 
routine basis. This success is observable through the numerous airborne forces 
collective training events and exercises that were successfully conducted during the 
course of the war. These exercises essentially took three different forms. First there 
were low level exercises involving only a section to a company of airborne troops 
designed either as demonstrations for conventional troops, senior officers and 
politicians or to introduce a realistic enemy into larger anti-invasion exercises. Second 
there were exercises from company to divisional level designed to assess and practice 
the generic airborne tactical principles and techniques that could be required during any 
178 
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operation. Finally there were exercises from platoon to battalion leýcl that were 
conducted as focussed rehearsals for very specific airborne operations. 
Exercises in the first category began very early in the airborne development process. 
One of the first took place on 26 October 1940 near Macclesfield. Two gliders landed 
in a small field next to their supposed objective, a railway viaduct. The exercise was 
observed by Lieutenant Colonel Stephenson of SD4 in the War Office. 180 By mid-April 
1941 11 SAS Battalion had taken part in six exercises. These included one conducted at 
Tatton Park for the benefit of the CIGS, General Sir John Dill on I" December 1940 
incorporating a drop by sixteen paratroops with a landing by five single-seat gliders. In 
January 1941 the CLE sent a detachment to the Aldershot area to take part in a Home 
Forces exercise named DRAGON. According to the orders issued by Ringway the 
airborne portion of the exercise was designed to demonstrate 'how troops may be 
transported by air and surprise pin-point landings made at pre-determined places by 
parachutes and gliders. ' The demonstration was small but configured to show the C-in- 
C Home Forces and other senior officers what a larger force might achieve. One 
Whitley carrying a section of paratroops and five single-seat gliders were used to 
represent a landing by two platoons of paratroops and seventy-five air-landing troops 
respectively. This time the objective, in a premonition of Operation FRESHMAN, was 
a small enemy factory producing a new kind of weapon. During April 1941 several 
sections from II SAS Battalion represented German parachute forces during a Northern 
Command exercise named ALFRED. They were dropped in the path of I Corps to 
delay and harass their movement north as they advanced to attack a German beachhead 
in the area of Middlesborough. "' 
These examples are typical of the early exercise activity conducted by Britain's 
fledgling airborne forces. The commander of No. I PTS, Group Captain Maurice 
Newnham, believed they were valuable in providing a realistic training opportunity for 
the troops involved. 182 There is some merit in this view however these small-scale 
exercises did little to progress tactical development. This lack of focussed collective 
training led to false procedures and tactics being developed. An example is the 
180 NA, AIR 29/512, CH 'operational Record Book, entry for 26 October 1940. 
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'Landing Drill for Sub-Sections' produced in November 1940. The five-page document 
listed in great detail the roles and equipment to be carried b-, each member of a 
parachute section. Further to this it prescribed precise actions for each section member 
on landing. Which man was responsible for unloading each container, who carried 
which ammunition loads and who was responsible for protection were all listed. Even 
, 83 the author had to admit that the procedures represented 'a long rigmerole [sic] .I This 
approach demonstrated a fundamental ignorance of the nature of airborne warfare at the 
tactical level. The drills developed to ensure successful demonstrations in front of 
important visitors were given tacit tactical validity. This ignored the fact that probable 
confusion on a combat DZ did not lend itself to being resolved by a serics of drills. The 
increased use of tactical drills had gained acceptance through 1941 in order to meet the 
needs of training thousands of conscripts and wartime volunteers. This method 
recognised the dilution of the pre-war professional army and was aimed to suit the 
lowest common denominator. ' 84 Airborne forces, through selection and rigorous 
individual training, were soldiers of higher ability than average. Flexibility and 
initiative were the requirements to ensure effective action post landing and these 
qualities required repeated and varied collective tactical training and exercises in order 
to develop. 
By mid- 1942 collective training was being planned by the airborne HQs rather than 
being coordinated by the CLE. However it was only being conducted at company level. 
Training in any greater numbers required special arrangements and requests had to be 
judged individually on their merits. 185 In May 1942 Browning produced a paper 
requesting the resources to allow a battalion of paratroops and a battalion of air-landing 
troops to exercise simultaneously. 186 295 and 298 squadrons RAF were added to 38 
Wing shortly afterwards to allow this to happen. It was subsequently decided that the 
minimum requirement for collective training should be three live exercises involving 
aircraft per man every two months. It was accepted that many of these exercises would 
be small scale but others would have to be on a large scale and involve cooperation %% ith 
conventional troops in order to achieve the training objectives. Taking into account the 
183 NA, DFFE 2/79 1, Cl H draft pamphlet 'Landing Drill fior Sub-Sections% 7 November 1940. 
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effects of the weather it was determined that this training rate would result in 
approximately twenty exercises per month being conducted for the airborne 
establishment. From these calculations a precise aircraft requirement could be deduced 
which confirmed the establishment of 38 Wing RAF. 187 
Despite this more scientific approach to the requirements of collectiýc training. the 
practicalities of integrating all arms was still problematic. Conducting exercises for 
different an-ns and units made it difficult to balance training and ensure it was 
constructive for all involved. The danger of conducting glider exercises with live loads 
has already been explained. Incorporating the artillery into exercises was also difficult. 
Live firing gunnery exercises had to be separated from troops on exercise because of the 
obvious danger. Due to the technical complexity of achieving accurate gunnery, static, 
live firing target practice exercises often took precedence over integration with largcr 
airborne exercises. Captain Wilkinson RA does not recall taking part in any exercises 
involving infantry participants. His training consisted of mainly firing practicc on 
various ranges across the country. "' 
This difficulty in integrating all arms was not unique to airborne forces and to 
overcome the problems planning and procedures were often practiced by conducting 
TEWTs. These were essentially tabletop map based exercises that trained the planning 
staff without actually requiring troops deploying into the field. As early as 1938 
theoretical groupings of parachute troops had been drawn up to be used in anti-invasion 
TEWTs. 189 In 1941 a United States military observer, Lieutenant Colonel J. C. 
Kennedy, reported on a TEWT representing an airborne assault on the Humberside 
coast involving 500 gliders being released fifteen miles off shore to land on three 
separate LZs. The force delivered included infantry and artillery. 
190 Prior to D Day 
Crookcnden recalled a TEWT being conducted for over 100 officers from 6 Air- 
Landing Brigade. 191 However, while this type of training was of benefit to formation 
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and unit staff there was still no substitute for live exercises to practice and develop 
tactics throughout the airborne establishment. 
Larger scale tactical exercises helped to develop and practice specific operational 
techniques and brought out important lessons that could then be applied durin(-, - battle. 
One such operational technique that required coordinated exercises to provide effective 
training was the glider pilot's 'funnel'. This system taught pilots to fly into an area 
1000 feet above the ground and 1000 yards out from the LZ perimeter. From this 
position a pilot had sufficient height, speed and manoeuvrability to land at any point on 
the LZ up to 2000 yards inside the perimeter. This training taught the pilots a scientific 
method of applying flaps during a landing and allowed the pilot to select the most 
tactically appropriate landing point. Practising this tactic as a single glider Nýas 
relatively simple. It required dozens of gliders to be released simultaneously to provide 
a realistic test of the pilots' skill. These principles were adhered to during training and 
as a result the glider pilots improved in tactical ability and confidence. 192 
In some cases an exercise could highlight a fault in tactics or procedures. An exercise 
held by I Parachute Brigade near Grimsby a few weeks before Operation MARKET 
GARDEN demonstrated the limitations of the issued signals equipment in built up 
areas. This lesson allowed the signals organisation to reassess its equipment holdings 
and subsequently fly into Arnhem with a greater than usual supply of field telephones 
and cable. 193 Despite these important results some exercise participants were often 
unimpressed and were more likely to remember the exercise names, such asTHRUST, 
BIZZ, MUSH and BANGER than they were the tactical objective of the activity. 1 9, 
Nevertheless, these exercises were all vital in developing and practicing general 
airborne tactics. However once units and formations were warned for operations much 
more specific training was required in order to prepare them for the tasks they were 
likely to execute. As early as October 1943, in preparation for D Day Gale designated a 
number of likely missions 6 Airborne Division would have to undertake during the 
invasion. These were divided into offensive and defensive tasks. The attack missions 
192 NA, AIR 37/998, Commander Glider Pilot's Report on Operation NI-T II INk, 26 July 1944 and IWN1. 
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included the capture of enemy gun batteries and strong points, the capture of tactical 
ground behind the beaches and defiles and river crossings and the attack of enemy 
reserves. Defensive tasks included holding tactical features, bridges. defiles and hi, (Yh 
ground overlooking the beachhead. Gale's directive also listed lessons that had been 
identified during previous exercises and split the tasks down into explicit training 
objectives. For example the assault on an enemy gun battery required the followint, 
training objectives to be practiced. 
(i) The discovery by patrols of whether the pos[itio]n is occupied. 
(ii) Practice in finding the way to an objective after landing in the 
dark. 
(iii) The re-org[anisation] after the assault and the rapid assembly 
at the pre-arranged R. V. 195 
This represents a relatively sophisticated approach to training. Complicated missions 
are reduced to a number of simpler tasks each of which are then given a related training 
objective. Therefore each of these training objectives could be achieved in isolation as 
time allowed and still contribute towards the success of the overall mission. 
As an operation became imminent and objectives were revealed planning could be 
conducted down to unit and sub-unit level. Those units and sub-units could then focus 
their training very precisely on achieving their own specific objectives. In conventional 
operations commanders at all levels could have an opportunity to see the ground they 
were due to fight over. Prior to offensive operations the lie of the land could be studied 
from observation points or during reconnaissance activity. During defensive operations 
the ground might be occupied already and would be intimately familiar to all the 
defenders. Airborne commanders and soldiers did not have this luxury. The ground 
they would fight over might be hundreds of miles away over completely unfamiliar 
ground with foreign features. Very few would be able to fly over the ground prior to an 
operation, the risks were too high. Most commanders would have to make do '. ý ith 
maps and aerial photographs. The information available in these formats could be 
enhanced by combining the two and building scale models. The use of models was not 
195 NA. WO 205/75 1.1 IQ 6 Airbome DIvislon. Airbome Liaison Report No. 11.5 October 1943. 
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unique to airborne operations but they were used extensively prior to all levels of action 
from minor raids to divisional assaults. 196 In one case this technique mas ingeniously 
adapted to provide a highly sophisticated training aid. 
A model of the Orne bridgehead was built to assist the glider pilots prior to D Daý. A 
No. 38 Group officer, Squadron Leader Lawrence Wright conceived the idea of makino 
a film of the model. Chatterton recalled the results. 'By using a blue filter on his 16mm 
Camera, and by holding the camera at a calculated height, he produced a remarkable 
film for briefing. It gave a complete picture of a glider coming in from 1.000 feet. doNN n 
to about 100 feet, and provided a most realistic impression of what the landing in 
Normandy might be like. ' 197 Staff Sergeant Jim Wallwork, the commander of the first 
glider to land in Normandy, also recalls the model. The camera was rigged from the 
ceiling using a series of wires. Chatterton maintains that the film was of great 
assistance to the pilots. Wallwork however recalls seeing the film just once or twice 
and considers that it was of novelty value only. 198 This initiative represented a very 
modern approach however, along with all models it really only represented an aid to 
briefing as opposed to practical training. 
Training in an environment designed to imitate a known objective is an activitv 
militarily defined as rehearsals. Rehearsals were recognised as an important aspect of 
training early in the airborne development process. 199 For rehearsals to be valuable they 
had to be conducted in an environment that replicated the real objective as closely as 
possible. Due to this requirement rehearsals were only really applicable to small-scale 
actions, up to battalion level. Above this size realistic environments were more difficult 
to create and their effectiveness was therefore reduced. This meant that rehearsals were 
normally restricted to training for raids or for discrete actions planned as part of a wider 
operation. Rehearsals can be broken down into two broad types. First they could be 
conducted over ground closely resembling that over which the operation would be 
196 A model ofthe Norsk I lydro plant in Vemork. Norway enabled the members of Operation 
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executed. Alternatively full-scale models could be built to replicate features that would 
be encountered during an operation. 
In some cases the ground selected for a rehearsal might have resembled the area of an 
operation only in the very broadest sense. An example of this was the final rehearsal for 
Operation BITING that took place on the cliffs around Lulworth on the Dorset coast. 200 
In other instances great care was taken to select a piece of ground that replicated the 
target as closely as possible. Pine-Coffin recalled during the build up to Operation 
OVERLORD training over two water obstacles at Countess Weare near Exeter that 
were fairly similar to the Caen Canal and the Ome River in Normandy. 201 Chatterton 
claimed the credit for finding another piece of real estate 'near Hinton, Buckland and 
Bampton Aston which almost completely corresponded to the area of the River Ornc 
!, 202 and the Caen Canal . Exercise CANDID was run over this part of the Oxfordshire 
countryside in May 1944 during which members of the GPR were put through a 
ýcomplete rehearsal' of their operational role post landing on D Day. This included 
finding their way to a designated RV and then moving along a specified route across the 
two bridges to their evacuation point on the beach near Ouistreham. Map traces show 
that the area of the exercise almost exactly replicated the ground to be covered during 
the operation including the distances between RVs, the relative positions of the bridges, 
the routes in between and some landmarks such as woods. 203 
Where representative ground could not be found or where a very specific location was 
the objective of an operation then full scale replicas were sometimes built. The 
sophistication of the construction required varied. Operation DEADSTICK was the 
first act of D Day requiring six Horsa gliders to land in very close proximity to the 
River Ome and Caen Canal bridges so they could be seized by coup de main by a 
reinforced company of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. Two Us 
were selected for this operation, 'X' and 'Y', between the river and the canal. Both 
were very constricted by their size and surroundings. Seven glider crews had been 
selected for the operation. Mock-ups of LZ 'X' and 'Y' were marked out at Netheravon 
on Salisbury Plain using white tape. They exactly replicated the Us in Normandy 
in 
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size, shape and relationship to each other. During rehearsals the gliders X% ere released at 
the correct point with reference to the landing points. The gliders then flexý the correct 
flight paths to land in the taped areas. This was first conducted in daylight, then ýý Ith 
the pilots wearing dark goggles, then at night using flares and then usingjust moonlight 
as they would have to during the operation. 204 The link between training and the 
performance of glider pilots had been made clear during the preparation for Operation 
HUSKY. The training for operation DEADSTICK was intensive. The six crex% s and 
one reserve crew allocated to the operation flew forty landings in the three months 
before D Day. The 300 crews taking part in Operation MALLARD, the mass glider 
landing on the evening of D Day had on average just ten day and two night landings in 
the six months prior to D Day. 205 Wallwork is modest about Operation DEADSTICK's 
success and is, 'at pains to emphasise that any member of the Regiment could have 
done it, given the practice and attention we lucky ones experienced. 206 
Some mock-ups required considerably more effort than marking an area on the ground 
with tape. Britain's first airborne operation used a mock-up. A full-scale wooden 
model of the Tregino viaduct was built in Tatton Park close to Ringway. 207 Major 
General Tony Deane-Drummond, a Lieutenant on Operation COLOSSUS, 'regarded the 
mock-ups as essential aids but mainly for briefing purposes' as opposed to being used 
208 for live rehearsals. Alongside Operation DEADSTICK 9 Battalion, The Parachute 
Regiment under command of Otway attacked a German coastal battery at Mervi I le 
during the early hours of D Day as part of Operation TONGA. This was a complex 
battalion operation. A complete mock-up was built below Inkpen Ridge in Berkshire 
and the four casernates were constructed out of wood and canvas. The surrounding 
wire, ditches and minefields were all replicated. Otway's battalion rehearsed repeatedly 
on the mock-up for months. Many different permutations of attack were practiced until 
any man could fulfil any other's role and nearly all eventualities had been covered. 
However this was not the only result of these rehearsals. 
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Lieutenant Alan Jefferson recalled an additional psychological effect. 'The whole 
Battalion was keyed up to fever pitch: the barometer of morale was absenteeism. and 
that registered zero. Each man had been made to feel indispensable and consequently 
he felt important. 209 The conduct of rehearsals also helped to alleviate the 
psychological pressure of dislocation for paratroopers and glider pilots on landing. A 
piece of ground or a feature that was familiar would have been a point of focus on 
landing, allowing the individual to instinctively proceed on his mission despite being in 
foreign and hostile territory. The ground, objective and routine became so familiar that 
when the operation itself was finally executed it often seemed to the participants like yet 
another iteration of the training and rehearsal process. Crookenden described his 
experience of this effect on landing on D Day, 'Everything was exactly as I had 
imagined it would be, as, thanks to our [training] I never had to think more than a 
moment where I was' and again during his flight on the way to land on the east bank of 
the Rhine, 'I think that we all of us half expect to see the familiar roofs of our barracks 
below us when we jump oUt., 210 Familiarity through rehearsal helped mitigate the 
effects of dislocation. 
The coordination of training was critical to convert individually trained personnel into 
a militarily effective fighting force. Combining the training of the various arms of the 
Army element of the airborne force presented particular technical challenges. Some of 
these were common to conventional formation training; geographical dispersion of units 
and the problems of integrating artillery into an all arms scenario. Others were unique 
to airborne forces such as the risks in exercising glider landings with live loads. 
However bringing the crucial RAF support to the training process involved overcoming 
institutional and systemic barriers. In actual fact this appears to have been overcome in 
a most pragmatic manner. Inter-service rivalry, apparent between the respective 
ministries and in the higher commands was bypassed and ignored at squadron, group, 
battalion and brigade level. This willingness to cooperate meant that effective training 
programmes could be formulated including conducting tactical exercises at all levels. 
The evidence suggests that these airborne exercises were planned and conducted in a 
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serious manner. This can be explained by two facts. First is the high value of fl% ing, 
hours that the exercise planners could not be seen to be wasting. Second is the verý real 
risk of death or serious injury to those exercise participants being deploNed b\ parachute 
or glider. The mitigation of this risk required careful planning by the staff and 
meticulous preparation by the participants. This focussed application permeated the 
airborne establishment and resulted in a zealous approach to the conduct of exercises. 
These were essential in demonstrating the fledgling airborne capability. developing 
tactical doctrine and rehearsing specific operations. 
4.6 The Human Resource as a Factor in Development 
Effective manning was one of the keys to success of the development of Britain's 
airborne capability. The recruitment and training of airborne troops progressed 
remarkably efficiently in spite of the many hurdles and challenges encountered during 
the process. Peaty concluded that the manpower invested in various special fonnations 
during the Second World War could only barely be justified by their operational impact. 
However the figures quoted for the airborne establishment are not significant in terms of 
overall Army manning. Nevertheless due to operational casualties the persistent 
recruitment and training requirement was a formidable task. Added to this quantitative 
challenge there were also qualitative considerations that inflated the effect of the drain 
of manpower into the airborne capability. Immediately post D Day there were 16,623 
personnel on the strength of the Army Air Corps (AAC) which represents less than 
three-quarters of a percent of the British Army's total strength at that time. However 
the strength of the AAC is not necessarily an accurate measure of the size of Britain's 
airborne forces. The figure includes SAS troops which were not strictly airborne forces 
in the truest sense and simultaneously omits all those arms and services, such as Royal 
Engineers and Royal Artillery who formed a vital component of the airborne capability. 
At its height the total strength of the airborne force, i. e. two divisions and one 
independent brigade has been calculated at 28,345. The addition of 44 Indian Airborne 
Division would bring this number up to around 40,000. Even this total represents only 
just over one and a half percent of the Army's total . 
21 1 HoA-cver this figure does not 
4 'll PcýitN. Briii. vh., Irmy, Afanpoii'c"Cri, visl944, pp. 106-107. 
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paint the full picture. in common with many other elite organisations. Britain's airborne 
forces relied on the infantry to generate most of its fighting power. At maximum 
stren h the airborne capability contained approximately 14,000 infantrymen or around 9t 
twenty standard infantry battalions, a resource bill that the infantry found increasinglý 
difficult to pay, particularly after June 1944. The value of the human resources absorbed 
represent a greater investment than these small percentages indicates due to the 
generally higher calibre of the men it employed. There is some sympathy for 
commanders such as Montgomery and Slim who, along with Horrocks. contested the 
validity of skimming off the best soldiers to fill specialist requirements such as airborne 
212 forces 
. 
These figures only represent a snap-shot in time and therefore do not tell the full story 
of the need for ongoing recruitment to meet the total requirement. This challenge ýN ýIs 
exacerbated by the tendency to retain airborne forces in combat, using them as regular 
infantry once an airborne operation was complete, a task unsuited such lightly equipped 
formations. This occurred during Operation TORCH where I Parachute Brigade, 
having taken part in parachute operations in November 1942 were retained to fight as 
conventional infantry until April 1943, losing 1,700 casualties during the five month 
period. In Italy 2 Independent Parachute Brigade was employed as a conventional 
fan-nation for most of the campaign although relatively light casualties resulted. In 
Normandy 6 Airborne Division remained committed to defensive operations until 
August 1944 causing 4,457 casualties in three months. Even airborne operations that 
were relatively limited in terms of duration could generate significant casualties. 
Operation HUSKY caused 706 casualties within I Airborne Division over four days and 
the same formation sustained another 7,167 casualties during Operation MARKET 
GARDEN. 6 Airborne Division took 1,434 casualties over three days during Operation 
VARSITY in March 1945 and then marched to the Baltic over the next two months. 213 
Overall Britain's airborne establishment based in Europe lost approxiniately 16,000 
casualties over a two and half year period. This equates to well over half the total 
strength of the airborne force at its peak. 
11, ibid, pp. II ]- 112. 
213 All casuah figures taken from Mýaý. - firborne 
Forces. pp. 87,123.130,191.283 and 319. 
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Apart from the physical effect of the casualty rate there was also a potential moral 
effect. This could be manifested as an increase in battle fatigue and a correspond in (-, 
reduction in morale within a unit or formation. However, any reference to the typical 
indicators of a break down in morale, insubordination, absenteeism and psychological 
breakdown are completely absent from both the primary and secondary sources. 214 
Even during the desperate defence of Oosterbeek, as casualties mounted and there was 
no chance of victory, the evidence suggests that morale was maintained as demonstrated 
by the defiant manner of those airborne soldiers that became prisoners of war and bý the 
discipline maintained during the final withdrawal. Maintenance of morale in the face of 
the high casualty rate is perhaps explained by the appreciation by airborne troops that 
they were an elite force. The training, the beret and the badges fed this attitude to the 
point where airborne troops almost gloried in adversity. This corresponds with 
Montgomery's belief that self-respect and regimental tradition were basic and 
contributory factors to high morale. 215 This can be seen in the rhetoric that can often be 
found in the published primary sources. 
The airborne have blazed their trail of glory and sacrifice across 
the deep vault of heavens, and over the blasted soil of Europe. 
Spawned from this war, their memory will live on forever and 
new men will come forward to take over and carry on the 
unfurled flag with the sign of the Pegasus upon it, fluttering 
proudly in the breeze of freedom, ever ready to spread thcir wings 
over Europe again, or even further if the call should come 
"Defend thy home by attack. - They did not die in vain. 216 
Notwithstanding the maintenance of morale physical losses still had to be replaced to 
ensure the combat effectiveness of the airborne capability. That this was achieved with 
relatively few problems was mainly through the pragmatism of the War 
Office and the 
Air Ministry. Although firm principles were laid down for the recruitment of 
paratroops (volunteers only) and glider pilots (soldiers only) these were willingly 
amended when it became clear there was a more efficient or effective solution. 
214 j. I-IliS. I 7he, 5harp Entl the righting Alan in World WarlI (London: Pimlico. 1993). p-234- 
20 Montgomery. -Morale in Battle: Analysis". British Arm .v 
Review, No. 145. Autumn 2008. pp. 8, - 
85. 
21o v. Millcr, Nothing is impossible (Stapichurst: Spellmount. 1994), p-274. 
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Pragmatism often implies a level of compromise. Although hand selected volunteers 
may have provided the best material for paratroops in ideal circumstances the cxigencý 
of rapid expansion in 1942 and 1943 necessitated compromise and the wholesale 
conversion of battalions with back-filling by volunteers was accepted. Earl'y tactical 
experimentation proved that trained soldiers made the most effective glider pilots; 
however a compromise was agreed and RAF pilots were accepted in 1944 ýý hen it 
became clear that this represented a more efficient method of generating the required 
manpower. There is no evidence that either of these compromises adversely affected 
operational effectiveness. 
While pragmatism was the key to recruiting, the conduct of individual training 
required a different approach. There was no model available to the initial proponents of 
airborne warfare. Ideally the process of training had to be envisioned before it was 
implemented. In reality this had to happen simultaneously and a high degree of 
ingenuity was required by the trainers to allow this to happen. Many innovations were 
implemented and applied to the individual training of paratroops. These included 
synthetic training methods, many of which were ahead of their time and hence have 
persisted to the current day. This ingenuity had many beneficial consequences 
including the mitigation of the effect of aircraft shortages on training and some of the 
psychological pressures of airborne warfare. However the application of ingenuity was 
not so apparent in the training of glider pilots. There is perhaps an explanation for this. 
The training of paratroops was a completely new process to the British in 1940; 
however once the process had been devised it formed part of a relatively straightforward 
training system that therefore proved to be robust. In contrast the process of training 
glider pilots was relatively simple - after all it was a variation on basic flying training 
that had been conducted in Britain for nearly half a century up to that point. 
Nevertheless the glider training system became disjointed and complicated as it grew 
and hence it was inherently fragile. For parachute training it was the process that 
benefited from applied ingenuity. For glider pilot training it was the system that was in 
need of innovation and it is far more difficult to be ingenious in systems engineering 
than it is in process development. Along with the rate of glider production and doctrinal 
ambiguity, this in part explains why the glider component continually lagged behind the 
parachute component in terms of rate of development. 
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Airborne collective training was approached in a focussed and pragmatic matter. A 
high degree of coordination was achieved across all arms and, more importantly, across 
the two services which translated into close and instinctive coordination on the 
battlefield in most circumstances. Where a lack of coordination bet,. ýeen the ArIm and 
RAF appears to have impinged on operational effectiveness it can often be explained b% 
a lack of collective training preceding the event. This was certainly the case in North 
Africa and Sicily although at Arnhem it was due to other factors, which will be 
examined in the following chapter. Harrison Place concluded that there was an over 
reliance on the effect of artillery preparation during exercises to the detriment of lo\\ - 
level infantry tactics, the problem of 'the last 200 yards'. Further to this he argues that 
collective training in conventional infantry units and formations minimised the need for 
low-level initiative and decision making and excluded any preparation for the 
possibility of deviation from the set drill or plan. 217 Due to their unique tactical 
situation this was certainly not the case with airbome collective training and exercises. 
A lack of fire support and the light armament of an airborne unit meant that it had to 
carry an objective through speed and the closest contact with the enemy. 'The last 200 
yards' could not be ignored or left to the artillery and it had to be practiced and 
rehearsed to ensure success. Although the use of mock-ups and models was not unique 
they did have added significance. 
One criticism of British Army training during the Second World War is that it 
concentrated far too much on inducing immediate and exact obedience to orders and 
very little else. This was a reflection of the Army's basic doctrine with an emphasis on 
centralised control . 
218 Low-level initiative and decision making was essential to ensure 
that an airborne soldier could first rendezvous with his comrades and then carry an 
objective no matter what configuration of section or sub-unit he found himself in. The 
repeated attacks on the Tregino and Merville mock-ups and the bridges at Countess 
Weare were designed to give the soldier the experience and confidence to tackle his 
objective no matter what the circumstances he found himself in. Although perhaps true 
of the conventional infantry, Harrison Place's assertion that -major exercises were not 
217 1 larrison Place. Vilifary Training In The BritishArniv, p. 174. 
218 French. Raising Churchill'selrm-v, p. 55. 
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occasions on which minor tactics were practiced' is not applicable to the same degree 
for airborne training. 
The provision of personnel and training could easily have proved a stumbling block t7 
on the path of airborne development. Aircraft shortages and political friction had the 
potential to hinder or even halt the recruiting and training process. Nevertheless the 
human resource for the airborne capability steadily increased at probably the maximum 
rate that could be expected under the conditions. However despite the successful 
provision of trained manpower it does have to be recognised that the process was 
incremental. By June 1941 there werejust 338 paratroops, or half a battalion mailable 
for operations. 219 In October 1941 31 Independent Brigade Group was re-roled as I 
Air-Landing Brigade with a strength of approximately 3,000 and in March 1942 with I 
Parachute Brigade operational the total available airborne manpower had risen to 
around 5,500 personnel. I Airborne Division reached full strength in December 1942 
and with 2 Independent Parachute Brigade available the figure reached 15,500. Finally, 
in February 1944 with the operational readiness of 6 Airborne Division the full total of 
28,000 airborne troops available in Europe was reached . 
220 Thus. despite the success of 
airborne recruiting and training, the size of an airborne force that could be utilised at 
any particular stage of the war was constrained by the manpower available at the time. 
219 N A, AIR 2/7470,1) Plans to CAS. 24 Junc 1941. 
220 Ot \\ zi\. A irborne Forct's. pp. 3 4. -) 
8.5 1& 140. 
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CHAPTER 5- Command and Control 
5.1 Leadership in Airborne Warfare 
As J. F. C. Fuller observed, men are more than 'mobile tripods to rest rifles on". ' The 
value of an individual soldier on the battlefield lies in the fact that he is a sensate being 
and can act according to his own will and judgement. However, during intense conflict 
where death or injury might be judged as imminent these factors can become a 
disadvantage. Training and discipline will help overcome a soldier's natural instinct 
towards self-preservation but they are seldom enough in themselves to force a soldier to 
act against his will. Soldiers and more importantly groups of soldiers need to be 
effectively led and motivated in order to achieve their assigned objectives in a cohesive 
manner. Leadership and motivation are elements of the less tangible moral component 
of fighting power. Strong motivation is the result of effective leadership and effective 
leadership is a function of a good commander. 2 
Some of the characteristics of Britain's new and evolving airborne capability made 
conventional approaches to command and control incongruous at best and detrimental 
to effectiveness in some circumstances. Command from platoon level upwards was 
routinely invested in officers in the British Army during the Second World War. Those 
officers who served with airborne forces, apart from the specific processes described in 
the previous chapter, underwent the same selection and training as all other officers 
during the War. 3 At first glance it may appear that an airborne officer and in particular 
a parachute officer would have a more difficult task than his conventional infantry or 
armoured counterpart. Before he could lead his men in battle and motivate them to fight 
he had to lead them out of an aircraft in flight, urging them to risk their lives in the 
process. In actual fact airborne training and deployment into battle gave an airborne 
cornmander an advantage in leadership. Airborne training, hazardous in itself, gave an 
airborne commander a shared experience with his men, a point of reference and a 
' 
. 1. 
Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought 1815-1940, (Chicago: Univcrsitý of 
Chicago Press, 1965), p. 3 )39. 
2 ., Me moral component is concerned with the least predictable aspect ofopcrations - the 
human clement. 
Tf the human clement is neglected, the penalties to be paid will be great and battle-losing. lftimc and 
c1l'ort are invested in the human clement, all things become possible. 
' Anon, Arm), Doctrine Publication. 
'Land Oivralions'(MOD: London. 2005), p. 143. 
For a detailed examination of the officer selection. training and promotion process 
during the second 
World War see Crang, Ihe British Army and Me People's War1939-1945. pp. 
21-57. 
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demonstration that he was willing to accept the same fisks as the soldiers he led. A 
resolute determination to share the discomforts and dangers of his subordinates NN ill 
always make leadership and motivation a simpler task. 4A parachute platoon 
commander was normally the first man out of the door of a Dakota durin(-, training and 
operations, an evident example of leading from the front to those following behind him. 
An officer in an air-landing unit had to sit face-to-face with his men in the back of a 
Horsa as they all risked death or injury as they glided into battle. Senior officers could 
not exempt themselves from this and brigade and divisional commanders arrived on the 
battlefield in a glider or below a parachute in the same manner as a private soldier. 
These are very obvious manifestations of John Keegan's 'imperative of example' and 
produced a deep bond between an airborne officer and his men. 5 Despite the 
advantages of an unavoidable kinship of danger airborne commanders also had another 
difficulty to contend with. Airborne soldiers were deliberately inculcated with an ethos 
of personal initiative. In order that the advantages of this approach were not stifled 
commanders would have to develop a style that would allow their soldiers a degree of 
autonomy. 
At more senior levels of command the 'imperative of example' became less easy to 
demonstrate and less important to those being commanded. Soldiers needed to be 
convinced that their senior generals knew their business if they were to have any 
confidence in his abilities. Professional knowledge or understanding nearly always 
appears in any one of the many lists of principles of leadersh ip. 
6 However, a senior 
commander during the Second World War was unlikely to have any direct experience of 
working with airborne forces. Certainly during the first half of the war a senior 
commander's knowledge of airborne warfare was likely to be purely theoretical, based 
on his own study, research and understanding. Some senior officers were more liable to 
apply themselves to this pursuit of knowledge than others. However there was a 
further, more vital factor that senior commanders would have to adapt to in order to 
successfully command an airborne force. Airborne warfare relied entirely on the 
4 R. I lolmes, Firing Line, (London: Pimlico, 1985). p. 342. 
J. Kcegan, The A fask of Commam]. (London: Penguin, 1988), pp. 329-338. 
Sec fior c\amples MOD, Land Operations. p. 137, Wavell, A.. Generals and 
Generalship (London: 'I-he 
l'inics. 194 1), p. 8 and Anon, Serve to Lead (Cambericy: RMAS, undated). p. 31. 
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contribution of the air force. Senior commanders and their staff ýý()Ljld haNe to work 
very closely with air force counterparts and ideally joint HQs were required to 
effectively coordinate the two services. 
Commanders, like their soldiers, are individuals and will therefore each adopt their 
own approach to command. Thus there is an element of unpredictability as to hoNN any 
commander thinks or acts in any given situation. The character of the commander at 
any level can therefore have a direct influence on the interpretation of doctrine. the 
application of tactics and ultimately the outcome of a battle. As Gale commented, 
command is 'one of the most evasive subjects - certainly one of the most important'. 
not only because of the immediate effect of a commander's decisions on the current 
battle but because of the influence that he can exert well beyond the scope and tenure of 
his command. 7 
5.2 The Experience and Influence of Superior Commanders 
Until November 1942 Britain's airborne forces were employed on raiding operations. 
These were planned, mounted and directed by DCO and COC, which had built up some 
experience on the subject since 1940. These operations were small. discrete and self- 
contained once launched. This changed with Operation TORCH in North Africa when 
I Airborne Brigade was employed as a component of the larger invasion force. While I 
Airborne Division in Britain retained full command of the formation, it was placed 
under the operational command of the Allied Forces HQ (AFHQ) in Tunisia. This 
pattern was repeated throughout the rest of the war. Airborne formations were under 
full command of an airborne HQ for training and administration but were then placed 
under the operational command of a conventional field HQ for the duration of an 
operation. In principle the highest HQ in the field exercised operational command of an 
airborne force but it was often delegated to a tactical HQ to enable closer cooperation 
with the ground force. 
Devolving command of an airborne force to the tactical level required careful 
consideration. Few if any senior tactical commanders would have had any dcpth of 
7 1,11CMA, 6ale to Liddel II lart, 8Apri 1 1952. 
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experience of handling airborne units: Horrocks, as commander of XXX Corps, had not 
8 
even seen a parachute drop before Operation MARKET GARDEN .A tactical 
commander had to be given clear direction in order to ensure that airborne forces under 
his command were employed within the overall planned scheme of operations. Despite 
his rank and the large army under his command General Sir Miles Dempsey, the 
commander of British Second Army, was still operating at the tactical level with little 
influence over the air forces required to execute any airborne operation. He had British 
airborne forces placed under his command during D Day, Operation MARKET 
GARDEN and Operation VARSITY in support of the Rhine Crossing in March 1945. 
He had very clear views on the utility and employment of airborne forces during the 
invasion of Normandy and ensuing operations. His initial plan for Operation 
OVERLORD envisioned 6 Airborne Division being placed under command of I Corps 
for the landings in Normandy, Operation NEPTUNE. He then foresaw I Airborne 
Division being placed under the command of VIII Corps for the subsequent breakout. 
Dempsey believed there were two possible methods of deploying 6 Airborne Division 
east of the River Orne during the first phase of the operation. One option was to land 
the force directly behind the beaches at Franceville to allow I Special Service (SS) 
Brigade to land unopposed and achieve its immediate objectives inland thus sccuring 
the main landing's left flank. The second possible method was to use the airborne 
division to capture the bridges over the Caen Canal and River Orne over which I SS 
Brigade could then pass following a landing on the main beaches. Dempsey selected 
the latter option because he considered it would take the airborne division too long to 
neutralise the beach defences at Franceville and the SS Brigade would have to advance 
too far from the beaches to reach its objectives. 9 The success of the airborne landings 
on D Day suggests that his decision was correct. 
Dempsey's views on the employment of airborne forces under his tactical command 
during the breakout from the beachhead were equally unequivocal. Recalling the fact 
that during the Italian campaign outflanking amphibious operations had successfully 
turned enemy defensive lines, he concluded that airborne forces in Normandy could 
' Chattcrton. The I vlikjýs Of Pegawtv, p. 177. 
0 NA. WO 285/1, General DempseN's appreciation of the capture of the area cast of the River Orne. 14 
Fcbruarý 1944. 
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execute this outflanking role. Certain principles had to be adhered to. The airborne 
landing had to be made close enough to the main force to ensure every prospect of a 
link up being made before the landing became a liability. The commander of the main 
body had to be prepared to use maximum force in order to assist the landino. Dei-np..,, c\ ý7 - 
also correctly understood that the eatest effect could be achieved by employing gr 
airborne forces en masse, committing a brigade as a minimum and preferablý, a full 
division. 10 
Dempsey obviously had a deep professional interest in this new form of warfare and 
made copious personal notes on official papers. He transmitted this enthusiasm to his 
subordinates and encouraged them to consider the intricacies of airborne operations. He 
set Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O'Connor, the commander of VII I Corps, a problem 
concerning the employment of an airborne force during a breakout from the Orne 
bridgehead. The crux of the matter, as Dempsey noted, was whether the airborne force 
should be committed once success was ensured, to turn an enemy withdrawal into a rout 
or in cooperation with the main force in order to gain success., I O'Connor did not 
commit himself to one or the other of the two conditions but in response to his 
commander's orders he produced detailed plans outlining the possible methods of 
employing an airborne division in Normandy. This included control, liaison, fire plans 
and communication diagrams. 12 Dempsey encouraged his subordinates to liaise closely 
with the airborne establishment. O'Connor and Lieutenant General John Crocker, the 
commander I Corps, held planning meetings with Browning, commander I British 
Airborne Corps, to consider the problems set by their commander. ' 3 
There were problems with delegating command and control of airborne operations to 
lower tactical HQs. As the Combined Chiefs of Staff noted, one result was that the vital 
and necessary coordination between the Army and RAF was also delegated to the 
tactical commander. This arrangement was likely to be less successful than retaining 
command at a higher level since in order to achieve coordination decisions had to be 
made by a commander who was in direct control of all the forces concerned, both 
10 NA, WO 285/1, Thc employment of airborne forces. 21 March 1944. 
11 NA, WO 285/1, The employment of airborne forces, April 1944. 
12 NA, WO 285/1. Co-operation required in planning bý I Airborne Dkision and IIQ 8 Corps, 9 %ia\ 
1944. 
13 NA, WO 285/1. The employment of airbome forces. 21 March 1944. 
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ground and air. 14 Working at the tactical level meant that a commander could only 
expect to have airborne formations under his control for discrete operations. For 
Dempsey there was six-month gap between Arnhem and his next chance to depl()\ 
airborne troops during Operation PLUNDER, the Rhine Crossing in March 1945. 
Corps commanders such as Crocker and O'Connor would have even less regular 
opportunities. It was therefore difficult for the commander to build consistent 
experience in deploying airborne forces. 
At the operational level of command, what contemporarily would have been thought 
of as the theatre level. ) the 
land commander had more opportunity to develop concepts 
and doctrine for the employment of airborne troops. 15 He would also have a closer and 
more regular relationship with his air force counterparts. He could have airborne 
formations under command for protracted periods or even throughout the enti rcty of' a 
campaign. This might include very different types of operation in various terrain and 
conditions. Alexander took over as C-in-C in the Middle East in August 1942 but had 
no direct influence over the British airborne operations during Operation TORCH in 
November 1942. He took command of Eighteenth Army Group in Tunisia in February 
1943 and as General Dwight Eisenhower's deputy in command of all land operations in 
North Africa he continued to work at the operational level. He was thus in command 
for the planning and execution of the invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, which 
included I British Airborne Division. During HUSKY three British airborne operations 
were planned with two being executed. Alexander retained command of the division 
during the Italian campaign until October 1943 when it was withdrawn leaving 2 
Independent Parachute Brigade in the theatre until it was committed to the invasion of 
Southern France, Operation DRAGOON in June 1944. While under Alexander's 
command the Brigade conducted only one minor airborne operation to harass the 
Germans in Italy, Operation HASTY from I to 7 June 1944. The Brigade returned to 
Italy in January 1945 and between 6 March and 4 May thirty-two airborne operations 
were initiated and cancelled by Alexander's HQ. At one point the Brigade HQ was 
14 ABIN, File 1115, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Polic) as to the Organisation and 
Employment of- AirbomeTroops, 6 March 1944. 
" The operational level of command can be defined as 'the emploýment of substantial 
land. sea and air 
florces. either singly or in combination, in a discrete and definable theatre of \\ar over a finite period of' 
time. ' J. Gooch. -Historý and Nature of Strategy" in W. Murray and RI lart Sinnreich. eds.. The I'aslAs 
Proloiýiie. (Cambridge: (I ambridge University Press. 2006), p. 14 1. 
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simultaneously planning eleven separate operations all of which were due to take place 
within a fortnight, none of which were executed. 16 This demonstrated a lack of 
foresight and the inability to clearly identify the best opportunity for the emploý inent of 
the airborne force. Apart from DRAGOON and the brief interlude of HASTY 
Alexander's British airborne forces were employed as line infantry in Italy causing a 
steady casualty rate including Major General Hopkinson the GOC I Airborne Division. 
killed in action. 
The Combined Chiefs of Staff indirectly criticised Alexander for his lack of positive 
action and misuse of his airborne forces on two separate occasions. In March 1944 thcý' 
noted, 'since airborne units are designed primarily for use when opportunity arises, they 
should not be employed in roles for which other units are suitable. In the past some 
commanders have been guilty of violation of this principle and have failed to appreciate 
the proper role of airborne units. ' 17 Because Alexander employed 2 Independent 
Parachute Brigade as conventional infantry it made it far more difficult to emploN, them 
to take advantage of any opportunity more suited to their specialist role. In August 
1944 Alexander was more obviously the object of criticism as General George C. 
Marshall, Chairman of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated there had been 
no airborne operations in Italy since Operation AVALANCHE at Salerno in September 
1943. He felt that this demonstrated a lack of understanding or even misuse of airborne 
forces. 18 
Despite his experience Alexander left little evidence of having conducted any deep 
analysis into the most effective employment of his allotted airborne forces. 9 Despite 
Marshall's assessment he did clearly recognise the value of airborne forces. Following 
Sicily he reported to the COS Committee on Operation HUSKY, praising the 
achievements of I Airborne Division and emphasising the advantage gained by its 
employment during the operation. He believed that it was time to make the expansion 
of the airborne corps a high priority and listed what needed to be done in terms of 
OtN% av, ýI irborne Forces, p. 227. 
I cý as to the Organisati 17 ABFIý 1/15, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Po 1 on and Employment of' 
AirborneTroops. 6 March 1944. In the final minutes the second sentence was deleted. 
18 NA. CAB K-10/262. JointStaff Mission to COS Committee, 9 August 1944. 
19 Alexander hardIN cý, cn mentions the airborne forces under his command in his autobiographN. 
I I. R. L. O. Alexander, The Hemoirs of Field Marshal Earl 41exander of Tunis 1940-1945 (London: 
Cassell, 1962) 
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supplying equipment and improving training to ensure this happened . 
20 ShortIN after 
the invasion of mainland Italy Alexander wrote to CIGS outlining his intention for the 
forthcoming campaign: to advance north and knock Italy out of the %kar. His concept 
involved Fifteenth Army Group moving steadily up the peninsula bound b. -, bound. He 
intended to take every opportunity to outflank the enemy defensive lines by amphibious 
assault and, with the allies' air superiority, by airborne assault. 'It will be possible, and 
highly desirable, to employ a portion of our two airborne divisions to secure keý points 
in the rear of the enemy by attacking him over the open vertical flank. '21 
Alexander liked the term 'vertical flank' and used it on several occasions. He 
described it again in letter sent to Brooke in autumn 1945 concerning the future valuc of 
airborne forces. 22 It therefore appears anomalous that he did not employ his airborne 
formations to greater effect during the Italian campaign. Admittedly there were limited 
airfields in Sicily and southern Italy that were sufficiently developed for medium and 
heavy aircraft and where they did exist bombers took priority over transport aircraft. He 
did use 82 United States Airborne Division in the parachute role during the operations 
in the Salerno beachhead but only after he was urged to do so by General Walter Bedell 
Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. 23 I British Airborne Division and later 2 
Independent Parachute Brigade remained largely confined to conventional infantry 
24 
operations . Alexander therefore represents something of a paradox when 
it comes to 
his handling of airborne forces. He clearly recognised their value but did not seem to be 
able to identify appropriate operations for their employment. IdentilYing opportunities 
that had a good probability of success required perception and timely decision making 
from a commander. Alexander was not famed for his intellect; one officer commented 
that he could not imagine the Army Group Commander ever producing a plan. let alone 
a good plan. 25 The command of airborne forces at the operational level required the 
ability to recognise the unique advantages that the airborne capability represented and 
20 NA. CAB 120/262. Report bý General Alexander. 21" July 1943 quoted in minute from Brooke to 
Churchill. 28 July 1943 and PREM 3/32/4, COS (43) 17.11 January 1943). 
21 NA, WO 106/3913, Alcxander to Brooke, 21 September 1943. 
22 () t \\ a\. ., I irborne 
FOrces, p. 44 9. 
21N. Hamilton, Yllonf. v- The Afavler Qf The Balflefield 
1942-1944 (London: Ilamish Hamilton. 
p. 389. 
24 Ot\\ýi\, 4irborne h'orccs. pp. 210-222. 
Is R. Atkinson. al Dawn. The War in Vorlh. -Iftica 1942-1943. (Nc\\ York: I lenry I lolt, 2(X)2). 
p. -176. 
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then be able to overlay these onto the overall plan so as to realise those advantages 
without prejudicing the main effort. General Sir Bernard Montgomel-N. Commander 
Eighth Army and as such Alexander's subordinate, had no doubt that he did not possess 
these qualities. 
In my opinion 15 Army Group is a very bad and inefficient H. Q. I 
think the staff there works under great difficulties since they find it 
quite impossible to get any decision out of ALEXANDER. or any firm 
line of country on which to work. There is no proper planning or 
thinkingahead. ALEXANDER does not really know clearly %N hat he 
wants; and he has very little idea how to operate the Armies in the 
field... He does not understand the offensive and mobile battle; he 
cannot make up his mind and give quick decisions; he cannot snap out 
clear and concise orders. He does not think and plan ahead... The 
whole truth of the matter is that ALEXANDER has got a definitely 
limited brain and does not understand the business: the use of air 26 
power in the land battle is a closed book to him . 
Montgomery, along with Eisenhower had, by the end of the war, built up a greater 
depth of experience in handling airborne forces at operational level than any other 
senior commander. From North Africa, through Sicily, into Normandy and across the 
Rhine these two officers planned many and executed several medium and large-scale 
airborne operations involving British parachute and air-landing formations. 
Montgomery and Eisenhower's approaches to airborne warfare often overlapped if they 
were not entirely coincident. 
Eisenhower was given command of the allied landings in North Africa on 26 July 
1942. His first outline draft plan for TORCH, written at the HQ European Theatre of 
Operations on 9 August 1942, made no mention of employing airborne troops. Neither 
did the next iteration written on 21 August 1942 and delivered to the COS Committee 
27 the following day. At around the same time the first thoughts on including an airborne 
element appeared in correspondence between Major General Mark Clark and 
Eisenhower. Planning began and at the beginning of September an Airborne Task 
Force was established and combined training began. On 15 September Browning was 
20 1 lamilton, Wont),: The Master Qf The Bafdýfield, pp. 457 & 460. 
27 NA. WO 106/2 764. Outline Plans for Operation TORCI 1,9 & 21 A Ligust 1942. 
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brought in to discuss the use of British airborne troops and theirjoint training ýý ith 
American air transport. The prominence of airborne forces Ný ithin the plan began to rise 
rapidly. By 19 September it had been decided that paratroops were to be used 'as 
extensively as possible. ' Four days later it was considered that the *use of paratroops is 
extremely vital to the operation. ' It is possible that Browning's introduction to the 
planning process was instrumental in this escalation as he pointed out to Clark that he 
was eager to have his whole command included in the operation. 28 
Eisenhower's dispatch from the North African campaign described the airborne 
operations that took place but drew no conclusions concerning their utility and lessons 
for the future . 
29 There appears to be no evidence that he had thought through any 
personal concepts for the employment of airborne forces prior to TORCH. 
Montgomery in contrast had dedicated a considerable amount of thought to the 
application of this new style of warfare well before he arrived to take over Eighth Armý 
in Egypt in August 1942. This is perhaps not surprising as his Chief of Staff MaJor 
General Sir Francis de Guingand noted, 'his [Montgomery's] knowledge of the mII itary 
art, in all its spheres at the outbreak of war, was, I think, quite unique... lie could talk 
with exact and technical knowledge of either the sappers' or the gunners' work; as 
easily as he could discuss that of his own arm's r6le in battle - i. e. the infantry. ' 
30 It is 
therefore logical that Montgomery applied equal thought to the concept of airborne 
warfare when it first emerged. In December 1940, as the Commander of V Corps, 
Montgomery conducted two very ambitious exercises across southern England, which 
included paratroops in his friendly forces order of battle. During the two short exercises 
there were four parachute drops involving a total of 250 paratroops. The drops were 
integrated within the entirety of the exercise activity including air attack, the fire-plan, 
reconnaissance and bridging tasks. The number employed represented almost the whole 
of Britain's airborne capability at that time. The exercises were considered a success 
31 
and helped to convince Brooke of the utility of airborne forces . Montgomery 
continued to include a proportion of airborne troops in many of his large-scale exercises 
2' NA. WO 204/4585. Correspondence between Eisenhower and Clark concerning planning for Operation 
TORCH, 9& 21 August, 8.15,19 & 23 September, 9 October 1942. 
NA. WO 106/2786,1 IQ Allied Forccs. C in C's Dispatch from the North African Campaign 1942-4 -1. 
I de G ui ngand. Operalion I "iclory (London: II odder & Stoughton, 
1947). p. 173. 
N. I-lam i Iton, AlonlY. - The Making Of .I 
General 188 7- / 942 (1, ondon: II am i sh II am i Iton. 198 1 ). pp. 446- 
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such as MOREBINGE in August 1941 when training XII Corps and BUMPFIR in 
September 194 1, a Home Forces exercise for which he was made Chief Umpire. 
Having experimented and examined the subject Montgomery felt confident enough to 
expose his thoughts on the employment of parachute troops publicly during an address 
to 500 officers of 3 and 4 Division in March 194 1. He expounded his views on the 
basic concept for the conduct of airborne warfare. These included the inviolable 
principle that once dropped paratroops should have a good and reasonable chance of 
linking up with ground forces. They should not be inserted too deep as any failure to 
adhere to this would obviously have an adverse affect on morale. From this principle he 
deduced that paratroops would not be suitable as part of a defensive plan. He 
considered that harassing tasks and seizing key points ahead of an advancing force 
presented the most appropriate opportunities to employ airborne troops. lie also 
emphasised the importance of good communications and intelligence in airborne 
operations. Montgomery was already demonstrating his belief that the place for 
airborne forces was in pre-planned, deliberate, set-piece operations. 'The employment 
of parachute troops must have a very definite place in any plan of battle. For this reason 
I wish greater attention paid to the subject. ' His thoughts on the subject were far more 
advanced than most of his peer group, many of who remained unconvinced by the 
utility of the new capabi I ity. 32 
The first time Eisenhower and Montgomery coincided on the subject of airborne 
operations was during the planning for Operation HUSKY. The decision at the 
SYMBOL conference to designate Sicily as the next allied target following victory in 
North Africa was a turning point for British airborne forces as Eisenhower decided to 
use 'airborne troops in the operation on a much larger scale than had yet been attempted 
in warfare. 33 Although there was some early dispute between Eisenhower and 
Montgomery as to the initial dispositions and objectives of the invading forces the 
focussed use of airborne forces was never in doubt. Both the American Seventh Armv 
and Montgomery's Eighth Army had airborne forces placed under command for the 
initial assault. I Airlanding Brigade was used to seize the approaches to Syracuse 
including the capture of the Ponte Grande on 10 July 1943. Three days later 
lbid, pp. 470-471. 
D. D. I-, iscnliox\cr. Crusade In Europe (London: Heinemann. 1948). p-188- 
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Montgomery, keen to maintain the initial momentum, used I Parachute Brigade to seize 
the Primasole Bridge over the River Simeto south of Catania. 
Despite the high casualty rate, due mainly to the inexperience of the American pilots 
of Troop Carrier Command and a lack of time for collective training immediately before 
the operation, both operational commanders agreed that the airborne operations on 
Sicily had presented important tactical lessons. Montgomery believed that the operation 
mounted by I Airlanding Brigade had accelerated his advance by no less than seven 
days. 34 However he considered that the operation to gain a firm hold of the Primasole 
Bridge had been a failure. 35 He had identified an important lesson that confirmed his 
previous assumptions and his own general approach to operations. Where airborne 
forces were employed in a pre-planned, deliberate, set-piece operation they could be 
valuable and stood a good chance of success. When they were used in a hasty operation 
to exploit success or overcome a tactical impasse the probability of failure was 
increased. He also developed firm views on the importance of collective training and 
the importance of dedicated aircrews for airborne operations. He felt it was unfair to 
commit airborne troops if the air force could not be relied upon to deliver them 
accurately. 36 The formation of 38 and 46 Groups RAF as dedicated airborne support 
formations followed the experiences of HUSKY. His observations in Sicily may also 
explain the fervour and resources applied to airborne training prior to D Day and the 
resources made available to it. 
Eisenhower believed that 'the outstanding tactical lesson of the [Sicily] campaign 
was, for me. ) at 
least, the potentialities of airborne operations. 37 He had also drafted a 
number of lessons to be carried forward to future operations. He shared Montgomery's 
view that the principal utility of airborne forces was to be found in deliberate operations 
with a long lead-time to allow the maximum period for coordination between all 
services and arms. He believed that airborne forces should only be committed to 
missions suited to their role. 
34 NA, WO 204/1818, Report on Airborne Operations - "I I USKY'", 24 Julý 1943. 
Hamilton. The Alavier Of The Baulefteld, p. 304- 
ibid. p. 354. 
37 NA, WO . 12/163031. 
Allied Forccs I IQ, C-in-C's Dispatch, The Sicilian Campaign 1943. 
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The force commander's decision to use them must be made onk after 
he is positive that the mission cannot be accomplished h\ other memis 
more economical or equally suited to the mission. In weighing the 
decision it must be recognized that airborne operations are both 
hazardous and difficult of coordination, and can be justified onl% by a 
situation which clearly shows the use of such troops to be 
im perative. 
38 
However, Eisenhower came under pressure to abandon these principles when his 
chief, Marshall,, tried to influence his operational plans from Washington. In Februarý 
1944 Marshall was imploring Eisenhower to include an airborne operation deep in the 
enemy's rear during Operation OVERLORD. He identified the area around ývreux, 
forty-five miles from Paris as a possible objective as he believed it would have 
presented a strategic concern to German forces by threatening the crossings over the 
Seine. Montgomery believed the plan was mad and criminal in its indifference to the 
lives of allied airborne soldiers. Eisenhower was persuaded by Montgomery amongst 
others to reject the proposal . 
39 Eisenhower reported to Marshall that to employ airborne 
forces so deep at such an early stage of the operation was impossible, as he could not 
guarantee an expeditious link-up. Marshall felt that without the deep employment of 
concentrated airborne forces the existing plan for OVERLORD lacked the clement of 
surprise. Eisenhower disagreed but conceded that the use of a large airborne force at 
some later stage of the operation might be desirable. 40 
After the invasion of Normandy had been consolidated and the breakout had begun 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff criticised Eisenhower's handling of his airborne forces 
once again. The Joint Staff Mission in Washington reported to the COS Committee: 
He [Marshall] felt that neither Eisenhower nor [General Sir HenrN 
Maitland] Wilson [C-in-C Mediterranean] had used their airborne 
potentialities to the full and were inclined to "save them up" and 
even misuse them as ordinary infantry.... He felt strongly that the 
introduction of these large forces in France at the right time and 
38 NA, WO 204/1818, Allied Forces IIQ. Training Memorandum 43, Employment ofAirbome Forces. 2 
August 1943. p. 1. 
I . 19 11 am iI ton. Monti,: i I(Wer Of The Battlefield, p. 521. 
40 ý\BFM 1/15. Rerx)rt to the Combined Chict's of Staff. PolicN as to the Organisation and I-Implo-, ment ot 
Ai rbome Trwps, 6 March 1944, p. 1. 
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place had very great potentialities and he had no indication of 
General Eisenhower's plans for their use. 41 
Marshall made suggestions for the future employment of the available airborne 
formations. He believed they could be dropped on Rouen if German resistance between 
Caen and Vire weakened or south of Dunkirk as a potential method of eliminating the 
flying bomb threat. He admitted that these suggestions were the result of only a 
relatively superficial appreciation and that no serious study of the forces required had 
been made. Both schemes violated the principles identified by Eisenhower and 
Montgomery in the past. The Rouen option relied on reacting quickly to an enemN 
reverse and so it could not have been pre-planned and deliberate to any great degree. 
The Dunkirk plan stood very little chance of any link up being made by a land advance 
before the airborne force could be destroyed in detail. 
By this time Montgomery had already been forced to cancel one airborne operation. 
He had planned to drop I Airborne Division around Evrecy on 13 June in order to form 
the linchpin for an encirclement of Caen. However Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh- 
Mallory, C-in-C Allied Expeditionary Air Force, objected to the plan as he thought the 
scheme would have been expensive in terms of aircraft and casualties and thus prejudice 
future airborne operations. Montgomery thought Leigh-Mallory 'a gutless bugger' but 
allowed the concerns of his air commander to influence his operational plan and on the 
42 
morning of 13 June he cancelled Operation WILD OATS . Following this incident 
Montgomery's plans for airborne operations were continually frustrated. Operation 
BENEFICIARY, an airborne assault to capture the defences around St. Maio, 
SWORDHILT, an effort to destroy the Morlaix viaduct, and HANDS-UP, a plan to 
capture the port of Quiberon to assist the American breakout were all cancelled as the 
ground advance reached the objectives before an airborne assault could be launched as 
43 
were TRANSFIGURE, BOXER, AXEHEAD, LfNNET. INFATUATE and COMET . 
It was against this background that Montgomery was given priority to try breaking the 
static situation on the Belgian/Dutch border and attempt a narrow thrust into Germany 
41 NA, CAB 120/262, Joint Staff Mission Report 182,9 August 1944. 
42 Leigh-Mallory had already objjected to part of the airborne plan for D Daý but on that occasion was 
o\ ci- ruled and subsequently proved wrong. Hamilton. Monty- Alavler Of The BaIllefteld, pp. 634 & 648. 
43 Ot\\ av, .I 
irborne Forces, pp. 206-213. Horrocks c\ cn consi dcrcd arx)logi sing to the ai rbome IIQ for 
the speed ot'his advance. B. G. lJorrocks. Corps Commander (London: Sidp\ ick & Jackson. 1977), p. 76. 
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in order to encircle the Ruhr in September 1944. At the same time EisenhoN% er was 
under pressure from Marshall to use his airborne forces. Eisenho%%er responded bN 
looking at all potential employment so that his staff appeared to have *decided to buy an 
airborne product and were shopping around. '44 So both Eisenhower and Montgomery 
were induced to abandon the principles for the employment of airbome forces that they 
had expressed previously. Operation MARKET planned to seize key crossings m, cr the 
Maas, Waal and Rhine in order to allow an advance by Second British Ann), to 
penetrate Germany. Only seven days were available to plan the largest airborne 
operation of the war thus far, hence the schemes for two previous operations, 1. INN I'F 
and COMET, were stitched together to speed up the process. The depth of the insertion 
of I British Airborne Division behind the German front line reduced the chancc of a 
link up with Dempsey's army. Communications at the operational level were poor, 
intelligence was ignored and the air force appeared to dictate crucial parts of the plan. 
Operation MARKET was thus an aberration in both Eisenhower's and Montgomcrý's 
approach to airborne warfare. Although deviating from their principles did not 
automatically lead to failure it did reduce the chances of success and meant that 
relatively minor tactical errors were more likely to jeopardise the entire operation. 
Comprehensive lessons were drawn from Operation MARKET at the tactical level 
and it would appear that they were learned at operational level also. The next and final 
time a major airborne operation was launched in Europe Eisenhower and Montgomery's 
principles were fully applied once again. Operation VARSITY, as part ofthe wider 
Operation PLUNDER, was a deliberate set-piece battle to cross the Rhine. 
Montgomery returned to hisfortý and to ensure that a link up with the airborne force 
was achieved it was not launched until the ground forces were already across the river. 
The operation was highly successful despite the casualty rate and all the airborne 
obiectives were achieved within hours . 
45 Montgomery acknowledged his experiences 
when he wrote to Brooke during the autumn of 1945 to give his views on the value of 
airborne forces. He emphasised that the vital role of airborne forces was most 
44 ILK. G. Sixsmith, British Generalship In The Twentieth enturv (1, ondon: Arms & Armour Prcs,,. 
1970), p. 260. 
45 
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particularly suited to deliberate operations. He could relate from experience that during 
highly mobile operations the value of airborne forces was limited due to the 
considerable amount of time required to plan for their deployment and use. 46 
It has been argued that the long period of readiness between Dunkirk and D Day 
provided the opportunity for training and large-scale exercises and thus officers selected 
for high command had experience in command of large forces in mobile exercises such 
as they had never had before. 47 Numerous airborne exercises were conducted during 
this period but it would appear that few senior commanders took the chances proffered 
to experiment with the benefits and limitations of this new opportunity. Those who did, 
like Montgomery, quickly built up firm ideas concerning their effective employment. 
The thoughts and enthusiasm of a single commander such as Montgomery could then be 
effectively communicated to subordinate commanders through the chain of command: 
thus Dempsey passed ideas down to Crocker and O'Connor. 
It had been recognised before an airborne formation had ever been committed to 
operations that command and control would be a complicated matter . 
48 Command of 
airborne forces could only be delegated to the tactical level for defined periods and 
limited operations as the advantages of close cooperation with ground forces could be 
negated by the inability to coordinate effectively with the air component. The 
successful handling of airborne forces at the operational level required foresight and 
understanding to identify opportunities and timely and effective decision making to 
ensure that there was time to properly plan and coordinate their deployment. Where this 
was not apparent, as with Alexander, they were misemploycd and hence opportunities 
were lost. Those who did have the opportunity to use airborne forces on multiple 
occasions over a protracted period of time drew firm conclusions as to their effective 
employment. These essentially centred on set piece, deliberate operations where the 
chance of linking up with ground forces was practically guaranteed. Where these 
principles were forgotten or ignored by operational commanders it made success at the 
tactical level very difficult. 
" Otwa),,,. Iirborne Forces, p. 440. 
47 s-, il vsm i th. (; eneralship, p. 193. 
48 NA, AIR 2/7470, Joint Gcneral Staff/Air Staft'Memorandum. 4 Julý 1942. 
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5.3 The Selection and Competence of Airborne Commanders 
Operational and higher tactical command of airborne forces required an understanding 
of concepts, the ability to adapt and apply doctrine and the coordination of ground and 
air components in order to fit a desired plan. The tactical command of airborne forces. 
at the divisional level and below required different qualities. The unique capabilities, 
limitations and the technical intricacies of mounting airborne operations needed officers 
in command who were intimate with the tactics, techniques and procedures associated 
with airborne warfare. Tactical airborne commanders held the potential to influcrice the 
formations and units under their command to a greater extent than the commanders of 
conventional formations and units. Even the most informed and adept superior 
commanders were by no means experts in this field. They had not served in airborne 
units themselves and were therefore less inclined to meddle at the tactical level. They 
were not subject to the same level of tactical suggestion and prescription as infantry and 
armoured commanders and their staff, who were continually confronted with Army 
Training Memoranda and Military Training Pamphlets. During operations airborric 
formations were often isolated, deploying in advance of ground formations. They often 
fought alone for a period of time, without the requirement to conform to flanking 
formations and therefore tactics could be dictated by necessity rather than by tcmplate. 
Finally, as will be discussed, airborne doctrine for both training and operations was thin 
during the war. All these factors left an airborne commander with wider latitude to 
dictate the manner in which his unit or formation trained and operated. 
The initial intakes of airborne commanders had no more experience of airborne 
warfare than the men they were expected to lead. However, many of these young 
officers brought with them a wealth of general military experience from various theatres 
across the world. Frost had served with Assyrian Levies in Iraq before volunteering for 
parachute duties, Crookenden in Egypt, Palestine and Ulster. Some of them, such as 
Pearson, Deane-Drummond and Crookenden brought valuable lessons with them from 
service with the BEF prior to and during Dunkirk. 
'9 These men were pre-war 
professional soldiers or had at least served with the Territorial Army. They ýNcre 'voung, 
49 IWM, Papers ot'l, icutenant General Sir Napier Crookenden KCB DSO 013E 1)1,, Vol 11. A. Deanc- 
Drummond. Arrows Qf Fortune (Lonclon: Leo Cooper, 1992), p. 3. Frost, A Drop Too Many. pp. 
Jarnes. A Flerce QualilY. pp. 18-21. 
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capable, and adventurous and many demonstrated a streak of unconventional i tý in their 
early careers. They were the ideal officers to take forward the initial establishment and 
expansion of Britain's airborne forces. Their limited time in the Armv and service in 
the colonies and on the continent meant they were unlikely to have been irreversibl\ 
imbued with conventional military thought. This was important, as airborne warfare 
required a different, if not unconventional, approach to tactical command. 
A commander would have to lead airborne soldiers who had been trained to think and 
act on their own initiative. On landing he might have to rapidly reconfigure his troops 
to achieve his objectives. His unit would have to generate speed during the assault, 
which was essential to compensate for the lightweight nature of their arms, in order to 
produce sufficient momentum of force to carry the objective. He might have to fight 
with open flanks and an unguarded rear. These factors required a style of command that 
was not overly prescriptive, relied on decentralisation and allowed men and officers to 
achieve their objectives through their own means rather than by dogmatically following 
detailed orders. This approach required a high degree of trust, mutual understanding 
and good communication. This was more akin to the German style of command, which 
they named Auftragslaktik and was latterly known as 'mission command' by the British. 
A commander set out his intent for a battle and subordinates were given wide latitude to 
act as they saw fit as long as that intent was achieved. '0 
This approach to command was certainly recognised within the airborne community 
and the chain of command and training were adapted to bring forward its advantages. 
Lieutenant Colonel James Hill recalled the effects of an acceptance of 'mission 
command' following Operation TORCH where he commanded I Parachute Battalion. 
Fortunately throughout our training we had always appreciated 
that it might be necessary for parachute troops to carry out an 
operation quickly under great difficulties at very short notice. and 
a system of decentralization had been very carefully worked 
out... If we had not had this [approach] our new task would have 
51 been totally impossible. 
Certainly in many cases subordinates recognised and appreciated this style of command 
so French. Raising Churchill'sArmy, P-20- 
51 SJ. L. II il L 'Operation "Torch-, Armv Quarterly, Vol H. No. 2. JanuarNI 1946, p. 179. 
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in their superiors. Crookenden considered that his brigade commander. Brigadier The 
Honourable Hugh Kindersley, had these qualities. 'I think he will be ý [crý I good as a 
Com[manld[er], since he has the gift of leaving people to get on with it. '52 
Another symptom of the traditional British bureaucratic attitude to command could be 
seen in an over reliance on copious written orders. Detailed and cumbersome. over- 
prescriptive orders reflected the army's hierarchical ethos and structure but were not 
responsive enough to be of use during a highly fluid battle. 53 Once again Britain's 
airborne forces appear to have recognised this weakness and modified procedures, 
attempting to keep written orders brief and leaving subordinates scope for autonomy. 
The entire planning instructions issued by HQ 6 Airborne Division prior to tile invasion 
of Normandy ran to just approximately 2,500 words. The instructions gave each 
subordinate commander clear objectives, task and constraints but left him with the 
freedom to configure and deploy his formation as necessary in order to be most 
effective. Only where objectives were critical to the overall D Day landings, such as the 
battery at Merville and the bridges over the Orne and Caen Canal, did the orders 
become more prescriptive. 54 This style of instruction gave a subordinate commander 
the chance to think through the tasks he had been given and conduct his own 
appreciation of the situation and the approach required rather than simply following 
superior orders. This can be seen in the appreciation written by Hill, as commander of 3 
Parachute Brigade to interpret the D Day instructions disseminated by HQ 6 Airborne 
Division's instructions. 55 This method allowed a commander to build in flexibility to 
cope with the inevitable last minute changes required in most airborne operations once 
troops had landed and the force available could be assessed. It allowed subordinates to 
use their initiative if the original plan became invalid. According to Gale, initiative '. N'as 
the primary quality of an airborne leader. 56 As long as the commander's intent was 
understood and objectives were accomplished the method and means were less 
52 IWM. Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookenden KCB DSO OBE' DI,. Vol Ill. cntr-, for 6 
June 1943. 
53 French, Raising Churchill'sArmy, p. 16 1. 
54 OtN%aN,. lit-borne Forces. pp. 429-4314. 
55 Def'ence Academy Library, OVFIRl. ORD - Appreciation of'Situation by Brigadier S.. I. I.. I fill 0M) %I( 
undated. 
ý" Gale, Call Io. I rins. p. 116. 
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important. Where a commander was over prescriptive and exercised too direct control 
over his subordinates an airborne operation could quickly go awry, as ýý iII be seen. 
The promotion and re-assignment of qualified airborne officers was not alNNays 
sufficient to fill the new appointments created by the surges in expansion of the 
establishment, particularly between late 1941 and late 1943. The formation of I 
Parachute Brigade during the second half of 1941 necessitated the simultaneous 
appointment of three battalion commanders and a brigade commander. These selections 
required careful consideration as the commanders in such a small and still relatively 
experimental establishment could have an effect out of all proportion to their position. 
The command of a parachute battalion was considered unique and required first-class. 
independently minded officers to fulfil it. 57 During this period a brigade commander 
was given the opportunity to select his own battalion commanders and their company 
58 
commanders. Gale was selected to command the new I Parachute Brigade. There 
appears to be no evidence as to why Gale was singled out for this appointment. To that 
date he had had a relatively conventional career; a machine gun officer during the First 
World War where he won the MC,, he attended Staff College at Quetta, India between 
the wars and was working as a staff officer in the War Office for the first two years of 
the Second World War. During this period it is possible that someone in authority 
identified him as having the necessary qualities to command a parachute brigade and he 
was promoted into the post from battalion command. '9 He then selected his battalion 
commanders as Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Down, who already commanded II SAS 
Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Flavell who had been Gale's company 
commander during the previous war and Lieutenant Colonels Lathbury and Hope- 
Thompson. 
As the establishment expanded to a division during 1942 and then to two divisions 
during 1943 some of these officers and their peers did make steady progress through tile 
ranks. Down was promoted twice and commanded 2 Parachute Brigade and then I 
Airborne Division. Lathbury, after a spell working for the Director of Air in the War 
57 IWM, Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookenclen KCB DSO OBE DI.. Vol Ill. entry for 19 
August 1943. 
58 NA. WO 32/9778, meeting held to discuss fiormation ol't%No nc%k air battalions. 30 August 194 1. 
59 For a full account of (Yale's career see Gale. Call To Irms. 
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Office was promoted and commanded I Parachute Brigade as Hill became the 
commander of 3 Parachute Brigade. Gale moved from bfigade command to become the 
newly designated Director of Air and was then promoted to comr-nand 6 Airborric 
Division, subsequently being appointed commander of I British Airborne Corps. 
However it was still necessary to bring officers in from outside the airborne fraternity in 
order to fill all the new appointments. These included officers such as Brigadier Nigel 
Poett who commanded 5 Parachute Brigade in Normandy and on the Rhine, Brigadier 
'Shan' Hackett, commander of 4 Parachute Brigade at Arnhem, and Major General Eric 
Bois, GOC of 6 Airborne Division during the Rhine crossing. 60 These officers brought 
with them a wide variety of experience and hence each had a different approach to their 
new commands. For most there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest \N [I\, they were 
selected to command what was considered a corps d'eliie beyond the fact that thcy had 
obviously demonstrated a certain level of competence in their careers thus far. 61 
Hackett was not even an infantryman. One of the factors that connects these 
commander's airborne careers is the mystery of their selection for the appointment. For 
some there is evidence of patronage. Certainly Bois was personally selected to 
command 6 Airborne Division by Montgomery and was informed of the fact as the 
Field Marshal pinned his DSO on his cheSt. 62 Although the methods by which these 
officers were selected for airborne command are unclear on the whole they appear to 
have been successful as generally they performed equally well as their indigenous peers. 
The officers selected as the original commanders of the airlanding brigades had both 
been amateur civil pilots before the war. Colonel Chatterton, the Commander Glider 
Pilots, considered this was an unhealthy precedent on the principle that a little 
knowledge is a dangerous thing. 63 Kindersley assumed command of 6 Airlanding 
Brigade in May 1943 having commanded a battalion of the Scots Guards. His 
subordinate officers considered him pleasant, efficient and invaluable in battle. 
64 
Poett's autobiography gives a full account of his career, Poett, Pure Poell. Ilackett's 
biograph-, gi%cs a 
full account of his career, R. Fullick. Shan Hackett: The Pursuit Of Exactitude 
(London: Leo Cooper. 
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Brigadier Frederick Hopkinson preceded Kindersley having taken command of I 
Airlanding Brigade in October 1941. The Brigade hadjust been created from the 
conversion of 31 Independent Brigade Group and Hopkinson took over from that 
formation's commander. Hopkinson had served in the First World War and had made a 
name for himself in 1940 with the BEF as the commander of the GHQ Reconnaissance 
Unit, later to develop into the Phantom Group. 65 Deane-Drummond found Hopkinson 
dogmatic and inflexible while Chatterton considered him. 'an unusual little man ýNith a 
little knowledge of the air... he was very ambitious. -)66 It was possibly this latter trait 
that motivated his actions after he was promoted and became the commander of I 
Airborne Division in April 1943. During the planning for Operation HUSKY 
Hopkinson bypassed the chain of command and approached Montgomery personally in 
order to try to ensure the participation of his Division during the invasion of Sicily. 
Despite having commanded an Airlanding Brigade for eighteen months Hopkinson's 
appreciation of the requirements of a mass airborne landing was low. The airborne 
collective training establishment in Britain had yet to reach the stage where brigade 
level exercises could be practised. The training available to the glider pilots in 
particular in North Africa prior to HUSKY was insufficient to prepare them adequately 
for the operation. Hopkinson was aware of this as Chatterton had advised him as such 
and recommended cancelling or at least reducing the airborne participation in the 
operation. Hopkinson threatened Chatterton with the sack if he did not comply. 67 
Browning, Hopkinson's superior within the airborne establishment, was also concerned 
and wanted to discuss the operation with him. Hopkinson deliberately evaded 
Browning by missing a pre-arranged meeting in Algiers in order to avoid reconsidering 
68 his plan . 
The result of Hopkinson's over enthusiasm in terms of airborne casualties 
has already been discussed. After HUSKY Hopkinson landed with his Division by sea 
at Taranto and accepted the Italian surrender of that city. Shortly after he was ki I led in 
action while observing one of his forward un itS. 69 
Throughout the war the airborne establishment was commanded at all levels by a I 
65 Dm, cr, The Sky Generals, p. 7 1. 
66 l, (111 Dcanc-Drummond letter to the author, 6 July 2006 and Chatterton. The Wings Of Pegasus. P-38- 
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mixture of officers who had worked their way through the airborne ranks and those %N ith 
external, conventional experience brought in at various levels to take command X% hen 
required. At first glance it may appear that bringing officers in from other parts of the 
Army could have stifled the careers of those looking for promotion " ithin. Some very 
capable airborne officers appear to have had their careers truncated. However, in most 
cases there were very good reasons for this. Lathbury, having commanded a brigade in 
Sicily and at Arnhem, would have been a candidate to take over 6 Airborne Division 
from Gale in December 1944 had he not been wounded and captured during Operation 
MARKET GARDEN. 70 Frost, one of the most experienced British airborne officers 
having commanded at Bruneval, in North Africa, Sicily and at Arnhem did not make it 
beyond Lieutenant Colonel during the War. He might well have been selected to 
succeed Lathbury as brigade commander had he not also been wounded and captured at 
Arnhem. In other cases the reasons for a career decelerating were less obvious. 
Having been appointed commander of I Airborne Division, Down was moved into a 
much lower profile theatre to take command of the newly formed 44 Indian Airborne 
Division. It is probable that this was a political appointment designed to placate the 
Indian General Staff and convince them that the War Office was taking its airborne 
aspirations seriously. Down was a victim of his own success. He was considered by 
one of his biographers to be the toughest of all the Second World War airborne generals, 
hard but held in high regard by those he commanded .71 At 
least one of his subordinates 
held him in very high opinion. Deane-Drummond found that he set high standards and 
was ruthless in applying them. He considered Down was the best airborne theorist of 
the war who had taken time to study the problems associated with landing deep into 
enemy territory. 72 Down was known for being taciturn, a quality displayed by his 
assessment of 154 Parachute Battalion. Having observed its training during an exercise 
in India in October 1944 he commented, 'The jumping with rifles and LMG I light 
" Lathbury had been a candidate to succeed Down as GOC I Airbornc Division in January 1944 and may 
even have 
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machine gun] carried down on the man was good, the accuracy of dropping bad. The 
work of the Co[mpan]y on the ground average. 73 
From the end of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Indian Viceroy, Linlithgow, the 
Secretary of State for India, Amery and C-in-C India, Wavell had all lobbied the V'ar 
Office to little avail to increase the rate of development of their own airborne force. In 
late 1943 Browning visited India and recommended that more effort be put into the 
Indian airborne establishment. By dispatching the European theatre's most competent 
and widely respected airborne soldier Whitehall could convince India that it was taking 
its aspirations seriously without having to commit significant resources. Down left for 
India in January 1944 and was clearly not pleased at having to give up command of I 
74 Airborne Division . 44 Indian Airborne Division was never committed to battle as an 
entire formation and so Down's qualities were never tested at that level. He handed 
over I Airborne Division to Major General Robert 'Roy' Urquhart who subsequently 
commanded at Arnhem. 
It has been generally accepted that Urquhart, like Bols, was personally selected for 
this command by Montgomery. 75 Montgomery certainly knew Urquhart before the 
appointment. He was commissioned into the Highland Light Infantry in 1920 and 
served in Malta and India before the war. In late 1940 Urquhart was posted onto the 
staff of 3 Division and was subsequently made the chief administrative officer. It is 
possible that he was first noticed by Montgomery as his corps commander during this 
period. Between 1941 and 1944 he commanded a battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's 
Light Infantry, served as a staff officer with 51 Highland Division and XII Corps and he 
commanded 231 (Malta) Infantry Brigade Group. During the majority of this period 
Urquhart was subordinate to Montgomery at some level. Montgomery put great store in 
personally selecting many of his junior commanders and estimated that he spent a third 
of his working hours considering new appointments and officers' performance. He 
deemed the most important qualities of a leader to be initiative, drive, determination, 
76 
moral courage, resolution, and the ability to radiate and inspire confidence . 
73 NA, WO 203/2418, Nl4jor General Down, 50 Independent Parachute Brigade. 17 October 1944 
74 Dover, TheSky Generals, p. 87. 
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Montgomery favoured commanders with a proven combat record. HoNýcýer. between 
the outbreak of war and January 1944 Urquhart had only commanded 231 Brigade in 
action and forjust approximately twenty-four days on Sicily and for a further three da\ s 
in Italy. 77 The Brigade had an independent role during the invasion of Sicily under 
Montgomery's Eighth Army. One of the most difficult actions carried out b\ the 
Brigade was the capture of a crossing over the River Dittaino conducted during the 
night of 18 July 1943. The battle was recorded by the brigade history as 'a perfect little 
set-piece of military manoeuvre. ' 78 
Urquhart the divisional commander was a product of his experience, however. and the 
understanding accrued from conventional operations was not fully transferable to the 
airborne method of operating. Commanders arriving as newcomers to the airborne 
establishment might be inclined to think that it represented just another means of 
arriving in battle, ignoring the unique physical, mental and tactical challenges. 79 
Urquhart had ample time prior to taking his division into battle to acquaint himself with 
the distinctions. When he assumed command of the division in Lincolnshire it had only 
recently returned from the Mediterranean where it had been committed to operations for 
seven months, twelve months in the case of I Parachute Brigade. Formations and units 
that have spent protracted periods on operations more often than not require intense 
confirmatory training in order to bring everyone back to a common base-line, remove 
bad tactical habits acquired while deployed and prepare for subsequent operations. 
Urquhart was well aware of this and knew that his main task prior to the projected date 
for Operation OVERLORD was to concentrate on brigade and divisional level 
80 
training. It has to be assumed that the divisional commander also benefited from this 
cxtended period of training. There is little evidence available as to Urquhart's thoughts 
and methods during this period but by June 1944 he might reasonably have acquainted 
himself with the idiosyncrasies and particular requirements of airborne warfare and anN 
changes to his own command style that he might have needed to affect in order to 
accommodate them. 
77 
BaN ties, Unjuharl OfArnhem. pp. 52-65. 71 ibid. p. 55- 
79 Frost. .I J)i-()p 
Foo A lany, p. 194. 
so Baytics. Urquhart OfArnhem, p-72- 
200 
The course and results of I British Airborne Division's battle at Arnhem have been 
extensively documented but Urquhart's role as commander has seldorn been subject to 
any depth of critical examination. His contribution to the planning process for 
Operation MARKET produces mixed opinions, particularly the selection of the drop .1 
and landing zones eight miles west of the critical road bridge across the Rhine. 
Urquhart believed that the air force had to remain responsible for all planning up to the 
point at which paratroops were dropped or gliders were released .81 Despite this 
approach Urquhart's biographer maintains that he did personally select the drop zones. 82 
One divisional staff officer is certain that the commander took no part in the process and 
83 that the selection was left to the RAF and Troop Carrier Command . Certainly 
Urquhart was offered alternatives including the possibility of a coup de main glider 
landing against the main road bridge as had been achieved, albeit on a smaller scale, 
during the early hours of D Day. 84 Whether Urquhart was part of the decision making 
process or not, the Division landed on DZs and LZs some eight miles from its main 
objective. However this in itself was not an entirely calamitous situation. There may 
even have been advantages to this position as it allowed the units to form up almost 
entirely unmolested by the enemy. The distance did not make seizing the main bridge 
impossible, as Frost's 2 Parachute Battalion was to prove. It was the plan and conduct 
of the approach and assault from the DZs and LZs into Arnhem that betray Urquhart's 
unfamiliarity with airborne warfare and the approach to command it required. 
The plan for the Division post the initial landing involved the three parachute 
battalions of I Parachute Brigade advancing along three separate routes into Arnhem to 
seize the crossings over the Rhine while the three airlanding battalions of I Airlanding 
Brigade remained on the DZs and LZs to defend them for subsequent drops and 
landings. 85 However the plan for the advance began to unravel early in the operation. 
The divisional reconnaissance squadron had been tasked to race ahead of I Parachute 
81 Urquhart, Arnhem, p. 18. 
82 Baynes. Urquhart OfArnhem, p. 94. 
83 VonN Deane-Drummond letters to the author 18 MaN and 3 Jul-, 2005. 
84 Baynes, Urquhart OfArnhem, p. 94. Chatterton thought a coup de main landing was possible but was 
made to feel like 'a bloody murderer' for suggesting it. I lowever, Chatterton makes no reference to this 
e ýf Pegasus (London: NI ýic I )onal d, 1962). yisode in his autobiography. G. Chatterton, The 117ngs 0 
'- Only I Parachute Brigade and I Airlanding Brigade landed on the first day of the operation. 4 
Parachute brigade and the Polish Parachute brigade were not due to land until the second and third daýs 
of the operation. For a full account of the battle for Arnhem see Middlcbrook,. Irnhem 1944. 
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Brigade to seize the main road bridge but its jeeps were quicklý halted hý fierce 
resistance and the surviving vehicles returned to their start point and became inactiý e 
for a prolonged period, apparently impotent without new orders. Without 
reconnaissance and lightly armed, the lead parachute battalions \kere repeatedl\ halted 
by relatively minor action which required counter-attack before they could be bypassed. 
This intermittent progress made it difficult for the battalions to generate the speed of 
advance they required to overcome the disadvantages of their light armament. 
With the initial advance not moving as quickly as planned Urquhart fclt he had to 
intervene personally. He left his divisional HQ and moved forward to try to expedite 33 
Parachute Battalion's progress along the centre route through Oosterbeek. When 
Urquhart arrived at Lieutenant Colonel Fitch's Battalion HQ he found the brigade 
commander, Lathbury, already in attendance. The Battalion had been held up bN 
relatively light but determined opposition from 16 SS Panzer Grenadier Depot and 
Reserve Battalion which had been exercising in the area when the drop took place. 
Rather than bypassing the enemy and continuing to the bridge Fitch spent time tryino to 
eliminate the enemy unit. By dusk 3 Parachute Battalion was still engaged on thc centrc 
route several miles short of the bridge. Urquhart, with Lathbury and Fitch, took the 
decision to take up all round defence for the night, disengage from the enemy before 
first light and move on to the southern route to continue towards the bridge the next day. 
It seems remarkable that, having come forward to try to speed things up Urquhart was 
then content to allow this overnight delay and inevitable loss of momentum-8" Thc 
incapability of the reconnaissance squadron after an initial setback and the inabilit\ of 
parts of I Parachute Brigade to bypass the enemy and make best speed to the bridge are 
not indications of a division that fully embraced a 'mission command' ethos. 
Urquhart's decision to leave his HQ and then halt 3 Parachute Battalion for the night 
betray a lack of understanding of the situation and, more fundamentally the essence of 
airborne warfare and the absolute requirement for speed in the attack. 
By the next morning the Germans had moved reinforcements from 9 SS Panzer 
Division to form an impenetrable blocking line to the west of Arnhem. Throughout the 
remainder of the battle no further significant advance could be made towards the bridge 
sS '(, MAF. I Airborne Division Report on Operation Nlarkct Gardcn. 10 Januar-,, 1945. Part IV. Annex N. 
War Diary of' I Parachute Brigade. 
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and those already there were steadily destroyed in detail. Certainly the Gen-nans 
pointed to the decision to halt on the first night as the critical mistake of the battle. as 
noted in an official report. 'The adversary only made one big mistake, and that not onl,. 
thwarted his own intentions but exposed him to destruction... If the enemy had pushed 
straight on to Arnhem after having surrounded the [16 SS Panzer Grenadier Depot and 
Reserve I B[attaliojn instead of trying to wipe it out, he would have succeeded in 
capturing the town. ' The report concluded that British airborne forces lacked the 
capacity for 'courageous and resolute advance. 87 Urquhart's decision to move forward 
to personally encourage Fitch is understandable given the breakdown of radio 
communications shortly after landing. Military doctrine also encouraged this practice, 
stating that the coordination of the infantry battle relied upon the timely arrival of the 
divisional commander at a position from which he could make decisions that could 
88 directly affect the course of operations. However, this had been written with a 
conventional infantry formation on a linear battlefield in mind. Moving to forward 
units during an airborne battle, where they might be isolated or have unprotected flanks 
was more perilous. By nightfall on the first day of the battle, cut off from his HQ with 3 
Parachute Battalion, Urquhart realised that he was losing control of his division. 89 He 
could not return for forty-eight hours. The Divisional Commander's actions during the 
early part of the battle have been summarised by one member of his staff as being like 
'a wet hen. '90 
This criticism of Urquhart is specific to that situation and cannot be applied across his 
career, as he was obviously highly successful as brigade commander in Sicily and Italy. 
It is not even applicable to the whole of the battle at Arnhem. It was certainly not *a 
perfect little set-piece of military manoeuvre' but once the battle became static 
Urquhart's conduct of the defence was admirable and his planning and execution of the 
withdrawal across the Rhine was almost impeccable. However, during the planning and 
critical early phase of the battle Urquhart appears to have failed to recognise and apply 
some of the basic principles of airborne warfare, primarily the necessity for initiative 
87 MAF, 16 SS llanzcr Grenadier Depot and Reserve Battlion, War Diary 17 September to 7 October 
1944. 
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and independent action through the application of 'mission command' and the critical 
requirement to maintain speed during the assault. His decisions and actions during 
these hours had ramifications beyond Operation MARKET GARDEN and had a direct 
influence on the direction of future British airborne tactics. The shadoNv that Arnhem 
cast over Operation VARSITY will be examined in the following chapter. 
One officer dominates the subject of British airborne forces during the Second \Vorld 
War. Sometimes described as the 'father' of airborne forces, Lieutenant-General 
Frederick 'Boy' Browning has no full biography. Commissioned into the Grenadier 
Guards in 1915 he won the DSO during the First World War for his actions during the 
capture of Gauche Wood and was awarded the Croix de Guerre. Between the \, ý ýirs he 
was stationed in Egypt, at the Guards Depot and as adjutant of the Royal Military 
College, Sandhurst, where he established the tradition of riding a horse up the steps of 
Old College during passing out parades. An accomplished sportsman he represented 
England at hurdling in the Olympic Games and was a member of the British Olympic 
bobsleigh team. Browning commanded 2 Battalion Grenadier Guards at the outbreak of 
the Second World War and during the retreat to Dunkirk. "' He then commanded 128 
Infantry Brigade and 24 Guards Brigade in England before being appointed Commander 
Paratroops and Airborne Troops on 29 October 1941. He took over the new command 
with the acting rank of Major General the following week. 92 
Many of Browning's character traits are well documented. Immaculately turned out, 
he was suave and affable and charmed many of those he met within a very short space 
of time. Chatterton recalls how he 'met 'Boy' Browning for the first time, and fell 
under his spell as everyone did. 93 Gale attributed him with a colourful personality, a 
ready smile, great resolve and determination but with a quick temper. 
94 One of 
Browning's staff officers considered that the enthusiasm with which the early airborne 
division strove forward and overcame obstacles radiated directly from the commander 
himse If . 
95 However not everyone was as complimentary. Pownall, whom Browning 
succeeded as COS to Mountbatten in Southeast Asia, believed he was rather nerv,,, and 
91 For an abridged and non-critical account of Browning's lil'c see Dover, The Sky Generals, pp. 38-56. 
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highly strung. 
96 Browning's supreme self-confidence and fastidious demeanour were 
interpreted by some as signs of arrogance and Horrocks believed that his immaculate 
97 dress led others to underestimate him . This was particularly true of foreign allies and 
members of the other services who did not necessarily understand that this was the 
natural manner of a Guards officer. General James Gavin, Commander of the American 
82 Airborne Division. ) 
found Browning dapper and handsome but believed that his 
ambition was misdirected and that he lacked experience and understanding of airborne 
98 
warfare. Their meetings frequently appear to have resulted in antagoni SM. 
Another characteristic that Browning inherited from his Guards background was his 
obsession with discipline and bearing. In 1942 Browning produced an eight-page 
pamphlet to be distributed across the airborne establishment entitled 'Discipline - The 
Only Road to Victory'. In it he explained that the ultimate objective of discipline was 
to ensure that when a battle was not going to plan, when immediate commanders had 
been killed and strain and exhaustion were setting in, the soldiers' natural reaction 
would be to hold on and keep fighting. 99 In October of the same year Browning 
addressed the officers and men of I Parachute Brigade prior to their departure for North 
Africa on Operation TORCH. 
This war cannot be finally won nor can the intervening battles be 
fought, without the aid of airborne troops. I have no doubt in my 
mind that you will furnish the proofs of this, by your deeds, in the 
months to come. More than this, I have the utmost confidence that 
by your fighting efficiency, your speed of thought and action, and 
above all your bearing and discipline, you will most worthily uphold 
the good name of the airborne division. 100 
Obviously this speech is an attempt to motivate a body of men prior to battle but in it 
Browning implied that he considered bearing and discipline to be more important 
96 Bond. Chief ofStaff, p. 193. 
97 1 lorrocks, Corps Commander, p. 109. 
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individual factors in airborne warfare than speed and initiative. 'O' 
Browning's approach and attitude and his ability to create friction through his 
apparent arrogance caused Frost to question his suitability for command of airborne 
forces. 'Was this the right background for someone who ought to be able to think quite 
new thoughts and realize that airborne forces would have to rely entirely on air 
102 forces? ' Certainly there is not much evidence that Browning had many significant 
'new thoughts' or if he did they were not committed to paper. As the ultimate 
commander of such a new and unique force it might be expected that Browning N%ould 
have had serious ideas concerning the concepts and doctrine for the employment of li is 
airborne troops and methods for training. However, practically no papers of this type 
appear to have emanated from his HQ when he was divisional and subsequently corps 
commander. When he was given an opportunity to expound his views on the nature of 
airborne warfare the results were surreal. At one point during 1942 Browning gave an 
address to all the officers of the Airborne Division. 11is speech, lasting approximatek 
twenty minutes, was intended to be on the strategy and tactics of airborne forces. The 
lecture that he gave, entitled 'A Dream' was quite bizarre. Set at some distant. 
undefined point in the future he described a huge fleet of vertical take-off, _jet aircraft 
running on a novel fuel source. The aircraft had fully autonomous weapons that COUld 
distinguish soldiers from civilians and casualties were 'beamed up' into the aircraft to 
be treated. The address had absolutely no relevance to the reality of the moment. Quite 
what impression the officers of the Division, eager to hear their leader's ideas on how 
the inevitable forthcoming battles might be fought, left with can only be guessed at. 103 
If he was not a doctrinal visionary then Browning did have compensating qualities. 
He had the ability to move forward projects that, in the hands of others, had apparently 
stalled. He appears to have been able to produce solutions to previously intractable 
")' One photograph, often reproduced, sums up his apparent obsession with discipline and appearance. 
On 19 May 1944 King George VI. Queen Elizabeth and Princess Elizabeth visited 6 Airborne DVision 
accompanied by Browning. In the photograph a line of soldiers from 224 Parachute Field Ambulance 
stand to attention, ready for battle, with their equipment laid out to view. The King and Queen stands 
in 
front of the men, smiling, relaxed and apparently interested in what the men have to sa,. Meanwhile 
Browning is behind the men, bent over and using his swagger stick to inspect the contents of their 
backpacks. P. I larcierode, Go To It! The Illustrated History of e Airborne Division (London: Caxton, 
1990), p. 50 or Bernage, Red Devils In Normandy, p. 14. 
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problems. He was what today might be termed a 'mover and shaker'. Browning \ýas 
well connected and could present ideas and requirements at the highest level, bypassin-g, 
bureaucratic obstacles. In May 1942 he presented the Air Ministry's paper on the 
concept of a 'Nucleus Force' of transport aircraft directly to the Prime Minister. CIGS 
and CAS. Browning did this because he felt that no one else had placed aný 
constructive ideas before Churchill and that it was an opportunit\ to offer some insight 
into the problems facing airborne forces. 104 Two months later the establishment of 38 
Wing RAF was doubled. 50 Indian Parachute Brigade had been formed at Delhi in 
October 1941. However, by mid-] 943 not much progress had been made and despite 
the requests and protests of the Viceroy, Secretary of State and C-in-C India expansion 
was painfully slow and the brigade was 1,200 men under strength. Browning was sent 
to India to report on the situation on the orders of VCIGS, Lieutenant General Sir 
Archibald Nye in September 1943. He was given a comprehensive list of objectives by 
the War Office and following a five week tour of the country he returned to London 
with eight recommendations. These included the formation of an airborne forces depot 
at Rawalpindi and the raising of an Indian airborne division. The results were 
immediate. The C-in-C, General Sir Claude Auchinleck ordered thirty British officers 
to be posted to 50 Indian Parachute Brigade before Browning had even finished his tour. 
By December 1943 several units had been expanded and reorganised. In January 1944 
Down arrived in India to raise and train 44 Indian Airborne Division. 105 
Browning's penchant for detail on the parade square extended to his staff work. He 
was willing to immerse himself in the issues which, while they could not have been 
considered minutiae, were the less glamorous aspects of airborne expansion but 
important to success nonetheless. He detailed the organisation and duties of the 
airborne staff, he argued that parachute battalions should retain some of their pre- 
conversion identities; he requested the provision of smoke bombs that could be dropped 
alongside paratroops to conceal them on the DZ. 106 Browning, particularly up until the 
invasion of Sicily, frequently had to battle against War Office indifference and the 
resistance of the Air Ministry, what one of his staff officers termed the 'many doubters 
104 NA, AIR 39/39. Browning to Barratt, 7 May 1942. 
105 OtNNiý,,, lirborne Forces, pp. 341--)43. 
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in the higher realms of authority. " 07 But his determination and connections meant that 
he was eventually successful more often than not. 
Gavin had commented on Browning's ambition as being a negative aspect of his 
character. However the majority of his ambition was genuinely on behalf of the 
airborne force that he earnestly wished to develop and progress as far as possible. As 
well as working on those mundane but essential subjects required to ensure success he 
also took every opportunity to ensure that British airborne forces were considered for 
deployment on active operations. His inclusion in the planning process for Operation 
TORCH in September 1942 resulted in a far higher prominence being given to the role 
to be played by I Parachute Brigade. 108 During the planning for Operation RUTTER 
(later to become Operation JUBILEE), the raid on Dieppe, Browning volunteered the 
use of parachute troops and pushed hard to have a glider borne force included. '09 
Following the cancellation of the airborne element of that ill-fated operation he lobbied 
GHQ Home Forces and expounded his view that his airborne forces should be taking 
part in small raiding operations at the rate of one per fortnight. ''o Despite this 
obviously over ambitious assertion he would not, unlike Hopkinson, try to commit his 
force whatever the consequences. He withdrew the airborne element from a projected 
raid on Alderney in May 1942, although his reasons were unclear. III In May 1943 he 
advised against the use of paratroops on Operation CORKSCREW, the capture of the 
island of Pantellaria in the Mediterranean, due to the projected casualty rate. '' 2 
Following an operation, whether it had been fully successful, such as the raid on 
Bruneval or if there had been serious set-backs, as with the invasion of Sicily, Browning 
published a detailed report listing the faults and achievements and actions required to 
take development forward. ' 13 
107 1 WM 99/18/1, Papers of Major Pope, September 1939 to February 1944. 
108 NA, WO 204/4585, Correspondence between Eisenhower and Clark concerning planning for 
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However, there was a streak of personal ambition in Browning, fed in part by, vanity. 
which showed itself dufing Operation MARKET GARDEN. Inmid-194413rowning 
was the commander of I British Airborne Corps as a Lieutenant-General. There had 
been considerable inter-allied manoeuvring for control of First Allied Airborne Army. a 
position that he had coveted but which had been given to an American officer. 
Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton. Browning had to be content as his deput". 
Following D Day several airborne operations were planned and cancelled and once 
again inter-allied rivalry had been apparent dufing this process. Once Operation 
MARKET GARDEN was confirmed Browning pushed for a corps HQ to be dep I oý ed 
into Holland to control the two American and one British airborne division that 
participated. Acutely aware that he had not been in action as a senior commander 
Browning volunteered his own corps HQ. ' 14 The HQ of I British Airborne Corps was 
based in Moor Park Golf Club in Hertfordshire. The HQ was never intended to be 
deployable and hence had not been established as such. There were not enough 
signallers and those there were had not been on exercise. ' 15 Once on the ground the role 
of the HQ would have been ambiguous. It was usual practice to place an airborne force 
committed to operations under the command of a suitable ground formation HQ. In the 
case of Operation MARKET GARDEN this was XXX Corps and Second British Army. 
The intrusion of Browning's HQ was likely to be an extraneous distraction .,, 
6 
Despite these factors Browning landed with his HQ at Groesbeek near Nijmegen on 
the first day of the operation, 17 September 1944. Predictably, his signals organisation 
was inadequate and throughout the battle he had very little communication with I 
British Airborne Division, twelve miles to the north. Therefore he could do little to 
assist and advise Urquhart. By flying to Holland Browning had dislocated himself from 
the air forces that supported him from England with which he also had only very limited 
114 The only other candidate was the commander of XVII US Airborne Corps, l. ieutenant General 
Matthew Ridgeway but his IIQ had already been fighting in Normandy, controlling 82 and 101 Airborne 
Divisions. Gavin, On to Berlin, pp. 90-92. 
"5Mi dd I ebrook, .I rnhem 1944, p. 
12. 
116 1 lorrocks insisted he and Browning 'took all the major decisions together without any scmblance of 
1'riction. ' NA, CAB 106/1054, The Battle of Arnhem - Notes Made By Lt Gen Sir B. Horrocks. undated, 
'T ga% c the capture p. 5. I lowever Browning's orders to 82 US Airborne Division for Operation MARKE 
of the high ground at Groesbeek, location for the Corps HQ, equal prominence to the capture ofNijmegen 
Bridge. These orders almost certainly delayed the capture of the bridge and therel'Ore slo%%cd XXX Corps- 
advance towards Arnhem. NA, WO 176/366. Op MARKET Operation Instruction \No. l. 13 '-, cptember 
1944. 
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contact. When the battle at Arnhem began to go adversel\ he was unable to influence 
the air support plan and adjust the locations of re-supphy, DZs. Without good 
communications Browning could do little to influence the three airborne divisions. each 
fighting its own battle, or the overall air operation being planned and launched from 
England. In getting himself into that position he had used thirty-eight valuable Horsas 
to fly in his HQ. 2 Battalion The South Staffordshire Regiment was forced to flý into 
Arnhem on 17 September 1944 with less than half the battalion because there Nýas a 
deficiency of thirty-four gliders from the fifty-six required to lift an airlanding battalion. 
The remainder had to be flown in on the second day of the operation. 11 7 
Browning's Nijmegen expedition was a poorly judged endeavour that left a blemish 
on his otherwise worthy airborne career. Shortly after Arnhem, he left the airborne 
establishment to become COS to Mountbatten in South-East Asia Command. However, 
true to form,, he was soon pushing for the use of airborne forces in that theatre. Down 
wrote to Gale shortly after Browning's arrival, 'The Boy [Browning] has made his 
presence felt already. He has covered more ground in three weeks than his predecessor 
did in the last six months! ' 118 He wrote to CIGS on Christmas Day 1944 to explain that 
44 Indian Airborne Division, despite his previous efforts, was not yet ready for 
operations and that there were insufficient transport aircraft available. He argued for the 
transfer of at least one allied airborne division from Europe to the Far East. He over 
optimistically estimated that a fully functioning airborne division might shorten the war 
with Japan by six months or possibly even a year. ' 196 Airborne Division was ordered 
to re-deploy to the Far East in May 1945. The requirement was subsequently reduced to 
a brigade and 5 Parachute Brigade flew to India in July 1945.1 British Airborne Corps 
HQ, now commanded by Gale, followed a month later to take over planning. However, 
two weeks later the Japanese capitulated and the Corps HQ was disbanded that 
October. 120 
Frost was not convinced by the methods used to select airborne commanders during 
the war. 'It never seemed to me that much serious thought was given to producing the 
117 NA. WO 176/366, Op MARKET Operation Instruction No. ], 13 Scptember 1944. 
118 ABFM, File 63, Down to Gale, 10 Januarý- 1945. 
119 H ICMA, 6/2/56. Browning to CIGS. 25 December 1945. 
120 Otýý, ý, N. . 4irborne 
F'orces, pp. 329 & 351. Anothcr lcgacý of Browning x%as the dcployment of- I British 
Airbornc Corps I IQ on Fxercise BUZZ in order to test its proccdures in December 1944. VV Ao 
219/498 1, Airborne Corps I -'Ixcrcisc "BUZ/-. 9 December 1944. 
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type of leaders or their staff needed to lead a completely neýý force who would be 
pioneering anew means of introducing soldiers into battle. "'-" In truth there ýýas little 
experience or evidence on which to base any selection criteria or a syllabus for training, 
airborne leaders. As with so much of British airborne forces development it folloýýed a 
process of trial and error. In view of this the competence of the commanders that ýN ere 
produced was very good, particularly up to brigade level where very little evidence of 
poor leadership exists. At the divisional level and above there are examples of 
commanders whose decisions and style of command could be questioned. Hopkinson, 
Urquhart and Browning have been criticised but generally only in respect of isolated 
decisions and not because of a general incompetence. Hopkinson's decision, against 
advice, to commit his division on Sicily and Browning's to take his HQ to Nijmegen 
were driven by misguided personal ambition as opposed to any gross misunderstanding 
of the situation. If I Airborne Division had not landed on Sicily then many of the faults 
apparent during that operation might not have been rectified in time for D Day. 
Browning's lack of conceptual vision was balanced by his ability to enforce progress 
and was compensated by Gale's acute understanding of doctrinal development and, 
more importantly the training issues linked to it, while working as Director of Air in the 
War Office. Urquhart's poor appreciation of the situation on the first evening of the 
battle at Arnhem and his failure to apply the tactical principles of airborne warfare, 
while it had far reaching consequences was an isolated decision made by a commander 
under intense pressure and with limited experience of the type of battle he was fighting 
and at a time where the concept of 'mission command' was largely alien to the British 
Army. It is also worth considering that while these commanders have to retain the 
responsibility for the decisions they made many of them would have been informed by 
the advice they received from their staff. 
5.4 The Airborne Staff 
Command is not exercised and control is not maintained just 
simply by the direct issue of orders to subordinate commanders. 
Between the commander and his troops is a machine, a human 
machine, the staff. 122 
1-11 Frost, Nearly Mere. p. 71. 
122 Gale. With the 6". firborne Division In Normandy. p. 27. 
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By the outbreak of the Second World War Gale's words had been fact for many years. 
The mechanised battle was too diverse, complex and fast moving for a single 
commander to absorb all the information he required, digest it, make a decision and 
inform his troops of his intent. Even a battalion commander had a small staff to assist 
him each being an expert in his field. The adjutant looked after manning and discipline. 
the quartermaster had control of the administrative and logistic support and he NNould 
have an operations officer and possibly a signals officer and an intelligence officer. 
Each would routinely gather information from his own area of interest and present it to 
his commanding officer in a manner that would assist his decision making process. 
At battalion level these officers were selected from amongst the other regimental 
officers usually by seniority. At brigade level and above there existed a core of 
specifically selected and trained staff officers. These were men who had passed the 
coveted, almost mystical, selection process for Staff College. Attendance at Staff 
College, preferably at Camberley but also possible at Quetta in India and Haifa in 
Palestine during the war, was a prerequisite for certain advancement beyond the rank of 
major. Staff College was not universally esteemed but the criticism was usually 
groundless and the process successfully selected not only competent staff officers but 
also those who would go on to the higher echelons of command. 123 Those who attended 
undoubtedly benefited from the experience and often paid high tribute to the standard of 
instruction, which was successfully maintained throughout the war years. 124 The British 
had never maintained a General Staff Corps on the continental pattern. Instead it 
produced a cohort of able men who were able to alternate between command in the 
front line and service with the staff in various HQs and therefore gain and spread 
valuable experience. The cohort, bound by the suffix 'psc' (passed staff college) had a 
shared experience and often knew each other and thus the wheels of the Ari-ny were 
often greased by personal relationships. 125 
Within the brigade and higher HQs the staff were essential in order to prevent a 
commander becoming immersed in detail. Montgomery, who took the system of 
separating a commander from the trivia to its extreme. had no doubt as to the staff 
123 1 lorrocks, Corps Commander. p. 22. 124 
Si xsm i th. British Generalship, p. 17 1. 
125 1). 1 -ms c r, ., I nd We Shall Shwk Them 
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officer's function. 'Details are their province. No commander %k hose daily life is spent 
in the consideration of details, and who has not time for quiet thought and reflection, 
can make a sound plan of battle on a high level or conduct large-scale operations 
efficiently. ' 126 Unfortunately, as Montgomery suggests, the life of the staff officer was 
normally far less glamorous than that of his counterpart commanding, soldiers in a 
company or squadron. Consequently and unsurprisingly first hand accounts from staff 
officers, apart from those in the highest positions, are rare. Memoirs from members of 
the airborne staff are practically non-existent. Both Major A. A. K. Pope and 
Crookenden actively sought postings onto the airborne staff. Following Staff College a 
posting to the staff was inevitable and many officers would have made every effort to 
ensure that this did not keep them out of action. A posting to an airborne headquarters 
would have fulfilled this ambition. Crookenden went to the HQ of 6 Air-Landino 
Brigade straight from Staff College in mid-1943 and Pope was posted to Browning's 
staff at the Airborne Divisional HQ in October 1942. Both write about their airborne 
training, the personalities around them and the operations in which they took part but 
neither took much time to record the daily routine activity of their HQ or the staff 127 
Prior to September 1941 the only staff dedicated to airbornc forces were those based 
at Ringway but those men were employed on administrative and experimental duties as 
opposed to command and control. During that month I Parachute Brigade was formed 
under the command of Gale and his staff began to gather. With the establishment of I 
Air-Landing Brigade the following month a divisional HQ was required to maintain 
control over both formations. The HQ Airbome Division was formed under Browning 
during November 1941 with an initial establishment of seven staff officers, which was 
subsequently expanded to twelve plus an administrative staff the following month. The 
War Office recognised that in the future the division might be ordered to deploy as a 
complete formation and therefore the HQ should also be operational and would be 
brought up to war strength gradually through the ensuing months. 1 28 By the end of 
1941 a provisional establishment for the HQ had been published with the addition of 
general and intelligence staff and staff officers from the engineers, signals, medical 
'2' Montgomery. The Alemoirs Of Field Marshal Viscount, wonigomery Of 11kimein. p. 77. 
127 IWM. Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookcnden KC13 DSO OBL DL and 99/18/1. Papers 
of Major A. A. K. Pope. 128 
Ot%%aN. Airborne FW-ces, pp. 14-19. 
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services, ordnance and the chaplains department. In total there was provision for fitteen 
officers and seventy-five other ranks. 129 
It quickly became apparent that the duties of Browning and his staff ýN ere far more 
extensive than the relatively straightforward command of two brigades. The Airborne 
Division HQ became a sorting office for all matters concerned with airborne forces and 
their development. Constant and direct liaison was necessary with the War Ot1lice. the 
Air Ministry, AC Comd and 70 Group RAF. Browning also had to work ýN ith the 
Airborne Forces Establishment (AFE) at Ringway and with DCO and COC on matters 
of operational planning. Through his position as the senior British airborne officer 
Browning also became responsible for Polish, French, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian 
airborne contingents beginning to form in the United Kingdom. Before the 
establishment of Hardwick Hall the HQ was also, administratively if not physically, the 
defacto airborne forces' depot. Through the first half of 1942 these multiple duties 
began to exert pressure on Browning and his staff. 130 
Browning recognised the situation and began to lobby HQ Home Forces and the War 
Office in June 1942 to try to relieve some of the workload from his staff. He 
recommended that an HQ separate and superior to the divisional HQ should be created 
in order to take on the liaison and administrative tasks leaving him free to command his 
formation. The following month the staff at HQ Home Forces requested that Browning 
investigate a number of options including the formation of a superior HQ Airborne 
Forces but also the establishment of a small separate liaison and administrative HQ to 
be under control of the division and the expansion of the divisional HQ in order to cope 
with the extra duties it had acquired. Browning reconfirmed his preference for a 
separate superior HQ but Home Forces dragged its heels and continued to pose 
questions rather than make a decision despite his almost weekly correspondence on the 
subject. 131 In October 1942 Browning submitted a detailed paper to Home Forces 
precisely delineating the responsibilities between an airborne divisional commander and 
the desired superior airborne HQ. The duties of the new superior commander and his 
staff would include liaison with the experimental establishment concerning all trials and 
121) NA, AIR 39/39, Formation ot'HQ. Airborne Division. 2 December 1941. 
130 Otýý, IIN .I irhorne Forces, p. 40. 
NA, WO 32/9778. Organisation and Duties of Airborne Forces and Airborne Division, 19 Novcnibcr 
1942 
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equipment development, liaison with allied airborne contingents, liaison \ý ith the War 
Office, Air Ministry and COC, supervision of an airborne forces depot, the coordination 
of important visits and perhaps most crucially the provision of an operational airborne 
advisor. For all this he proposed a HQ under a major-general with approximately thirty- 
five staff, including RAF officers, split into four staff branches of advice and plans, staff 
duties, training and liaison and administration and quartermaster. This ýN ould relie\ c 
much of the pressure from the divisional HQ and leave it responsible only for the 
command and training of the divisional units, liaison with No. 38 Wing RAF for 
training and operations and liaison with COC for operational planning. 132 
The experience of I Parachute Brigade in North Africa supported Browning's vievýs 
but it was not until the formation of 6 Airborne Division that HQ Home Forces acceded 
to the formation of HQ Major General Airborne Forces in April 1943. Browning 
moved into this new role the following month handing over command of I Airborne 
Division to Hopkinson. 133 This new arrangement caused some confusion. Chatterton 
complained that he was 'becoming somewhat mystified about the set-up of Airborne 
Divisional HQ. General Browning seemed to have been changed from Divisional 
Commander and had become known as Major-General Airborne Forces. ' 134 Indeed it 
was not long before Browning himself became dissatisfied with the new organisation 
that he had struggled so hard to establish. On 20 August 1943 he wrote to the War 
Office complaining that he had no command function and as such. with the same rank 
as the divisional commanders he was now in a position where he felt subordinate to 
them. The invasion of Sicily had necessitated his deployment, along with his staff, as 
airborne advisor to Allied Forces HQ leaving no means of control back in the UK. He 
felt his HQ was over committed and should be enlarged and given the ability and the 
authority to command more than one division in operations and prepare them during 
training. Browning recommended a revision of the existing organisation under a 
Lieutenant-General Airborne Forces. On 26 December 1943 Major General Airborne 
Forces was disbanded on the formation of HQ Airborne Troops, which subsequently 
became HQ I British Airborne Corps in April 1944. The new organisation was to be 
IIZ NA, WO 32/9778, Organisation. Airtx)me Forces, 19 Octobcr 1942. 
133 01 \N ziý. A irborne FOrces, pp. 100 &I 11. 
134 Chattcrton, WiiWs (? f Pegasus. p. 38. 
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commanded by a Lieutenant-General and Browning was promoted into the job .13 
Bý 
the close of 1944 HQ I British Airborne Corps had a staff of fortý -three officers and 203 
other ranks. 136 Certainly the establishment of a three star airborne headquarters N-. -as 
justified once there were two divisions in Britain but it cannot be ruled out that 
Browning had at least one eye on self-advancement when he put forward the changes. 
Certainly some senior American officers believed that Browning was a scheming 
empire builder. 137 
During that period of Browning's machinations the airborne divisions were allox%ed to 
develop their own HQ and staffs. I and 6 Airborne Division's HQ evolved along 
similar lines through training, trials and the experience gained in the Mediterranean. B-,,, 
August 1943 the HQ of 6 Airborne Division had grown to thirty-tNýo officers and 149 
other ranks. This was practically double the establishment of HQ I Airborne Division 
at the end of 194 1. A parachute brigade HQ comprised of ten officers and twenty-fivc 
other ranks and an air-landing brigade fifteen officers and sixty-eight other ranks. This 
meant within the division approximately sixty-seven officers and 270 other ranks were 
involved in the command and control of the formation. The case for such expansion 
must have been clear to have justified such an investment in manpower. Sixty-seven 
officers would have filled the establishment of two parachute battalions. 
During the Second World War there was a lack of detailed knowledge within the 
higher echelons of command of the British Army concerning the capabilities and 
employment of airborne forces. The airborne staff therefore, besides the command and 
control of airborne formations, had a further role in providing advice and expertise to 
superior headquarters that were planning, commanding or coordinating the use of 
airborne forces within a wider battle. This had been recognised as early as March 1941 
when the CLE prepared instructions for HQ III Corps re staff duties regarding the use of 
parachute troops. Along with useful information on the size and weight of parachutes, 
containers and trolleys and a checklist of points that should be included in the orders of 
any operation employing parachute troops it also identified the requirement for an 
airborne advisor to be present in the force HQ and gave clear instructions as to his role. 
135 Otwaý. Airborne Forces, pp. 137-139 
'"NA, WO 219/498 1, Fxcrcisc "BUZZ" Instructions, 14 December 1944. 
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He must be prepared to advise the Force Commander whether 
the operation is feasible or not depending on the weather 
conditions at the time. He should be able to give the proportion 
of casualties likely due to adverse weather conditions. The 
Force Commander should then decide on the importance of his 
task vis-a-vis the probable landing casualties. 138 
At this time only very minor airborne operations could be mounted but as complexitN 
mounted so the vital role and necessity of having carefully selected and positioned 
a visors ncreased. 
In September 1942,1 Parachute Brigade was designated for employment during 
Operation TORCH, the allied invasion of North Africa. The Brigade was allotted to 
First British Army under General Sir Kenneth Anderson and the Brigade Commander, 
Brigadier Edward Flavell, dealt directly with HQ First Army. Browning and the 
divisional HQ assisted but had to concentrate on a myriad of tasks to prepare the 
brigade for war. Browning repeatedly requested that a senior airborne advisor should be 
appointed to HQ, First Army but this was not granted. The result was that during both 
planning and the operation in North Africa Flavell was pulled between commanding his 
brigade and assisting with planning at HQ First Army. Inevitably this led to neither 
appointment being fulfilled satisfactorily as he could not be in two places at once. The 
Combined Chiefs of Staff learned this lesson stating that it would never work well to 
employ senior officers from airborne or troop carrier tactical units to act temporarily in 
a higher staff capacity as doing so would 'seriously cripple the combat efficiency of the 
tactical unit concerned. ' 139 The lack of a permanent airbomc expert in the superior HQ 
led to I Parachute Brigade not being employed at ful I capacity or in the most suitable 
manner. There were also glaring omissions in administration such as a lack of maps 
and aerial photographs and in the coordination between the British paratroops and the 
American troop carriers. All these points were detailed in the post operational report 
including a recommendation to increase the staff in a brigadc HQ so as to cope with 
ground operations and simultaneous preparations for airborne operations. 140 
137 (Yavin, On to Berlin, pp. 90-91. 
138 NA, AIR 32/2, Staff Duties in Connection With the Use of Parachute Troops. I March 1941. 
139 
"\131., M. 1/ 15. COS(44) 230(0), Policy as to the 
Organization and Employmcnt of Airborne I roop-., 6 
March 1944. 
140 Ot%NaN. Airborne Forc-cs, pp. 74ý 81 & 89. 
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Many of the lessons were learned prior to Operation HIJSKY. the allied invasion of 
Sicily in July 1943. The position of Major-General Airborne Forces had onlyjust been 
agreed to in principle by the War Office when Browning was appointed Airborne 
Forces Adviser to 15 Army Group. He was responsible for advising the higher 
commanders and coordinating inter-services requirements with the RAF and Troop 
Carrier Command. I Airborne Division was placed under command of Montgomery .s 
Eighth Army. Once given his mission and tasks it was Commander I Airborne 
Division, Hopkinson's duty to give advice to Montgomery and cooperate direct \N ith his 
staff for planning and cooperation. Meanwhile Browning remained responsible for 
matters such as provision of stores and equipment, aircraft routing, photographic cover 
and offensive air support. 14 1 For these tasks he had a staff ofjust four officers. This 
division of responsibilities, while created with the best of intentions of relieving HQ I 
Airborne Division of some its peripheral workload, allowed dangerous gaps to appear in 
the staffing process and certainly assisted Hopkinson in his machinations to deploy his 
division whatever the cost. When Browning left the theatre at the end of July he 
attempted to close these gaps. He recommended the establishment of a permanent 
Mediterranean airborne staff. By combining staffs in North Africa and the Middle East 
he believed a pool of fifteen officers covering all disciplines could be created. Crucially 
the task of this staff was to embed itself in various HQ at all levels including Eighth 
Army and XIII Corps. This staff would report up to a Brigadier-General Staff (BGS) 
who would work between AFHQ and 15 Army Group. This organisation ensured closer 
coordination and meant that a commander could not plan an operation without some 
degree of scrutiny from a superior HQ. 142 
If the 'outstanding tactical lesson' of Operation HUSKY was the potentiality of 
airborne forces then the major lessons identified by the airborne establishment were 
those of coordination and staff effort. Browning concluded that much of the staff work 
concerned with an airborne operation must be centralised at the highest appropriate 
level so as to allow coordination between the land and air components under a single 
commander. 14' The AFHQ report supported the view of its senior airborne advisor. 
144 
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The COS Committee also considered the airborne contribution to the operation and 
emphasised the vital importance of joint planning and particularl) the role of the air 
force. Airborne operations should be planned integrally within the overall air operation 
both strategically and tactically. It had to be controlled tactically by the same formation 
controlling other air operations within the immediate vicinity. The controlling influence 
of the air force during the preparation, planning and sanctioning of operations was 
reiterated. In order to assist in the planning and execution of individual operations 
airborne advisors should be appointed to the air force commander's staff. "ý 
Browning's analysis of the structural requirements of the future airborne staff were 
essentially sound based on ajoint controlling headquarters at the highest level and 
airborne advisors embedded where necessary in all subordinate headquarters. 
It became clear from Operations TORCH and HUSKY that any future major airborne 
operations were going to be allied affairs requiring the close integration of British and 
American airborne and air forces. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognised this and 
stated that there must be a commander with a staff who was able to directly control all 
troops and aircraft involved in an allied airborne operation. They were critical of senior 
commanders claiming that they had generally failed to follow established principles and 
re-emphasised that the planning of airborne operations could not be successfully 
delegated without losing coordination. They identified this as being primarily the result 
of 'higher commanders have failed to provide themselves with capable airborne and 
troop carrier staff advisers. ' 146 The result of this edict was the creation of the First 
Allied Airborne Army, initially outlined in early June 1944 and formally established 
that August under Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton, an American Air Force 
commander. Brereton's HQ controlled five, later six British and American airborne 
divisions and crucially IX US Troop Carrier Command and 38 and 46 Groups RAF. 
The functions of the HQ were laid down by Eisenhower and included the training, 
development, re-supply and reconstitution of airborne formations, the preparation and 
examination of outline plans for the employment of airborne forces and the direction 
and control of such plans until a designated ground force commander took command of 
145 1) 552(0), Report on the t-I'mployment ot'Airbome Forces, 20 Scptcm -r 1943. ABFM, 1/15, COS(4 
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146 A13FM. 1/15, COS(44) 230(0), PolicN as to the Organization and I mployment of Airborne Trcx)ps. 6 I 
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the units involved. Not everyone was in favour of the neýk organisation. I-eigh-Mallory 
thought that increases in personnel and thus time and labour would inevitabi. N, lead to a 
loss of efficiency. He believed that the reorganisation was illogical 
and unsound on the basis that the previous method of operating had not failed. He Nvas 
also unhappy that the air force elements of the new establishment would not be 
available for other purposes between airborne operations. 
Despite this opposition HQ First Allied Airborne Army was established but not in 
time to influence the planning for D Day which followed the same process as that used 
prior to Operation HUSKY. The outline airborne plan was developed at SFIAFF and 
passed to the an-ny group HQ for development. It was then disseminated to the relevant 
army HQ and on down to corps. Concurrently and in parallel the airborne corps HQ 
was also given their orders direct from army group and army HQ. It was not until tile 
orders permeated down to army and corps HQ that joint planning was conducted with 
airborne and ground force commanders together. At this level there was no control over 
the air forces involved and therefore any changes to the air plan would have to be 
staffed back up the chain of command. This system was cumbersome but worked 
successfully for the invasion of Normandy due to the protracted planning period. With 
the establishment of HQ First Allied Airborne Army joint planning could take place 
from the very outset with advisors available direct to SHAEF. Brereton's HQ would 
then be placed under the command of a particular army group for specified periods. 
Thus all its resources were allotted to 21 Army Group for the pursuit from Non-nandy 
and during the Rhine Crossing. With Brereton embedded at this level initial outline 
plans for the employment of airborne forces could be scrutinised from the ground and 
air force perspectives simultaneously. Thus First Allied Airborne Army HQ acted as a 
(planning filter' checking the validity of proposed airborne plans and then passing them 
down to the airborne corps HQ with much of the coordination already in place. "' 
HQ First Allied Airborne Army with its constituent XVIII US and I British Airborne 
Corps developed a successful planning and coordination mechanism that was effective 
throughout the remainder of the war. Valuable lessons had been learned and hut,,. e 
advances had been made since Flavell had struggled to both command his brigade and 
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act as a staff officer at HQ First Army. The internal brigade and divisional staffs, had 
also evolved into robust and practical organisations in a relatively short space of time. 
This situation was, however, not unique to airborne forces. Conventional infantry and 
armoured formations also had to rapidly increase and develop their staff during the war 
due to inter-war neglect. For example in 1936 the GOC of I Division in Aldershot had 
only three staff officers permanently attached to his headquarters. Even this was better 
than his territorial contemporaries who had only two. 148 Whereas in the case of a 
commander it could be argued that long service with airborne forces was an advantage 
with the staff a breadth and variety of experience was often a benefit. Obviously 
detailed airborne knowledge was essential while planning but having a v-ider range of 
backgrounds and cap badges within the headquarters often assisted the coordination 
with ground forces. To that end airborne headquarters benefited from the British staff 
system, as did the rest of the Army. The German Army system of a maintaining a 
specialist staff created a gap between 'those who thought and those who fought' while 
the British shared and moved around an individual's experience. 149 Take Crookenden 
as an example. He was a pre-war, regular infantry officer with eight years experience 
before he attended Staff College. He then took that experience to HQ 6 Air-Landing 
Brigade during the planning, training and execution of the invasion of Normandy. After 
Normandy he was promoted and moved to command 9 Battalion, The Parachute 
Regiment where he would have been able to draw from his knowledge of how a brigade 
HQ thought, planned and operated. 
5.5 Individual Commanders and their Staff as a Factor in Development 
Britain's new airborne capability required innovative methods of command and control 
in two distinct key areas. At the higher level a joint approach to command, staff and 
headquarters was needed to ensure that effective coordination between the necessary 
land and air forces was evident in order to ensure efficient planning and close control of 
operations. Ideally a single commander should have the necessary land and air forces 
under his direct and sole control. This was not achieved until August 1944 ýN ith the 




. 1. Keegan, 
The Alask of Command, (London: Penguin. 1988), p. '136. 
221 
establishment of Brereton's HQ First Allied Airborne Arm,,. It \ýas not mature enough 
to effectively influence the plan for MARKET GARDEN as demonstrated b\ the lack 
of coordination during the selection of DZs and Us. However b\ March 1945 and 
Operation VARSITY it could plan, execute and control the highly efficient airborne 
element of the Rhine crossing all within fifteen days. '50 The burden of the detailed 
coordination required to achieve this was carried by of the airborne staff. It may appear 
that the airborne staff had a less stressful existence than their counterparts in armoured 
and infantry formation headquarters thanks to the low incidence of airborne operations 
throughout the war. However the number of cancelled operations also has to be taken 
into account. Around fifteen operations in France and Holland were planned and 
cancelled between June and September 1944. Thirty-two airborne operations ýNcrc 
initiated and cancelled by Alexander's headquarters in Italy between March and Ma" 
1944. At least five projected airborne operations in Germany were cancelled betvveen 
March and May 1945. Despite not being launched the planning t'Or each of these 
operations required no less staff effort and seeing that effort continually failing to reach 
fruition must have had an adverse affect on morale. This unglamorous burden was 
borne stoically by officers who in peacetime might have been successful barristers, 
solicitors and schoolmasters. 151 
Before the creation of First Allied Airborne Army the required coordination with the 
air force had to be conducted by land commanders at the operational level in order to be 
effective. However most of these commanders had little practical experience of 
airborne operations and had to rely on advisors and be prepared to study the problems 
and characteristics inherent in airborne warfare. Where an operational level commander 
failed to apply any conceptual thought to the employment of airborne forces their use 
became more difficult and less probable, Alexander in Italy being the obvious example. 
Montgomery and Eisenhower did both apply time and effort to understanding the nature 
of airborne warfare and while they were not entirely coincident on the subject the 
principles they produced were valid and enduring. These principles were important to 
the development of Britain's airborne forces at the operational level. Where they ýk ere 
ignored the odds of tactical success were reduced, as at Arnhem but more significantlý 
150 Otwa,,. Airborne Forces. pp. 262 & 297. 
'5' Sixsmith. Brifish Generalship. p-296- 
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those principles had the potential to influence the wider airborne concept of 
employment, as will be examined in the following chapter. As Liddell Hart observed. 
successful training, organisation and planning for operations demanded, aboN e all, 
intellect based upon knowledge. 152 However. at the most senior levels it is difficult to 
justify criticism of commanders for displaying inadequate personal knowledge of the 
employment of airborne forces. This was a novel concept and most senior officers 
during the period between Dunkirk and D Day would have had more pressing, matters to 
attend to than the study of an arm which they might or might not at some point in the 
future have under their command for a brief period. When it became clear to a 
commander that he would have control of airborne forces for a particular operation then 
there is clear evidence that time and thought was applied, as was the case with 
Dempsey, Crocker and O'Connor during the build up to D Day. 
The second characteristic of airborne warfare that required an innovative approach to 
command was apparent at the tactical level. The maroon beret and the parachute badge 
were physical representations of the 'imperative of example'. a signal that the tactical 
airborne commander had endured the same risks and hardships as his 111en during 
training. However training soldiers to react according to their own initiative could 
make command by traditional methods difficult. A looser framework of command was 
required, an ethos already adopted by the Germans as Auftragstaktik and recognised 
currently within the British Army as 'mission command'. Although the limited 
published airborne doctrine did to some extent recognise the unique tactical 
circumstances that an airborne force might have to fight under it did not go so far as 
suggesting any distinctive style of command required to cope with them. 
Notwithstanding the lack of any formal direction there is certainly ample evidence of a 
style of leadership close to what would now be termed 'mission command' being 
adopted by airborne commanders while the majority of the British Army 'retained its 
153 
commitment to autocratic, top-down managerial control' . That evolution of 
command must therefore have been driven from the bottom up as a reaction to the 
environment that airborne commanders found themselves in when engaged in airborne 
warfare rather than through adherence to any official doctrine. This perhaps explains 
152 13.11. Liddell Hart. Thoughis on War (London: Faber & Faber. 1944). p. 226. 
15 3 French. Raising Churchill's Army, p. 283. 
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why this looser style of command, while often in evidence at the lowest tactical levels. 
occasionally appeared not to extend the higher tactical level around divisional and corps 
command. This though is unsurprising as it would be decades before the British Arm-N 
formally recognised the tenets of mission command. However. Gale felt that the failure 
of the British to adopt a style of command more akin to the Germans during the Second 
World War was at least partly to blame for many of the tactical setbacks experienced hý 
the British Second Army in Normandy. 154 
The 'imperative of example' was a double-edged weapon. Officers made up less than 
six per cent of an airborne division's manpower. 155 This figure is approximatel,, equal 
to that found across the infantry during the Second World War. However in 6 Airborne 
Division in Normandy officers made up over nine percent of the men killed in action 
and eleven percent during the Rhine Crossing. I Airborne Division officers contributed 
sixteen percent of those killed during the battle at Arnhem. 156 These figures arc not 
necessarily unique to airborne formations (Brigadier Lord Lovat's I Special Service 
Brigade lost fifty-three per cent of its officers during eighty-three days of fighting in 
Normandy) but the rate of loss was greater than for most other ground formations. 157 
These casualty rates were practically unsustainable. Only one in three brigade 
commanders and one in nine battalion commanders re-crossed the Rhine with I 
Airborne Division during the initial evacuation from Arnhem. It was this scale of loss 
within such a short time frame coupled with the rapid expansion of the airborne 
establishment that necessitated non-airbome officers being posted into positions of 
formation command. There is no evidence that these commanders performed any better 
or worse in general than their 'thoroughbred' counterparts, although two in particular 
are open to criticism. 
The critical comments of Hopkinson and Urquhart made in this chapter are obviously 
the product of hindsight. They are not a general reproach of either of the officers' 
abilities but represent a focussed assessment of their actions at specific points in time. 
These observations have to be tempered by factors influencing the two men at the timc. 
Nevertheless, Hopkinson's blinkered insistence on committing his Division to the 
154 H ICMA. letter Gale to Liddell Hart, 16 April 1952. 
155 NA. WO 205/75 1, Formation of 6 Airborne Division, 6 August 1943). 
15" Figures extracted from Otway,. 4irborne FOrCes. pp. 191.283 & 319. 
157 11( 
' Firing Line, p349. 
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invasion of Sicily and Urquhart's failure to drive I Parachute Brigade forward on the 
first evening of Operation MARKET GARDEN were significant incidents. The-y both 
directly influenced the development tactical doctfine as applied to subsequent 
operations, hence the scrutiny is justified. 
The same criteria apply to the cfiticism of Browning. Clearly his decision to deplov 
HQ I British Airborne Corps to Nijmegen was poorly judged at best. Hisdeployment 
prevented a battalion from flying to Arnhem complete and more significantly deprived 
the operation of an informed controller in a position to influence the battle. His lack of 
conceptual insight could have had a detrimental effect on airborne development if there 
had not been an officer of Gale's calibre in a position to pick up the reins. His 
insistence on discipline could be viewed as contrary to the tenets of 'mission command' 
but it paid dividends during the I Airborne Division's withdrawal from Arnhem and 6 
Airborne Division's protracted defensive battle in the Orne bridgehead. He immersed 
himself in detail that might have overwhelmed others but he forced progress and 
produced results. Browning's performance can be assessed far more favourably if he is 
measured as a senior staff officer and administrator rather than as a commander with 
airborne forces. After all his positions as the first GOC I Airborne Division, Major 
General Airborne Forces and Commander I British Airborne Corps were essentially 
created to improve coordination and development, not to lead troops into battle. Above 
al I maybe Browning set himself up as a figurehead for Britain's developing airborne 
forces. To the men below him he became 'the distillation' of the airborne establishment 
and inspired such loyalty that many sprang to his defence following his unflattering 
portrayal in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' twelve years after his death. 158 
158 ABI'M, File 212, letter from Hackett published in The Times, 25 June 1977 and unpublished lettcr 
Tavlor toThe Times, 7 July 1977. 
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CHAPTER 6- CONCEPT AND DOCTRINE 
6.1 Conceptual and Doctrinal Innovation 
The physical and moral components of fighting power are underpinned b) a third. 
conceptual component concerning principles and understanding, the concept and 
doctrine of a fighting force. This aspect of war fighting is vital as it provides the 
common understanding within which different units, formations, arms. services and 
even nations can conduct operations with a degree of coherence and mutual 
appreciation. When an innovative military capability or technology was introdliced, as 
many were during the war, it took time for this mutual understanding to develop. An 
appreciation of the potential and limitations of the capability could diverge betwccii 
different areas of the military establishment based on their prejudices and wider 
interests. 
The terms 'concept and doctrine' do not necessarily translate directly into the 
language understood by the military establishment during the Second World War. A 
concept is a description of the way in which a military capability will be employed 
within a given environment. It describes the function or purpose of that capability in a 
manner that allows its development to be framed and parameters set for the procurement 
of equipment and training of personnel. It is a high level document that then has to be 
'translated into a doctrine that will provide sufficient guidance for the force to use in its 
war preparation without being so specific that it binds too tightly the hands of the future 
commanders who will have to use it. " A concept informs developers while doctrine 
guides practitioners. A concept prescribes where and when a capability will fight while 
doctrine advises how it should fight. The two together therefore are the catalyst through 
which physical resources under command are translated into military effectiveness. 
Although the terminology might have been unfamiliar during the first half of the 
twentieth century the idea of framing a concept ahead of drafting doctrine was 
commonplace. Some conceptual debates have attracted a good deal of scrutiny, such as 
the purpose and function of the tank within mechanised and armoured warfare from 
III. R \Vinton. 'On Militarý Change' in H. R. Winton and D. R. Mets. eds.. The Challenge (ff Cliange. 
Atiliftwi, 1rutifulions andNew Realities, 1918-1941 (London: Univcrsity of Nebraska Prcss. 2000) p. xii. 
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1917 through to 1943 .2 To produce an innovative concept requires intellectual as NN ell 
as professional vision. Individuals with vision and the position, aspiration and abillt\ to 
communicate that vision and drive the organisational change required to implement it 
are a rare commod ity. 3 Churchill was such an individual but his initial minute in June 
1940 failed to express his vision. It fell far short of articulating an adequate concept of 
the purpose that he expected his proposed airborne force to operate within. As 
development progressed Churchill was never able to dedicate sufficient intellectual 
space to drafting any sort of concept to explicate his original vision. 
Without the Prime Minister's contribution it was the task of the officers of the War 
Office, the Air Ministry and the central staff to develop the airborne concept. Recent 
studies have concluded that the British Army was far more open to innovation than it 
has previously been given credit for. 4 However, this was most apparent at the micro or 
tactical level. Within the higher echelons of the establishment the Army and, to a lesser 
extent, the RAF remained inherently conservative and strictly hierarchical, inducing a 
lack of imagination, excessive caution, professional pessimism and conventional 
thinking. 5 Stephen Rosen concluded, 'Those being ordered to innovate may well not 
have control over everything needed to carry out the order, particularly if what is 
needed is unconventional creativity. 6 Yet with the collective military intellect focussed 
on the immediate threat to national survival during the early part of the war 
gunconventional creativity' was not necessarily a luxury that the over burdened staff 
could afford. 
The purpose and function of the new airborne force had of necessity to be centrally 
dictated to ensure that the concept integrated with and contributed to overarching war 
plans. Doctrine however required a degree of critical examination. It was designed to 
2, Me various debates surrounding the concept of mechanised warfare and the purpose of' the tank are 
described in S. P. Rosen, Winning the Next War (New York: Comell Universit,, l1ress, 199 1), pp. 109-129, 
1 I. R Winton, 'Tanks, Votes and Budgets' in Winton and Mets, eds.. The Challenge Of Change, pp. 74-107 
and W. Murray, 'Armoured Warfare' in W. Murray and A. R. Millett, eds., Mililaiý, Innovation In 7he 
Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 649. 
3 J. P. I larris, 'Obstacles to Innovation and Readiness' in Murray and I lart Sinnreich, eds.. Ihe Pam Is 
Prologue, p. 214. 
4 See for example D. F. Showalter, 'Military Innovation and the Whig llcrspecti,, c of I listor, ' in 'A inton 
and Mets, cds., The Challenge Of Change, p. 225 and J. P. Harris 'Obstacles to Inno,. ation and Readiness' 
in W. MurraN and R. Hart Sinnreich, eds., The Past. 4s Prologue, p. 215. 
R. A. Mason, 'Innovation and the Military Mind%. fir UnIversih, Review, Vol XXX'ý'll, No. 2. JanuarN - 
Februar,, 1986, p. 39. 
() Rosen, Winning the Ne-VI War, p. 11. 
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guide the preparation and actions of practitioners but it relied on the intellectual honestý 
of those practitioners to provide reaction and comment on the utilit'.. of doctrine based 
on the experience of exercises and operations. Nevertheless, at some point the debate 
has to halt and an enduring core to tactical doctrine has to be identified NN hich is retained 
despite adaptations and amendments following lessons gathered from its application. 
6.2 Developing the Airborne Concept 
Limited thought had been applied to the potential of airborne warfare in and around 
the British military establishment before the Second World War. In an eark example of 
(unconventional creativity' applied to the subject Li eutenant-Co lone I Groves of the 
Royal Flying Corps foresaw in 1917 an end to the 'battering ram tactics' of trench 
warfare. He believed that 'a new and tremendous phase in air warfare is about to begin 
- the phase of the Long Arm'! Groves described his 'Long Arm' concept in detail. - 
how a force of 15,000 men might be landed from the air in the cnemy's rear area 
simultaneous to an attack on his front line. This force would then destroy enemy 
batteries and disrupt his reinforcements and supplies. Groves also explained how an 
airborne force might be used to strategic effect by landing a force well behind the 
enemy front, close to industrial areas in order to disrupt factories and manufacturing. 
Fear of such action would cause an enemy to deploy troops to guard such installations 
thus entailing attrition of his reserves and therefore of his front line. 8 
Nearly two decades later official British military observers attended Soviet 
demonstrations of its parachute troops. 9 The War Office attempted to assess the 
potential of this new capability during a brief flurry of staff activity that followed the 
Soviet airborne exercises in 1935. Just over a year after the Red Army demonstration 
near Kiev, the initial British attempt to express a theoretical concept of employment for 
airborne forces was not encouraging. The General Staff identified three different types 
of operations, which might conceivably be carried out by a force landing from the air: 
1 WM, 69/34/ 1,1) RC Gro,, es to Major General Salmond CMG DSO, 17 November 1917, p. 2. 
8 PA M, 09/34,1. p. 3. 
9 For a description ol",, o\ let airbomc dc\ clopmcnt bL-I()rc the \Nar see Buckinghwn. Paras. pp. 38-43 and 
Glantz, A llisloi: v of Sovicl. Irmed FOrces, pp. 1 -46. 
228 
(a) The landing of a comparatively large force ýN ith the 
intention of maintaining it by air. 
(b) The landing of a force, whether it is large or small. without any 
intention of maintaining it by air, but in the expectation that the 
development of operations on land will shortly permit its 
maintenance by land. 
(c) The landing of a small force in the nature of a 'forlorn hope', 
which will do as much damage as possible and subsequently 
surrender. ' 0 
Whilst the use of term 'forlorn hope' is seldom reassuring, this list does not describe the 
function of a future airborne force. It more closely resembles an early attempt to write a 
doctrinal statement, a foundation for the practical application of an airborne force. I'lle 
function of that airborne force in the wider sense remains unclear. Less than eighteen 
months later the General Staff did produce a more clearly defined conceptual statement. 
It concisely identified the activity to be accomplished by an airborne force. 
(a) The seizure of important points in rear of the enemy lines, 
in conjunction with an advance or attack of land forces. (b) 
Surprise action in the pursuit... The [airborne] group may be 
expected to hold its ground until relieved by the advancing forces. 
(c) Attacks on enemy headquarters, centres of communications, e. g. 
railway junctions or important bridges, L. of C. [lines of 
communication] installations, aerodromes etc. ' 
This marked an improvement; however, those ideas had been formulated for exercise 
purposes only and amounted to a projection of how British airborne forces, which had 
not as yet been conceived, might in theory operate. 
While the War Office was first attempting to grapple with the concept, Liddell Hart 
also contributed to the subject. In 1936 he wrote of the physical and psychological 
strain resulting from having to defend rear areas and vital points from an airborne 
assault. 12 A year later he included in a list of important technological military 
10 NA, WO 32/4371. M01 to DDMO, 15 December 1936. 
II NA, Wo 32/4371, Parachute Group: Employment, Training and Organisation, 19 April 1938. 
12 Liddell Hart advised both Alfired Duff Cooper and Leslie Hore-Belisha as successiNc Ministcrs of War 
through N-17. I I. R. Winton, "I'anks, Votes and Budgets' in H. R. Winton and D. R. Mets. The Challenge 
(? I'Change: Military Institutions and Nciv Realities, 1918-1941 (London: Unixcrsitý ot'Nebraska Prcss. 
2000), pp. 94-96. 
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advances, 'The development of parachute forces which may be dropped ahead of an 
advancing army to secure key points, or may be dropped in the enem-Cs rear to seize 
points on his communications. ' 13 Liddell Hart %%ould contribute to the debate again but 
in 1937 his thoughts, like those of the War Office. were academic. British airhome 
forces would not be conceived for another three years and in the meantime there %\ ere 
more pressing and basic military requirements to be deten-nined. Hence in 1940. 
immediately following Churchill's initial minute, a mature concept of the function of 
British airborne forces, if an aspiration at all, was still distant. 
In September 1940 the JPS began to study possible future offensive operations. The), 
developed five scenarios (four of which had been suggested by Churchill) all of %\hich 
involved seizing and developing a bridgehead on an enemy held coast. The five 
operations outlined were the invasion of Norway, the Low Countries, France, the 
Iberian Peninsula and metropolitan Italy, the latter of which was considered the 
priority. 14 By 26 September 1940 the JPS had produced the first draft of their paper 
'Future Plans: Basic Requirements', the remit of which was to detail 'recommendations 
regarding certain basic requirements which are likely to be common to all operations 
[involving seizing a bridgehead]. ' The JPS suggested that the early capture of' 
aerodromes on a hostile shore was essential, both in order to deny their use to the enemy 
and in order to maintain them for allied use. The planners declared that the capture of' 
enemy aerodromes was a suitable task for airborne troops. 15 Aerodrome capture groups 
thus became listed as an integral part of any future invasion corps. 
The JPS certainly held both the position and the authority required to devisc a concept 
and therefore influence the manner in which Britain's fledgling airborne forces should 
be utilised. However, 'Future Plans: Basic Requirements' detailed the capabilities 
required to achieve a large-scale invasion of mainland Europe across all arms and 
services. Airborne forces were not accorded any special priority by the Joint Planning 
Committee (JPC). Additionally there is no evidence to suggest that anyone in the JPS 
in 1940 had the intellectual vision or 'unconventional creativity" to foresee the full 
future potential of the airborne capability. The JPS had to adopt a more pragmatic 
methodology and to rely on experience to guide their concept for airborne forces. In 
13 1,1 1, Iddell: 1211937/1, Some Important'l'cchnological Militarý Dc% elopments. 16 April 1937. 
14 NA, CA13 84'19/-19.. II'S to Churchill. Future Operational Planning. 2()-, cptember 1940. 
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September 1940 the only experience available on which to base their plans ý% as that of 
Germany. On 9 April 1940 German airborne forces seized airfields at Aalborg in 
Denmark and at Stavanger and Oslo-Fornebu in Norway. On 9 May 1940 the War 
Cabinet sought assurance from the Dutch government that their airfields had been 
prepared for demolition in order to prevent them from being captured intact. Ho%% ever 
the next day German airborne troops seized aerodromes at Waalhovcn and Kam ijk in 
The Netherlands. 16 German airborne forces were part of the Luftwaffi, rather than the 
army and therefore these airfield assaults represented discrete 'air operations for an air 
purpose. ' 17 Control and integration were relatively simple due to the single chain of 
command for the air and ground elements of the operation. As the Germans discovered, 
using airborne troops to support land operations such as those that seized the crossings 
over the Albert Canal presented a more complicated set of doctrinal challenges in order 
to achieve the necessary integration and coordination. To the JPS airborne forces 
represented an expedient solution to the problem of aerodrome capture, providing them 
with a discrete capability that would neatly accomplish one of the objectives that must 
be achieved as part of a successful invasion. 
The degree to which the British military establishment relied on German experience to 
frame its own concept of purpose for British airborne forces can be clearly traced in 
early doctrinal publications. Military Training Pamphlet N6.50, Airborne Troops, Parl 
18 I- Dqfence Against Airborne Troops was published in 194 1. The sixteen-page 
document detailed the characteristics, organisation, tactics and equipment of German 
airborne troops. It also outlined the counter measures required to defend against an 
airborne operation. 9 A comprehensive section dealt with the defence of airrields 
against airborne attack, which the pamphlet regarded as likely employment for German 
paratroops. The types of operation on which it was considered German airborne forces 
might be employed were broken down into major and minor roles. The definition of 
these roles was a word for word copy of those listed for British airborne forces in ArmY 
NA. CA13 84/19/112. 'Future Plans: Basic Requirements', 26 Scptember 1940. 
NA, CA13 65/7/8, Conclusions of Mecting ol'the War Cabinct. 9 klaý 1940. 
17 NA. AIR 2/7470,, Actions Required for Providing Airborne Forces. 5 August 1941. 
18 
-. 
Alililai-v Training Ilamphlel No. 50,4 irborne Troops, A ugust 1941 (NA. %k 023 1/ 126) 
1'4 ibid. pp. I 
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Training Inviruction N6.5, Employment ofParachute Troops also published in 194 1. 
The implication was that British doctrine would be an exact reflection of German 
doctrine. This was a tenuous assumption considering the dearth of information on 
which it was based. The British military establishment had little firm eý idence of the 
doctrine and tactics used by German airborne troops in the Low Countries and Norway 
in 1940. The British Army did not face German paratroops and air-landino troops until 
the invasion of Crete in May 1941. A comprehensive report was produced on German 
airborne military effectiveness and doctrine displayed on Crete but it was published too 
late the influence the writing of either MTP No. 50 or ATI No. 5. 
On 5 October 1940 the initial draft of 'Future Plans: Basic Requirements' was 
approved by Churchi 11.22 The paper became the accepted overarching concept for 
Britain's future offensive operational aspirations and airbome forces formed an integral 
part of that concept. By the time the full document was published two weeks later tile 
JPS considered that 'unless a proportion of air-borne troops are included in the proposed 
Invasion Corps, the difficulties of certain operations we are considering might be 
considerably increased. -)23 However, aerodrome capture was not universally accepted as 
a suitable or credible purpose for airborne troops. Even before the JPS had published 
their paper the concept had been questioned. Sceptics in the Air Ministry doubted 
whether the German experience could be repeated and considered that there was very 
little prospect of replicating the successful airborne operations conducted by the 
Germans in 1940, particularly if it was intended to capture an aerodrome as an essential 
precursor to further air operations. 24 The analysis behind this pessimism was logical 
and difficult to deny. The German airborne operations in 1940 represented 
technological surprise at the operational level. It was unlikely that the Germans would 
allow themselves to be surprised in a similar manner and their airfields on the continent 
20 
_, 
Irm. v Training Instruction No. 5, Employment of Parachute Troops, 1941, (I, IICMA Lli 
15/8/148). 
21 NA, AIR 23/6110,1 IQ RAF Middle East Intelligence Report, German Air-Bome Attack on Cretc. I 
November 1941. 
22 NA, CAB 84/20/44, Future Operational Planning, 5 October 1940. Wilmot states that Churchill 
initiated the planning process on the 5 October 1940 although clearly considerable -vNork had alreadN been 
completed prior to this date, C. Wilmot, The Struggle For Europe (London: Collins. 1952), p. 97. 
23 NA. CAB 84/20/212, 'Future Plans: Basic Requirements', 18 October 1940. 
24 NA, CAB 120/262. meeting held at the Air Ministry. 5 September 1940. 
232 
would probably be heavily defended as a consequence. 25 Not only ýý as future 
aerodrome capture considered to be an extremely high risk concept it Ný as also deemed 
by some to be unnecessary. The Air Ministry was beginning to recognise the potential 
use of gliders and concluded that being able to land heavy equipment almost anyNN here 
on the battlefield by this method reduced the necessity to seize airfields in the initial 
26 
stages of an invasion . 
Despite some doubts as to its validity, 'Future Plans: Basic Requirements' continued to 
contain the aerodrome capture concept when it was published and controversý persisted 
for at least another eighteen months. The General Staff were indecisive from the start. 
In January 1941 they appeared content that the most likely purpose for airborne troops 
27 lay in the capture of aerodromes. Only days later they had changed their mind: 'As' 
regards the purpose for which airborne forces are required, it is thought that they should 
not be primarily related to the capture of aerodromes but that the primary reason should 
be to enable the land forces to occupy enemy territory. ' 28 One member of the Army 
was in no doubt that the airborne concept was a far more complicated and potentially 
more significant capability than had been examined thus far. On 24 June 1940 Major 
J. F. Rock, a Royal Engineer, commissioned in 1925 and a graduate of Staff College, 
was commanded by the War Office to take control of the development and organisation 
of Britain's emerging airborne forces. It is difficult to ascertain why Rock was singled 
out for this job as nothing in his previous record suggests that he might be regarded as 
an expert or even particularly air minded . 
29 Despite a lack of experience Rock does 
appear to have had a degree of intellectual vision when it came to recognising the 
potential of the airborne capability, in particular gliders and airlanding troops. 
Rock was certain that aerodrome capture was only one of the many tasks for which an 
airborne force was suitable and probably the one that was least credible. During recent 
command conferences at Camberley senior officers had discussed how the Germans 
mioht employ airborne forces during an invasion. Aerodrome capture was not one of 
25 NA, CAB 120/262. Air Ministn, The Fmployment of Airborne Forces, 2 September 1940. 
2(' NA, AIR 32/2, meeting held at the Air Ministry, 5 September 1940. 
27 NA. WO 32/9778, DMO&P, 6 January 1941 and Air 2/7470, Airborric 1'r(x)ps - Policy I-or. 10 January 
1941. 
11 _8 NA. AIR 2/7470. Airborne Troops - Policy For, 14 Januar\ 194 1. 
21) 
"N BFN/1, Fi le I A/2, Summary of Set-\ ice ot Lt Col J. F. Rock. undated. 
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the tasks that they considered likely. 30 He suggested a broader concept of purpose 
including attacking defended positions from the rear in conjunction ýN ith a conventional 
frontal attack, isolating the enemy from reinforcement, seizing important bridges and 
defiles, flank attack, a feint to draw off enemy reserves and the disruption of 
communications. Before the end of the war, British airborne forces would conduct most 
of these types of operation. If Rock had a degree of vision he certainh, had the time to 
commit to developing the airborne concept; as the senior An-nv officer at the CLE it was 
his only remit. However, what Rock lacked was the position to influence development 
at the higher level. He could develop tactics but as ajunior major and then liCUteriant 
colonel, isolated at Ringway hundreds of miles from the War Office, he could do little 
to influence the overarching concept. The JPS did not involve Rock in the planning 
process and hence the work carried out by his Tactical Development Section at 
Ringway was not heeded as it 'had not been related to a specific operational object. ' 31 
On 8 October 1942 Rock died following a glider accident and the British airborne 
establishment lost one of its more prescient thinkers. 
Rock realised that using previous German experience on which to base their likely 
future intentions during an invasion of Britain was not credible. The Air Ministry had 
also come to the conclusion that aerodrome capture as a purpose for airborne forces had 
been based on the unsound extrapolation of enemy experience into allied future 
operations. Goddard believed that 'the demand for the creation of airborne forces has 
arisen from our experience of what the enemy has done with them.... Perhaps a too 
ready assumption follows that our requirements are similar. In the exercises which have 
3- 
taken place I doubt whether a sufficiently realistic British point of view has prevailed ., 
" 
The Air Staff went further, suggesting that the entire basis on which the requirement for 
aerodrome capture groups had been based was now invalid and that the Invasion Corps 
project was already out of date. 33 By the spring of 1941 the War Office and Air 
Ministry were agreed that they had learned false lessons from the use of German 
airborne troops in the Low Countries and that it was doubtful whether such ideal 
30 NAý WO 321/9778, Rock to War Office SD4,15 Januaný 1941. 
NA. AIR 32/2. niceting held at the Air Ministrý. 5 Scptember 1940 
32 N, /\.,, \IR 2/7470. DMCto WIGS. 5 Fcbruar-\ 1941. 
NA-AIR 2/7470, DMC to SD4.17 February 1941. 
234 
conditions would recur. 34 However, despite its being pointed out that enemý air 
strength and ground defences would make the capture of aerodromes by Ii ghtlN armed 
airborne troops a high-risk endeavour, the task persisted in published doctrine but was 
placed further down the list of priorities. The isolation of the enemy from his reserN c-S 
and the attack in the enemy rear in conjunction with a conventional frontal attack, as 
proposed by Rock, now appeared as more probable concepts of purpose. 
It was German action that would signal the end of aerodrome capture as a valid 
concept, just as it had created it in the first place. On 20 May 1941 the Germans 
attacked Crete initially using an almost exclusively airborne force. In the morning 
gliders and paratroops landed at Maleme and the airfield there was assaulted. Despite 
having a high degree of air superiority it took the German airborne units thirty-six hoLirs 
to capture the airfield and even then it was not fully secure. A British intelligocricc 
report outlined the German experience. 
On the whole from the German point of view the results obtained from 
the employment of parachutists in Crete must have been beloNN 
expectations. At Canea, Retimo and Heraklion, the parachutists did not 
achieve the rapid success expected and their losses were out of all 
proportion to any local advantage gained. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the capture of Maleme landing ground which was the 
turning point in the campaign, was effected largely by parachutists. Even 
here, however, the situation remained critical for two days and was only 
held by intensive air support given by an airforce which enjoyed, for the 
time being, complete air superiority. Without this, the attack would have 
35 failed 
. 
Had the defenders been more adeptly handled Maleme airfield might have been dcnied 
to the Germans. It was a costly victory with 4000 Germans killed or missing and 175 of 
the 530 transport aircraft employed destroyed or damaged beyond immediate repair. 36 
The lessons were clear; the Germans had attempted to repeat their experiences of 1940 
without fully realising that the operating environment had changed. It appeared that the 
34 NA. AIR 2/7470, Policy for the Provision ofAirborne Forces. 24 March 194 1. 
35 NA, AIR 23/6110,14Q RAF Middle Fast Intelligence Report, German Air-Bome /Wack on Crete. I 
Noxember 1941. 
"' OtN%ýiN. . -firborne 
Forces, pp. 11-12. For a full account of' the German invasion of Crete see C. 
N Iýicl)onald, The I. osl Battle: Crete 1941. (London: Pan, 2002) and A. Beevor, Crete: 1he Balile and Me 
Resisl(inct, (London: Penguin. 199 1). 
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Germans were no longer sure about the correct method of use of their airbome forccý' 
and made several fundamental errors. It was foolhardy to drop paratroops onto heaN il., 
defended airfields. They suffered heavy losses and would have been far more effectiNe 
had they been dropped on the island out of range of defending fire. 37 Gale N, ýas certain 
that the risk involved in capturing an airfield, even with air superiority and in the facc of 
incoherent defence, was now close to unacceptable. 
The almost complete lack of fighter defence or adequate anti- 
aircraft artillery gave to this operation [Crete] a sense of 
unreality.... In Crete reinforcements [sic] of the defence was 
impracticable, whereas in northwest Europe the German counter- 
attack could be both massive and rapid and airborne assault troops 
might in these circumstances be liquidated before relief could 38 
arrive . 
Following Crete, aerodrome capture began to fade as a valid purpose for British 
airborne forces. Lord Cherwell, Churchill's chief scientific advisor, believed that if 
aerodrome capture persisted as a task it would require the development of new weapons 
39 to ensure success and even then it might fail in the face of a determined counter attack . 
Where aerodrome capture did continue to appear as a concept it was in a modified form 
40 
as in Airborne Operations Pamphlet No. I- General published in 1943 . In late 1942 
it was considered a realistic task for airborne forces to assist in achieving air superiority 
by denying to the enemy the use of forward fighter aerodromes. 41 Landing on an 
airfield and denying it, through cratering for example, is a far simpler operation than 
seizing it intact and then defending it with light weapons. 
In retrospect it is initially difficult to understand, except for the sake of expediency, 
why the JPS considered aerodrome capture not only as a credible purpose but as the 
only conceptual purpose for airborne forces during an invasion. The concept, based on 
operations in an environment that was unlikely to recur, was clearly flawed. HoýNcver. 
officially at least, it was the only concept considered for many months and was still 
retained, although as a lower priority, after the Germans had demonstrated the high risks 
,7A. E. Sitck, and V. Blunt, The Flying Soldier: The Air Requirements Of Airborne Forces (London: 
Alliancc Press, 1944). pp. I ')- 14. 
GaIc. Call To A rms, p. 13 3. 
NA, CAB 120/262. Chemcil to Churchill, 29 April 1942. 
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involved. The adoption of and perseverance with a concept and purpose based on false 
lessons from previous operations is indicative of the lack of clear and coherent 
conceptual thought concerning British airborne forces in the War Office during the earIN 
part of the war. 
Aerodrome capture is not the only example of poor conceptual expression associated 
with Britain's airborne forces. The new airborne capability was clearlY -, -, oln(--, 
to haNe 
most utility in the offensive role. However there were two distinct areas of'offenske 
planning being undertaken in the early part of the war. First there Xý ere operations 
designed to strike the enemy in his rear areas, destroy strategically important targets. 
harass and cause the enemy to re-deploy reserves to cover the threat. These type of 
operations were likely to be transient in nature but could be mounted early in the war 
42 effort and might be termed 'deep' operations in today's parlance . The second class of 
operation was a major offensive involving the mass invasion of mainland Europe and 
the 'close' engagement of the enemy on his front line. These operations would 
probably be enduring but could not hope to executed until the requisite trained 
manpower and equipment had been amassed. There was no explicit distinction made 
between the two types of operation except in terms of where command and control was 
invested for planning and execution. 
Airborne forces obviously had utility in both 'deep' and 'close' operations. Groves in 
1917 and the War Office in 1936 and 1937 both including references to types of 'deep' 
and 'close' operation that could be conducted by an airborne force. However, 
influencing the 'close' or tactical battle by isolating an enemy from his reserves or 
attacking him in the rear is clearly a different type of operation to attaining 'deep' or 
strategic objectives by destroying, neutralising or isolating vital military, civil or 
political targets. If both were to be adopted as valid purposes for airborne forces then 
each would require its own doctrine in order to ensure that both could be executed 
effectively and efficiently. However the differences between the two ýý ere at best 
41 NA, AIR 20/2437, C16S, The Value of Airborne Forces, 10 October 1942. 
4 In this thesis the term 'deep' is used to describe operations against encniý 1orccs and installations not 
immediatel) engaged in the close battle. The targets maý not cýen be military such as the Tregino 
aqueduct in ltalý. This is a different concept of employment to the So\ let model of deep battle and the 
airborne arm's place NN ithin it. In the So\ ict concept deep airborne operations Involved paratroops 
landing in the immediate rear ofan enemy's front line in coordination with a frontal assault. R. Simpkin, 
Ocep BaIlle: The Braiwhild (. )/'. i farshal Tukhachevskii (Brasseys: London. 1987) pp. 42-43 ). 
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poorly expressed and at worst not even recognised until the latter part of the Second 
World War. That lack of distinction was in turn responsible for imprecise doctrinc. 
which manifested itself frequently throughout the war. 
Early attempts to express on paper future objectives that might be achieved bý 
airborne forces in both 'deep' and 'close' operations ranged from the confused and 
misguided to suggestions bordering on the ridiculous, as this list from October 1940 
demonstrated. 
(i) The immobilizing of large numbers of enemy troops in dispositions 
unfavourable to their strategy. 
(ii) The spearhead for offensive action within a range of say -500 miles of 
a suitable air base. 
(iii) As a self contained force, capable of being sustained by airborne 
supplies, for small localised actions. 
(iv) For the 'planting' of agents, saboteurs and other irregular troops in 
enemy territory. 
(v) For air transport by towed gliders of personnel, rations and 
equipment thus greatly augmenting the scope of usefulness of operational 
bomber aircraft. 
(vi) The bringing into the War effort to a greater extent the 
woodworking trade (furniture etc) which could undertake the building of 43 
gliders . 
Although a product of the CLE, this is not the work of Rock. The first statement above 
was a sound expression of the effect on the enemy resulting from the threat of airborne 
forces operating in the deep concept. The second statement, though valid in itself, did 
not progress the close concept, as it did not include an objective or purpose for the 
44 
spearhead' . Statement three once again contained no objective or purpose and could 
have been taken to mean either deep or close employment, although the former ýN as 
more likely to have been the intention because of reference to the action being small and 
4 3, NA, AIR 32/2, CI. F. Brief Appreciation of the Frivisaged Functions of' Airborne I-orccs: Thcor-,. 31 
October 1940. 
44 Churchill liked the phrase 'spearhead' and had circled and underlined it throughout a preNious 
document, NA. CAB 120"-102. minutes of meeting held at the Air Ministr-ý. 5 September 1940. 
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localised. The fourth statement was, in effect one means of achieving the objectiN e 
expressed in the first. It confused legitimate employment within the deep concept ýN Ith 
tasks that would come outside of the remit of airborne forces. This N% as probablý the 
result of the ambiguous language in Churchill*s original minute. It is difficult to give 
the fifth statement any credibility as part of an airborne concept, particulark as the Air 
Staff were adamant that airborne forces would reduce the operational effectiveness of 
the bomber force. This was an example of the misguided interpretations of the 
employment of gliders, which will be expanded later in this chapter. Finally, statement 
six bordered on the ridiculous. The warlike employment of the furniture industry might 
be a useful by-product of the development of airborne forces but it could not 
realistically have been considered one of the latter's functions. Reintroducing the 
Trojan Horse as a weapon of war would have had a similar effect. 
Bluffing the line between 'deep' and 'close' employment is explicable when the lack 
of experience., knowledge and vision concerned with the subject in 1940 is considered. 
However, in at least one example it was the result of a deliberate policy. The Air 
Ministry believed that there was no need to distinguish between airborne forces destined 
to act as a spearhead for an invading force, those required for tactical operations in 
conjunction with a land battle and those employed on sabotage and espionage 
operations. 45 This might have been true when considering the recruitment and 
individual training of airborne forces; however it was not a sound principle to apply 
when developing concepts, doctrine, equipment and collective training. 
If the conceptual ideas coming from official channels were confused then there were 
men on the periphery of the official military establishment who were producing 
innovative and coherent thinking. Just before the outbreak of war Liddell Hart believed 
that the greatest potential for airborne employment would be in Asia and Africa where 
physical communications were poor. In Western Europe he concluded that an airborne 
force would probably be quickly located and overwhelmed by motorised troops and 
tanks and therefore their use in that theatre was unlikely. 46 In 1941 however, following 
the German example, Liddell Hart contributed with a far more lucid and tangible vision 
of the airborne concept. 
'5 NA. DEFF 2/791. agenda for meeting held at the Air MinistrN, II December 1940. 
46 Liddell I lart. Thoughts on Weir, p. 247. 
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If the primary aim of the invading force is to secure some keý citý or 
port, it would be essential for the invaders to gain control of the main 
roads leading in that direction before the strategic defiles on the ý%aý - 
the river crossings or mountain passes - can be occupied b% the 
defenders reserves. 
There are risks to air-borne detachments being landed so far 
forward. But they are outweighed by the risks which the N% hole 
invading force, and its mission, would run, if the defender were 
allowed time to occupy these barrier-points in any considerable force. 
On this calculation, the invading commander may well decide to 
use the bulk of his parachute forces for an 'attack in depth', and a 
lesser part for attacking the rear of the beach defences. 
On this calculation, the invader may conclude that the key to success 
for him lies in jumping into the interval (between coastal defences and 
mobile reserves), with his parachute troops, and blocking the move-up 
of counter-attack divisions, before they can get properly underway. 47 
This was a perceptive conclusion from Liddell Hart. The importance of judging and 
then controlling 'the interval' in terms of both geography and thric became apparent in 
Sicily, in Normandy and during the Rhine Crossing. However, by the time this was 
written he had lost the sponsorship of the Secretary of State for War and his ideas and 
comments on the subject were too brief and infrequent to influence those responsible for 
airborne development. Although the isolation of reserves did appear as published 
doctrine in 1941 the intended objective of the root concept, as described by Liddell Hart 
above, did not. 
Another protagonist in the debate was Leo Amery. He accurately drew the boundary 
between the 'close' and the 'deep' concepts in late 1941 while trying to gain support for 
Indian airborne forces. He attempted to explain the differences in employment in 
North-West Europe as compared to the Indian sub-continent. 
The Germans used them [airborne forces] at Rotterdam and in Crete, for 
tactical purposes, i. e. for intervening in the actual battle... I should have 
thought that, on the other hand, the greatest value of airborne troops, at 
any rate in an area like the Middle East, lay in their strategical [sic] use, 
i. e. in being able to send off appreciable forces to seize distant positions 
in advance of our own movements, or behind the enemy's rear, N% here no 
serious opposition to landing need be expected... After all, it N, ýas this 
47 H ICMA. Liddell: 12/1941/5. Possibilities and Problems ofInvasion. 19 November 1941. 
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strategical [sic] use of airborne troops, on a very small scale indeed. 
reinforcing Habbaniya, landing behind the Iraqis at Falluja, and sendin, (;, 18 off a detachment to Mosul,, that proved so useful in the Iraqi campai_, -, n. 
This was a remarkably prescient observation. Amery saw the utility of airborne forces 
in India in 'deep' employment: being dropped on key vulnerable points In order to cam., 
out internal security operations and therefore achieve strategic effect i. e. the enduring 
stability of colonial rule. In fact by the time Indian airborne forces were read\ to be 
committed they were only employed in the 'close' concept for 'tactical purposes' at 
Rangoon during Operation DRACULA in May 1945. 
In 1943 Otto Miksche, a Czechoslovak officer serving with the Free French Forces on 
the staff of General de Gaulle in London published Parairoops, the first attempt to 
outline the history, utility and future of the airborne capability and place it in the PUblic 
domain. By 1943 the 'deep' concept had essentially become the domain of special 
forces such as the SAS and SOE and Miksche did not consider 'deep' operations in his 
book, describing only 'The Tactical Employment of Airborne Troops. 49 Miksche split 
the 'close' concept of operations into two categories based on their effect on the enemy, 
direct and indirect, and offered several examples to illustrate this idea including a forced 
river crossing and an amphibious landing. 50 In both cases he cited the capture of key 
defiles in the enemy's immediate rear in order to prevent the movement of enemy 
reinforcements as indirect action. This was a reasonable concept and corresponded with 
Liddell Hart's 'interval'. However, as direct action he quoted the immediate seizure of 
an enemy held riverbank or beach. This might be reasonable if the operations were only 
lightly or unopposed but to attempt to capture a defended riverbank or beach would 
rank alongside aerodrome capture in terms of risk. 
Despite aberrations such as this, Miksche, along with Liddell Hart and Amery, all 
demonstrated some degree of intellectual vision when it came to the conceptual 
employment of airborne forces; however, the thoughts and ideas of these men ýýerc 
48 N A, CA B 120/262. Amen, to Churchi 11,6 October 194 1. 
49 Miksche. Paratroops, pp. 56-68. 
50 ibid, pp. 62 and 64. 
241 
never pooled and used to assist development by making up for the lack of 
-unconventional creativity' in the traditional military establishmenC' 
During the early work carried out in the War Office and Air MinistrN an implication 
began to emerge that the two different concepts of operation for airhorne force, -,. 'deep' 
and 'close', were inextricably linked to the size of the formation required to carry out 
the task. The implication was made explicit in 1941 when it was stated that alrbornc 
operations fell into two different categories. 
Mý! ior. 
(a) Seizure of an advanced tactical position, to be followed up 
by supporting forces. 
(b) A major raid , where the airborne forces v, iII be w ithdrawii 
after completion of the task by land, sea or air. 





(g) First flight of an amphibious operation. 52 
Once again the different concepts according to which airborne forces could be 
employed had been confused by an attempt to draw the boundaries according to the size 
of the operation or formation taking part. The first statement fell within the close 
concept whereas the raid, whether major or minor, as outlined in the second statement 
would have normally sat more comfortably in the second group of operations. As to the 
'First flight of an amphibious operation' being a minor operation, Sicily and Normandy 
51 In 1938 Liddell I lart was appointed by Churchill as adviser to the 'Focus' group, a small group ()i' 
emient men brought together to discuss the growing crisis in Furope. There is no c,. ldcnce that Liddell 
I lart contributed aný thoughts connected with airborne forces during that period. l, c%N in. Churchill (v; 
Wai-lord, p. 15. Miksche did in fact become a person of interest to the central militar-N establishment after 
the publication ofhis book but onlý because one of his illustrations (ibid, p. 64, illustration 10) sho%%ed a 
remarkable resemblance to the allied plans Ibr OVERLORD including the location. Dank. The Wider 
Gang, p. 10 1- 
52 NA. AIR 2/7470, Air MinistrN, Provision ofAirborneTroops, 14 February 194 1. 
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would demonstrate the error behind this classification. All of the preceding naiN, e 
attempts to express a concept for airborne forces were at least harmless \N hile they výcre 
constrained to papers that circulated between the Air Ministry and \Var Office. In fact 
the exchange of ideas, however ill conceived, must be considered healthy considering 
the lack of a single, visionary force behind the development of the airborne concept. 
However, the result was a confusion of immature principles that could potential 1ý be 
dangerous if they became published as doctrine and presented as policy to the \\ ider 
military community as they were in ATI No. 5 in 1941. 
Notwithstanding this, the confusion and debate surrounding the differentiation 
between the major and minor concepts of purpose were largely academic up until the 
end of 1942. The airborne concept during that period would be dictated bý resource 
limitations rather than through doctrinal debate. By the tinic Operation TORCH was 
launched in November 1942 Britain's combat effective airborne force was represented 
by a single deployable parachute brigade. The first thirty months of development had 
therefore produced a force of approximately 8,500 men with light weapons onlý, less 
than half of whom could have been considered militarily effective. Earlier during 
development the limitations were even greater. By June 1941 only eighteen officers and 
320 paratroopers were immediately available for operations. However the number that 
could be dropped on any given operation was considerably less at just fifty six, 
restricted by there only being seven Whitleys converted and available to drop airborne 
53 1 or anything troops. A force of less than sixty men could not be considered practica f 
other than a minor operation and in 1941 minor equated to deep operations or raids. 
The manpower and equipment situation improved only slowly and the employment of 
British airborne forces within the deep concept from 1940 to 1942 was therefore the 
result of resource constraints rather than a conscious conceptual or doctrinal decision. 
The only other option open to the airborne establishment was to withdraw from active 
operations during this period, concentrate on training, equipment procurement and 
tactical development and wait for an operational imperative to be created such as a full 
scale invasion of mainland Europe. Isolating and retaining a military force purely 
for 
research and development is difficult to justify while the rest of the establishment 
is 
53 NA, AIR 2/7470,1) 131ans to CAS. 24 June 1941. 
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simultaneously employed in prosecuting a major war. Reserving resources in terms of 
men and equipment purely for experimentation and innovation, even on a relatively 
small scale, is unlikely to be accepted, particularly by a nation on a total war footing. 
The non -contribution of the early airborne force to the war effort attracted adverse 
attention and parts of the military establishment were keen to recoup some of the 
valuable resources invested in the airborne experiment. particularly in terms of high 
quality personnel. As early as August 1940 Dill pointed out that the commandos and 
paratroops under training consisted of specially picked men and contained a high 
proportion of officer material. The Army was badly in need of such material and, if 
there was no immediate prospect of them being used for offensive operations he wanted 
to have high quality manpower returned from the Commandos to their Lin its . 
54 
Churchill denied Dill's request on this occasion but if further attempts to recoup 
valuable manpower and aircraft committed to airborne forces were to be countered tlicn 
there had to be a visible physical contribution to the war effort. Isolating, themselves 
during a protracted period of experimentation and development was not a viable option. 
Although small scale, deep raids became the default concept and I'Linction for Britain's 
airborne forces until the end of 1942 the control mechanism for planning and executing 
airborne raids during that period was not within the airborne establishment's remit. 
Following Dunkirk, regardless of the lack of resources, Churchill did not want Britain to 
settle into a defensive mindset. He charged the DCO and COC with turning 'the south 
coast of England from a bastion of defence into a springboard of attack ., 
55 However in 
1940 DCO was essentially a naval organisation with only amphibious manoeuvre as a 
means of delivering any necessarily small scale offensive or raid on to enemy territory. 
Thus COC's operations were restricted to the coast and therefore prone to predictability. 
The potential for British airborne forces to improve COC's limit of operations beyond 
the littoral environment was recognised by DCO: 'Unless arrangements for airborne 
raids are ensured, offensive activities against the enemy must necessarily be limited for 
a very long time to areas lying within a mile or two of his seaboard ., 
56 However, 
COHQ contained neither the inherent expertise nor the experience required to plan 
54 NA. CA13 120/262. Chiel-s of Staff Committee, 6 August 1940. 
55 11 ough. Mouniballen: Hero Of Our Time. p. 146. 
ý" N A. DE FI ` 21179 1. Flmploý ment of A irborneTroops. 4 September 1940. 
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airborne operations. It had to rely on advisors such as Browninu to inform its decisions 
and planning process. But Browning and other senior members of the airborne 
establishment were biased and eager to see their arm employed \ý henever practical in 
order to promote its capabilities, justify the resources invested and keep the War Oft-ice 
and Air Ministry at bay. After the success of Operation BITING. the Bruncý aI raid in 
February 1942 COC sought every opportunity to deploy airborne forces. During 1942 
airborne participation was planned but cancelled for at least five operations. the most 
potentially damaging of which was a considerable contribution to Operation JUBILFF. 
the raid on Dieppe. 57 Browning encouraged COC throughout this period. 
As a final request, I urge most strongly that Airborne Forces may be 
given far more opportunities of taking part in or initiating raids on the 
continent. A great deal of experience is required before airborne tactics 
and administration generally can be improved... There is no reason 
known to me why we could not carry out with our own aircraft, within 
three weeks from date of warning, operations using two companies of 
parachute or light airlanding troops ... Such operations would be 
extremely good for morale ... I would like to aim at one small operation 
per fortnight, with two or three larger scale ones later on during the 
58 winter. Given the organisation and staff asked for, this can be done . 
Not only were Browning's figures over optimistic, but his approach was potentially 
detrimental to development. First there would be a constant attrition of trained 
manpower and equipment that would slow progress and could, in the case of the raids 
failing, undermine confidence in the entire capability. This factor was understood and 
stressed by more perceptive members of the airborne establishment. For example Rock 
considered that 'both parachute troops themselves, the aircraft which carry them and the 
aircraft crews are too valuable to be used up on minor operations not directly connected 
with an offensive against Germany and Italy... British parachute troops should not be 
used for anything less important than say the capture of Channel ports, as a preliminary 
to an invasion of France or in a major offensive against the Italians in North Africa. 'ý" 
57 NA, DEFE 2/546. Operation 'Rutter' and 'Jubilcc' - Notes on Principal Changes in the MilitarN Plan, 
14 September 1942. 
58 NA. WO 
-12! 
9778, Browning to GHQ Home Forces, Future Organisation. Airborne Forccs. 6 August 
1942. 
5o NA. AIR 32/2. draft paper b,, Rock, Training and Organisation ot'Air-I-andingTroops, JuIN 1940. 
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The difference in opinion between Browning and Rock is indicatiýe of the dilemma 
that faced Britain's airborne establishment. On one hand there was a desire to take part 
in necessarily small-scale raiding operations in order in order to demonstrate the utilitý 
of airborne forces andjustify the resources invested in the programme. On the other 
was the longer term aspiration to conserve the physical capability and train men and 
procure equipment to enable the participation in large-scale operations as envisaged in 
'Future Plans: Basic Requirements. This dilemma persisted because there NNas no 
controlling authority in a position to resolve it. Without an established joint 
organisation or individual charged with coordinating airborne development there XNas no 
coherent concept of purpose during the period from 1940 to the end of 1942. Th is NN as 
not only the primary factor in the rate of development during this period but was also 
critical in dictating military effectiveness. 
The pernicious effect of the absence of joint direction and control, and therefore a 
coherent concept for employment, became apparent in the tactics employed by Britain's 
airborne force during its first contribution to a major operation. TORCH should have 
been a watershed - the point at which the airborne capability moved from being 
restricted to minor DCO operations to being a component of a full scale conventional 
battle. Instead I Parachute Brigade's contribution to the operation was charactcrised bý 
'fervent though amateurish efforts. ' 60 The three separate battalion-level British airborne 
operations conducted during TORCH were akin to three individual raids. The airborne 
battalions were dropped far ahead of British First Army's front line, up to three hundred 
and fifty miles in one case, beyond the point at which they could directly influence the 
close battle and were expected to be self sufficient once on the ground. They had no 
fire support, received no re-supply and evacuation of casualties was practically 
impossible. The experience available within the Headquarters of First British Army on 
which to base airborne planning was severely limited and had to be supplemented b" 
moving I Parachute Brigade's commander, Brigadier Edward Flavell, onto the staff. 
Therefore, in the absence of a robust controlling authority tactical doctrine was driven 
by the airborne troops and their commanders on the ground. The experience of those at 
the tactical level had been accumulated entirely from planning 
Frost. Vear4v There, p. 7 1. 
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and conducting deep raiding operations and hence the British airborne performancc in 
North Africa reflected that experience. Britain's airborne forces had adopted a doctrine 
of -quickly in and quickly out'. ' 61 The absence of both detailed intelligence and tlie 
means of expeditious extraction, and the presence of a mobile and heaN i Ix armed 
enemy, made 'quickly in and quickly out' al I but impossible. Frost's battalion lost t\N o, 
hundred and sixty men killed, wounded or missing during a single five day period of 
62 
operation S. 
6.3 The Development of Airborne Tactical Doctrine 
Strategic decision-making changed the military environment during the allied 
conference, SYMBOL, held at Casablanca in January 1943. The conference endorsed 
the Mediterranean offensive policy and designated Sicily as the next Allied ob_Iective. 
The principles and conditions required for a major opposed amphibious assault had 
been defined by the JPS in 'Future Plans: Basic Requirements' at the end of 1940. 
Although the scale of HUSKY would be greater than the corps level operation 
envisaged by the JPS, the fundamental requirements remained extant and these included 
the utility of an airborne contingent. Thus a large-scale operational imperative for 
Britain's airborne forces was created and the impetus for development was firmly 
established. With HUSKY being planned for the summer of 1943 progress became 
expeditious. Churchill's 'stand still' order was rescinded and barriers to development 
began to fall away. The requirement for a much larger airborne force was accepted and 
as I Airborne Division trained for HUSKY the War Office issued orders for the 
formation of 6 Airborne Division in April 1943. The reliance on the volunteer system 
of recruitment was no longer paramount as the Army recognised the need to man the 
airborne establishment quickly and earmarked infantry battalions for wholesale 
conversion. The rate of rise in trained airborne manpower became exponential. 
Although SYMBOL did not result in the creation of ajoint organisation specificallý to 
monitor and guide airborne development, the operational imperative did begin to align 
the War Office and Air Ministry's approach to development. From the beginning ot' 
61 Frost. .4 Drop Toollan. v. p. 
84. 
t-2 Om a\, . 
lirborne Forc-cs. p. 80. 
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1943 onwards the Air Staff no longer opposed airborne forces on an institutional ICN el. 
although individual officers did continue privately to doubt their utility. 63 The Air 
Ministry could no longer resist the operational imperative for airborne forces and 
acceded to the War Office's requirement for support aircraft. As 38 Wing RAF %% as 
expanded to 38 Group the provision of transport aircraft became a more imperative 
issue and monthly deliveries of the Dakota steadily increased until 46 Group RAF %%as 
established in January 1944 equipped solely with that aircraft. 
Despite this renewed impetus there were still barriers to overcome before HUSKY 
could be executed. Notwithstanding the Air Ministry's improved efforts the provision 
of suitable RAF aircraft to drop paratroopers and tow gliders from North Africa to 
Sicily could still not meet the requirements of the operation. As with TORCH Britain's 
airborne forces employed during HUSKY had to rely heavily on American aircraft. 
While the solution to this physical problem was relatively straight forward, there Nvas 
also a doctrinal issue that required the application of deeper consideration. HUSKY 
was the first operation during which appreciable air-landing forces were employed 
although the tactical doctrine for a large-scale glider assault was untested. The only 
previous use of gliders had been during operation FRESHMAN but the raid on the 
heavy water plant at Ryukan in Norway had been a disaster with the all the airborne 
personnel involved either dying in crashes en route or being captured and then executed 
by the occupying Germans. 64 Even if FRESHMAN had been successful TORCH had 
demonstrated that basing the tactical doctrine for large-scale operations on the 
experience from minor raids was disadvantageous. In addition to this lack of experience 
the tactical employment of gliders and air-landing troops had been the subject of 
enduring and often specious debate. 
The possibilities of gliding for military advantage had stirred official interest long 
before the War Office briefly examined the potential of parachute troops from 1935 to 
1937. As early as 1922 the Air Ministry was taking an interest in gliding at the highest 
level. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard as CAS personally directed more effort to 
be put into investigating the potentialities of the military use of gliders in August of that 
tO SIcssor maintained his scepticism towards airborne forces throughout the ý%ar and hcýond. publick 
questioning their effectiveness in 1948. Slessor, 'Some Reflections on Airborne Forccs'. pp. 161-166. 
`4 For a full account of'Operation FRFSHMAN see R. Wiggan, Operation Freshman (London: Kimber. 
1986). 
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year. 65 At the end of September 1922 Squadron Leader Maurice \k'ri(-, ht and Captain 
W. H. Sayers were despatched to Fulda in Germaný to observe glider trials. Clearly theý 
were not impressed by their observations and transmitted this opinion to their masters in 
the Air Ministry. Despite some of the gliders taking part achieving impressi%c fcats ot' 
endurance in the air, Wright concluded that there could be no direct milltarý or 
commercial value attached to gliding. 66 With growing public interest in the subJect. 
thanks to af1,000 prize being offered by the Daily Mail in a aliding competition, the 
Air Ministry felt compelled to make a statement. Published in the press, the official 
account of the Fulda trials concluded that prolonged flight by gliders over definite 
distances was not possible and this fact precluded them from becoming a dependablc 
method of transport. 67 A proposed glider committee was abandoned and Trenchard and 
68 the RAF lost interest in the subject . 
At the outbreak of the war there was no British military gliding activity whatsoc\ cr. 
This remained the case until mid- 1940 and the German invasion of the Low Countrics. 
Following this event the possibility that gliders might be used during an invasion of 
Britain began to be considered. A small experimental Special Duty Flight was 
established at Christchurch to ascertain the probability of gliders being detectcd bý 
radar. This small organisation became the basis of the initial glider training 
establishment following its move to Ringway. 69 However. basing tactical doctrine on 
the German model for glider operations was an even more tenuous proposition than it 
had been with paratroops. There were doubts about whether gliders had been used at all 
during the German operations in Belgium and The Netherlands. A month after the 
event the Air Ministry intelligence department had only unconfirmed and unreliable 
information that gliders had been used during the capture of the Belgian fort at Eben 
Emael. Stressing that this was only speculation, the Air Staff conceded that it had no 
knowledge whatsoever that any real military value was placed on the glider bN 
Germany. 70 Three months later the Air Ministry was more certain that gliders had been 
6S NA, AIR 5/278, Minute from CAS to Secretary of State for Air. 22 August 1922. 
66 NA, AIR 5/268, Report on the Development of Soaring Flight in German). 18 September 1922. 
67 NA, AIR 5/278, Minute from Director of Research to CAS. 6 Septcnityer 1922 and Fhe Birmingham 
Post, 18 September 1922. 
68 NA. AIR ý, /278, Minute from Air Member for Suppl) and Research to Under Secrctarý of State for %ir. 
22' December 19212. 
69 Re, -, [. each, 
letter to the author, 4 December 2006. 
70 NA, WO 199/438, Possible German t Ise ot'Gliders Against'rhis Countrýý. 19.1une 1940. 
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used during the capture of "a defended position in Beh-, ium'. but there ýN ere no further 
details of the methods or tactics used. 71 Even as late as August 1942 the roic of the 
glider during the Eben Emael operation was unclear. An American publication related 
that only paratroops had been used and the German demolition teams had arrived bv 
road after the initial coup de main. 72 
With no obvious source of 'unconventional creativity' and no clear German cxýimple 
to copy, the War Office and the Air Ministry struggled to express a coherent application 
for the glider as a military tool. They realised it must have a useful application. 
otherwise why would the Germans have used them, but they followed blind alleN s and 
fanciful postulations rather than first adopting the obvious and simplest solution. 
Suggestions were put forward that gliders could be used to drop vcrý, large bombs of 
two or three tons. 73 Using gliders as towed fuel tanks to enable air to air refuellino of 
long range bombers was also proposed . 
74 However, amongst the unlikeIN and 
unfeasible schemes the true value of the glider was eventually idcntit-icd. The carriýigc 
and delivery of light tanks and other heavy equipment was suggested as a possible 
suitable role for investigation. It followed that if gliders could carry heavy equipment 
then it was reasonable to suppose they could be used for landing troops. In September 
1940 the Air Staff brought some sense to the proceedings. 'We must walk before we 
can run. At the moment we have no experience in operating towed gliders... I would 
hesitate to put out requirements for gliders for these purposes [tank 1111, refuelling etc 
unti I we have obtained some experience with gliders for the transport of troops. 
75 
Although the more outlandish proposals for the application of gliders were quicklý 
dispensed with, the true capability of these aircraft took longer to determine. All 
aspects of the glider's technical potential were a mystery in mid- 1940 and some 
misapprehension remained into 1942. For example it was believed in June 1940 that a 
glider could not be towed off the ground without some form of assisted take-off and 
well into 1941 there were still discussions regarding the length of runwa,, required to 
71 NA, CAB 120/262. meeting held in the Air Ministry, 7 September 1940. 
72 P. W. Thompson, 'I low The Germans Took Fort I-'Ib---n Emael', Unifc(l Stales . Irm, v Itifawn, 
Journal. 
August 1942. pp. 24-26. 
71 NA. AIR 20/5256. meeting held in the Air Ministrý. 25 Julý 1940. 
74 N A. AIR 201 13 78, ACA S( F), 4 September 1940. 
75 NA, AIR 2013378. ACAS(T) to ACAS(R). 4 September 1940. 
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get airborne . 
76 In June 1940 it was believed that 'fairly good' weather ý%as required to 
77 
operate gliders with no cloud below 10,000 feet . As late as October 1942 it N% as st iII 
considered that the presence of cloud made the use of gliders impossible. 78 However 
the most potentially damaging assertions in June 1940 ý%ere that gliders could not be 
used in large numbers together and could not land at night . 
79 This vie%N maN have been 
an aberration as elsewhere in the Air Ministry the opposite analysis had been made. 8" 
Nevertheless the same points were being put forward for clarification twenty-eight 
81 
months later. 
Of course these questions could be effectively answered by running trials and a series 
were ordered to look at mass landings and landings in confined areas and at night at the 
82 
end of 1941. However, sometimes the true capability of the glider was discovered bý 
accident. The forced landing of a Horsa in April 1942 was written up as an example of 
just how effectively the aircraft could land in a confined area if necessary. 83 The 
problem with conducting a sufficient number of trials frequently enough to expedite the 
fact-finding process was the availability of aircraft, particularly the gliders themselves. 
The Horsa and Hotspur were not available for trials unti I the summer of 194 1. In the 
spring of 1941 frustration and concern over the lack of progress with glider 
development was beginning to become apparent in the War Office and the Air 
84 Ministry. The lack of firm evidence demonstrating the glider's true potential and 
limitations allowed enthusiasts and dissenters to voice their opinions without their 
facing the possibility of being contradicted by facts. The arguments put forward during 
this period, primarily by the Air Staff, were based purely on theory and projection and 
did little to advance progress. 
76 NA WO 199/438, Possible German Use of Gliders Against This Country, 19 June 1940 and AIR 
20/5256, meeting held at the Air ministry. 25 July 1940 and AIR 2/7470, draft COS paper, Policy for 
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77 NA. WO 199/438, Air Ministry to the War Office, 18 June 1940. 
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1942. 
79 NA WO 199/438, Air Intelligence note, Possible German Use of Gliders Against This CountrN, 19 June 
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Another feature of these debates was that the glider was often placed in direct 
competition with paratroops extolling the virtues or constraints of the one versus the 
other, argued as if the two were mutually exclusive. In the summer of 1940 the Air 
Staff were already beginning to realise the scale of the task of providing, aircraft for 
paratroops. Perhaps as a distraction from the difficulties that Nvere beginning to surf. -ice 
in this area the Air Ministry suggested gliders as an alternative rather than a 
complementary capability to paratroops. With very little verified information and no 
practical experience on which to base it, the Air Staff s assertion appears to ha% c been a 
reckless assumption. 
We are beginning to incline to the view that dropping troops from 
the air by parachute is a clumsy and obsolescent method and that 
there are far more important possibilities in gliders. The Germans 
made excellent use of their parachute troops in the Low Countries bý 
exploiting surprise, and by virtue of fact that they had practically no 
opposition. But it seems to us at least possible that this may bc the 
last time parachute troops are used on a serious scale in major 85 
operation S. 
The Air Ministry then vacillated between support for either gliders or paratroops 
ahead of the other for another two years and in September 1942 the doubts expressed 
over the utility of gliders, supported by Cherwell and Cripps was largely responsible for 
causing Churchill's decision to drastically reduce airborne development. Muchorthis 
conniving was due to the Air Ministry endeavouring to preserve the means to conduct 
its own core doctrine. The promotion of gliders ahead of paratroops and the subsequent 
complete shift of opinion was an attempt by the Air Staff to reduce the number of 
bombers it would have to commit to the developing airborne forces. However, the fact 
that it often used doctrinal theories and assumptions to advance this aim impeded the 
efforts of those who were earnestly trying to develop air-landing tactics and policý. 
Many of the Air Staff s arguments rested on an adversarial approach to the integration 
of the glider and the parachute; it was either one or the other. This spread into %ý ider 
doctrinal thinking. Often when airborne doctrine or tactics were under discussion the 
potential of air-landing was weighed against that of parachuting rather than evaluating 
85 NA. CAB 120/202. ["resent Situation in Respect ofthc DcNclopmcnt of'Parachute I raining, 12 August 
1940. 
252 
the two side by side as complementary capabilities. The advantages and disadNantages 
of paratroops were listed beside those of glider-borne troops Ný ithout considerin(-, how 
the advantages of one might offset the disadvantages of the other. 86 The m4jor' and 
(minor' concepts further divided them. It was supposed at one point that parachutists 
were more suited to 'minor' operations while gliders should invariabl\ be used for 
large-scale, 'major' operations. 87 The German experience appeared to support 
completely the opposite view with gliders being suited for the capture of specificall) 
designated and locally defended objectives while parachutists were seen as more 
effective for the purpose of capturing large areas. " 
Efforts were made to separate parachutes and gliders by time and space on the 
battlefield. Most theories along these lines proposed an initial landing b\ paratroops 
subsequently reinforced by a glider landing. 89 This followed the accepted, although 
incorrect, perception of German experience. The official history relates that the 
Germans 'always realized that troops carried in aeroplanes or oliders had a great 
advantage over parachute troops ... 
However, it was accepted that normally parachute 
troops must land first in order to secure landing places. '90 However, on Crete gliders 
were used in the first wave of the assault, attempting to achieve surprise by casting off 
from their tugs at a distance from the coast. The sequence of the attack was gliders then 
parachutists, followed by air transported and then amphibious troops. 
91 In fact 
preceding a glider landing with paratroops was sound doctrine. Parachutists could 
ensure that there was no substantial local opposition, remove obstructions, give the 
signal for the main air landing operation to take place and lay out wind indicators and 
92 boundary marks. This eventually became the role of specially trained pathfinder units 
within airborne formations. However, early attempts at integrating gliders with 
paratroops were based on the supposition that this would be the only role for the latter. 
This theory was expounded in considerable detail by some proponents and led to the 
assumption that air-landing troops would always greatly outnumber their parachute- 
8" NA, Air 32/2. Characteristics of Airborne Forces. November 1940. 
87 NA, DFTT, -1/791, Air-Borne 
Forces, II December 1940. 
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borne compatriots in any airborne operation. The proposed proportion of (Jider troops 
to parachutists varied from three to one up to ten to one in tavour of airdanding, 
troops. 93 - Fhe actual proportion within an airborne division later in the War would he 
just over one to two in favour of paratroops. 94 
Despite these machinations and the lack of experience the plan for the emplo\ mcnt of 
air-landing troops during HUSKY was both credible and sensible . 
95 1 Air-Landing 
Brigade was deployed by glider on the night of 9/10 Julý 1943 to capture the Ponte 
Grande over the Anopo Canal by coup de main and then secure the adjacent toN, ý n of 
Syracuse. Gliders were also used to fly in heavy equipment to support I Parachute 
Brigade's assault on the Primasole Bridge over the River Simeto four days later. 
However, despite this relatively mature approach to the tactical employment of air- 
landing troops and the success of the operations the cost was excessive, particulark 
during I Air-Landing Brigade's operation. In some cases as few as thirty-fOLir pcrcclit 
of the gliders employed landed on their designated LZs with over fifty percent ditching 
into the Mediterranean. 96 This in turn led to the high casualty rate in the Air-Landini, 
Brigade of nearly 500 men killed, drowned, wounded or missing. In total the Division 
97 
suffered over 700 casualties during the operation . The unacceptably high casualty rate 
among British airborne troops on Operation HUSKY was due almost entirely to the 
inexperience of American aircrew and a lack of collective training immediately prior to 
the operation. However, the board of inquiry instigated by the AFHQ, with limited 
airborne experience and distorted by multi-national and inter-service sensitivities, came 
to different conclusions. Despite both Browning and Alexander identifying the lack of 
collective training as the key factor, the official report blamed the use of small tactical 
93 NA, CAB 120/262, meeting held in the Air Ministry. 7 September 1940 and Dl- FF 2/79 1, Notes hN the 
(leneral Staff on the Employment of Airborne Tr(-x)ps, 4 September 1940. 
94 NA. WO 205/75 1, Formation of6 Airborne Division, 6 August 1943. This figure is based on fighting 
battalions onIN within a division: six battalions of paratroops totalling 3192 men against three air-landing 
battalions totalling 1634 men. 
95 No glider and air-landing doctrine \%as published until Airborne Operations Pamphlet No. 1 in %laN 
1943 which was too late to ha\c any influence over the planning for III 'SKY. 
'16 Figures extracted 1rom D. 1 1. Wood, A Noble Pair of Brothers ( __: , 
1996). p. 43 and C. Smith. 
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DZs and Us and their proximity to the enemy objectives for the high casualties. 98 -I- 11 e 
result of this flawed analysis, despite the success of the airborne operations on '-'icil" 
was a shift away from accepting risk to aircraft and men during the early sta, -, cs of an 
airborne operation. 
The conclusions of the report became absorbed as implicit doctrine ýN ithin the 
airborne establishment. Although there is no evidence that changes to tactical doctrine 
were formally directed the tactical expression of this implicit doctrine NNas apparent 
during the invasion of Normandy. With the exception of the coup (Je main on the Ome 
and Caen Canal bridges, 6 Airborne Division's DZs and LZs on D Day were large. : 71 
often brigade-sized pieces of ground. Most were at least a mile and up to three miles 
from the units' objectives. This factor combined with the scattered night drops reduced 
the margin of success in some areas to a very narrow degree. Without the cover of night 
the reduction in speed and surprise caused by the distances involved could have been 
critical. However, the overall achievements in Normandy masked any tactical 
weaknesses and the level of scrutiny and analysis conducted after the operation was 
low. Headquarters First Allied Airborne Army was activated in August 1944.1 lowevcr, 
there is no evidence that it conducted any focussed post operational analysis of 
OVERLORD and in any case it was launched immediately into a frantic planning cycle 
attempting to keep pace with the advance of the allies across Europe. With no further 
analysis the apparent success in Normandy appeared to validate the implicit doctrinc 
adopted after HUSKY. 
During the planning for Operation MARKET GARDEN the continuing shortage of 
aircraft and concerns over losses from flak led to the pattern of large DZs and LZs 
selected well away from enemy influence being stretched and repeated in order to 
further reduce the risk at the front end of the operation. In Normandy one to three miles 
between landing and the objective severely reduced the margin of success despite the 
protracted planning period and overwhelming fire support. Such luxuries were not 
apparent at Arnhem where the distances involved were extended to six to eight miles. 
The margin for error had been reduced to such an extent that when the 'partial 1,, knoýN n' 
factors, such as weather and the enemy and 'the unknown factors commonl,, described 
98 VV WO 204/4220. Report on the Proceedings of a Board ot'Officcrs conwned on 23 JuIN 1943 and 
ABI-Al. 1/15. COS(43) 552(0). Report on the Imployment of Airborne Forces. 20 September 1943. 
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as luck", went against Urquhart the chances of success became N cr\ slim indeed. " . \s 
well as Urquhart's personal leadership style a further doctrinal factor also exacerbated 
the flaws in the plan at Arnhem. 
During training air-landing and parachute battalions and brigades N%cre separated at 
unit and formation level. This was a historical legacy that had administrative and 
training advantages. The parachute and air-landing capabilities had evolý cd separately. 
I Parachute Brigade was formed in September 1941. before any air-landing units had 
been established, and hence it retained its integrity as a parachute only formation. I 
Air-Landing Brigade was converted wholesale from 31 Independent Brigade Group and 
hence there was a valid reason for not immediately breaking up that formation Ný lille it 
adapted to its new role. Keeping the two roles separated by formation suited their 
respective requirements for individual training. The equipment, organisation, real estate 
and time required to train paratroops were very different from those of an air-landinp 
unit and the essential glider pilots. This all made eminent administrative and 
operational sense up to the point of landing on the DZ or LZ. However, once on the 
ground a parachute unit or formation brought quite different capabilities and qualities to 
the battle than its air-landing counterpart. A parachute battalion had three fighting 
companies totalling 556 men whereas an air-landing battalion had four companies 
totalling 864 men. A parachute brigade had integral engineer and medical support. An 
air-landing brigade had anti-tank batteries and a light anti-air battery as part of its 
organic support. 100 Parachute units were light and trained to move quickly in the 
assault. Air-landing units had heavier firepower but with it came an inevitably enlarged 
logistic tail that could slow movement. 
This in itself was still not a great problem. Even today different capabilities are still 
generally separated on unit or formation lines during peacetime in order to ease the 
administrative and individual and specialist training burden. However, for collective 
training and operations units and sub-units are moved and exchanged in order to ensure 
that a formation fights with a balance of capabilities. This is a process knoNNn as battle- 
grouping. Battle-grouping as a concept was not completely alien to the British Arm\ 
during the Second World War. For example, although the low level doctrine and tactics 
NA. WO 205/26. Report on 6 Airborne Di\ sion During Operation NEPTUNE. 14 Novernbcr 1944. 
100 NA. WO 205/75 1, based on war fighting establishments within 6AIrborne Di\ Ision. 
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may have taken some time to perfect, the advantal,,,., es of a squadron of tanks bein-, -, 
attached to an infantry battalion for an attack or vice versa had been %% idely recoonkcd 
since operational experience gained in North Africa although official doctrine took 
some time to reflect it. 101 However. battle-grouping, making the most of the advantages 
of both parachute and air-landing troops, was seldom part of the airborne planning 
process. A notable exception occurred on D Day when a reinforced company of 2 
Battalion The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light lnfantr-% Nvas attached to 7 
Parachute Battalion to seize the crossings over the Orne river and the Caen Canal. 
However this was more a consequence of the capability of the (,, I ider, which %%as able to 
land a compact group of soldiers close to the targets silently. rather than of the men 
inside them. ' 02 
The consequences of a lack of planned battle-grouping became pronounced at 
Arnhem. I Parachute Brigade and I Air-Landing Brigade were both dropped on the 
first day of the operation on separate but adjacent DZs and Us. I Parachute Brigade's 
task was to move east and capture the bridge or bridges in Arnhem. I Air-landino 
Brigade's task was to defend the DZs and Us several miles west of Arnhem until the 
second drop the following day. This meant that while ten heavily armed air-landino 
companies were allotted a static, subsidiary task only nine lightly armed parachute 
companies were committed to the Division's main effort, seizing the bridges., 03 
Admittedly the parachute units were more likely to generate the speed in the assault that 
was essential to reach the bridges but they were landed fifty minutes after the Air- 
Landing Brigade. It is worth considering what the effect might have been of attaching 
one air-landing company to each of the parachute battalions, thereby putting twelve 
companies on the main effort and still leaving seven, totalling approximately 1500 men, 
to defend the DZs and Us for twenty-four hours. These air-landing companies could 
101 1 larrison Place. Military Training In The British Army 1940-1944, pp. 150-152. 
102 Gliders were also attached to 9 Parachute Battalion for the assault on the Merville but these ý%ere 
manned b,, paratroops ofthe battalion rather than by air-landing troops. The reasons for this decision are 
unclear as there %%, ere more air-landing troops available lor 1) Day from 6 Airborne Division than were 
used. The creation ofthe Armoured Reconnaissance Group is a good example of battIc-grouping within 6 
Airborne Division on 1) Daý but was constituted from the Airbome Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment 
with a compan) from 12 Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment with supporting arms and did not represent 
a inix ofparachute and air-landing infantr, %. 
103 
, Nn air-landing 
brigade has t\N, cl\c companies but during Operation MARKF. T t\ýo companies of' 2 
Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment \\ere not landed until the second day due to a lack ot'gliders. 
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have been ready to join I Parachute Brigade by the time it N% as landed and able to begin 
the advance east. As the parachute battalions forged east at best speed they could haý c 
identified areas of enemy resistance and called forward an air-landing, company to deal 
with them while the paratroops bypassed the enemy and continued their advancc. This 
is, needless to say, a retrospective appreciation but one that would appear rclativcl\ 
intuitive to a commander today. Battle-grouping did occur later in the battle but it %\as 
through force of circumstance, rather than by appreciation and plannillg. as the integritý 
of many units was lost through numbers of casualties and the Division fell back into 
defence. 
The result of both the flaws in the operational planning and the tactical doctrine, 
despite Montgomery's assertion that MARKET GARDEN ýN as ninety percent 
successful, was an unmitigated disaster at Arnhem which led to an entire airborne 
division being written off and unfit for operations for eight months. It also exposed the 
flaws in the implicit doctrine adopted after HUSKY. Unsurprisingly the desperate 
outcome of I Airborne Division's battle at Arnhem was the cause of a good deal of 
introspection. In retrospect Urquhart recognised that the balance of risk had swung too 
far in favour of preserving men and in particular aircraft during the early stages of an 
operation. 'It would appear a reasonable risk to have landed the Div[ision] much closer 
to the objective chosen, even in the face of enemy flak... An extra two minutes flying 
tirne in the face of flak, if not too severe, would have put the Div[ision I ... much nearer 
its objective. Initial surprise in this operation was obtained, but the effect of the Surprise 
was lost owing to the time lag.... before the troops could arrive at the objective 
chosen. ' 104 Now, with Headquarters First Allied Airborne Army firmly established and 
a relatively quiet period in terms of airborne planning through the winter of 1944, the 
lessons from Arnhem could be thoroughly analysed from ajoint perspective. Airborne 
warfare had to return to the doctrine of Sicily - small tactical DZs and LZs close to the 
objectives - and in doing so the reservations and caution of the air forces might have to 
be over-ruled, shifting the balance of risk back to the front end of an operation in order 
to increase the overall chance of success. 
Once again these lessons became implicit doctrine to be applied during the next 
104 MAF. -, ), '1-'/02.1 Airborne Division 
Report on Operation Market Garden. Part Ill. 10 Januarý 1945. 
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airborne operation. The contribution of 6 Airborne Di\ ision to Operation VARSHN in 
March 1945 was a model of airborne warfare. The Division landed in a single litt 
deploying all three brigades and the organic support within one hour. Maw, of the 
troops landed practically on top of their objectives in the face of flak and fire from the 
enemy on the ground. The paratroops and air-landing troops in most cases landed in 
small, tactical company sized groups with separate designated objectives. supported h\ 
heavier weapons landing by glider in the same area immediatelý after them. As a result 
all the Division's key objectives had been seized within five hours of the initial landing. 
The link-up with the ground forces, which had begun crossino the Rhine in advance of 
the airborne operation, was achieved within the same time span. In addition another 
doctrinal lesson. 
) apparent to German airborne forces for some time. had also been 
assimilated. During the Rhine crossing the air-landing troops were used to secure point 
targets, the bridges over the Issel River, while the parachute formations were used to 
occupy areas of ground to disrupt the movement of German reserves. Despite the 
relatively high casualties (nearly 350 killed and over 630 wounded from 6 Airborne 
Division on the first day) the advantages of landing in tactical groups as close to the 
objective as possible was stressed. The post operational report endorsed the principle of 
accepting more risk early. The use of air-landing troops for pin-point, coul) de, nwin 
type operations and parachute troops to occupy larger enemy held areas was also 
confirmed. 105 More significantly the critical contribution of a controlling joint 
headquarters in efficient operational planning and effective post operational analysis 
had been demonstrated and validated. Finally, by March 1945 this effective system 
resulted in credible and potentially enduring tactical doctrine. 
6.4 The Airborne Concept, Tactical Doctrine and Military Effectiveness 
The concept for the employment of Britain's airborne forces and the tactical doctrine 
that ouided their operations are the line of development that had the most obvious and 
direct impact on airborne military effectiveness. However, as has been shown the 
concept and doctrine adopted at any point during the war was a result of the influence of 
105 NA. NA, 'O -105/947.6 Airborne Division Report on Operation VARSITY, undated. 1945. 
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factors stemming from the other lines of development. From June 1940 until December 
1942 the concept in which airborne forces were emploYed %kas that of minor. deep 
raiding operations. However, the adoption of this concept was throul-1h c\pedienc.,, and 
necessity rather than through any deep routed principles or because of a long term plan 
for the development of the airborne establishment. The lack of resources in terms of the 
persistent dearth of support and transport aircraft and to a lesser extent the initiall% slow 
accrual of trained manpower limited the size of a force that could be emplo,. cd. 
In turn both the deficiency of aircraft and the pressure on manpower that lorccd the 
need to take part in raiding operations were largely political factors. Throughout 
development Britain's airborne forces had no single person or organisation who %%as 
able to influence progress at a political level. Churchill was too busy to give the project 
more than intermittent interest. Renwick's terms of reference wcrc too narro%% to allo%% 
him to exert control in all the areas of development that required coordination and 
oversight. The Chiefs of Staff s views on the subject were irreconcilably divergent to 
ever allow progress at the rate that was required. Without an individual empowered to 
drive the change, which was unpalatable to the ministries and departments in a position 
to expedite progress the Air Ministry, MAP and to a lesser cxtent the War Office were 
able to pursue their own agendas in relation to airborne development and afford it a 
commensurately low priority. Hence the provision of the physical resources required to 
progress airborne development continued to be a detrimental factor. 
In addition to the difficulties in coordinating the provision of equipment and 
manpower the lack of a clearly defined control mechanism also inade conceptual 
development problematic. A concept had to be enduring in order to provide a firm 
platform upon which the developmental process could be built. However, the airborne 
concept until December 1942 wavered between the aspiration to build towards large- 
scale "close' operations and the necessity to execute minor raids. Conceptual red 
herrings such as aerodrome capture were allowed to persist. With no clear. centrally 
generated concept practitioners had to conceive and evolve their own ideas. This could 
be effective and Montgomery and Eisenhower's concepts of mass and deliberation 
proved to have enduring credibility. 
SYMBOL established the operational imperative for expeditious developmental 
prooress from January 1943 until February 1945. which had not been instituted hý aný 
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nominated individual or organisation prior to that period. Hoýýeýler. resources 
continued to influence development. The provision of aircraft never reco-vcred to the 
point where the RAF was able to deploy a British airborne diý'ision into battle in a 
single lift. To overcome this one of two approaches was possible for operational 
planners. First was to rely on allied, principally American airpoNýcr. This became a 
feature of all major British airborne operations from TORCH through to VARS ITY. 
with the exception of those conducted on D Day where the RAF was able to effcctivck 
fly shuttles across the Channel. The use of American aircraft during HUSKY, the 
unfamiliarity of their crews with British airborne techniques and the lack of time for 
collective training to remedy this directly contributed to the high casualty rate. The 
second approach was to stagger the fly in of an airborne formation. This was the case 
during operation MARKET GARDEN and this factor along with the reluctance to 
accept risk to the aircraft during the deployment seriously reduced the probabilitý' of 
tactical success being achieved. 
This pernicious and continued influence of poor aircraft availability on military 
effectiveness was exacerbated by a there being no centrally coordinated and focussed 
scheme for operational analysis following each operation. The was no organisation 
such as the AORG in airborne terms to gather information, conduct post operational 
analysis and then use the results to influence continued development. This is manifest 
in the lack of primary evidence demonstrating centrally coordinated improvements to 
equipment and training as a result of lessons learned during operations. Instead 
observations through experience were translated into changes from the bottom up in a 
haphazard manner. The development of the leg bag for carrying personal equipment is 
an example of this. Similarly, changes to tactical doctrine were adopted implicitlý' 
following each operation rather than through any process of explicit revision. The risk 
with implicit doctrine is that it may not be common across a force and it may even differ 
between formations. The danger is that implicit doctrine is open to individual 
interpretation and encourages false assumptions about other's understanding. 
' 06 
Notwithstanding this risk, if implicit doctrine is published and distributed locallý it can 
induce a degree of mutual understanding and common practice endorsed by the 
106 Armv Doctrine Publication, 'Land Operations'. p. 150 
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signature of the local commander in a given formation or theatre. One example was a 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) produced by Supreme Headquarters, Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) on 13 March 1944 and amended on 8 June and 4 
November the same year. Memorandum No. 12, SOPfor Airborne and Troop Carrier 
Units, was published to provide 'a common basis upon which the training and 
operations of allied airborne and troop carrier units can be conducted. " 07 The document 
detailed liaison requirements, staff and operating procedures and the responsibilities 
(including joint responsibilities) of airborne and troop carrier commanders. The SOP 
was clearly amended on the basis of experience gained in Normandy and during 
Operation MARKET GARDEN and its final amendment was made once First Allied 
Airborne Army had been established. 
However, the fact remains that the implicit doctrine adopted following HUSKY led, in 
part, to the disaster at Arnhem. This could perhaps have been averted had an 
organisation been established at a level that could command and control both the air and 
airborne forces required to execute airborne warfare, oversee all airborne operations and 
thus provide a structured approach to doctrinal development. HQ First Allied Airborne 
Army was such an organisation but its creation came too late to influence military 
effectiveness until VARSITY in February 1945. 
Gale surnmarised the conduct of British airborne operations during the second half of 
the war: 'Except that all were airborne, no two operations [between 1943 and 1945] had 
been alike. There was, thus, no set-piece method of employment for this new arm. ' 108 
This is an uncharacteristic lack of insight from Gale because clearly there were enduring 
methods of employment at both the conceptual and doctrinal level. Mass and 
deliberation were enduring and significant conceptual factors where speed and surprise 
were invariably doctrinal requirements at the tactical level. What is true is that these 
features were not adequately identified, emphasised and published from a central joint 
authoritative source. Hence implicit doctrine was adopted as a substitute and although 
this proved to be effective by the end of the war British airborne forces took longer to 
achieve their potential military effectiveness through that process. 
107 0t%Na,,.., 1irborne Forces, pp. 413-420. 
108 Gale, Call ToArms, p. 154. 
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CHAPTER 7- CONCLUSION 
Operation VARSITY undoubtedly represents the pinnacle of the militaD, 
effectiveness of British airborne warfare. It provides a remarkable contrast to those 
demonstrations for Churchill and the early raids of 1941 and 1942. It also demonstrates 
the significant progress that was made from Sicily in 1943 through Normandy in 1944 
and even in the six months post Operation MARKET GARDEN. What is self-evident 
is that the wartime environment was a constant condition that continually influenced the 
entire developmental process. There has been extensive debate over the contrasting 
results of military innovation during wartime as opposed to during peacetime. ' 
Britain's airborne forces travelled from inception to apooce during the Second World 
War; no component of the process occurred in peacetime. Therefore direct influences 
on the development process were entirely a product of the wartime environment. It can 
be contended that innovation during war may be a more efficient and effective process. 
The operational imperative is more obvious and the performance of a new capability 
and the time to introduce it into service become more important than the cost and 
therefore resources are more readily made available. However, as the development of 
airborne forces demonstrates, no matter how abundant resources may become there kk III 
always be competing interests for their apportionment. 
This competition for resources means there has to be fast and visible evidence that the 
investment is producing a militarily effective return. This fact had considerable 
influence on the early development of Britain's airborne forces as units had to be 
committed to raiding operations in order to justify their existence. This caused limited 
attrition of resources, considerable diversion of staff effort away from the development 
process, and the adoption of a concept and doctrine that later impinged on mainstream 
formation level operations. Notwithstanding this the fact that the fledgling airborne 
establishment competed at all against the momentum of the bomber offensive prior to 
mid- 1943 is a creditable achievement. This at least allowed British airborne forces to 
survive, if only just, to a point where a clear operational imperative where the 
competition began to become less unfavourable. Limitations in resources continued 
I see for example B. R. Posen, The Sources of Military Docirine (London: Cornell, 1984). pp. 55-182. 
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have an effect until the end of the war and clearly the disaster at Arnhem %vas at least in 
part directly due to the lack of available aircraft. However, by Operation V,, \RSITY the 
airborne establishment had learned to cope with these limitations through thorough and 
pragmatic planning at a joint and multi-national level. 
The second effect of wartime innovation in the case of British airborne forces was the 
influence that the environment and events had on doctrinal development. As has been 
shown, the dearth of a centrally endorsed concept and doctfine caused the vacuum to be 
filled by the thoughts and experience of commanders and practitioners. This was not 
necessarily a detrimental or retrograde course, rather an expedient means of producing 
the guidance required by those involved in airborne warfare. However, the drawback 
was that successive iterations of the semi-formalised doctrine that resulted were unduly 
influenced by the unique circumstances of particular operations. The pace of successive 
operations meant that doctrine, tactics and procedures were subject to reiterative review 
and amendment at a greater pace then would be the case in peacetime. The operational 
experience gathered by practitioners produced outcomes that differed from the original 
vision of the developers and resulted in a contorted evolutionary path that sometimes 
even retarded successful development. At some points in the process this directly 
translated into a reduction in potential military effectiveness. 
However, British airborne forces were not unique in this trait. The wider publication 
of doctrine during the Second World War suffered from two inherent problems, 
timeliness and volume. It has been suggested that when it came to publishing doctrine, 
a common fault of the British Army throughout the war was that it never managed to 
collect together what was good while fully excluding what was poor. 2 The problem 
with much of the published airborne doctrine was that it collected what had been good 
but was not necessarily relevant for the future. This can be seen most clearly in ATI 
No. 5 with its reproduction of German doctfine that had been successful a year earlier, a 
year during which the military environment in Europe had changed significantly. 
However it is to the credit of the General Staff that it managed to publish any airborne 
doctrine at all in 1941. ATI No. 5 was only eight pages long but its publication was still 
a minor achievement considering the lack of clear conceptual thought and practical 
experience available at that time. There was a deliberate effort to update published 
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airborne doctrine throughout the war with Airborne Operations Paniphlet NO. I in 1943 
and then ArmylA ir Operations Pamphlet No. 4-A irbornel'-I ir Traavported Operations 
produced in early 1945 .3 The fact that the material contained within these oflicial 
publications was largely obsolete by the time it reached the hands of the ýiý erage staff 
officer is possibly irrelevant. Whether any of the wider army published doctrinc \%as 
effective or even heeded in some cases is questionable. The plethora of doctrine and 
instructions on all subjects published by the War Office often defeated their own 
purpose through their very volume. They were often left unread or only skimmed and 
the excess of pamphlets confused many staff officers, not knowing where to look lor 
unfamiliar information and in all probability published airborne doctrine suffered ill a 
similar manner. 4 
There are several areas within this thesis that it would appear could have been 
improved by the intervention of strong, centrally focussed leadership, for cxample the 
procurement of aircraft and the provision of glider pilots. Much has been written 
concerning the role of the individual in military innovation and many studies conclude 
that some type of unique personality is required to provide leadership and expeditc the 
process of development. Barry Posen has reasoned that military 'mavericks' are 
required to translate the innovation directed by civilian leaders into changes in militirN 
doctrine. 5 In order to visualise that change Stephen Rosen believes a degree of 
4unconventional creativity, 6 is required, what General Sir John Bumett-Stuart, the 
interwar proponent of mechanised warfare called 'a touch of divine fire. ' 7 However, 
these theories are over simplistic and do not take account the many different 
requirements of the development process. This thesis has studied airborne development 
through the examination of separate lines of development. In doing so it is possible to 
discern three broad levels to the development process. First is the impetus to innovate, 
the identification of the requirement for a new military capability and the means to 
2 Harrison I'lace. Military Training In The British Army 1940-1944. p. 168. 
ArmylAir Operations Pamphlet No. 4 - AirbornelAir Transported Operation. v. 1945 
(Airborne Forces Museum File). 
4 French. Raising Churchill's Army, pp. 201-202 and Harrison Nacc. Military Training In The British 
A rm. v 1940- 1944. p. 16. 
Poscri. The Sources qf Mililary Doctrine, pp. 222-228. 
Roscn. JI inning the Next I Gir, p. 11. 
Quoted in W. Murray, 'Armoured Warfare' in Murraý and Millett. eds., Mihlwý- Innovation in the 
Interwar Period, P. 25. 
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express that requirement to the wider military establishment in terms that were easilý 
understood. Second is the impulse to change, the recognition, implementation and 
scrutiny of the major changes needed to accommodate the neýN capabilitý. Third is the 
drive to develop, the minutiae of the process, the day to day enthusiasm and dedication 
needed to carry innovation forward. These levels of development %Nere not discrete and 
distinct but overlapped and had greater or less prominence at different points during the 
process. Creating an impetus to innovate, providing the impulse to change, or driving 
grass roots development each requires different approaches and styles of leadership. 
Therefore a range of individuals with a variety of personal characteristics and skills are 
required during different stages of the development process. 
Although Buckingham has demonstrated that the Air Ministry and War Office Nvere 
investigating airborne forces prior to 20 June 1940, it was Churchill who provided the 
impetus to initiate actual development. He had the vision to recognise the potential and 
future requirement for airborne forces and express that view, albeit imperfectly, to the 
military establishment. However, implicit in providing the impetus to innovate is 
ensuring the maintenance of that impetus and here Churchill's contribution was weak 
and inconsistent. This is easily excusable given the prime Minister's list of priorities, 
particularly up until the end of 1942. However he then exacerbated the consequences of 
his intermittent leadership by failing to delegate and identify and appoint anyone 
capable of developing the impulse to change. This was the predominant factor in 
shaping the developmental path of British airborne forces during the Second World War 
and ultimately their military effectiveness during operations. A truly joint permanent 
headquarters or committee established at least at three star level, with a strong and 
empowered leader in control was the single act that could have led to fundamental 
improvement in progress across the lines of development. Buckingham did identify this 
as an important, although not the primary factor and suggested that Amery could have 
fulfilled the vital leadership role. 8 Amery, however, despite his pre-war association 
with projecting military force by air and his obvious interest in airborne forces in India, 
had developed an antagonistic relationship with the Air Ministry that would ultimately 
have been counterproductive. Admittedly it is not easy to identify a suitable candidate 
in hindsight and perhaps this is in part why no one was appointed. CertainIN there was 
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no one from within the airborne establishment that fitted the criteria. Broýý nin'-, came 
closest and his enthusiasm and political awareness would have been assets but he did 
not reach suitable rank until April 1944 and akin to Amer-\ his personality hindered 
inter-service and multinational relationships. It may have been judicious to look for a 
candidate from outside of the Army and RAF, a suitably empowered civilian or perhaps 
even a naval officer, a Mountbatten type character perhaps? 
Had a suitable leader been identified and appointed his organisation ýýould haý, c had a 
clear mandate and definite areas that required close and immediate attention. Chief 
among these was the direction of the procurement of support and transport aircrat! in 
order to ensure a programme of supply sufficient to meet the airborne establishment's 
requirements for training and operations. Second was the need to create a coherent 
airborne concept, produce valid joint doctrine and then monitor tactical development 
and analyse the experience gained during operations. These two subjects were the 
leading factors in influencing the developmental path and military effectiveness of 
British airborne forces during the first and second halves of the process. 
Without this critical layer of leadership in place much of its potential remit had to be 
fulfilled by those operating in the final layer, driving development. This tactical level 
of leadership was in effect collectively responsible for dictating the direction and pace 
of airborne development. Rock is perhaps one of the few officers linked with airborne 
development who could have been considered to possess a 'touch of divine fire'. 
Otherwise, most of the main protagonists were middle to senior ranking, competent 
staff officers and battlefield commanders. Neither Browning, nor Gale nor Down could 
be said to have possessed any great degree of 'unconventional creativity' and they 
certainly could not be classified as mavericks. These were officers who dedicated 
themselves to the new form of warfare and took time to study the problems associated 
with it. They were highly effective trainers and administrators and staunch advocates of 
their chosen area while remaining cognisant of its limitations. These traits were not 
confined to the Army as RAF officers such as Wing Commander Maurice Newnham 
and Squadron Leader Louis Strange did a huge amount of good work in developing 
both parachute and glider training at Ringway. Certainly in the case of Bro%Nning. Gale 
and Down and others such as Hill and Frost these were officers able to inspire and drive 
Buckingham, The Establishment and lnilialDevelopmeni (? f British. I irborne I-OrCcs. p. 300. 
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those numerous and anonymous individuals who Ný ere vital to the deN elopment process 
and to create intense personal and collective loyalty. As such they confon-n to a 
category of individuals who can promote a new capability and motivate those involNed 
in its development. 9 These were the men who were ultimatelý responsible for 
procuring the aircraft, training the soldiers, writing the doctrine and commanding 
airborne units and formations around the Mediterranean and across northwest Europe. 
British airborne development was driven forward by enthusiastic advocacy, a degree 
of individual innovation and good old-fashioned, meticulous staff work at the tactical 
level. This 'bottom-up' approach to development, although Russell Hart believed it to 
be the fastest and most effective means of adaptation, was by its very nature fractured 
and often unfocussed. 10 No matter how committed the personnel involved at the tactical 
level of development, without the critical layer of leadership required to compel tile 
necessary institutional and systemic change and provide coherence, this approach 
resulted in a developmental path that fluctuated and lurched forward. However, when 
viewed from inception to apogee the process as a whole has to be considered a success, 
a fact displayed by the remarkable level of military effectiveness achieved during 
Operation VARSITY in March 1945. 
9 Judkins. Making Vision inlo Power. p. 562. 
10 11 art. Clavh of A rms, p. 412. 
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